A. Whether the protocol of interrogation of the suspect prepared by the chief public prosecutor without the presence of the public prosecutor according to the direction of the public prosecutor and prepared by the public prosecutor, and in fact, the protocol of interrogation of the suspect prepared by the chief public prosecutor with the testimony of the witness at the place of residence of the witness, and the protocol of statement prepared by the public prosecutor, which was prepared by the public prosecutor, constitutes the protocol which contains the statement of the suspect or a person who is not the suspect

B. Whether the suspect's interrogation record and statement which are prepared by the prosecutor may constitute "documents in which the defendant's statement is recorded in addition to the provisions of the preceding two Articles of Article 313 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act" (negative)

A. In a case where the admissibility of the suspect examination protocol against the defendant, which is prepared by the prosecutor, is denied, whether the testimony in the court of law that the prosecutor's office clerk who participated in the preparation of the above protocol, led to the confession of the defendant in the preparation of the above protocol is admissible (negative)

A. Even though the chief of the prosecutorial police officer questioning the defendant who was a suspect without the presence of the prosecutor according to the prosecutor's order, and the prosecutor prepared an interrogation protocol of the defendant and the protocol of statement of witness prepared by the chief of the prosecutor's office, even though he received his statement from the witness's residence, it cannot be deemed that the prosecutor prepared the protocol of interrogation of the defendant and the protocol of statement of witness prepared by the chief of the prosecutor's office, even though it is signed and sealed by the prosecutor. Thus, it is evident that the prosecutor does not constitute "written statement of the suspect or person who is not the suspect" under Article 312 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act.

B. As to the admissibility of the protocol of interrogation or the protocol of statement prepared by the prosecutor stating the statement of the suspect or a person other than the suspect who became the defendant, the protocol of interrogation and the protocol of statement prepared by the prosecutor is not deemed to fall under the “documents other than the provisions of the preceding two Articles” under Article 313(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, as provided in Article 312(1) of the same Act.

C. If the contents of testimony at the court of the court of Grade VI, which was prepared by the prosecutor, led to the confession of the defendant when the defendant prepared the above protocol as the suspect, the admissibility of the above protocol of interrogation is not recognized unless the admissibility of evidence is recognized.

(b)Paragraph 1 of Article 312 of the Criminal Procedure Act; Section 1 of Article 313;

C. Supreme Court Decision 73Do2123 decided Mar. 12, 1974 (Gong1984, 652) 82Do385 decided Jul. 26, 1983 (Gong1983, 1367), Supreme Court Decision 83Do323,83Do538 decided Feb. 28, 1984 (Gong1984, 652)

Defendant

Prosecutor

Chuncheon District Court Decision 89No92 delivered on March 29, 1990

The appeal is dismissed.

1. Prosecutor's ground of appeal Nos. 1 and 2

As duly confirmed by the court below, the suspect interrogation protocol of the defendant, which is prepared by the prosecutor, was prepared by Non-Indicted 1, who was the chief of the Chuncheon District Prosecutor's Office (the Prosecutor's Office) and Non-Indicted 2, who was the chief of the Chuncheon District Prosecutor's Office (the Prosecutor's Office in charge of the case, and the prosecutor did not attend the above prosecutor's office in accordance with the direction of the prosecutor's office of the Chuncheon District Prosecutor's Office. The above prosecutor entered about about 1 minute of the suspect's interrogation while the above chief questioning the defendant, and the above chief interrogation protocol was prepared by the prosecutor again after the investigation of the defendant was completed. The above chief interrogation protocol was prepared by the prosecutor again after the above chief interrogation of the defendant, and it was not prepared according to the contents of the interrogation, and it was not prepared by the prosecutor individually, and also prepared by the prosecutor's office, and it is evident that the above chief interrogation was prepared by the prosecutor's statement or the suspect's statement prepared by the prosecutor.

The judgment of the court below with the same purport is just, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to admissibility of evidence, such as the theory of lawsuit.

The case of a party member cited by the theory of lawsuit (Supreme Court Decision 84Do846 delivered on July 10, 1984) was examined by the prosecutor on the overall and essential matters of the suspected facts, and on the basis of this, the assistant prosecutor's officer who participated in the examination made an interrogation of the suspect, and entered it in the protocol on the suspect's direct questioning of the somewhat ambiguous or auxiliary matters or auxiliary matters. However, when the assistant prosecutor's inquiry is made, the prosecutor's inquiry was made at the place, and if there is any problem, the prosecutor's inquiry was made at the place, and the assistant clerk's direct questioning was entered in the protocol, and after the preparation of the protocol was completed, the prosecutor's examination was made and signed and confirmed that it is consistent with the results of his examination. The question is related to the issue which the prosecutor prepared and sealed, and it is not appropriate to be invoked in this case.

As to the admissibility of the suspect interrogation protocol or statement prepared by the prosecutor stating the statement of the suspect or a person other than the suspect who was the defendant or the suspect, as provided in Article 312(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, the above interrogation protocol or statement prepared by the prosecutor in the form of the prosecutor does not constitute "documents other than the preceding two Articles" as provided in Article 313(1) of the same Act. Thus, even though the above interrogation protocol and statement are not prepared lawfully by the prosecutor, it does not constitute "written statement stating the statement of the suspect or person other than the suspect" as provided in Article 312(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, it is not acceptable to the effect that "documents stating the statement of the defendant or person other than the defendant" as provided in Article 313(1) of the same Act should be viewed as falling under "documents stating the statement of the defendant or person other than the defendant."

There is no reason to discuss.

2. Determination on the third ground for appeal

The testimony of the presiding judge of the court below is that the defendant made a confession of the facts charged in this case when he examines the defendant as the suspect as above. As seen above, unless the admissibility of the above interrogation protocol against the defendant prepared by the prosecutor is acknowledged, the above testimony of the above chief judge's interrogation protocol shall also be deemed inadmissible (see Supreme Court Decision 73Do2123, Mar. 12, 1974; Supreme Court Decision 82Do385, Jul. 26, 1983; Supreme Court Decision 83Do323, 83Do5, Feb. 28, 1984; Supreme Court Decision 83Do3223, 83Do58, Feb. 28, 1984; etc.). This is because it is against the purpose of denying the admissibility of evidence of the interrogation protocol as hearsay evidence without recognizing the admissibility of evidence.

In the same purport, the court below was just to deny the admissibility of evidence of the testimony of the above tin, and it cannot be deemed that there was an error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to admissibility of evidence, such as the theory of lawsuit.

3. Determination on the ground of appeal No. 4

In comparison with relevant evidence records, the judgment of the court below which rejected the evidence corresponding to the facts charged of this case as inadmissible evidence and acquitted on the ground that there is no proof of criminal facts is just, and the judgment of the court below did not err in finding the facts against the rules of evidence.

We cannot accept the issue because it criticizes the selection of evidence and the recognition of facts belonging to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court below.

4. Therefore, the prosecutor's appeal shall be dismissed, and it is so decided as per Disposition with the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Lee Jae-sung (Presiding Justice)