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(영문) 대법원 1992. 6. 9. 선고 92다8446 판결
[부당이득금][공1992.8.1.(925),2125]
Main Issues

(a)the presumption of possession with autonomy in the acquisition by prescription;

B. Whether the presumption of possession with autonomy can be reversed merely on the ground that the fact that the State or a local government lawfully acquired the source of possession right in accordance with the Road Act or the Urban Planning Act at the time of construction of a road (negative)

Summary of Judgment

A. The intention of ownership, which is the requirement for possession with intention to hold it autonomously, is objectively determined by the nature of the source of possessory right, but if the nature of possessory right is not clear, it shall be presumed to be possession independently in accordance with Article 197(1) of the Civil Code.

B. The presumption of possession independently applies to a road possessed by the State or a local government, and even if it is not recognized that the party lawfully acquired the source of possession right in accordance with the procedures stipulated in the Road Act or the Urban Planning Act at the time of the construction of the road, it cannot be deemed as the possession by the nature of the source of possession right by changing the presumption of possession legally.

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 197(1) and 245 of the Civil Act

Reference Cases

A. (B) Supreme Court Decision 89Meu12176 Decided June 28, 1991 (Gong1991, 2012) (Gong1991, 2012) 91Da6139 Decided July 12, 1991 (Gong1991, 2149). Supreme Court Decision 90Da18838 Decided July 9, 1991 (Gong191, 215) 91Da27259, 27266 Decided April 28, 1992 (Gong192,1694)

Plaintiff-Appellant

[Defendant-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 12 others, Counsel for defendant-appellant-appellant

Defendant-Appellee

Attorney Kim In-hwan, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 91Na21796 delivered on January 28, 1992

Text

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

Reasons

We examine the Plaintiffs’ grounds of appeal.

The intention of possession, which is the requirement for the possession by prescription, is objectively determined as the existence or absence by the nature of the possessory right. However, if the nature of the possessory right is not clear, the presumption of possession is presumed to be the possession by the State or a local government pursuant to Article 197(1) of the Civil Act. Even if it is not acknowledged that the possessor has lawfully acquired the possessory right in accordance with the procedures stipulated in the Road Act or the Urban Planning Act at the time of construction of the road, etc., the presumption of possession by possession by possession by reason of the nature of the possessory right cannot be deemed to be the possession by the nature of the possessory right (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 89Meu12176, Jun. 28, 1991; 91Da6139, Jul. 12, 1991).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below recognized the fact that the land of this case was occupied and managed by the defendant Si from the time when the land category was changed to the road on September 1, 1940, and was assigned to the site of the local highway No. 399, and was provided to the general public by Gyeonggi-do, a management agency, from that time on March 14, 1981, as it was occupied and managed by the public. - The State was occupied by Gyeonggi-do as it was occupied by the national highway between the government and succeeded to the possession of Gyeonggi-do and the road packing around May 1, 1986. As the defendant Si was established on January 1, 1989, the above road management agency changed to the defendant Si and was in possession and managed by the defendant Si from that time. In light of the evidence relations prepared by the court below, the court below's fact-finding is acceptable, and there was no error of law by violating the rules of evidence, or by

If the facts are as above, since the possession of the road of this case from Gyeonggi-do to the defendant is presumed to be an independent possession, the acquisition by prescription shall be completed after the lapse of 20 years from September 1, 1940, which is the starting date of possession, is just and there is no error of law in the misapprehension of legal principles, such as the theory of lawsuit, and the theory of lawsuit is not a proper precedent in this case, unlike the case.

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Song Man-man (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-서울고등법원 1992.1.28.선고 91나21796
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