Where an employee commits suicide due to mental illness, such as depression caused by occupational stress, the standard for determining whether there is a proximate causal relationship between his/her duties and accident.

Since suicide is essentially based on free will of an employee, there is a proximate causal relationship between his/her duties and suicide solely on the ground that stress experienced in the course of performing his/her duties and that depression was not irrelevant to the motive or cause of suicide. In light of the age, character and position of the person who committed suicide, the degree and duration of stress arising from his/her duties, the degree and duration of pressure, the physical and mental situation of the person who committed suicide, the surrounding circumstances surrounding the person who committed suicide, the outbreak of depression, the timing of the occurrence of suicide, and other circumstances leading to suicide, the existence of existing mental illness and family history, etc., a proximate causal relationship cannot be found unless the suicide was due to occupational stress that cannot be seen from an average point of view or overcome from the point of view of the social average person, and that there was a proximate causal relationship between duties and a disaster. Thus, even in the case of suicide, the determination of a causal relationship between duties should be based on the health and physical conditions of the employee concerned, not on an average person, but on the basis of social average conditions of the worker concerned.

Article 37(1) of the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (Amended by Act No. 9988, Jan. 27, 2010)

Supreme Court Decision 2005Du8009 Decided November 10, 2005 (Gong2005Ha, 1977) Supreme Court Decision 2007Du2029 Decided March 13, 2008, Supreme Court Decision 2007Du16318 Decided June 12, 2008, Supreme Court Decision 201Du3944 Decided June 9, 201

Plaintiff (Law Firm Haro, Attorneys Im Young-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Korea Labor Welfare Corporation

Busan High Court Decision 2011Nu174 decided September 21, 2011

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Busan High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The term “occupational accident” as referred to in Article 37(1) of the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (amended by Act No. 9988, Jan. 27, 2010) refers to an injury, disease, physical disability, or death of an employee who was caused by his/her duties during the performance of his/her duties. As such, there should be causation between his/her duties and disaster. The causation between his/her duties and disaster should be proved by his/her assertion. The existence of causation should not be clearly proved in medical and natural science, but it should be determined by a proximate causal relationship from a normative point of view. Therefore, it is obvious that a worker suffers from a disease due to his/her duties, or whose occupational or stress overlaps with the main cause of the disease, and it can be presumed that there was a serious causal causal relationship between his/her occupational or mental disorder or mental disorder, and that there was no mental stress or stress from the standpoint of his/her own mental disorder (see Supreme Court Decision 9Da3979, Dec. 139, 1993).

In addition, the existence of proximate causal relation between work and accident should be determined on the basis of the health and physical conditions of the worker concerned, not the average person (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Du8009, Nov. 10, 2005). Thus, even when the worker committed suicide, whether the mental illness, such as depression, which caused suicide, is attributable to work should be determined on the basis of the health and physical conditions of the worker concerned. However, whether the worker in question was bound to commit suicide due to mental illness caused by occupational stress, etc. should be determined on the basis of the above overall circumstances from the perspective of the average person.

2. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court found facts as indicated in its reasoning, and determined that the deceased’s death constitutes an occupational accident on the ground that: (a) it is presumed that the deceased’s occurrence of depression caused by occupational stress, and the symptoms of mental illness deepened or continued to spread, led to suicide in a state where normal perception, capacity to choose an act, or ability to suppress mental disorder significantly drops; and (b) the deceased’s death constitutes an occupational accident.

3. However, examining the records in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, it is difficult to accept such judgment of the court below for the following reasons.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below and evidence duly adopted, the deceased was on May 1, 1992 with 00, and the head of the division of the deceased was on Jan. 20, 197, who was on the 10th day after 0th day after 192, and was on the 1st day after 0th day after 7th day after 8th day after 192. The deceased was on the 1st day after 10th day after 200, and was on the 1st day after 0th day after 100, and was on the 1st day after 10th day after 200, the deceased was on the 1st day after 10th day after 206, and was on the 1st day after 10th day after 206, the deceased was on the 1st day after 10th day after 206, and the deceased was on the 1st day after 10th day after 20,000.

According to these facts, the deceased experienced difficulties due to the shortage of the number of workers on board while serving as the chief of the dispatch division or the dispatch division, and without holidays, he was under stress due to work, such as working at the new wall every day, and after the long-term treatment of depression, he was requested to retire from the company for which he had worked for a long time, and was under mental stress.

However, it does not seem that the duties of the deceased are so excessive that they could cause depression, and it does not appear to be recorded that there was a physical injury or insult from his superior’s or her superior’s disease with respect to his or her duties. Moreover, it is difficult to view that the deceased was subject to somewhat mental stress due to his or her retirement, but the degree of stress is ordinary due to his or her retirement, and it does not seem that the deceased was considerably treated from his or her company relationship in the course of the settlement of retirement or retirement allowances.

In other words, it is difficult to view occupational stress exposed to the deceased as a serious stress to the extent that it causes or deepens depression from an objective perspective, and the major cause caused by the deceased to suffer from depression seems to be in a personal lawsuit, such as a strong nature, excessive responsibility consciousness, and worship.

Therefore, even if the deceased’s work volume is somewhat excessive in terms of work hours and work hours, it cannot be concluded that there was an outbreak of depression or deepened.

Meanwhile, the Deceased temporarily laid off and hospitalized the company for the treatment of depression on May 2008, and expressed his/her intent to return to the company upon the recovery of his/her health at that time. In light of all the circumstances indicated in the records, such as the fact that the Deceased was suffering from occupational stress that he/she committed suicide on December 13, 2008, when viewed from the perspective of the average social person, and that the Deceased was suffering from occupational stress to the degree that he/she was significantly unable to be able to be able to receive or overcome, and that he/she was committing suicide due to depression and depression caused thereby.

Nevertheless, the lower court recognized the deceased’s death due to suicide as an occupational accident. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on proximate causal relation between work and death in occupational accidents, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The allegation in the grounds of appeal assigning this error is with merit.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Poe-dae (Presiding Justice)