Extinctive prescription on the damages for delay of bank loans

The damages for delay after the due date for payment for a loan as a business act is not the interest claim subject to the short-term extinctive prescription under Article 163 subparag. 1 of the Civil Code, but the short-term extinctive prescription under Article 766(1) of the Civil Code concerning damages for tort is not subject to the short-term extinctive prescription under Article 766(1) of the Civil Code, and Article 64 of the

Article 64 of the Commercial Act

Attorney Lee Jong-chul et al., Counsel for the defendant

Dong Mine Chemical Industry Co., Ltd and two others, Counsel for the defendant-appellant-appellee)

Seoul High Court Decision 79Na1043 delivered on July 6, 1979

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendants.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. In its reasoning, the court below's decision that the claim in this case against the defendant's defense of prescription is obvious that it is damages for delay after the due date for the loan made as a business act by the plaintiff bank is the interest claim equivalent to the short-term extinctive prescription under subparagraph 1 of Article 163 of the Civil Act, and there is no room to apply the short-term extinctive prescription period of three years under Article 766 (1) of the Civil Act as to damages for delay of the loan made as above with respect to damages for delay of the loan made as a business act, and there is no room to apply the short-term extinctive prescription period of three years under Article 766 (1) of the Civil Act as to damages for tort, and this case's decision that Article 64 of the Commercial Act, which provides for the extinctive prescription period of five years as to claims arising from commercial activities, is acceptable based on the records, and there is no ground for objection to the above decision.

2. In addition, the theory of lawsuit cited Article 479 of the Civil Code as the whole recovery of the leased principal, and thus, the damages for delay should be deemed to have been renounced or renounced. However, according to the evidence of the court below, it can be written that the plaintiff, the creditor, is entitled to designate the appropriation of obligation when there is no special agreement between the parties. Thus, the plaintiff cannot be said to have given up the damages for delay which occurred after being appropriated first to the principal and it cannot be said that the plaintiff has given up the damages for delay which occurred. The theory of lawsuit on this point is without merit.

Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed and the costs of the appeal shall be borne by the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Yong-chul (Presiding Justice)