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(영문) 대법원 2009. 5. 28. 선고 2008다81633 판결
[보험금][미간행]
Main Issues

[1] The principle of disadvantage of the author in the interpretation of the standardized contract

[2] The case holding that, although the provisions of the special agreement for accident death and the special agreement for accident security stipulate that the main insurance contract shall apply mutatis mutandis to the terms and conditions of the insurance contract, the "regulation for self-injury exemption" stipulated in the special agreement for the main insurance contract which covers the death, etc. of the insured as an insurance accident shall be limited to the insurance accident under the premise that suicide may be included in the insurance accident, so it is reasonable to view that the insurance accident is limited to the "Death caused by a disaster, etc." and that the special agreement for accident death that is not included in the insurance accident does not apply to the insurance accident, so long as it can be reasonably interpreted so, there is no room for applying the principle of disadvantage

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Article 5 (2) of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act / [2] Article 5 (2) of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act

Reference Cases

[1] Supreme Court Decision 98Da20752 Decided October 23, 1998 (Gong1998Ha, 2730), Supreme Court Decision 2005Da35226 Decided October 28, 2005 (Gong2005Ha, 1862), Supreme Court Decision 2006Da72093 Decided February 22, 2007 (Gong2007Sang, 498)

Plaintiff-Appellee

Plaintiff 1 and two others (Attorney Kang-gu, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant-Appellant

Korea Life Insurance Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Gyeongsung, Attorneys Park Dong-young et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 2008Na57960 decided October 14, 2008

Text

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The interpretation of a standardized contract shall be interpreted fairly and reasonably in light of the purpose and purpose of the standardized contract in question in accordance with the principle of trust and good faith, and it shall be interpreted objectively and uniformly on the basis of average customer's interests without considering the intended purpose or intent of the individual contracting party. Even after such interpretation, in cases where the meaning of the standardized contract is not clear, such as where the standardized contract provisions are objectively and objectively interpreted and their respective interpretations are reasonable, it shall be interpreted favorably to customers.

2. According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below and the record, Article 17 provides that "I, if the insured were to die or to be in a state of disability of Class I in the table of insurance coverage (see the attached Table 1)" of this case, the company shall pay the death benefit (see the attached Table 1) to the insured during the insurance period, and Article 19 (1) provides that "I, as a result of the accident listed in the table of insurance coverage of this case, the insured shall not intentionally harm the insured." However, the provision of subparagraph 1 provides that "I, if the insured was to die or to be in a state of disability of Grade I in the table of insurance coverage of this case due to an accident of Class I" (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 200Da144440, Apr. 1, 2006). It shall also stipulate that "I, as the main cause of the accident insurance premium classification for which the insured was not specified in the table of insurance coverage of this case."

3. We examine the above legal principles and the above facts.

Article 659(1) of the Commercial Act provides that “Death Insurance Money” shall be paid when a cause for the payment of insurance proceeds occurs, regardless of the cause or character of the death of the insured, if the insured intentionally commits suicide, the term of the principal insurance contract of this case can be seen as a type of a general life insurance contract. However, the term of the principal insurance contract of this case provides that the insured shall be exempted from liability for the payment of insurance proceeds even if the cause for the payment of insurance proceeds occurred, but the insurance proceeds shall not be paid even if the insured intentionally commits suicide after the lapse of two years from the date on which the liability for the payment of insurance proceeds was commenced (hereinafter “the provision on the restriction on self-injury exemption”).

On the other hand, each of the instant special agreements is a special agreement that concludes an additional premium separate from the main insurance contract of this case. The insurance contract of this case provides that "accident", which is an contingent accident as stipulated in the terms and conditions of each of the instant special agreements, occurs, and dies due to a direct cause of the accident, shall be determined as an insurance accident, and the type of the accident is listed in the disaster classification table, and it clearly states the purport that the insurance contract of this case shall be separately paid for the case of death, etc. due to a disaster stipulated in the terms and conditions of each of the instant special agreements,

As above, the main insurance contract of this case and each special contract of this case differ from the insurance accident of this case, and they differ from the insurance accident of this case. Thus, even if the name, purpose and purport of the main insurance contract of this case and each special contract of this case are examined on the basis of average customer's understanding possibility, the above difference between the main insurance contract of this case and the insurance accident of this case and each special contract of this case can be easily and clearly understood. In other words, average customer can not receive only the death insurance contract of this case where the main insurance contract of this case are widely viewed as an insured accident including suicide, but also the special contract of this case where the "Death which is directly caused by a disaster" of this case is concluded by paying a separate insurance premium with the knowledge that separate insurance premium would be additionally paid. Thus, suicide which does not fall under the special contract of this case does not constitute an accident of this case under each special contract of this case is basically a premise that each of the above special contract of this case is not dealt with by the insurance accident of this case.

However, there is a provision that limits suicide exemption in the main insurance contract of this case, and that the provisions of the main insurance contract of this case apply mutatis mutandis to the provisions of the main insurance contract of this case (hereinafter referred to as the "main insurance contract of this case"). Thus, the main insurance contract of this case can be interpreted as applicable mutatis mutandis under the provisions of the main insurance contract of this case. However, the main insurance contract of this case shall apply mutatis mutandis to "matters not stipulated in the main insurance contract of this case" under the provisions of the main insurance contract of this case, so it is clear that "matters stipulated in the main insurance contract of this case" cannot be applied mutatis mutandis to the main insurance contract of this case, and it is interpreted as applicable mutatis mutandis to the provisions of the main insurance contract of this case to the extent that it does not go against the original purpose and purpose of each of the provisions of the main insurance contracts of this case. Accordingly, in light of such interpretation, suicide exemption restriction provisions stipulated in the main insurance contract of this case can be included in the insurance accident of this case under the main insurance contract of this case, and therefore, it does not apply to each of this case.

Rather, as seen earlier, even from the perspective of an average customer, it can clearly understand what the original purpose of each of the instant special agreements is. However, interpreting that the insurer intends to extend the scope of each of the instant special agreements to suicide, not disaster, on the ground that the main provisions of each of the instant special agreements apply mutatis mutandis to what provisions in the process of establishing the terms and conditions of each of the instant special agreements, are not clearly indicated per se. On the other hand, it would give the policyholders, etc. the benefit that is not anticipated at the time of concluding the initial special agreement, while it would undermine the interests of all the insurance organizations subscribed to the insurance contracts, such as each of the instant special agreements, and imposes unreasonable burden unexpected to the insurer. Therefore, it cannot be deemed reasonable.

In addition, as long as each of the instant special agreements can be reasonably interpreted as not applying the limitation on exemption from suicide of the main insurance contract of this case, there is no room to apply the principle of disadvantage of the author as stipulated in Article 5 (2) of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act.

Supreme Court Decision 2006Da55005 Decided September 6, 2007, cited by the court below, determined the "traffic disaster", etc., which may belong to the category of "disaster" as an insured accident, unlike this case, and the special agreement provides for "disaster" which may include "traffic disaster" as an insured accident, and the provisions extending the scope of the insurance accident with respect to the former can also apply mutatis mutandis to the latter. It is related to the reasonable insurance terms and conditions, which are different from this case, and therefore, it is inappropriate to invoke this case.

Nevertheless, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the interpretation of the terms and conditions, which affected the conclusion of the judgment, on the ground that the provisions on the limitation of suicide exemption in the main contract of this case apply mutatis mutandis to each of the provisions of this case under the main contract of this case pursuant to the provisions of the main contract of this case.

The ground of appeal pointing this out is with merit.

4. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Yang Chang-soo (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-서울고등법원 2008.10.14.선고 2008나57960
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