In a case where Eul et al., who were relatives of Gap, who were missing at the time of 6/25, made a false confession by the staff of the former Ministry of National Security Planning, adviser, etc., and subsequently executed punishment upon conviction of Eul et al., for the crime of espionage. After the truth-finding decision and the judgment of innocence was affirmed, Eul et al. filed a lawsuit against the State for damages after 6 months or more from the date of the determination of criminal compensation, it cannot be readily concluded that Byung et al. failed to exercise rights until the date of final determination of innocence of Eul et al. because Eul et al., the court below rejected the judgment which ruled that the statute of limitations expired cannot be seen as abuse of rights in light of Article 166(1), 76(1), and 96(2) of the former Budget and Accounts Act, and Article 76(1)6(2) of the same Act, which is the starting date of the statute of limitations period, and Article 66(1)6(2) of the same Act, which provides for the unconstitutional Court.

Since Eul et al., the relatives of Eul et al., who were missing at the time of 6/25, made a false confession by the former employees of the National Security Planning Department, adviser et al., and subsequently executed the sentence upon conviction of Eul et al., after the truth-finding decision and the judgment of innocence was affirmed, the court below filed a lawsuit against Eul et al. after 6 months or more from the date of the determination of criminal compensation, it cannot be readily concluded that Byung et al. did not have a de facto obstacle that could not expect the exercise of rights until the date of the final determination of innocence of Eul et al., since Eul et al., who was the relatives of Eul et al., of the deceased at the time of 6/25, could not be deemed as abuse of rights (hereinafter referred to as "the judgment of retrial"), and that the part of the judgment of unconstitutionality determination under Articles 166(1) and 76(1) and (2) of the Civil Act, which is the objective starting point of the statute of limitations, and Article 166(2) of the former Budget Act.

Since the judgment subject to a retrial, which is a judgment on suspicion of serious violation of human rights and manipulation under Article 2(1)4 of the previous Bankruptcy Adjustment Act, has already become final and conclusive since Article 166(1) and Article 766(2) of the Civil Act, which lost its validity as a decision of unconstitutionality, applied the part of the case applied to the cases under Articles 2(1)3 and 2(1)4 of the previous Bankruptcy Adjustment Act, the case held that Eul, Byung, etc. may request a retrial pursuant to Article 75(7) of the Constitutional Court Act, and it is reasonable to see Eul, etc. as well as Byung, etc. as well as Byung, etc., as the date when the judgment was filed before three years have passed since the initial date in which the short term statute of limitations under Article 766(1) of the Civil Act began to be the final and conclusive date in which the right to claim damages such as Eul and Byung, etc., was not expired, in light of the purport of the decision of unconstitutionality decision, the objective starting point of the statute of extinctive prescription is excluded.

Articles 166(1), 766(1) and (2) of the Civil Act, Article 96(2) of the former Budget and Accounts Act (repealed by Article 2 of Addenda to the National Finance Act, Act No. 8050, Oct. 4, 2006) (see current Article 96(2) of the National Finance Act), Article 2(1)3 and 4 of the Framework Act on the Settlement of History for Truth and Reconciliation, Article 75(7) of the Constitutional Court Act

See Attached List of Plaintiffs (Law Firm LLC, Attorneys Kim Gi-de et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Republic of Korea (Attorney Park Jong-won, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Seoul Central District Court Decision 201Gahap45304 Decided July 20, 2012

Seoul High Court Decision 2012Na63894 decided July 19, 2013

Supreme Court Decision 2013Da210428 Decided December 24, 2014

Seoul High Court Decision 2015Na2003172 decided September 22, 2015

March 14, 2019

1. The decision subject to review shall be revoked.

2. The judgment of the court of first instance is modified as follows.

The Defendant (Re-Defendant) shall:

A. As to KRW 1,134,436,818 and KRW 160,904,211 among the Plaintiff (Plaintiffs) 6, 5% per annum from September 28, 2010 to April 18, 2019; and KRW 20% per annum from June 20, 2012 to April 18, 2019 to the date of full payment; and

B. [Attachment 3. Payment to the remaining plaintiffs of the amount of money stated in the "total amount of claim" list of the purport of the request for retrial and 5% per annum from June 20, 2012 to April 18, 2019, and 20% per annum from the following day to the date of full payment.

C. All remaining claims of the Plaintiff (Plaintiffs) are dismissed.

3. 20% of the total litigation costs before and after the review shall be borne by the Plaintiff (Plaintiffs) and the remainder by the Defendant (Defendants on review) respectively.

4.Paragraphs 2-A, b) may be provisionally executed.

1. Purport of claim

The Defendant (hereinafter “Defendant”) pays to the Plaintiff (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) 5% interest per annum from June 9, 1981 to the service date of a copy of the instant complaint, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the day of full payment with respect to each of the said amounts as stated in the “total amount of claims” in the “total amount of claims” list of the claim amount No. 1. 1. 1. 1. 2.

2. Purport of appeal

A. The plaintiffs

The judgment of the first instance is modified as follows. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiffs 2. The amount of money calculated by the rate of 5% per annum from June 9, 1981 to May 12, 201, and 20% per annum from the following day to the day of full payment.

B. Defendant

The part against the defendant in the judgment of the first instance is revoked, and all of the plaintiffs' claims corresponding to the revocation are dismissed.

3. Purport of request for retrial;

The decision for review is revoked. The defendant's decision for review is revoked. The defendant's decision for review listed in attached Form 3. The "total amount of claim" in attached Table 3. Each plaintiff's money and ① with respect to KRW 160,904,211 out of KRW 1,134,436,818 to Plaintiff 6, the annual interest rate of KRW 5% from September 28, 2010 to July 20, 2012; and the annual interest rate of KRW 20% from June 20, 2012 to July 20, 2012 to the day of full payment; ② the remaining plaintiffs calculated with respect to each amount stated in the "total amount of claim" in attached Table 3. The interest rate of KRW 5% per annum from June 20, 2012 to July 20, 2012 to the day of full payment; and the annual interest rate of KRW 20% from the next day to the day of full payment (hereinafter the same).

1. Determination of the original judgment

In full view of the purport of the entire pleadings in the records of this case, the following facts are recognized.

A. On May 6, 2011, the Plaintiffs: (a) filed a claim for damages against the Defendant on the ground of tort under Article 2(1) of the State Compensation Act against Seoul Central District Court Decision 201Gahap45304, and was sentenced to partial winning judgment on July 20, 2012 (hereinafter “the first instance judgment”).

B. Both the Plaintiffs and the Defendant appeals to Seoul High Court No. 2012Na63894, but both the Plaintiffs and the Defendant’s appeals were dismissed on July 19, 2013 (hereinafter “pre-delivery judgment”).

C. As to this, the Defendant appealed by Supreme Court Decision 2013Da210428, and on December 24, 2014, the Defendant accepted the Defendant’s final appeal and reversed the part against the Defendant in the judgment prior to remand and the judgment remanded to the lower court (hereinafter “the judgment remanded”).

The gist of the judgment of remand is as follows.

① In a case where a public prosecution was instituted on the basis of evidence, etc. collected by an illegal act, etc. committed in the course of investigation, and a judgment of innocence became final and conclusive on the basis of the existence of grounds for retrial, but later, the existence of grounds for retrial is unknown, and a judgment of innocence became final and conclusive on the retrial procedure, there is de facto disability that the obligee cannot expect to claim damages against the State until the judgment

(2) In such cases, a creditor shall exercise his/her rights within a period of six months equivalent to the suspension of prescription under the Civil Act from the date of final judgment of acquittal on which such disability has been annulled, except in extenuating circumstances

③ Plaintiff 1, etc. filed the instant lawsuit only on May 6, 201 after the final judgment of innocence was rendered and the decision on criminal compensation became final and conclusive on September 10, 201, which had been six months or more thereafter passed since the Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit. Therefore, barring any special circumstance, the Plaintiffs cannot be deemed to have exercised their rights within a reasonable period that could prevent the Defendant from protesting the extinctive prescription defense, and it is difficult to conclude that the Defendant’s defense of extinctive prescription constitutes abuse of rights.

④ Nonparty 2, 10, and 25 (hereinafter “Nonindicted 2, etc.”) did not file an application with the Korean Film Settlement Commission for the verification of the truth, nor did they receive the truth-finding from the Korean Film Settlement Commission, and it cannot be readily concluded that there was a de facto obstacle that Nonparty 2, etc. could not expect the Defendant to claim damages against the Defendant by November 21, 2009, which became final and conclusive as the conviction of the Defendants was final and conclusive as of November 21, 2009. Thus, the Defendant’s defense of extinctive prescription does not constitute abuse of rights.

D. After remanding, the appellate court proceeded with Seoul High Court No. 2015Na2003172, the lower court revoked the part of the first instance judgment against the Defendant and rendered a judgment dismissing all the claims of the Plaintiffs corresponding to the revoked part (hereinafter referred to as “the judgment on retrial”) in accordance with the purport of the judgment on remanding. The said judgment became final and conclusive on October 15, 2015.

2. Determination as to whether a ground for retrial is recognized

A. The plaintiffs' assertion

The plaintiffs asserted that there was a ground for retrial under Article 75 of the Constitutional Court Act, since the Constitutional Court rendered a decision of unconstitutionality on the objective starting point of the statute of limitations applicable to this case.

B. Facts of recognition

The following facts are acknowledged without dispute between the parties, and recognized in full view of the purport of the entire pleadings in the records of this case.

① On April 3, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed an application for adjudication on the unconstitutionality of statutes with respect to Articles 166(1)2 and 766(1) and (2)3 of the Civil Act, and Article 96(2)4 of the former Budget and Accounts Act (amended by Act No. 8050, Oct. 4, 2006) (hereinafter referred to as “the foregoing provisions”) (hereinafter referred to as “the unconstitutionality clause”).

The main point of the plaintiffs' applications is as follows.

The provisions on the unconstitutionality of statutes stipulate that the extinctive prescription shall apply to the right to claim damages due to “serious human rights violations and cruel manipulations,” as prescribed by Article 2(1)4 of the Framework Act on the Settlement of History for Truth and Reconciliation (hereinafter “The Act”), and that the extinctive prescription shall run as it is even in the case where “a cause for de facto disability where an obligee is objectively unable to exercise his/her right before the completion of the extinctive prescription” exists.

(b) The subordinate law is unconstitutional because it is contrary to the ideology of the Constitution, the essential mission of which is to confirm and guarantee the dignity and value of human beings.

② On December 24, 2014, the Supreme Court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ motion to propose adjudication on the unconstitutionality of statutes, and the Plaintiffs filed an adjudication on constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court No. 2015HunBa50 pursuant to Article 68(2) week 5 of the Constitutional Court Act.

③ On August 30, 2018, the Constitutional Court rendered a decision of unconstitutionality that “the part applicable to the cases provided for in Articles 2(1)3 and 766(2) of the former Bankruptcy Adjustment Act (amended by Act No. 471 of Feb. 22, 1958) and 2016(3) of the Civil Act shall be deemed unconstitutional” (hereinafter “instant decision of unconstitutionality”) with respect to the case pertaining to the adjudication on constitutional complaint filed by victims of past history, including the Plaintiffs (see Constitutional Court Decision 2014Hun-Ba148, 162, 219, 206, 205Hun-Ba50, 2015Hun-Ba50, 2014Hun-Ba23, 290, 2016Hun-Ba419).

The gist of the reasons is as follows.

In light of the history and purport of the past reorganization law, the cases of civilian collective life and the suspicion of serious human rights violations and manipulation are fundamentally different types from those of tort or general state compensation.

(b) It is difficult to view the request for legal stability through the extinction of the statute of limitations of the State's claim to the extent that it completely sacrifices the obligation of the State to protect fundamental rights under Article 10 of the Constitution and the need to guarantee the State's claim under Article 29 (1)

Although it was found guilty of false confession by illegal confinement, adviser, etc. for a long time due to the occurrence of a crime, it is difficult to regard the time of illegal act as the starting point of the statute of limitations as the starting point of the statute of limitations, and it is also inconsistent with the guiding principle of the damage compensation system, which is fair and reasonable allocation of damages incurred.

Without considering the specificity of “a group of people who are private individuals” under Article 2(1)3 and “a serious violation of human rights and manipulation” under Article 2(1)4 of the Act, the provision of “the starting point of objective starting” under Articles 166(1) and 766(2) of the Civil Act is deemed to deviate from the limit of legislative formation regarding the right to claim State compensation.

Article 166(1) and Article 766(2) of the Civil Act excludes the application of the objective starting point of the starting point of Article 166(1) and Article 96(2) of the National Finance Act, which is premised on such objective starting point of starting, the long-term statute of limitations under Article 96(2) of the former Budget and Accounts Act(Article 96(2) of the former Budget and Accounts Act) shall be excluded as a matter of course.

C. Determination

In addition to the above facts-related legal principles, in light of the following circumstances known, it is determined that the grounds for retrial of the plaintiffs' assertion are recognized.

(1) Article 75 of the Constitutional Court Act, where a constitutional complaint is accepted pursuant to Article 68 (2) 8 of the Constitutional Court Act, if a litigation case related to the relevant constitutional complaint has already become final and conclusive, the parties may request a review (paragraph (7)), the Criminal Procedure Act shall apply mutatis mutandis to a criminal case in the review thereafter, and the Civil Procedure Act shall apply mutatis mutandis to other cases (paragraph (8)).

The purport of Article 75(7) of the Constitutional Court Act is to establish a means of objection to remedy the relevant case which has been finalized before the constitutional complaint is accepted in cases where the request for adjudication on the constitutionality of a party is rejected by a court and the party who filed the request requests adjudication on the constitutionality of a party requests adjudication on the constitutional complaint, taking into account that the adjudication on the relevant case pending in the court may be finalized without suspending the adjudication on the constitutional complaint in cases where the request is pending in the adjudication on the constitutional complaint, so the "litigation related to the relevant constitutional complaint" in the above provision refers only to the relevant case which is the premise of the relevant constitutional complaint (see Supreme Court Decision 92Nu13400 delivered on July 27,

② The instant lawsuit filed by the Plaintiffs became the premise for filing a constitutional complaint, and the judgment subject to a retrial was related to the serious violation of human rights and manipulations as defined in Article 2(1)4 of the previous Bankruptcy Adjustment Act, and thus, the lower court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ claim for damages by applying the part applied to the cases stipulated in Articles 166(1) and 766(2) of the Civil Act, which lost its validity as the decision of unconstitutionality, and Article 2(1)3 and 4 of the previous Bankruptcy Adjustment Act.

③ Since an original judgment became final and conclusive on October 15, 2015, the Plaintiffs may file a petition for a retrial in accordance with Article 75(7) of the Constitutional Court Act.

3. Judgment on the merits

(a) Basic facts

The reasoning for this Court's explanation is as follows, except for the addition of the following "BE" to this part, since the part of "1. Basic Facts" from Part 5 to Part 1 of Part 8 is the same as that of Part 2 of the judgment of the first instance. Thus, it is acceptable in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

【On the other hand, Nonparty 1 died on October 1, 2014 and took over the lawsuit by Nonparty 17, and Nonparty 2 died on November 25, 2016, and Nonparty 2 took over the lawsuit by Plaintiffs 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24, who are children.

B. Occurrence of liability for damages

The reasoning for this Court’s explanation is as follows: (a) Nos. 3 through 9 of the judgment of the court of first instance; and (b) Nos. 5 and 8 of the judgment of the court of first instance are the same as the part of the “determination on the cause of claim”; and (c) such part is cited

C. Judgment on the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription

1) Determination on the short-term extinctive prescription defense

A) Defendant’s assertion

The defendant asserts that the plaintiffs' claim for damages of this case has been completed by the three-year statute of limitations as stipulated in Article 766(1) of the Civil Act from November 3, 1981 (the plaintiff 9), November 16, 1984 (the plaintiff 6), and August 15, 1998 (the plaintiff 1) and the three-year statute of limitations has expired before the lawsuit of this case was filed.

B) Relevant legal principles

The “date when the injured party becomes aware of the damage and the perpetrator” under Article 766(1) of the Civil Act refers to the time when the injured party actually and specifically recognized the facts of the requirements for the tort, such as the occurrence of the damage, the existence of the illegal harmful act, and the proximate causal relation between the harmful act and the occurrence of the damage. Whether the injured party, etc. is deemed to have actually and specifically recognized the facts of the requirements for the tort should be reasonably acknowledged in consideration of various objective circumstances in each individual case and the situation in which the claim for damages is practically possible (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Da33469, May 29, 2008, etc.).

In a case where a public prosecution was instituted and a conviction was finalized on the basis of evidence, etc. collected by an illegal act, etc. during the course of investigation, but the existence of grounds for retrial was revealed later and the judgment of innocence became final and conclusive in the retrial procedure, it shall be deemed that there is a de facto disability that the obligee cannot expect to claim compensation against the State until the judgment of innocence becomes final and conclusive (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da201844, Dec. 12, 2013)

C) Determination as to the plaintiffs (except for non-party 2 et al.) who received the judgment of conviction

As in the instant case, in a case where a conviction was rendered among the serious cases of violation of human rights and manipulation as provided in Article 2(1)4 of the previous Act, it is determined that the victim actually and specifically recognized the facts of the requirements of tort, such as the occurrence of damages, the existence of illegal harmful act, and proximate causal relation between the harmful act and the occurrence of damages, only after the judgment of conviction was revoked due to retrial due to the special circumstance that the existence of the judgment of

The Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit on May 6, 201, for which three years have not elapsed since November 21, 2009, since the judgment of innocence against the Defendants in the instant case became final and conclusive, the extinctive prescription cannot be deemed to have expired.

D) Determination as to Nonparty 2, etc.

(1) On the other hand, in the case of Nonparty 2, etc. who was prosecuted or was found guilty, whether the starting point of the short-term extinctive prescription can be seen as the final date of the judgment of innocence.

In light of the following circumstances, it is reasonable to start the short-term extinctive prescription against the non-party 2, etc. from the date of final judgment of innocence for retrial against the defendants of this case, in light of the following circumstances, which can be known comprehensively as the whole in the written evidence Nos. 3-1 through 3, 5, 11-15, 16, 23, 58-7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, and 16 of the evidence Nos. 3-1 to the above facts.

① Illegal confinement and adviser, etc. against the Defendants and Nonparty 2, etc. do not have any difference in the substance of unlawful act in terms of personal solicitation by a democratic or anti-human rights act. Furthermore, both illegal confinement and adviser against Nonparty 2, etc. appears to have been conducted in order to secure evidence to support the conviction of the Defendants. In fact, in the criminal trial against the Defendants of this case, the Defendant’s written examination of Nonparty 2, etc. and anti-instigious documents prepared by Nonparty 2, etc. were used as evidence.

② As such, since evidence obtained through illegal confinement and advisory against Nonparty 2, etc. is directly related to the final conviction judgment against the Defendants, Nonparty 2, etc., it appears that it was difficult for Nonparty 2, etc. to independently file a lawsuit against the State to seek compensation for damages due to illegal acts by breaking the statement made by himself/herself at an investigative agency or the statement made by himself/herself before the court rendered a final conviction judgment through retrial.

③ If Nonparty 2 et al. were indicted, it would have been convicted of the Defendant with the instant Defendants, and there would be no particular problems in claiming damages against the Defendant via a new judgment. If the additional part of the claim for damages depending on whether to prosecute or a judgment of conviction depends on whether to prosecute or a judgment of conviction, it would lead to a result of a public prosecutor’s non-prosecution of a prosecution even if the Defendants suffered the same damage as the instant Defendants, which is illegal confinement and adviser, and thus, it would be unreasonable.

④ In a claim for state compensation for illegal confinement and adviser, there are precedents to the effect that: (a) the victim was dead during his/her criminal trial and has not been convicted of conviction (Supreme Court Decision 2014Da208507 Decided August 20, 2014); and (b) the victim was not prosecuted (Supreme Court Decision 2013Da209831 Decided February 27, 2014); and (c) the victim was an objective obstacle that could not expect the victim to exercise his/her right to claim damages; and (d) the case of serious infringement of human rights and manipulations ought to be subject to limitation of the State’s defense in light of the background and intent of the enactment of the past Act. In light of the background and intent of the enactment of the Act, it seems adequate to deem that the serious violation of human rights and manipulation cases ought to be different from

(2) As can be seen, Nonparty 2, etc. also deemed to have completed the extinctive prescription insofar as the instant lawsuit was filed on May 6, 201, where the period of extinctive prescription has not expired, since the judgment of innocence against the Defendants in the instant case became final and conclusive on November 21, 2009.

2) Determination on the long-term extinctive prescription defense

The defendant asserts that the time when the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit for damages of this case has already passed five years from the time of tort, and that the statute of limitations has expired.

However, in light of the purport of the decision of unconstitutionality as seen earlier, the application of Articles 166(1) and 766(2) of the Civil Act to the judgment subject to a retrial on serious cases of violation of human rights and manipulation as provided by Article 2(1)4 of the previous Bankruptcy Adjustment Act is excluded, and the application of Article 96(2) of the National Finance Act (Article 96(2) of the National Finance Act (Article 96(2) of the former Budget and Accounts Act), which provides for the period of extinctive prescription for the right to benefit of money to the State premised on such objective starting point, is naturally excluded.

Therefore, the defendant's long-term statute of limitations defense cannot be accepted in this case, which is the pertinent case of the decision of unconstitutionality of this case, falling under Article 2 (1) 4 of the previous Bankruptcy Adjustment Act.

3) The defendant's rejection of extinctive prescription defense

As seen earlier, the defendant's short-term and long-term extinctive prescription defense is without merit.

D. Scope of liability for damages

The reasoning for this Court’s explanation is as follows: (a) the part of “the scope of liability for damages of 3.3” to 19.14 is the same as the part of “the scope of liability for damages of 3.3.3” in the first instance judgment, except for the addition or replacement of each corresponding part as follows; and (b) such part is cited by the main text of Article 420

○ 14. The following entry shall be added to the first page of 14.

【Defendant asserts that from the lost income of Plaintiffs 1 and 6, the above Plaintiffs should deduct the income that they obtained or could have obtained after the date of release.

However, the evidence submitted by the Defendant alone is insufficient to deem that Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 6 actually earned income after the release date, and there is no other evidence to support this.

However, in light of the respective ages, health, existence of dependent family members, etc. of Plaintiffs 1 and 6, it is highly probable that they actually obtained income after release, and the actual income of Plaintiffs 1 and 6 is calculated based on statistical income on the premise that they were actually employed even if they did not actually work, and thus, it is unreasonable to deduct income that could have been objectively obtained from an objective income in light of the principle of equity and other circumstances, such as the fact that it is not unreasonable in light of the principle of equity, the circumstances alleged by the Defendant should be considered in the calculation of consolation money.

Part 19, Chapters 15 through 20, 3, "E. Sub-s. Sub-s. Sub-s. Sub-s. Sub-s.)" shall be followed as indicated below.

(e) Inheritance of the right to claim damages due to the death of Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 2

1) Inheritance due to the death of Nonparty 1

The facts that Nonparty 1 died on October 1, 2014 are as seen earlier. Since Plaintiff 17 solely inherited Nonparty 1’s property, the Defendant is obligated to pay KRW 5 million to Plaintiff 17.

2) Inheritance due to the death of Nonparty 2

The facts that Nonparty 2 died on November 25, 2016 are as seen earlier, and Plaintiff 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 (hereinafter “Plaintiff 19, etc.”) who is Nonparty 2’s children inherited Nonparty 2’s property.

As can be seen, Nonparty 2’s damage claim against the Defendant: KRW 68,722,222, respectively (i.e., KRW 412,33,333 ± 6). As such, the Defendant is obligated to pay Plaintiff 19, etc. the amount of KRW 207,760,444, as indicated in [Attachment 3] No. 19 or 24 in the “total amount of claim” column of the purport of the request for reexamination. (i.e., KRW 194,88,888 + KRW 68,722,222).

F. Sub-committee

Therefore, the Defendant: (i) KRW 1,134,436,818 (i) daily income + KRW 160,904,211 + KRW 973,532,607) and KRW 160,904,211 as to KRW 160,90; (ii) the remainder of KRW 973,532,607, Sept. 28, 2010, which is the date of the closing of argument in the first instance court, deemed reasonable to dispute over the existence or scope of the Defendant’s obligation to perform; (iii) annual interest rate of KRW 5% as stipulated in the Civil Act from the date of the judgment, to April 18, 2019; and (iv) annual interest rate of KRW 20% as stipulated in the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Encouragement, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the following day to the date of full payment; and (v) annual interest rate of KRW 20% as to each claim for re-appeal from the remainder of Plaintiffs 6 to 20.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment subject to a retrial has a ground for retrial. The plaintiffs' claims are accepted within the scope of the above recognition, and all the remaining claims are dismissed due to the lack of grounds. The judgment of the court of first instance is partially different from this conclusion, and its part is modified according to the acceptance by the parties of the lawsuit of the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 who died. Thus, the judgment of the court of first instance is modified as ordered

[Attachment] List of Plaintiffs: Omitted

[Attachment 1] Claim List: omitted

[Attachment 2] Statement of Amount of Appeal: omitted

[Attachment 3] The purport of the request for retrial: omitted

Judges Bo Jae-sik (Presiding Judge)

(1) At the time of filing the first instance trial of this case, Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 2 died thereafter and their inheritors took over the lawsuit, but they are referred to as the Plaintiffs for convenience.

Note 2) Extinctive prescription shall run from the time when it can exercise its rights.

3) A claim for damages due to a tort under Article 766 (Extinctive Prescription) (1) expires if the injured party or his/her legal representative fails to exercise it for three years from the date on which he/she becomes aware of the damage and of the identity of the perpetrator.

4) Article 96 (Extinctive Prescription for Pecuniary Claim and Obligation) (1) The right of the State to payment of money is extinguished by prescription if it is not exercised for five years, unless otherwise provided for by any other Act, in respect of prescription.

5) If a request made for an adjudication on the constitutionality of a law under Article 41(1) is rejected, the person who has proposed a motion may request an adjudication on constitutional complaint to the Constitutional Court. In this case, the party concerned shall not request again an adjudication on the constitutionality of a law for the same reason in the proceedings of the case.

Note 6) The case of Mask-Pamins against civilians committed unlawfully at the time from August 15, 1945 to before and after the Korean War.

7) Death, injury, disappearance, and other serious human rights infringement cases and cruel manipulation cases, which were caused by an unlawful or significant exercise of public authority, such as the act of destroying constitutional order from August 15, 1945 to the control of authoritativeism, etc.

8) If a request made for an adjudication on the constitutionality of a law is rejected, the person who made the request may request an adjudication on constitutional complaint to the Constitutional Court.