(a) Whether the transfer from an enterprise employing an employee to another enterprise is effective with the consent of the employee, to have the employee engage in the business of another enterprise (affirmative with qualification);

B. Whether workers can be transferred to a company group with the comprehensive prior consent of workers (affirmative)

(c) Method by which the employer obtains the comprehensive prior consent of workers on a transfer within the business group;

(d) The case holding that it is difficult to recognize that modern group's establishment of a comprehensive planning office and assignment of employees to each affiliated company by taking charge of the supply and demand of employees on a group basis, and employees were also aware of such fact, and employees were allowed to move employees to an affiliated company in accordance with the rules of employment and collective agreement, on the sole basis of the fact that the rules of employment and collective agreement stipulate that employees were comprehensively given prior consent on a transfer basis, and that employees' transfer to an affiliated company was established by practice

(e) The case holding that, barring any special circumstance, an employee’s act was conducted on the premise of consent to the transfer, if the employee, who completed the procedure of retirement from the company A and completed the procedure of retirement from the company A, and submitted documents employed by the company B, an affiliated company, and worked normally in the company B for two months and two months thereafter;

A. The so-called transfer of a worker to another company that he/she employs to be engaged in the business of another company is formed by an agreement between the former and the former company, or by transferring a new employment contract between the latter and the latter company, or by transferring the status of the employer under an employment contract. Thus, the transfer of a worker to another company is effective with the employee’s consent, unless there are special circumstances, unlike transfer or transfer of personnel in the same company.

B. The reason for the transfer of workers' consent is to prevent disadvantages to workers due to the change of the subject of the right to command the work in a labor relationship. Thus, the transfer of workers employed by a company within the group to another affiliated company is difficult to say that the subject of the right to command the work actually changes even if the corporate personality of the employer is formally changed. Thus, the transfer of workers to another affiliated company without the consent of the worker can be effective once, if the employer is subject to the comprehensive consent of the worker (when the worker is employed or work) regarding the transfer of workers within the company group with the consent of the worker in advance.

C. According to Article 22 of the Labor Standards Act and Article 7 subparag. 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, an employer shall specify working conditions, such as matters concerning wages, working hours, place of employment, and work to be employed at the time of entering into an employment contract, with the employer’s comprehensive prior consent on the transfer of a worker within a business group, if the employer obtains the employee’s comprehensive prior consent on the transfer of a worker within the business group, he/she shall obtain the employee’s consent by specifying the basic working conditions, such as matters concerning the work to be employed

(d) The case holding that the Hyundai Group established a comprehensive planning office and allocated employees to each affiliate by taking charge of the supply and demand of employees on a group basis, and became aware of and entered in the employment rules and collective agreement, and even if the rules of employment and collective agreement provide for the transfer of employees to an affiliate, it is difficult to view that employees obtained prior consent on a comprehensive transfer from employees, and it is also insufficient to recognize that employees’ transfer to an affiliate was established as a practice.

E. The case holding that, barring special circumstances, an employee’s above behavior was conducted on the premise of consent to the transfer, unless there are special circumstances where the employee, who completed the procedure of retirement from the company Gap, and completed the procedure of retirement from the company Gap and submitted documents employed by the company Eul, an affiliated company, and worked normally in the company Eul for two months and two months thereafter.

(a)(d)Article 657(1) of the Civil Code, Article 27(c) of the Labor Standards Act, Article 22 of the same Act and Article 7 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act;

A.B. (C) Supreme Court Decision 92Da11695 delivered on January 26, 1993 (Gong1993,854). Supreme Court Decision 88Meu4918 delivered on May 9, 1989 (Gong1989,892)

Hyundai Construction Co., Ltd., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant and three others

The Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission

Intervenor joining the Defendant

Seoul High Court Decision 91Gu7301 delivered on April 23, 1992

The judgment of the court below is reversed.

The case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

1. Judgment on the first ground for appeal by the Plaintiff’s attorney

The so-called transfer of a worker to another company employed by him/her to be engaged in the business of another company is to terminate a labor contract and to be transferred to another company, or to be transferred the status of an employer under a labor contract. Thus, barring any special circumstance, the employer’s right to use and dispose of the worker’s labor force for the purpose of business is only acquired through a labor contract between the employee and his/her employer, and it cannot be deemed that the employer has the right to dispose of the worker’s labor force unilaterally regardless of the contract relationship. Furthermore, in light of the fact that Article 657(1) of the Civil Act, which is a mandatory law, provides that the worker shall not transfer his/her right to the worker’s labor force to a third party without the consent of the employee, the consent of the employee is obtained.

However, the reason for the transfer of workers' consent is to prevent disadvantages to workers due to the change of the subject of the right to command work in a labor relationship. If an affiliated company with various types of business and the type of business forms a business group, conducts economic activities, and the personnel exchange among affiliated companies is frequently conducted on a regular and commercial basis without any change in the personnel movement within the same group or transfer, it is difficult for the employer to transfer workers employed by the company within the group to another affiliated company, even though it is formally a change in the employer's corporate personality, so if it is obtained in advance (when a worker is employed or work) with the employees' comprehensive consent, it can be viewed that the employee's transfer to another affiliated company without the employee's consent.

However, Article 22 of the Labor Standards Act and Article 7 subparagraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provide that an employer shall specify working conditions, such as matters concerning the place of wages, working hours, and work to be employed at the time of entering into a labor contract. In light of the purport of the above provision that promotes the protection of workers by taking into account the subordinate nature of a specific company, if an employer obtains the comprehensive prior consent of the workers with regard to the transfer of property within a company group, the employer shall specify the company to be entered into, and obtain the consent of the employees by specifying, basic working conditions, such as matters concerning the work to be employed at the company (for multiple companies, the good condition),

The Plaintiff Company established a comprehensive planning office for the smooth adjustment of the supply and demand of human resources and the efficient execution of personnel policy among its affiliates and, after completing the training of new employees by employing employees as a whole, allocated to each of its affiliates in consideration of the situation of the supply and demand of human resources and their wishes. The Intervenor joining the Defendant (hereinafter referred to as the “Supplementary Intervenor”) knew of it with the explanation of the personnel movement between its affiliates before being employed by the Plaintiff Company, and even if the Plaintiff Company has a provision for the transfer of workers to an affiliate in the rules of employment and collective agreement, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff Company obtained the Intervenor’s comprehensive prior consent by specifying the matters concerning the transfer of workers in the rules of employment and collective agreement.

According to relevant evidence and records, the judgment of the court below that recognized the judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and it did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles as to labor-management practice, such as theory of lawsuit, in the judgment of the court below, even though the pre-entry of workers between the plaintiff company and other affiliated companies belonging to the Hyundai Group was considerably established as a practice approved as a normative fact from most workers belonging to the plaintiff company.

In conclusion, we cannot accept the judgment of the court below because it is merely an error of law such as misunderstanding the legal principles on the transfer of workers between a large-scale enterprise and its affiliated companies, on the premise that the judgment of the court below criticizes the determination of the evidence and the recognition of facts belonging to the exclusive jurisdiction or is inconsistent with the facts recognized by the court below.

2. Determination on the ground of appeal No. 2

The court below decided that the intervenor was not in charge of the plaintiff 1's new position at the end of 198.1.7, which had been employed by the plaintiff 2 as the plaintiff 1's company's employees and the plaintiff 2's new position at the end of 5 years after the plaintiff 2 was employed as the plaintiff 1's new position. The plaintiff 2's new position at the end of 5 years after the plaintiff 1's new position was rejected by the plaintiff 2's new position. The plaintiff 1's new position at the end of 5 months after the plaintiff 2's new position was rejected by the plaintiff 1's new position. The plaintiff 2's new position at the end of 5's new position at the end of 5's new position, and the plaintiff 1's new position at the end of 5's new position was rejected by the plaintiff 1's new position and the new position of the plaintiff 2's new position. The plaintiff 2 also transferred the above new position to the plaintiff 3's new position development.

However, according to the facts acknowledged by the court below, the intervenor decided to follow the transition from the plaintiff company to the Geum River Development, and completed the procedure of retiring from the plaintiff company on March 6, 1990 and prepared and submitted documents for employment in Geum River Development. Since the intervenor worked normally in the course of two months from March 12 to May 11, 199, the intervenor expressed his intention to withhold consent to the above transition or would be subject to sanctions such as disciplinary action in the event the intervenor's refusal of the transfer is inevitable in the above process, the intervenor's above action is in conformity with logical and empirical rules to view that the above action was conducted on the premise of consent to the transfer transfer. As stated in the court below, it is difficult to view that the intervenor's refusal to perform any duty and the intervenor's refusal of the transfer was merely a ground for sanctions such as disciplinary action, etc. due to the intervenor's refusal to grant any duty to the plaintiff company, and the intervenor's temporary refusal of the transfer does not necessarily have consented to the transfer transfer process.

Nevertheless, the court below determined that the intervenor's consent to the above order cannot be seen as having consented to the above order. The judgment of the court below is erroneous in the misapprehension of the doctor's interpretation or the fact-finding in violation of the rules of evidence, and it is clear that such illegality has affected the conclusion of the judgment. Thus, there is a reason to point this out.

3. Therefore, without deciding on the third ground of appeal, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.