Main Issues
[1] Criteria for the insured to claim that the insured person is another person under the General Terms and Conditions of Automobile Insurance in the event that the insured person himself/herself suffered from a traffic accident caused by an insured motor vehicle
[2] The meaning of the term "no damage suffered by the insured who is liable for compensation shall be compensated for" means the term "general terms and conditions of automobile insurance"
Summary of Judgment
[1] In a case where there are multiple insured persons liable for damages due to the same car accident, and one of them claims damages against another insured person due to the same car accident, the insured who suffered the accident may claim that the insured person is "other person as stipulated in Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act" if it appears that the insured person could easily prevent the occurrence of the accident because it appears more leading or directly and specifically, compared to the operating control and operational profit of the insured who suffered the accident. In such a case, when the insured person is liable for damages against the insurer, the insured person who suffered the accident is "other person" as stipulated in Article 9 (1) 1 of the General Insurance Clause of the Automobile Accident Compensation Act.
[2] Article 10 (2) 3 of the General Terms and Conditions of Automobile for Business Use (amended by Aug. 194), which was applied at the time of the occurrence of an insured incident, provides that "if the insured or his parents, spouse, and children who are liable to compensate are dead or injured, they shall not be compensated." Here, "the insured who is liable to compensate" refers to the case where the deceased or the injured is an operator under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act for Automobile Accident Compensation Act for the accident caused by the same accident, or there is another victim due to the same accident, and the insurer cannot claim the exemption from liability under the above provision on the sole ground that the victim is the insured.
[Reference Provisions]
[1] Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, Article 9 (1) 1 of the former General Insurance Terms and Conditions for Automobiles for Business / [2] Article 659 of the Commercial Act, Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, Article 10 (2) 3 of the former General Insurance Terms and Conditions for Automobiles for Business / [2] Article 659 of the Commercial Act, Article 10 (2) 3 of the former General Insurance Terms and Conditions for Automobiles for Business /
Reference Cases
[1] Supreme Court Decision 91Da42388, 42395 decided Feb. 11, 1992 (Gong1992, 103), Supreme Court Decision 91Da33285 decided Mar. 13, 1992 (Gong1992, 1301), Supreme Court Decision 93Da1879 decided Apr. 23, 1993 (Gong193Sang, 1535) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 91Da31784 decided Dec. 27, 1991 (Gong192, 775), Supreme Court Decision 94Da31860 decided Dec. 27, 194 (Gong195, 664)
Plaintiff, Appellee
Yellow Hahne et al.
Defendant, Appellant
Dongyang Fire Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Attorney Woo-jin, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)
Judgment of the lower court
Daegu High Court Decision 96Na2294 delivered on September 20, 1996
Text
The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.
Reasons
We examine the grounds of appeal together with the supplementary statement.
1. As to the ground of appeal by the victim that he does not fall under another person stipulated in the ordinary terms of automobile insurance
Article 9 (1) 1 of the General Terms and Conditions for Automobile Business (amended by Presidential Decree No. 1994, Aug. 1, 1994) provides that "the company will compensate the insured for losses sustained by the insured from being legally liable to compensate for losses caused by the insured's death or injury." Article 11 provides that "the insured shall mean the following persons: (1) the insured as stated in the insurance policy, (2) a relative who takes care or takes care of such insured's identity as the named insured, (3) a person who uses or manages the insured's automobile with the consent of the named insured, (4) the user of the named insured, and (5) a person who is driving the insured's automobile for the insured under the preceding subparagraphs, and (1) the insured's comprehensive liability to compensate for losses caused by the same automobile accident, and (3) the insured's comprehensive liability to compensate for damages can easily be claimed against the other person's accident, as it appears that the insured's general liability insurance would have been more or more easily claimed against the other person's accident.
According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the defendant, an insurance company on July 26, 194, based on macroficial evidence, concluded a comprehensive automobile insurance contract with the owner of the above lag Kim Jong-won's above lag's above lag's above lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag's lag''s lag''s lag's lag'.
Although the court below did not have any inappropriate points in its reasoning, it is just in its conclusion that the deceased Kim Jong-Un constitutes "other persons" as stipulated in Article 9 (1) 1 of the General Automobile Insurance Clause, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles, such as the theory of lawsuit. There is no ground for argument.
2. As to the assertion of misapprehension of the legal principle as to the automobile comprehensive insurance clause
Article 10 (2) 3 of the General Terms and Conditions of Automobile Insurance for Business Use (amended by Aug. 27, 1994), which was applied at the time of the occurrence of the insurance accident of this case, provides that "no compensation shall be made in case the insured or his parents, spouse, and children who are liable for compensation". Here, "the insured who is liable for compensation" refers to the case where the dead or injured-in-child insured is a operator under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act for Automobile Accident Compensation Act for the accident caused by the same accident, or another victim due to the same accident. The insurer cannot claim the exemption from liability under the above provision solely on the ground that the victim consented (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da31860 delivered on Dec. 27, 1994).
However, according to the records, since only the above deceased died due to the accident of this case and the other victim did not exist, the above deceased does not constitute a "insured who is liable to compensate" under the above exemption clause without any need to further examine. Thus, the defendant, who is the insurer, cannot claim the exemption from liability based on the above exemption clause.
The court below rejected the above assertion by the defendant that the above deceased constitutes the insured subject to exemption under the general terms and conditions of automobile comprehensive insurance for business use, and that the defendant does not have an obligation to pay insurance money. Article 11 (2) and Article 12 of the General Terms and Conditions of automobile comprehensive insurance for business use provides that "no compensation shall be made in case the person who uses or manages the insured motor vehicle with permission from the named insured, or who is a victim." However, according to the recognized facts, the above deceased cannot be deemed as a person who uses or manages the above mid-term term, but it cannot be deemed as a person who is not a user or manager, and thus, it does not constitute the above exemption clause. In addition, according to the facts established by the court below, the above deceased's assertion that the above general terms and conditions of automobile comprehensive insurance for business use applied at the time of the accident in this case (amended by August 194) did not have any provision as determined by the court below, and therefore, it is just in the court below's conclusion that it did not apply the above exemption or exemption clause as to the above general terms and the insurance clause.
3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Kim Jong-sik (Presiding Justice)