In case the parties did not designate the obligation to be appropriated for the satisfaction of the obligation, the party shall be responsible for proving the satisfaction of the obligation.

Where an obligor bears several obligations for the same kind of obligation to the same obligee, in the provision of performance, if the parties have not designated the obligation to be appropriated for payment, the statutory appropriation is made in accordance with Article 477 of the Civil Act. In particular, according to Article 477 subparagraph 4 of the Civil Act, if the order of statutory appropriation of obligation is identical under Article 477 of the Civil Act, it is appropriated for the repayment of each obligation in proportion to the amount of obligation. Thus, unlike the legal appropriation of obligation according to the above proportional appropriation of obligation, any person who claims that the legal effect of the above proportional appropriation of obligation is more favorable to himself/herself, the designation of the legal appropriation of obligation, the agreement between the parties on the appropriation of obligation, or the full appropriation

Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Act, Article 261 of the Civil Procedure Act

[Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellee] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law No. 1984, 437)

Plaintiff

Defendant

Seoul Civil District Court Decision 93Na3386 delivered on August 17, 1993

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

(1) Judgment on the first ground for appeal

In light of the records, the court below is just in finding that the repayment period of the instant collateral security obligation was April 24, 1990, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence such as theory of lawsuit. In theory, even if the instant collateral security obligation was a debt with no fixed repayment period, as in the lawsuit, it does not change the situation where the plaintiff must pay the full repayment amount to seek the cancellation of the registration of establishment of mortgage of the instant collateral security. The argument is without merit.

(2) Judgment on the second ground for appeal

According to Article 476 of the Civil Act, if an obligor bears several obligations to the same obligee for the same kind of obligation, and the offer of performance does not extinguish the entire obligation, the first obligor may designate any obligation at that time and apply it to the repayment, and if the obligee does not designate it, the second obligor may designate any obligation at that time and apply it to the payment. If the obligor does not designate the obligation to pay, the second obligor may apply it to the payment. In accordance with Article 477 of the Civil Act, if the obligor does not designate the obligation to pay the obligation, the obligor shall be legally appropriated pursuant to Article 477 of the Civil Act. In particular, according to Article 477 subparagraph 4 of the Civil Act, where the order of statutory appropriation is equal, the obligor shall be appropriated for the payment of each obligation in proportion to the amount of the obligation. Thus, unlike the statutory appropriation of the above proportional appropriation of obligation, unlike the designation of an appropriation of obligation which is more favorable to him by the court, or there is an agreement between the parties on the appropriation of obligation, or the claimant who claims the full appropriation of the obligation

Although the court below's reasoning is somewhat insufficient, it is just that the court below held that the plaintiff who is a debtor is liable to prove that the principal and interest of the collateral security obligation of this case was agreed or appropriated as a result of the plaintiff's legal effect which is more favorable to himself/herself, than the legal effect conferred by satisfaction of the debtor's payment of the debt of this case, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the burden of proving the payment of the debt of this case, like the theory of lawsuit, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the burden of proving the payment of the debt of this case. If the plaintiff asserts that the payment of debt of this case is more favorable to himself/herself than the legal effect conferred by the legal satisfaction of the payment of the debt of this case, it is not contrary to the above opinion as to the burden of proving the payment of debt of this case. All arguments are without merit.

(3) Judgment on the third ground for appeal

Even if there is an agreement on the designation of appropriation for performance, or an agreement on the designation of appropriation for performance, or a person asserts that the obligation in question was fully appropriated for performance of the obligation in question in the order of priority of statutory appropriation for performance fails to prove the fact, the above statutory appropriation for performance is a provision of voluntary performance, and thus, it would naturally be made by means of a proportional appropriation of each obligation. However, according to the records, even if the method of statutory appropriation for performance according to proportional appropriation is followed by the method of proportional appropriation for performance, it is apparent that the obligation in question does not become extinguished in whole. Therefore, it cannot be said that the court below erred by failing to examine how the obligation in question is repaid by the statutory appropriation for performance. Furthermore, since the most benefit of the obligation in question exists, the argument that the order of appropriation for performance of the obligation in question is based on the highest interest of the obligation in the court of final appeal, it cannot be a legitimate ground

(4) Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Song Man-man (Presiding Justice)