(a) Land excluded from the vacant land under Article 142 (1) 1 (6) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 10663 of December 31, 1981);

B. Criteria for determining whether a “temporary use of land” is “temporary use” as stipulated in the above Article

A. The purport of Article 142 (1) 1 (6) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 10663 of Dec. 31, 1981) is that the land is not actually used, and the temporary use is not actually used, and even if the land is not actually used, it is excluded from the public land. Thus, the land is not actually used, and it does not fall within the public land as a matter of course without considering whether it falls within the exception of the above (a) through (h). However, even if it is not actually used or temporarily used, it should be excluded from the public land if it falls within the exclusion of the above (a) through (h).

B. Determination of whether a temporary employee is employed under Article 142 (1) 1 (6) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 10663 of Dec. 31, 1981) shall be made by taking into consideration all all the circumstances such as the purpose of use, mode of use, surrounding circumstances of land, etc. as well as the length of use.

Article 142 (1) 1 (6) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 10663 of Dec. 31, 1981)

Attorney Jeon Jong-gu, et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellee

Yeongdeungpo-gu Administrator of the Office of Justice Kim Young-chul

Seoul High Court Decision 84Gu667 delivered on June 20, 1985

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The defendant's attorney's grounds of appeal are examined.

1. According to Article 142 (1) 1 (6) (amended by Presidential Decree No. 10663 of Dec. 31, 1981) of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 10663 of Dec. 31, 1981), with respect to the public land subject to imposition of property tax, the land excluding those listed below among the land in which no ground settlement exists and no actual use is made. In this case, a temporary building or other ordinary facilities constructed after January 14, 1974 for the fixed number of a building shall not be considered as a ground settlement, and a temporary installation or other temporary use of land shall not be considered as a de facto use of the land, and thus (a) through (h) shall be excluded from the public land, as stipulated in Article 142 (1) 1 (6) (Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act) of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act.

The purport of the above provision is that land which is not actually used or used is not actually used, and even if it is not actually used, it is called that the land prescribed in items (a) through (h) is excluded from the vacant land. Thus, land which is not actually used is not naturally used without considering whether it falls under the exception prescribed in items (a) through (h) above. However, even if it is not actually used or temporarily used, it shall be excluded from the vacant land (see Supreme Court Decision 82Nu367 delivered on September 11, 1984).

2. However, during the exception of the above public land, (h) provides that the land stipulated by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Home Affairs shall be the land for which the Ordinance of the Ministry of Home Affairs prescribes, and accordingly, Article 78-3 Item 6 (2) of the Enforcement Rule of the Local Tax Act provides that "the land for the temporary funeral which is continuously installed and used on or before January 14, 1974" among the land for the sports facilities, there is no room for misunderstanding as if the land for the temporary funeral installed after January 14, 1974 does not fall under the above public land exception, and ultimately, it is ultimately a public land. The argument for the theory is derived from such misunderstanding.

However, in light of the provisions of Article 142 (1) 1 (6) of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act, the land currently used as a refining place does not correspond to if it is not a temporary use, but a temporary employee is determined not only by the long term of use, but also by taking into account all the circumstances such as the purpose of use, the mode of use, the surrounding condition of the land, etc., so it cannot be determined whether to temporarily use the land with only the term of installation. However, if the date of installation of a refining place is before January 14, 1974 and continues to use the land after that time, it appears that the purpose of Article 78-3 (6) 6 (2) of the Enforcement Rule of the Local Tax Act is the purport of the above Enforcement Decree, which is the higher law, and it also conforms to the purport of the above Enforcement Decree, which is the higher law. Thus, it is not recognized that the temporary use of the land does not fall under Article 142 (1) 16 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act.

3. From the above point of view, the court below held that the Plaintiff’s president of this case was established around April 1976, but it does not constitute land which is not actually used as provided in Article 142(1)1(6) of the Local Tax Act in light of the actual use condition and circumstances as stated in its holding, and there is no ground for appeal that the judgment below erred in the misapprehension of the law as to the requirements for fair land from a different point of view.

4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-soo (Presiding Justice)