(a) Interpretation criteria of tax-related Acts;

B. Requirements to apply the principle of good faith to the acts of tax authorities in tax and legal relations.

C. Interpretation of land excluded from the vacant land under Article 142 (1) 1 (6) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 10663 of Dec. 31, 1981)

A. Under the principle of no taxation without representation, the interpretation of tax laws and regulations must be strict, and the expanded interpretation or analogical interpretation shall not be permitted.

B. In general, in tax law relations, the tax authority should first issue a public opinion list subject to trust to taxpayers, and second, there should be no reason attributable to taxpayers on the trust that the tax authority’s statement of opinion is justifiable, and third, the taxpayer should trust the name of opinion and conduct an act in which the tax authority made a disposition contrary to the above opinion list. Fourth, the tax authority should make a disposition contrary to the above opinion list, thereby infringing the taxpayer’s interest.

C. The purport of Article 142 (1) 1 (6) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 10663 of Dec. 31, 1981) is that land which is not actually used at the time of the enforcement of the above Act means land which is not actually used, and land which is not actually used shall be excluded from the public land. Thus, land actually used is not a temporary use, and land which is not a temporary use does not constitute a public land without examining whether it falls under the exception of Article 142 (1) (a) through (h) of the above Act.

(a) Article 18(b) of the Framework Act on National Taxes: Article 15 of the Framework Act on National Taxes; Article 142(1)1(6) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 10663, Dec. 31, 1981);

B. Supreme Court Decision 84Nu593 delivered on April 23, 1985; Supreme Court Decision 85Nu580 delivered on February 11, 1986

Plaintiff

The head of Gwangju City/Gu

Gwangju High Court Decision 85Gu35 delivered on December 26, 1985

The part of the judgment of the court below concerning the property tax and defense tax in the year 1979, 1980, and 1981 shall be reversed, and this part of the case shall be remanded to the Gwangju High Court.

The plaintiff's remaining appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal against the dismissal of an appeal shall be assessed against the plaintiff.

The plaintiff's grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Judgment on the second ground for appeal

In its reasoning, the judgment of the court below held that the plaintiff leased the site of this case to the non-party Y Co., Ltd. and used it as a parking lot or a tea, but the land of this case is not a parking lot or a tea used by the non-party company in accordance with the license conditions of the automobile transportation business, and thus it does not constitute a land subject to exclusion from the official land under Article 78-3 subparagraph 4 (1) (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Home Affairs No. 221 of Jan. 12, 197, 197, hereinafter the same shall apply) of the Enforcement Rule of the Local Tax Act, which is applied in this case. The fact-finding and judgment of the court below are justified and the interpretation of the tax law should be strict or prohibited under the principle of no taxation without the law, and the interpretation of the tax law shall not be permitted. Thus, it is not acceptable to discuss the view that the requirement of exclusion from

2. Judgment on the third ground for appeal

According to the records, the argument that the defendant's failure to impose property tax on the land of this case during a considerable period of time is established as a practice of non-taxation by failing to impose property tax on the land of this case is a new fact that the plaintiff asserted only in the final appeal, and it is evident that the court below did not have claimed it in the final appeal.

3. Judgment on the fourth ground for appeal

According to the records, the plaintiff's legal representative argued that the defendant's taxation of this case was unlawful because it was against the principle of trust and good faith when it imposed property tax on the site of this case for 4 years or more by general tax rate, and it was due to heavy tax rate as to whether it was properly public. On the second day of the court below's trial on June 18, 1985, it is apparent that the defendant used the result of the statement and verification at the time of the above on-site inspection. Thus, the court below should have deliberated and judged on the above argument, but the court below did not proceed to such a measure. Thus, the court below erred in the incomplete deliberation or omission of judgment on the above argument as pointed out in the theory of lawsuit.

However, in general, tax law relations, the principle of trust and good faith applies to the tax authority's acts: first, the tax authority must issue the public opinion list that is the object of trust to the taxpayer; second, there is no reason attributable to the taxpayer on the trust trust that the tax authority's opinion list is justifiable; third, the taxpayer must trust the opinion list and act what is in violation of the above opinion list; fourth, the tax authority's disposition against the above opinion list should result in a violation of the taxpayer's interest; fourth, when the tax authority satisfies all such requirements, the disposition of the tax authority is deemed to be illegal as an act in violation of the principle of trust and good faith (see Supreme Court Decision 84Nu593, Apr. 23, 1985). Thus, even in the records, the court below's judgment is reversed, and there is no clear evidence that the defendant omitted the application of heavy tax rate and tax rate in imposing the property tax on the land in this case for a certain period of time by the plaintiff's principal, and there is no other evidence that there is no reason to acknowledge any other public opinion from the plaintiff.

4. Judgment on ground of appeal No. 1

(a) With respect to a taxation disposition in the year 1983:

Article 142 (1) 1 (6) (amended by Presidential Decree No. 10663 of Dec. 31, 1981) of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 10663 of Dec. 31, 1981) which applies to the portion of tax assessment of this case among the tax assessment of this case provides that "land, land for factory, school site, school site, and miscellaneous land in an area determined by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Home Affairs as of the starting date of the payment of the property tax shall be "land without any ground fixtures (excluding temporary buildings and unauthorized buildings)". Since three buildings on the site of this case are all unauthorized buildings as determined by the court below's approval, and the site of this case does not fall under the land subject to exclusion from the official land of the plaintiff principal, even if the site of this case is used as a garage, the defendant's disposition is legitimate by the heavy and tax rate of the property tax in 1982 and 1983.

B. According to Article 142 (1) 1 (6) (amended by Presidential Decree No. 10663 of Dec. 31, 1981) of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 10663 of Dec. 31, 1981), with respect to land subject to taxation in the year 1979, 1980, 1981, among the taxation in this case, it refers to land with the exception of land enumerated below among land in the area determined by Ordinance of the Ministry of Home Affairs, which has no ground settlement and is actually not used. In this case, a building, a building for gardening, a building constructed without permission after January 14, 1974, and other temporary facilities not constructed for business purpose, and a building or other things on the ground shall not be considered as a temporary settlement, and the temporary use of land shall not be considered as a temporary use of land.

The purport of the above provision is that land used in fact at the time of the enforcement of the above provision refers to land which is not actually used, but is not actually used, and even if it is not actually used, it shall be excluded from the public land. Thus, land used in fact does not fall under the public land without examining whether it falls under the exception prescribed in paragraphs (a) through (h) above, and it does not fall under the public land (see Supreme Court Decision 85Nu580, Feb. 11, 1986).

§ 6).

However, in light of the records of the judgment below, since July 30, 1979, the plaintiff leased the site of this case to the non-party Mab Co., Ltd. to the non-party Mab Co., Ltd., and constructed 3 buildings such as office, lodging house, warehouse, etc. on the ground, and permanently used 20 employees as a garage for the above non-party company's vehicle (70 vehicles). Meanwhile, the plaintiff can look at the fact that he had paid the value-added tax and the comprehensive income tax after completing business registration at the district tax office immediately after the lease of the site of this case as real estate rental at the district tax office. Thus, it is reasonable to view that the site of this case, which was owned by the plaintiff during the year 1979, 1980, and 1981, should be viewed as having been used in light of the actual condition of use as seen above, does not meet the requirements of "land that is not actually used" among the official requirements under Article 142 (1) 1 (6) of the Enforcement Decree

In light of the above legal principles, the court below should have deliberated the actual use status of the site of this case and decided whether the defendant's property tax imposed on the site of this case for the three years, based on the tax rate, was legitimate. However, the court below decided to the purport that the defendant's taxation of the site of this case for the above period was not erroneous. The court below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as to whether the land of this case was officially assessed at the time of the enforcement of the above Acts and subordinate statutes, and did not exhaust all necessary deliberations, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. Thus, the court below

5. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below regarding the property tax and defense tax of 1979, 1980, 1981 is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Gwangju High Court which is the original judgment. The remaining appeal by the plaintiff is dismissed. The costs of appeal against the dismissal of the appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges

Justices Lee B-soo (Presiding Justice)