Article 142 (1) 1 (6) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 10663 of Dec. 31, 1981) and Article 142 (1) 1 (6) of the

The provisions of Article 142 (1) 1 (6) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 10663 of Dec. 31, 1981) and Article 142 (1) 1 (6) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act provide that land, factory site, school site, and miscellaneous land in an area prescribed by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Home Affairs shall not be used, and that land shall not be treated as a public land if it meets the requirements of Article 142 (1) 1 (6) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act, even if it does not meet the requirements of public land, and if it does not meet the requirements of public land excluded from public land, it shall not be deemed as a public land if it does not meet the requirements of public land under Article 142 (1) 1 (6) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act.

Article 142 (1) 1 (6) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 10663 of December 31, 1981) and Article 78-3 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Home Affairs No. 414 of May 12, 1984)

Supreme Court Decision 82Nu367 Delivered on September 11, 1984

Attorney Jeon Jong-gu, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Attorney Park Jong-won, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Seoul High Court Decision 82Gu584 delivered on March 15, 1983

The part of the judgment below against the plaintiff is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal by the Plaintiff’s attorney are examined.

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged that the land of this case was originally a public parking lot under the Local Tax Act as of September 16, 1981, and recognized that there was a building on the land for which the defendant imposed the tax disposition, but it did not constitute a public parking lot under Article 78-3 subparag. 4(c) of the Enforcement Rule of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 14146, Dec. 14, 1984). The court below determined that the land of this case was not directly used by the plaintiff as a public parking lot under Article 16 of the Enforcement Rule of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 1681, Dec. 24, 1980; Presidential Decree No. 1665, Sep. 16, 1981; Presidential Decree No. 2014, Jan. 14, 1984).

2. However, according to Article 142 (1) 1 (6) of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 16, Sep. 16, 1981) which applies to the date of the instant payment of property tax, land for factory, school site, and miscellaneous land (excluding dry field, Quarrying, and miscellaneous land) which do not meet the following conditions among the land in fact being used. In this case, building, structure for garden, unauthorized building constructed after Jan. 14, 1974, and other temporary facilities which do not fall under the requirement of Article 142 (1) 1 (6) of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 146) which do not meet the requirement of Article 142 (1) 1 (f) of the Local Tax Act, which does not fall under the requirement of Article 142 (1) 1 (f) of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act, and if it does not meet the requirement of Article 78 (1) 6 (h) of the Local Tax Act.

3. Therefore, if the plaintiff used the land of this case directly for the "parking business", which is the purpose business of the plaintiff corporation, as recognized by the court below, it does not constitute a public land because it does not meet the requirements of land which is not actually used among the official land requirements under Article 142 (1) 1 (6) of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act at the time (the judgment of the court below 79Nu158 delivered on August 14, 1979 and 80Nu36 delivered on November 25, 1981 is different from this case, and it is not appropriate in this case) although the original adjudication of this case is viewed as a public land, it cannot be maintained as the grounds for appeal pointing this out.

Therefore, it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices to reverse and return the part of the judgment of the court below against the plaintiff.

Justices Kim Young-ju (Presiding Justice)