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(영문) 대법원 1994. 12. 27. 선고 94다31860 판결
[채무부존재확인][공1995.2.1.(985),664]
Main Issues

(a) In a case where a public official operates a public vehicle for the performance of his duties, whether the public official falls under the “person who operates an automobile for his own sake” under Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act;

(b) Where the insured who is liable to compensate for losses is dead or injured, he/she may claim the meaning of Article 10 (2) 3 of the General Terms and Conditions of Automobile Insurance which provides for the reasons for exemption of the insurer's liability and its immunity;

Summary of Judgment

A. The term "person who operates an automobile for his own sake" under Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act refers to the person who is in the position of a responsible subject to the control of the operation of the automobile and to enjoy the benefits therefrom, and in the event that a public official operates a public vehicle owned by the State or a local government for the purpose of performing his duties, the operation control or the profit of the operation of the automobile shall belong to the State or the local government to which the public official belongs, and the public official shall not be deemed to have the operation control or the profit of the automobile, and therefore the public official shall not be deemed to have the operation control or the operation profit of the automobile for his own sake

B. Article 10 (2) 3 of the Automobile General Insurance Clause which provides for the insurer's exemption from liability refers to the case where the insured who is liable for damage is dead or injured, and the term "liability for compensation" refers to the case where another victim is liable for damage caused by the same accident. Thus, the insurer cannot claim the exemption from liability under the above provision solely on the ground that the victim is the insured, and it shall be interpreted that the insurer can claim the exemption from liability only when the insured is the operator under the Automobile Accident Compensation Guarantee Act or the other victim is liable for damage caused by the same accident.

[Reference Provisions]

(a) Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act;

Reference Cases

A. Supreme Court Decision 91Da12356 delivered on February 25, 1992 (Gong192, 1116)

Plaintiff-Appellee

Korean Automobile Insurance Co., Ltd., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Defendant-Appellant

[Defendant-Appellee] Plaintiff 1 and 3 others

Judgment of remand

Supreme Court Decision 93Da5376 delivered on January 11, 1994

Judgment of the lower court

Gwangju High Court Decision 94Na1240 delivered on June 3, 1994

Text

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Gwangju High Court.

Reasons

We examine the grounds of appeal.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a comprehensive automobile insurance contract of this case with respect to the automobiles of this case in accordance with the plaintiff's general automobile insurance terms and conditions, the insured under the above insurance contract of this case as " Jeju school" which is a special school established by the defendant as a local government pursuant to Article 144 of the Education Act, and the driver is stated as non-party 1. The above non-party 1 operated the automobile of this case and operated the automobile of this case with the camping site operated by the above school of this case and operated the automobile of this case with the above school of this case, and caused injury to the above non-party 2. The above non-party 2 was in a position to direct and supervise the above school's affairs pursuant to Article 75 of the Education Act as the principal of the above school of this school. The plaintiff's general automobile insurance contract of this case constitutes the non-party 2's duty to use and supervise the automobile of this case as stipulated in Article 11 of the Education Act, and the plaintiff's general automobile insurance contract of this case constitutes the non-party 1's insurance contract of this case.

However, "the person who operates an automobile for his own sake" under Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act refers to the person who is in a position as a responsible subject to the control of the operation of the automobile and to enjoy the benefit therefrom, and when the public official operates a public vehicle owned by the State or a local government for the purpose of performing his duties, the operation control or operation benefit of the automobile shall belong to the State or the local government to which the public official belongs, and the public official shall not be deemed to have the operation control or operation benefit of the automobile personally, and therefore the public official shall not be deemed to have the operation control or operation benefit of the automobile, and the public official shall not be deemed to be the subject of the liability for damages under Article 3 of the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da123

According to the facts acknowledged by the court below, the above non-party 2 was the principal of the special school established by the defendant, the non-party 1, who is the main driver in the insurance policy, boarding the automobile of this case, which is the automobile for the business purpose of the school operated by the non-party 1, and was in the camping site operated by the school. Thus, the above non-party 2, as a principal governing the school's affairs, is in the position to use and manage the above automobile and supervise the driver, and even if the above vehicle was operated in such position, it is deemed for the school's affairs if it is not for the personal purpose, and therefore it is not for the purpose of the school's affairs. Therefore, it cannot be said that the non-party 2, the principal of the above school, has the driving control or the profits of the vehicle. Therefore, in order to judge that the above non-party 2 had specific driving control or the profits of operation of the vehicle of this case, it should be examined whether the operation was made for the personal purpose.

In addition, the above non-party 2 is a person who uses and manages an insured motor vehicle with the consent of the registered insured and who can be qualified as the permitted insured. However, Article 10 (2) 3 of the above standardized contract providing for the insurer's exemption does not provide compensation for personal injury if the insured with the liability for compensation is dead or injured. Here, "the insurer is liable for compensation" refers to the case where other victims exist due to the same accident. Thus, the insurer cannot claim the exemption from liability under the above standardized contract just because the victim is the permitted insured, and the insurer can not claim the exemption from liability under the Automobile Accident Compensation Guarantee Act, and if other victims are involved due to the same accident, the insurer can claim the exemption from liability only if the insured is in the position of liability for damage against the victim.

Nevertheless, the court below held that the above non-party 2 had a specific operation control over the automobile of this case, and that the above contract constitutes "insured liable for damages" as stipulated in Article 10 (2) 3 of the Automobile Accident Compensation Guarantee Act, or there is an error of incomplete deliberation or interpretation of the "person operating an automobile for his own sake" as stipulated in Article 3 of the Automobile Accident Compensation Guarantee Act and the above contract clauses, and there is a reason why it is erroneous.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Jae-soo (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-광주고등법원 1992.12.15.선고 92나3495
-광주고등법원 1994.6.3.선고 94나1240
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