[1] The meaning of "in relation to the execution of affairs", which is the requirement for employer's liability under Article 756 of the Civil Code, and the meaning of "major negligence of the victim", which is the requirement for exemption

[2] Where an agent of a legal entity omits the agent's name in endorsement of a bill under the name of the legal entity, the validity of endorsement (negative)

[3] In a case where an employee is held liable for damages caused by forging an endorsement of a bill under the name of the employer, whether such endorsement is denied in relation to the execution of business affairs or whether the victim's bad faith or gross negligence is recognized solely on the ground that the endorsement becomes invalid due to the omission of the name of the agent

[1] The phrase "in relation to the performance of an employee's business", which is an element for an employer's liability under Article 756 of the Civil Code, means that an employee's tort is objectively deemed to be an act of performing an employee's business activities, performing affairs, or performing affairs related thereto without considering the offender's subjective circumstances. Whether it is objectively related to the employee's performance of affairs should be determined by considering the employee's original duty and tort, the degree of relation to the employee's tort, and the degree of the employee's loss occurrence, and the degree of responsibility for failing to take preventive measures. In case where the employee's tort falls within the scope of the employee's execution of affairs in appearance, if the victim himself knew, or was unable to know, due to the employee's gross negligence, that the employee's act does not fall under the employee's act of performing affairs on behalf of the employer or the employer, it shall not be held liable for the employer's liability. In this case, the material negligence means that the employee's act was not legitimate within his authority, but it is considerably similar to the ordinary person's duty of care to protect.

[2] In light of the nature of the written statement and words of the act of bill, whether the act of bill by a juristic person is the representative of the juristic person or the representative on the face of the bill, and it should be done by the proxy method of the person who has the authority to write his name and affix his seal on the face of the bill. Therefore, if the name of the agent who is the agent is omitted in the endorsement of the name of the juristic person, if the name of the agent who is the agent is omitted, it shall be deemed invalid.

[3] In a case where an endorsement under the name of an employer was forged by an employee, and the person who suffered losses from the act of forging an employee's endorsement claims damages against the employer pursuant to Article 756 of the Civil Code, the employer's liability is not a responsibility in the bill, but a tort liability under the Civil Code, and the requisite and scope of liability is not consistent with that in the bill. Thus, in the case of an employee's tort liability, the mere fact that the endorsement forged by the employee is invalid as an act of a bill because the name of the agent is omitted, it cannot be said that the employee's tort is objectively related to the employee's business activity, office execution, or execution of business, or such act is not objectively related to the employee's tort, and it is evident that the endorsement was made by an agent, not by the name of the nominal owner, but by an unauthorized person, because it constitutes a case where the employee's act does not constitute an act of execution of business of the supervisor on behalf of the employer or the

[1] Article 756 of the Civil Code / [2] Articles 16 and 77 (1) of the Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes Act / [3] Article 756 of the Civil Code

[1] Supreme Court Decision 97Da4978 delivered on July 24, 1998 (Gong1998Ha, 2203), Supreme Court Decision 97Da47989 delivered on October 27, 1998 (Gong1998Ha, 2747), Supreme Court Decision 98Da39930 delivered on January 26, 199 (Gong1999Sang, 355) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 97Da7745 delivered on March 9, 199 (Gong199Sang, 623)

Lee Byung-Jil (Law Firm Han, Attorney Shin Sang-hoon et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Korea-U.S. Bank (Law Firm Han-S., Attorneys Yu-hee et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Seoul District Court Decision 98Na31263 delivered on April 29, 1999

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Summary of the judgment below

A. The lower court acknowledged the following facts based on the evidence produced therefrom.

(1) On December 195, the non-party Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. (the non-party company of this case) issued 130,000,000 won, the payment place, the Seoul Special Metropolitan City, Korea-U.S. Bank's branch office, the payment date, the payment date, Feb. 15, 1996, and one promissory note with the issue date and the addressee, etc. in blank (hereinafter the instant promissory note), and requested the Plaintiff to discount of the instant promissory note for the purpose of financing, and the Plaintiff demanded the Plaintiff to accept endorsement of the guarantor who can secure the payment of the instant promissory note.

(2) On December 195, 1995, the Houseman found Nonparty 1, the deputy head of the Defendant branch, who was in charge of transactions with the non-party company, and he requested the non-party company to raise the credit in borrowing money by means of endorsement made in the name of the defendant in the instant promissory note. The non-party 1 arbitrarily delivered rubbers and medicines kept and used by the counter employees of the above branch office to the Houseman in order to prevent the non-party company from being insolvent.

(3) The Plaintiff confirmed that the instant promissory note was authentic through telephone conversations with Nonparty 1 after receiving the said promissory note from Hawon, and paid 119,600,000 won to Hawon with the instant promissory note discount.

(4) After that, the non-party company defaulted on January 18, 1996, and the plaintiff presented a payment proposal at the place of payment prior to the maturity of the Promissory Notes, but rejected payment.

(5) From July 1993, Nonparty 1 has been working as a 'examination team' in charge of credit review and commodity and post management, such as reviewing the financial status and business feasibility of an enterprise subject to credit at the Defendant branch. However, in the Defendant, the above 'examination team' is generally called the 'Deputy Director of the branch office', and it does not have the authority to perform the internal business of the branch office, and it does not externally perform the loan execution or receipt business on behalf of the Defendant, and it has a separate position that 'person in charge of business operation' is called the 'person in charge of business operation', and has the person in charge of business operation and direct and supervise his employees and takes charge of the loan execution or receipt business of the branch office.

B. The judgment of the court below

The court below held that, in light of the above facts and the fact that the defendant divided the above facts into "Examination Station" and "person in charge of business operation" different from other banks, and thus, the non-party 1's act of forging an endorsement objectively or closely related to the execution of his business affairs or its closely related to the non-party 1's act of forging an endorsement, since it can be seen that the non-party 1's act of forging an endorsement objectively is a non-party 1's act of forging an endorsement or its closely related to the non-party 1's act of forging an act of forging an endorsement, the non-party 1's act of forging an endorsement, the non-party 1's act of forging an endorsement, the non-party 1's act of forging an endorsement, the non-party 1's representative director of the non-party company, who was in charge of the follow-up management, is liable for damages caused by the non-party 1's act of forging an endorsement.

2. Determination:

A. On the first and second grounds for appeal

The phrase "in relation to the execution of an employee's business", which is an element for the employer's liability under Article 756 of the Civil Act, means that if an employee's unlawful act objectively appears to be objectively related to the employee's business activities, performance of affairs, or performance of affairs without considering the offender's subjective circumstances, it shall be determined in consideration of the employee's original duties and the degree of relation to the employee's unlawful act, and the degree of the employer's responsibility to create risks to the loss and lack of preventive measures. In a case where an employee's unlawful act falls within the scope of external execution of affairs, the employee's act cannot be held liable for employer's liability if the victim knew that the employee's act did not fall within the scope of the employee's act, or was not aware of due to gross negligence. In this case, if the other party to the transaction knew that the employee's act was not lawfully performed within his/her authority, it shall be deemed that the employee's act was not in violation of his/her duty to protect the ordinary public (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 996Da999.

In addition, in light of the written nature and text of the bill of exchange, where a representative of a juristic person or an agent of a juristic person claims compensation for damages under Article 756 of the Civil Act against the employer, the bill of exchange must be executed by the agent of the juristic person, who is given the power of representation from the representative of the juristic person and has the authority to sign in the name of the representative of the juristic person directly. Thus, if an agent of a juristic person omits the name of the agent when conducting endorsement under the name of the juristic person, it shall be deemed invalid if the name of the agent is omitted (see Supreme Court Decision 97Da745 delivered on March 9, 199). However, in cases where an endorsement under the name of the employer is forged by an employee, it shall not be deemed that the employer is not liable under the Civil Act, but the requirements and scope of liability for the tort committed by the employee, and it shall not be objectively the employer's act of omission or omission of the name of the agent in the name of the employer and thus, it shall not be deemed that the agent's act of omission or omission of the employee's.

In the case of this case, the endorsement of the bill of this case by Nonparty 1 is invalid because the name of the agent, who is the actor, is omitted. However, such circumstance alone does not objectively relate to the act of forging the bill of this case to the defendant, who is the employer, or the plaintiff cannot be deemed to have committed bad faith or gross negligence in acquiring the bill of this case. The same applies to the case where the circumstances alleged by the defendant, namely, the fact that the plaintiff's occupation is the so-called corporate bonds business, and that the plaintiff did not receive the personal endorsement of the plaintiff.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to employer liability, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

B. On the third ground for appeal

In light of the records, it is reasonable that the court below recognized that the plaintiff received a promissory note in this case from Hawon and confirmed the authenticity of the above endorsement through telephone conversations with Non-Party 1, and there is no error of misconception of facts due to violation of the rules of evidence as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

C. On the fourth ground for appeal

The determination of the rate of comparative negligence in a tort compensation case is an exclusive right of a fact-finding court unless it is deemed unreasonable in light of the principle of equity (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 95Da17267, Jul. 25, 1995). In light of the overall circumstances at the time of the instant case acknowledged by the record, it is deemed that the lower court’s assessment of the Plaintiff’s fault rate of 40% is considerably unreasonable in light of the principle of equity. Thus, there is no error of misapprehending the legal principles as to limitation of liability and comparative negligence, as

3. Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed and all costs of appeal shall be assessed against the losing defendant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all Justices who reviewed the appeal.

Justices Lee Yong-hun (Presiding Justice)