[1] The case where the “funds related to a corporation or organization” as provided by Article 31(2) of the Political Funds Act refers to “funds related to a corporation or organization” and the standard for determining the amount

[2] In a case where Defendants, who are executives of the Korean Association for Registered Security Guard, conspired to contribute funds raised within the council for legislative expenses to many National Assembly members as political funds under the name of individuals in the name of individuals, and were prosecuted for violating the Political Funds Act, the case holding that the above funds constitute “funds related to organizations” under Article 31(2) of the Political Funds Act

[3] Whether an act of donating political funds in relation to a solicitation by a donator to directly take charge of and manage the relevant political funds violates Article 32 subparag. 3 of the Political Funds Act (affirmative)

[1] In light of the legislative intent and history of Article 31(1) and (2) of the Political Funds Act, contents and relationship of each provision, etc., the phrase “a corporation or organization shall not contribute political funds” in Article 31(1) of the Political Funds Act shall be deemed as a provision prohibiting a corporation or organization from contributing political funds by itself with its own funds. Meanwhile, even if a corporation or organization does not contribute political funds by itself under Article 31(2) of the Political Funds Act, if a corporation or organization is related in any form to contribute political funds with its funds, it shall not be deemed as a “fund related to a corporation or organization” which is the object of donation as provided in Article 31(2) of the Political Funds Act, but if a corporation or organization is able to dispose of funds raised or at least identical to a corporation or organization, the overall process of collecting funds shall be determined by ascertaining whether it constitutes a fund-raising organization or organization.

[2] In a case where Defendants, an executive officer of the National Council for Police Assigned for Special Guard (hereinafter referred to as the "Council for Police Assigned for Special Guard") conspired to contribute funds for special membership fees collected within the Council to many National Assembly members in the name of support payments in the name of individuals in the name of individuals in the process of amending the Police Assigned for Special Guard Act, and were prosecuted for violating the Political Funds Act, the case holding that the above special membership fees funds constitute “funds related to organizations” as provided by Article 31(2) of the Political Funds Act, which may be collected and raised by the Council for Police Assigned for Special Guard under its name by primarily raising and raising funds by using its name.

[3] Legislative purport of Article 32 of the Political Funds Act, Article 32 subparag. 3 of the Political Funds Act provides that “any person shall not contribute or receive political funds in connection with the affairs in charge or handling by a public official,” which is prohibited from both soliciting and arranging acts. In light of the fact that “competing” is not premised on the affairs in charge or handling by another public official separate from a public official who received a contribution, unlike brokerage, the act of donating political funds in relation to the solicitation by a donator is also in violation of the said provision in relation to the affairs in charge or handling directly by a public official who received a contribution.

[1] Article 31 (1) and (2) of the Political Funds Act / [2] Articles 31 (2) and 45 (2) 5 of the Political Funds Act / [3] Articles 32 (3) and 45 (2) 5 of the Political Funds Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2008Do10658 Decided June 14, 2012 (Gong2012Ha, 1240) Supreme Court Decision 201Do15418 Decided March 14, 2013

Defendant 1 and two others

Defendants

Law Firm Initial, Attorneys Lee Dong-soo et al.

Seoul High Court Decision 2011No791 decided June 16, 2011

All appeals are dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Article 31(1) of the Political Funds Act provides that “no foreigner, domestic or foreign corporation or organization shall contribute any political funds,” and Paragraph (2) of the same Article provides that “no person shall contribute any political funds with funds related to any corporation or organization both domestically and overseas.” The purport of the Political Funds Act prohibiting any contribution of any political funds by any corporation or organization is to prevent any act detrimental to the exercise of sound political influence and the fairness of any election by any corporation or organization, etc., and to prevent any distortion of the intent of any corporation or organization members. Meanwhile, while the legislation on the prohibition of contribution of any political funds takes place, any corporation or organization, such as any corporation or organization, provides any political funds through any individual, such as an officer, etc., to distort the intent of any political fund contribution of any organization as provided in Article 31(1) of the Political Funds Act, thereby preventing any person from contributing any political funds related to any organization in order to prevent any evasion of the law.

In light of such legislative intent and history, contents and relationship of each provision, etc., the phrase “a corporation or organization shall not contribute political funds” in Article 31(1) of the Political Funds Act shall be deemed as a provision prohibiting a corporation or organization from contributing political funds with its own funds. Meanwhile, even if a corporation or organization does not contribute political funds by itself, Article 31(2) of the Political Funds Act prohibits a corporation or organization from contributing funds with its own funds, and if a corporation or organization is related to a corporation or organization in any form, it shall not be deemed as falling under “funds related to a corporation or organization,” which is the subject of the contribution funds as provided in Article 31(2) of the Political Funds Act. However, if a corporation or organization is able to dispose of funds raised and raised by it by leading and actively participating in raising and raising funds, it shall be deemed as falling under “corporation or organization related to such corporation or organization”. Furthermore, in a specific case, whether such funds are related to a corporation or organization, etc., 1501 through a series of decisions 2018 and 14.108.15

In full view of the circumstances stated in its holding, the court below determined that the National Council for Police Assigned for Special Guard established to improve the welfare and protect the rights and interests of the police assigned for special guard working for State agencies or local governments, etc. (hereinafter referred to as "Council for Police Assigned for Special Guard") is a meeting with which many people can make a systematic decision and make a decision with the common purpose or interest of the police assigned for special guard who are its members, and approximately KRW 650 million of special membership fees collected within the Council for Police Assigned for Special Guard in the process of amending the Police Assigned for Special Guard Act for legislative expenses, even though the amount is the money distinct from the general accounts, the Council for Police Assigned for Special Guard was an organization that can primarily raise and create the money by using its name and make a contribution to the Council for Police Assigned for Special Guard for Special Guard by making a decision-making by the Council for Police Assigned for Special Guard for Special Guard for Special Guard for Special Guard for Special Guard for Special Guard

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine and the evidence duly admitted by the lower court, the lower court’s aforementioned determination is justifiable, and contrary to what is alleged in the Defendants’ grounds of appeal, there were no errors of misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding funds related to organizations under Article 31(2) of the Political Funds Act, or exceeding the bounds of the principle

2. The purpose of the Political Funds Act is to ensure the adequate provision of political funds and ensure the transparency of political funds by disclosing the details of revenue and expenditure, and to contribute to the sound development of democratic politics by preventing any malpractice related to political funds. In full view of such legislative purpose and the contents and structure of the provisions of the Political Funds Act, the provisions pertaining to restrictions on contributions under Chapter VI of the Political Funds Act, in particular, should not be specifically permitted even if the amount of political funds is a contribution act in accordance with the procedures and limit permitted under Chapters I through V. In particular, Article 32 of the same Act, even if the amount of political funds is in accordance with the procedure and limit set forth in the above Act, if it is conducted in relation to a specific act set forth in the above Act, the number of such political funds shall be deemed prohibited in order to prevent the failure (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Do7204, Sept. 11, 2008).

In light of the legislative purport of Article 32 of the Political Funds Act, Article 32 subparag. 3 of the Political Funds Act provides that “any person shall not contribute or receive political funds in connection with the affairs in charge or handling by a public official,” which prohibits all acts of solicitation and mediation. However, unlike the arrangement, the term “componment” is not premised on the affairs that another public official separate from the public official who received contributions is in charge or handling, unlike the arrangement, the act of donating political funds in relation to the solicitation by the public official who received the relevant political funds is also in violation of the said provision.

In light of the circumstances stated in its holding, the lower court determined that the Defendants’ above act of donation of political funds constitutes a violation of Article 32 subparag. 3 of the Political Funds Act, in light of the following: (a) the Defendants’ above act of donation of political funds constitutes a case where Article 32 subparag. 3 of the Political Funds Act is committed, inasmuch as the Defendants’ aforementioned act of donation of political funds violates Article 32 subparag. 3

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal principles and the evidence duly admitted by the lower court, the lower court’s aforementioned determination is justifiable, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors of misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding contribution acts under the Political Funds Act, or exceeding the bounds

3. The crime of violating Article 32 subparag. 3 of the Political Funds Act due to the act of donation of funds related to organizations to National Assembly members and the crime of violating Article 31 subparag. 3 of the Political Funds Act due to the act of donation of political funds in relation to the act of solicitation or mediation in charge by the public officials is an ordinary concurrent relationship as provided in Article 40 of the Criminal Act in the case where the objective facts are the objects of one act of donation made by each National Assembly member, who is the other party to the donation, and one act constitutes several crimes. Thus, the court below erred in holding that the above two crimes are in a substantive concurrent relationship as provided in the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act. However, even if the court below erred in the evaluation of the number of crimes, since the defendants conspired to contribute political funds to several National Assembly members, it cannot be deemed that such errors of the court below affected the judgment (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2002Do735, Feb. 28, 2003; 2003Do73762

4. The remaining grounds of appeal by the Defendants are merely the purport of merely disputing the selection of evidence and fact-finding by the lower court, and they cannot be legitimate grounds of appeal.

5. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Sang-hoon (Presiding Justice)