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(영문) 대법원 1996. 5. 31. 선고 94도952 판결
[특정범죄가중처벌등에관한법률위반(조세)·조세범처벌법위반][공1996.7.15.(14),2076]
Main Issues

[1] The meaning of the phrase "no restriction on the concurrence of fines under Article 38 (1) 2 of the Punishment of Tax Evaders Act" means "no restriction on concurrence of fines shall apply"

[2] Whether the requirements for prosecution are satisfied in a case where a statement of reasons for accusation is omitted in the immediate accusation under the Procedure for the Punishment of Tax Evaders Act (affirmative)

Summary of Judgment

[1] Article 8(1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes provides that a person who commits a crime under Article 9(1) of the Punishment of Tax Evaders Act shall be punished aggravatingly, and the fine shall be imposed concurrently under Article 8(2) of the same Act. In the event of concurrent imposition of fines, the provision on exclusion from application of the provisions of the Criminal Act under Article 4 of the Punishment of Tax Evaders Act shall apply to both cases. The meaning of the above provision "no provision on aggravation from application of heavy restriction on concurrence of fines under Article 38(1)2 of the Criminal Act shall apply to several acts of tax evasion for which judgment has not become final and conclusive at the same time." In punishing several acts of tax evasion for which judgment has not become final and conclusive, it shall not be interpreted that "the method of sentencing a single sentence by adding up one half of the total amount of fines under the main sentence of Article 38(1)2 of the Criminal Act" shall not be applied to the punishment of a fine by adding up the amounts of fines under the latter part of the above provision.

[2] In filing an immediate accusation under the Procedure for the Punishment of Tax Evaders, there is no provision that the reasons for accusation shall be specified in the statement of accusation, and the right of immediate accusation was granted to a tax official to a tax official for the purpose of enabling a tax official to take appropriate disposition according to the time, and the right of recognition for the existence of a special reason is also entrusted to a tax official. Therefore, if a relevant tax official's immediate accusation is made with respect to a case of a tax offense, the requirements for prosecution are satisfied, and the court may not examine the reasons for immediate accusation.

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Article 8 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes, Article 4 and Article 9(1) of the Punishment of Tax Evaders Act / [2] Articles 9 and 12 of the Procedure for

Reference Cases

[1] Supreme Court Decision 82Do256 delivered on April 13, 1982 (Gong1982, 546), Supreme Court Decision 83Do2470 delivered on February 28, 1984 (Gong1984, 642) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 4293Do883 delivered on January 11, 1962 (No. 10-1, 3) Supreme Court Decision 73Do2711 delivered on March 26, 1974 (Gong1974, 7785)

Defendant

Defendant 1 and one other

Appellant

Defendants

Defense Counsel

East Western Law Firm et al.

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 93No3846 delivered on February 22, 1994

Text

All appeals are dismissed.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to Defendant 1’s grounds of appeal

Article 8(1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes provides that a person who commits a crime under Article 9(1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes shall be punished concurrently by a fine under Article 9(2) of the same Act. In the event of concurrent imposition of a fine, Article 4 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes applies to both the provisions on exclusion from application of the provisions of the Criminal Act under Article 38(1)2 of the Punishment of Tax Evaders Act, and Article 38(1)2 of the same Act provides that "no provision on restriction on the concurrence of fines shall apply to a fine" shall apply to the punishment of multiple tax evasion acts for which judgment has not become final and conclusive at the same time by a fine for up to 1/2 of the amount of fine specified in the same Article. It shall not be interpreted that the provision does not apply to only the sum of fines specified in the latter part of the main sentence of the same Article, which shall not exceed the maximum amount of fines for each crime.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, it is clear that the court below acknowledged Defendant 1's three tax evasion acts, and applied Article 8 (1) 1 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes to the aggravated punishment of fines pursuant to Article 8 (2) of the same Act, and applied Article 38 (1) 2 of the Criminal Act to the concurrent imposition of fines pursuant to Article 8 (2) of the same Act. Thus, the court below's decision that did not consider the sum of fines for each crime as a fine in accordance with the above purport is just and acceptable, and it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of the legal principle as to the concurrence of fines for tax crimes as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

2. As to Defendant 2’s defense counsel’s ground of appeal

A. According to the record, the director of the Seoul Regional Tax Office stated in the list of crimes accused of the defendant company and one and two defendants on August 27, 1993 as "1. Violation of Article 9 (1) 1 of the Punishment of Tax Evaders Act, and Article 8 (1) 1 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes," and "the provision of accusation" as "the crime falls under Article 8 (1) 1 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes," and it can be identified that the defendant filed an immediate accusation without taking the procedure for notification under Article 9 (3) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes. However, it is evident that the defendant company cannot be viewed as a violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes, and it is a person who has no choice but to rate as a violation of Article 9 (1) 1 of the Punishment of Tax Evaders Act (see Supreme Court Decision 92Do299, Aug. 14, 1992).

However, in filing an immediate accusation under the Procedure for the Punishment of Tax Evaders Act, there is no provision requiring a tax official to specify the grounds for accusation in the statement of accusation, and it is deemed that the tax official entrusted the authority to recognize the existence of special grounds to a tax official for the purpose of having a tax official take appropriate measures according to the time when the tax official granted the right to make an immediate accusation. Therefore, if there is a tax official’s immediate accusation in relation to the case of a tax offense, the requirements for prosecution are satisfied, and the court may not examine the grounds for an immediate accusation as to whether it is possible to judge on the merits of the case (see Supreme Court Decisions 4293Do883, Jan. 11, 1962; 73Do2711, Mar. 26, 1974). Accordingly, the judgment of the court below that the instant accusation, which was made by the Seoul Regional Tax Office without stating any grounds for accusation against the defendant company, is different or justifiable, and contrary, it cannot be accepted as the grounds for appeal assigning this error.

B. According to the records, when a defendant company made a confession of all the facts charged in the trial of the first instance and was sentenced to a conviction, it is clear that an accusation without a notification of disposition was lodged only on the grounds of illegality of the indictment procedure and unfair sentencing on the grounds that it becomes null and void, and thus, the appellate court’s dismissal of it cannot be deemed as the grounds for appeal for misconception of facts against the rules of evidence, which are not alleged as the grounds for appeal. Accordingly, the grounds for appeal that

3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-서울고등법원 1994.2.22.선고 93노3846
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