Main Issues
[1] The case affirming the judgment below holding that in case where Gap corporation's individual pension subsidy, etc. was paid to its employees after calculating and reporting industrial accident compensation insurance premium, etc. from 2003 to 2005, and the decision of the Supreme Court that the individual pension subsidy, etc. constitutes wages was issued, and the Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service determined that the individual pension subsidy, etc. included the individual pension subsidy, etc. in the total wage, etc. in property and imposed the difference on Gap corporation, the aforementioned disposition does not constitute a retroactive imposition that regulates the past facts or legal relations completed through retroactive legislation, and it does not violate
[2] Where the Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service has carried out the business of calculating insurance premiums on the premise that the personal pension subsidies, etc. do not constitute the basis for calculating the average wage, but the Supreme Court has ruled that the personal pension subsidies, etc. thereafter fall under the wage, whether such change of circumstance constitutes "reasons for adjusting or changing individual performance rates due to mistake in the decision, etc." under Article 13 (2) of the Enforcement Rule of the former Act on the Collection of Insurance Premiums, etc. for Employment Insurance and Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance (affirmative), and the method for the Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service to divide the individual pension subsidies, etc. into the total wage and impose the employment insurance premiums
[3] The case holding that the court below erred in the misapprehension of legal principle as to the burden of proof where Gap corporation's disposition was lawful, in case where Gap corporation's calculation of industrial accident compensation insurance fees, etc. from 2003 to 2005, after the Supreme Court's decision was rendered that individual pension subsidies, etc. constituted wages, the Korea Labor Welfare Corporation included individual pension subsidies, etc. as total wages, etc. in the total amount of wages, and imposed the difference on Gap corporation
Summary of Judgment
[1] The case affirming the judgment below holding that the above disposition did not violate the principle of trust protection on the ground that it was merely an amount calculated and imposed a legitimate insurance premium through an investigation, and it did not constitute a retroactive imposition to regulate the factual relations or legal relations of the past completed through retroactive legislation, and the Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service did not have expressed public opinion that it would be excluded from the total wage, on the ground that the above disposition did not violate the principle of trust protection on the ground that it did not violate the principle of trust protection on the ground that the report on the insurance premium was merely an amount calculated and imposed by the Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service, and the Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service did not have expressed public opinion that the personal pension subsidy, etc. would be excluded from the total wage
[2] Articles 14(3), 15(2), and 19(3) and (4) of the former Act on the Collection of Insurance Premiums, etc. (amended by Act No. 8117, Dec. 28, 2006; hereinafter “former Insurance Premium Collection Act”); Article 16 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Collection of Insurance Premiums, etc. for Employment Insurance and Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance (amended by Presidential Decree No. 19973, Mar. 27, 2007); Article 13(1) and (2) of the former Enforcement Rule of the Act on the Collection of Insurance Premiums, Etc. (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Employment and Labor No. 12, Dec. 22, 2010; hereinafter “former Enforcement Rule of the Insurance Premium Collection Act”) have to be deemed as having changed the rate of individual insurance premium calculated by changing the rate of individual insurance premium for industrial accident compensation insurance premiums, etc.; Article 25(1) and (2) of the former Enforcement Rule of the Insurance Premium Collection Act, etc.
[3] In a case where Company A calculated, reported, and paid industrial accident compensation insurance premiums and employment insurance premiums (hereinafter “industrial accident compensation insurance premiums, etc.”) from 2003 to 2005 without excluding personal pension subsidies, etc. paid to its employees, and the Supreme Court sentenced that individual pension subsidies, etc. constitute wages, etc., the Korea Workers’ Compensation and Welfare Service determined industrial accident insurance premiums, etc. by including such individual pension subsidies, etc. as total wages and imposed the difference on Company A, the case holding that even if the Korea Workers’ Compensation and Welfare Service, who bears the burden of proving whether the imposition of industrial accident insurance premiums, etc., is legitimate, there is no error in the misapprehension of the legal principle or determination on the amount of industrial accident insurance benefits (hereinafter “insurance premium balance rate”) due to the inclusion of individual pension subsidies, etc. in the total wage amount, etc., and there is no change in the number of individual insurance premium rates under Article 16 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance and Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 19973, Mar. 27, 2007). 208).
[Reference Provisions]
[1] Article 13(2) of the Constitution, Article 4(2) of the Administrative Procedures Act / [2] Articles 14(3), 15(2), and 19(3) (see current Article 19(4)) and (4) of the former Act on the Collection of Insurance Premiums, etc. for Employment Insurance and Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance (Amended by Act No. 8117, Dec. 28, 2006); Article 16 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Collection of Insurance Premiums, etc. for Employment Insurance and Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance (Amended by Presidential Decree No. 19973, Mar. 27, 2007); Article 13(1) and (2) of the former Enforcement Rule of the Act on the Collection of Insurance Premiums, etc. for Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance (Amended by Presidential Decree No. 19973, Dec. 12, 2010; Presidential Decree No. 1971, Apr. 17, 2017>
Reference Cases
[2] Supreme Court Decision 2003Da54322, 54339 decided May 26, 2006 (Gong2006Sang, 1132)
Plaintiff-Appellant
Hyundai U.S.C. (Law Firm Squa, Attorneys Song Hen-sop et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)
Defendant-Appellee
Korea Labor Welfare Corporation
Judgment of the lower court
Seoul High Court Decision 2009Nu7525 decided November 17, 2009
Text
The part of the judgment below regarding the imposition of industrial accident compensation insurance fees is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The remaining appeals are dismissed.
Reasons
The grounds of appeal are examined.
1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1
The principle of prohibition of retroactive legislation means that an obligation to pay various taxes, charges, etc. is not imposed retroactively by a new Act or subordinate statute after the establishment of an obligation to pay income, profit, property, act, or transaction that has already been established. Thus, applying a new Act or subordinate statute to the facts of imposition requirements that have already occurred after the enforcement of a new Act or subordinate statute does not conflict with the above principle (see Supreme Court Decision 99Du10834, Apr. 24, 2001, etc.)
In general, in administrative legal relations, in order to apply the principle of the protection of trust to the acts of an administrative agency, first, the administrative agency should name the public opinion that is the object of trust to the individual, second, the administrative agency should have no reason attributable to the individual when the statement of opinion is well-grounded, third, the individual should have conducted any act that is trusted and corresponding to that of the individual. Fourth, by the administrative agency's disposition contrary to the above statement of opinion against the above statement of opinion, it should result in an infringement of the individual's trust in the name of the opinion of the administrative agency, and last, when taking an administrative disposition in accordance with the above statement of opinion, it should not be likely to seriously undermine the public interest or legitimate interests of a third party (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Du46, Jun. 9, 2006, etc.).
The lower court, citing the reasoning of the first instance judgment, acknowledged the facts as indicated in its holding, and determined that the instant industrial accident compensation insurance premium (hereinafter “industrial accident compensation insurance premium”) and the imposition disposition of employment insurance premium (hereinafter “instant disposition”) only calculated and imposed a reasonable insurance premium through an investigation in a case where the report of insurance premium is different from the fact, and do not constitute a retroactive imposition that regulates the facts or legal relations in the past that was completed through retroactive legislation. In addition, the first reply of this case was sent by the Minister of Labor to the Nonparty’s personal inquiry, and the second reply of this case cannot be deemed as a reply to the Plaintiff, and its content can not be deemed as included in the total amount of wage in the case of family allowances, and thus, determined that the instant disposition did not violate the principle of trust inasmuch as the Defendant cannot be deemed to have expressed to the Plaintiff the public opinion that the amount of personal pension subsidy, family allowances, and welfare goods expenses, etc. (hereinafter “individual pension
In light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, the above determination by the court below is justifiable. In so doing, it did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the principle of prohibition of retroactive imposition or the principle of protection of trust, etc. as stated in the grounds of appeal.
2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2
Article 14(3) of the former Act on the Collection of Insurance Premiums, etc. for Employment Insurance and Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance (amended by Act No. 8117, Dec. 28, 2006; hereinafter the “former Insurance Premium Collection Act”) provides that “The industrial accident insurance premium rate shall be determined by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Labor, based on the ratio of the total industrial accident insurance benefits to the total amount of wages during the past three years as of September 30 of each year, taking into account the amount required for industrial accident insurance benefits, such as pensions, etc. under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, expenses for accident prevention and welfare promotion of workers, etc., and Article 15(2) provides that “The amount of the final premium shall be determined by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Labor according to the type of the business which is determined by the Presidential Decree, and if the ratio of the amount of industrial accident insurance premiums to the industrial accident insurance premiums for three years before September 30 of each year falls under the ratio prescribed by the Presidential Decree, the Corporation shall, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 14(3) and (4), make a report on the final premium premium to such business or collect it.”
In addition, Article 16 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Insurance Premium Collection Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 1973, Mar. 27, 2007) provides that "in cases falling under the rate prescribed by Presidential Decree" under Article 15 (2) of the Act refers to cases where the insurance premium rate is more than 85/100 or not more than 75/100," and Article 13 (1) of the former Enforcement Rule of the Insurance Premium Collection Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Employment and Labor, Dec. 22, 2010) provides that "in cases where the Corporation determines the special case of the determination of the insurance premium rate under Article 15 (2) of the Act (hereinafter referred to as "individual performance rate"), it shall be determined within 10 days from the public notice date of the industrial accident insurance premium rate under Article 13 of the Decree, and Article 13 (2) of the same Act provides that "in cases where the Corporation intends to change the individual performance rate or adjustment within five days from the date of the objection or decision."
According to the relevant laws and regulations including the above provisions, where the ratio of industrial accident insurance benefits to the amount of industrial accident insurance premiums (hereinafter “insurance premium balance ratio”) is changed when the total wage amount of workers at a workplace is changed, and where the insurance premium balance ratio is changed, the individual performance rate of the workplace is changed gradually. The defendant has been engaged in the business of calculating the insurance premium on the premise that the individual pension subsidy, etc. does not constitute the basis for calculating the average wage. However, Supreme Court Decision 2003Da54322, 5439 Decided May 26, 2006, which held that the individual pension subsidy, etc. should be included in the calculation of the insurance premium, etc., was sentenced to the change in the situation. Such change in the situation constitutes “reasons for adjusting or changing the individual performance rate due to mistake in the decision, etc.” as stipulated in Article 13(2) of the former Enforcement Rule of the Insurance Premium Collection Act. Therefore, since the defendant has the duty to adjust or change the individual performance rate within five days after the above Supreme Court ruling, the difference between the insurance premium and the total premium rate already paid or changed.
Meanwhile, the former Employment Insurance Act (amended by Act No. 7048 of Dec. 31, 2003) and the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (amended by Act No. 7049 of Dec. 31, 2003; hereinafter “former Industrial Accident Insurance Act”) have provisions relating to the calculation, reporting, and payment of employment insurance premiums and industrial accident insurance premiums. However, as the Insurance Premium Collection Act was enacted for the purpose of stipulating matters necessary for the establishment, termination, payment, collection, etc. of employment insurance and industrial accident insurance premiums, the provisions on the payment, collection, etc. of each insurance premium under the former Employment Insurance Act and the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act were deleted, and each of the pertinent provisions under the former Employment Insurance Act and the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act also have provisions similar to the Insurance Premium Collection Act, it is deemed that the aforementioned legal principles are applied as they are.
In addition, in an appeal litigation seeking the revocation of an administrative disposition, there is a burden of proof as to whether the pertinent disposition is legitimate (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Du12937, Jan. 12, 2007, etc.) to the defendant who is the administrative agency asserting the relevant disposition.
After compiling the adopted evidence, the lower court determined that the disposition imposing the instant industrial accident insurance premium was lawful on the ground that there was no evidence to deem that there was no change in the individual performance rate because the insurance balance ratio of the Plaintiff’s workplace exceeds 85/100 or is less than 75/100, and there was no evidence to deem that the individual performance rate of the Plaintiff’s workplace became final and conclusive due to the absence of an objection, etc., and no other evidence exists to deem that the calculation of the individual performance rate is unlawful.
However, in light of the aforementioned legal principles, even if the Defendant bears the burden of proving the legitimacy of the disposition imposing the industrial accident insurance premium in this case’s case’s calculation of the total amount of wages, etc., even if the change ratio of the amount of personal pension subsidy, etc. is not more than 85/100 or not more than 75/100, and thus, the Plaintiff’s individual performance rate at the Plaintiff’s workplace has no change, or the insurance balance ratio is more than 85/100 or not more than 75/100, the court below should examine whether the pertinent disposition in this case’s calculation of the industrial accident insurance premium is legitimate in accordance with the principle of burden of proof without proof.
Nevertheless, the court below held that the disposition of the industrial accident insurance premium of this case is legitimate, since there is no evidence to deem that it should change the rate of individual performance fee at the Plaintiff’s workplace for the reasons stated in its holding, or that the rate of individual performance fee has already become final and conclusive. In so doing, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the calculation method of the industrial accident insurance
3. As to the third ground for appeal
Article 13 (2) of the former Insurance Premium Collection Act provides, “The employment insurance premium to be borne by an employee who is an employment insured shall be the amount obtained by multiplying his total amount of his wages (where the relevant business falls under a special business for collection under Article 21 (1), the base wage shall be deemed the amount of wages; hereinafter the same shall apply) by 1/2 of the unemployment benefits premium rate under Article 14 (1): Provided, That where a worker is not paid the wages under the main sentence of subparagraph 3 of Article 2 from the business owner under the proviso of Article 2 subparagraph 3, the business owner shall bear the amount obtained by multiplying the total amount of the amount considered as wages under the proviso of Article 2 subparagraph 3 by the unemployment benefits premium rate under Article 14 (1).” Article 16 (1) provides, “The business owner may deduct the amount equivalent to the employment insurance premium to be borne by the employee who is an employment insured under the provisions of Article 13 (2) from the wages to the business owner who has not paid the final premium, the amount of the final premium shall be refunded to the business owner.”
In light of the contents, form, system, purport, etc. of the above provisions, in the case of employment insurance premiums, the amount equivalent to the employment insurance premiums to be borne by the original employee shall be borne by the employee himself/herself and paid by the employee, but the Insurance Premium Collection Act imposes on the business owner, who is a person responsible for the employment insurance premiums other than the employee, the obligation to pay the total amount of the employment insurance premiums to be borne by the employee and the business owner, and at the same time allows the employee
On the other hand, a judgment on the grounds of a written judgment can only be indicated to the extent that the text of the judgment is recognizable to be fair, and there is no need to determine all allegations by the parties or means of attack and defense (Article 208 of the Civil Procedure Act). Therefore, even if a specific and direct judgment on the matters alleged by the parties is not indicated in the judgment of the court, if it is possible to find out that the allegations were quoted or rejected in light of the overall purport of the reasons of the judgment, it cannot be deemed omission of the judgment. Even if the judgment was not actually rendered, if it is obvious that the assertion would be rejected, it cannot be said that there is an error of omission of the judgment since it has no influence on the conclusion of the judgment (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 200
In light of the above legal principles and records, even if the court below did not decide on the plaintiff's assertion that the imposition of the employment insurance premium of this case is unfair, it constitutes a clear case where the above assertion is rejected, and there is no error of omission in the determination as to this part of the grounds for appeal.
4. Conclusion
Therefore, the part of the judgment below regarding the imposition of industrial accident compensation insurance fees is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. The plaintiff's remaining appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Lee Sang-hoon (Presiding Justice)