A. The meaning of the so-called transfer and whether the consent of workers is a valid requirement (affirmative with qualification), and the requirements for recognizing that the practice of transfer without the consent of workers constitutes a content of a labor contract

B. Whether an employee’s comprehensive prior consent can be transferred to a company group’s internal part (affirmative)

(c) the method of consent where the employer obtains the comprehensive prior consent of the worker regarding the transfer within the business group.

A. The so-called transfer of a worker to another company that he/she employs to be engaged in the business of another company is terminated by an agreement between the previous company and the previous company that will be engaged in the business of another company, or is transferred to the position of the employer under the labor contract. Thus, barring any special circumstance, it takes effect upon the consent of the employee unless there is a difference in the transfer or transfer of the worker within the same company. Thus, in order for the employer to recognize that the practice of transferring the worker to another affiliated company within the business group without the consent of the employee is constituted the content of the labor contract, such practice is a normative fact that regulates the labor relationship in the business group, and it is clearly approved as a normative fact that regulates the labor relationship in the business group, or that the member of the company is naturally accepted as a member of the company and is not established

B. The reason for the transfer of workers' consent is to prevent disadvantages to workers due to the change of the subject of the right to command the work in a labor relationship. The transfer of workers employed by an enterprise within the group to another affiliated company is a mere change in the employer's corporate personality. Thus, even if the subject of the right to command the work is formally different, it is difficult to see that the subject of the right to command the work has changed substantially. Thus, if the employer obtained the comprehensive consent of workers in advance (when a worker enters or works for the company) regarding the transfer of workers within the company group, the worker can be transferred to another affiliated company without the consent of the worker.

C. In light of the purport of Article 22 of the Labor Standards Act and Article 7 subparag. 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, where the employer obtains the comprehensive prior consent of the workers regarding the transfer of the materials within the business group, the employer must obtain the consent of the workers by specifying the basic working conditions of the company (which is good even for multiple enterprises) such as the work that the company should be engaged in.

Article 657(1) of the Civil Act; Article 27(1) of the Labor Standards Act

A.B. (C) Supreme Court Decision 92Nu8200 delivered on January 26, 1993 (Gong1993,868). Supreme Court Decision 88Meu4918 delivered on May 9, 1989 (Gong1989,892)

Plaintiff

Suwon Capital Co., Ltd., Ltd., Counsel for the defendant-appellant and one other

Seoul High Court Decision 91Na13436 delivered on February 19, 1992

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

1. Summary of the facts found by the court below

A. The Treatment Group has established and operated 26 affiliated companies including the Defendant Company. However, for the purpose of smooth adjustment of the supply and demand of human resources and efficient personnel policy on a group level among affiliated companies, it has established and operated the Treatment Personnel Management Committee and the Group Planning Office as well as the former affiliated companies' pay system for the former affiliated companies. In principle, each affiliated company does not allow the individual employment of the former affiliated company, and the Group Manpower Management Committee comprehensively employs the former from the group group's level, taking into account the demand for human resources of each affiliated company. After that group's allocation to each affiliated company, it has established a supplementary plan by ascertaining the current status of human resources for each affiliated company and then transferred the former to another affiliated company requesting the recruitment of human resources from the group's level, but it has been 0% of the total amount of allowances paid to each of the above affiliated companies or 40% of the retirement allowances paid to each of the above affiliated companies or 0% of the total amount of allowances paid to the former affiliated companies or 0% of the total amount of allowances paid to each of the employees.

B. Around February 1986, the Plaintiff graduated from a university and was employed by the Treatment Group Manpower Management Committee, and was placed at the Defendant company by open recruitment, and thereafter was assigned to the Defendant company, and the Defendant company was recognized as talented by the Defendant company. The Defendant company was undergoing management difficulties due to the aggravation of management conditions, such as export progress and labor-management division by the early 1989, which led to the accumulation of deficit. However, from around April 1989, the production of the Gurocom developed by the Defendant company was gradually improved, and the management conditions such as the 190-year transition was gradually improved (the domestic sales volume of the Defendant company’s main products in the year 1990). The Defendant company recommended the employees of the Defendant company to supplement the number of the production surplus employees of the Defendant company up to 190, the number of the production surplus employees of the Defendant company up to 190, which was the first 190 representative director of the Defendant company.

C. Around February 1990, the issue at issue was discussed that the Plaintiff transferred to Gwangju Factory due to lack of one of the former employees to the foregoing Gwangju Factory. However, at the time, the Plaintiff was unable to work in Gwangju for reasons of disease treatment of the wife who was treated due to emulcation of grosis, etc., and around that time, the Daewoo Shipbuilding Industrial Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Treatment Shipbuilding”) requested the Plaintiff to recruit the former employees who are in the career of being combined with the small passenger car production team, which is its affiliated company, and the Daewoo Group Coordination Office requested the Plaintiff to dispatch the list of the former employees in the career of the Defendant Company and the personnel record card to the treatment assistant. On March 13, 190, the Defendant Company sent the treatment assistant to the Plaintiff on the list of the former employees in the career of the Defendant Company, including the Plaintiff, and notified the Plaintiff of this fact to the Plaintiff as the producer of the above list and the Defendant Company’s personnel management team without any reason. Accordingly, the Defendant Company did not request the above Defendant Company’s 4 and the Defendant Company’s personnel management team.

D. The Plaintiff continued to work for the Defendant Company on the ground that the above personnel measures were conducted in advance with the Plaintiff’s prior consultation or without the Plaintiff’s prior consent, and that the Plaintiff continued to work for the Defendant Company. The Defendant Company held a personnel committee on June 30 to August 7, 200 on the ground that the Plaintiff refused to comply with the company’s personnel order. On the other hand, on the ground that the Defendant Company convened a personnel committee for disciplinary action on the above ground, the Plaintiff Company distributed printed materials to the employees working at work at work on June 30, 300, the date of the meeting, which was June 30, 200, on the ground that the above suspension period was unreasonable after the expiration of the above suspension period. The Defendant Company did not list the Plaintiff’s personnel committee on August 17, 200, the Plaintiff did not comply with the company’s order for dismissal or non-compliance with the company’s order for dismissal or non-compliance with the company’s order for dismissal or non-compliance with any other justifiable reason for dismissal.

2. Determination on the first ground for appeal by the defendant's attorney

The judgment of the court below as to the point that the theory of lawsuit points out (the difference between the amount of bonus actually received by the members of the same class and the amount of various allowances for each affiliated company of the treatment group, and the fact that the management member in the treatment group moves into another affiliated company has been implemented with the explicit and implied consent of the relevant member) is justified in light of the evidence relation as stated in the judgment of the court below, and there is no error of law that misleads the facts against the rules of evidence such as the theory of lawsuit.

The so-called "transfer between affiliated companies" (the judgment of the court below is expressed as "transfer between affiliated companies") of the company to which the employee is employed is transferred to another company to be engaged in the business of the other company. Since the previous employment contract is terminated between the company and the company to which the employee is employed, or a new employment contract is transferred between the company to which the employee is to be transferred to the position of the employer under the employment contract, it takes effect upon the consent of the employee unless there are special circumstances. Thus, in order to recognize that the practice of transferring the employee to another affiliated company within the same company without the consent of the employee and transferring the employee to the other affiliated company within the company group, such practice is clearly approved as a normative fact which regulates the employment relationship in the company society, or it is naturally accepted as a norm that regulates the employment relationship in the company society without any objection, and it is not established as a de facto system within the company. On the basis of the facts established by the court below, it is difficult to readily conclude that the employee's previous employment relationship between affiliated companies has been implemented for 20 years or has been established as a de facto practice without the consent of the employee.

This paper ultimately criticizes the determination of evidence and the recognition of facts belonging to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court below, and thus is not acceptable.

3. Determination on the ground of appeal No. 2

The judgment of the court below as to the points out of theory (the fact that there was no surplus personnel to the defendant company's ○○○○○○○○ Team, to which the plaintiff belongs at the time of the prior order of this case) shall be justified in light of the evidence relations as stated by the court below, and it shall not be deemed that there was an error of law of misconception of facts in violation of the rules of evidence such as cooking evidence against the rule of experience as in the process

If the facts are as determined by the court below, it cannot be deemed that the Defendant Company made the instant transfer order as a means of avoiding layoff against the Plaintiff, who is an electrical employee. In the instant transfer order, as pointed out by the theory of lawsuit that the Defendant Company did not refer the Plaintiff to a small passenger vehicle production team of the originally scheduled treatment steering line, and transferred the Plaintiff to another department of the treatment steering line without being transferred to a small passenger vehicle production team of the original scheduled treatment steering line, and as long as it cannot be deemed that the instant disciplinary action was done on the ground that the Plaintiff did not comply with the above transfer order and the Plaintiff cannot be deemed as satisfying the requirements as a layoff, the circumstance that the Plaintiff’s work division in the treatment steering line changed is not directly related to the validity of the Defendant Company’s prior transfer order and disciplinary dismissal. Therefore, it cannot be deemed that there was no error of law that affected the conclusion of the judgment by failing to properly examine the judgment, such as the theory of the court below, and neglecting the judgment.

We cannot accept the judgment of the court below on the premise that the determination of evidence and the recognition of facts belonging to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court below were criticized or that the judgment of the court below was removed on the premise that the court below did not recognize it.

4. Determination on the ground of appeal No. 3

The lower court determined that the disciplinary action against the Plaintiff against the Plaintiff is null and void by rendering the legitimacy of the disciplinary action against the Plaintiff on the ground that the Plaintiff, who was dissatisfied with the instant order and refused to be a full-time company, and on the ground that the Plaintiff’s response to the convening of the disciplinary committee against the Plaintiff on the ground that he distributed some of the printed matters indicating a certain number of objections to the personnel system within the treatment group without the company’s approval.

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below as a whole, the court below is understood to the purport that even if the act of the plaintiff's act of distributing printed articles above constitutes an independent disciplinary cause, such as the lawsuit, it cannot be deemed as a reason attributable to the worker to the extent that it cannot continue labor contract in light of social norms in light of the motive or circumstance of the act, and therefore, the dismissal of the disciplinary action in this case on this ground cannot be justified. Thus, we cannot accept the argument that the judgment below erred by neglecting the judgment without properly examining the above act of distributing printed articles as an independent disciplinary

5. Determination on the ground of appeal No. 4

The reason why the employee's consent is a full-time requirement is to prevent the disadvantage of workers due to the change of the subject of the right to command work in a labor relationship. If an affiliated company with various types of business and type of business forms a business group and conducts economic activities with unity in the composition of capital, officers, working conditions, and business, and the personnel exchange among affiliated companies inside the group frequently takes place on a regular and customary basis without any change in personnel movement or transfer, etc. in the same company, it is difficult for the employer to transfer workers employed by the company within the group to another affiliated company, even though it is formally a change in the employer's corporate personality, so if the employer obtains a comprehensive consent of workers in advance (at the time of employment or work) about such a change in the subject of the right to command work inside the business group, it shall be deemed that even if the employee's consent is obtained, it may be effective to transfer workers to another affiliated company without the consent of the employee.

However, Article 22 (1) of the Labor Standards Act and Article 7 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provide that an employer shall specify working conditions, such as matters concerning the place of wages, working hours, and work to be engaged in, with regard to workers at the time of entering into a labor contract. In light of the purport of the above provision promoting the protection of workers by taking into account the subordinate nature of a specific company, if an employer obtains the comprehensive prior consent of the workers with regard to the transfer of workers within a company group, the employer shall specify the company to be entered into, and obtain the consent of the workers by specifying the basic working conditions, such as matters concerning the work to be engaged in in,

In the case of this case, even though the methods and circumstances of personnel management of the treatment group to which the defendant company belongs and the developments employed by the plaintiff as the employee of the defendant company are the same, such circumstance alone is difficult to deem that the plaintiff comprehensively consented to the plaintiff's transfer order to another affiliated company within the treatment group like the theory of lawsuit when the plaintiff is employed as the employee of the defendant company. In addition, the Eul evidence No. 3 cited in the theory of lawsuit is a pledge submitted by the plaintiff when the plaintiff is employed as the defendant company, and there is a part stating that "any transfer, business trip, or other return order will be subject to the defendant company's right to command the defendant company's business," but it is nothing more than that the plaintiff expresses his intention to comply with the defendant company's right to command the defendant company's business, and it cannot be deemed that the plaintiff comprehensively consented to the transfer of the defendant company's employment contract termination.

The court below rejected the defendant's assertion that the plaintiff's comprehensive consent was given in advance to the transfer to another affiliated company is just in light of the evidence relations and the legal principles as seen above. The judgment below did not err by misapprehending the rules of evidence or omitting judgment as it did not contain any error of law by misunderstanding facts against the rules of evidence or violating the rules of evidence. Thus, there is no reason to

6. Therefore, the defendant's appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing defendant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.