Plaintiff 1 and 40 others (Attorney Oap-sik, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

8. Tourist Development Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Barun, Attorneys Park Jong-chul et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

May 4, 2011

Suwon District Court Decision 2009Kahap4896 Decided October 9, 2009

1. Of the judgment of the first instance, the part against plaintiffs 38, 39, and 40 shall be revoked.

2. The claims of plaintiffs 38, 39, and 40 are all dismissed.

3. All appeals filed against the plaintiffs and plaintiffs 41 listed in the defendant's separate sheet (2) are dismissed.

4. The total cost of the lawsuit between the plaintiffs 38, 39, and 40 and the defendant shall be borne by the above plaintiffs, and the cost of the appeal between the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs 41, and the defendant shall be borne by each party.

1. Purport of claim

The defendant asserts that each disposition on the date indicated in the separate list (2) against the plaintiffs (Plaintiff 38,39,40, 41) on the date indicated in the separate list (Plaintiff 38,39, 40, 41) and each disposition on the date indicated in the separate list (3) against the plaintiffs on the same list is invalid (the plaintiff sought confirmation that each of the above dispositions is invalid, and that each of the above dispositions is not a legitimate disciplinary measure under the Labor Standards Act, or constitutes an unfair labor practice, or an anti-social legal act, or constitutes an anti-social legal act. In the first instance, the plaintiff asserts that the above disposition by the defendant is invalid, and the plaintiffs are not a legitimate disciplinary action under the Labor Standards Act, even if they are not workers under the Labor Standards Act, they are defined as workers under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, and even if they are not workers under the Labor Standards Act.

2. Purport of appeal

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. All of the plaintiffs' claims are dismissed.

1. Facts of recognition;

A. According to the provisions of the Patriots and Veterans Fund Act, the Defendant is a company running the operation of ○○○○○ club (hereinafter “instant golf club”) established around August 1987 and located in Young-si (hereinafter omitted), which is entrusted by the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs to provide golf club users with the services of using the golf club. The Plaintiffs are members of the National Women’s Union (hereinafter “instant Trade Union”) affiliated with the ○○○○○○○ Association (hereinafter “the instant trade union branch”) branch (hereinafter “instant trade union branch”) and has worked as business assistant prior to the disposition of each of the respective dispositions on the list of the instant golf clubs.

B. On September 15, 2008, Plaintiff 41, while assisting Nonparty 2 in the golf team’s games, which included Nonparty 2, began to run down, the distance from the team from 4 holes to the preceding team began. On September 9, 200, Nonparty 2 was pointed out of Nonparty 1 (the Nonparty of the judgment of the Supreme Court) of the Defendant’s sports team leader, and Nonparty 2 heard this in the process. The golf team supported by Plaintiff 41 was able to take into account the course operation situation while moving from 9 holes to 10 holes. Nonparty 1, immediately after the completion of the game subsidy, Plaintiff 41 was pointed out that Plaintiff 41 and Nonparty 1 had the representative director of the company run the golf course, and Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 41 came out of his trade name.

C. On September 16, 2008, the Defendant’s game team manager issued a business trip reservation disposition to Plaintiff 41 on September 16, 2008. On the following day, Plaintiff 41’s business delay act on September 15, 2008, the sports team leader’s intimidation and verbal abuse against Nonparty 1, and on August 8, 2008, the Defendant’s business trip reservation disposition against Plaintiff 41 maintained the Defendant’s business trip reservation disposition by informing Plaintiff 8 that he would make a decision on the punishment for the reasons for sanctions, such as the failure to report the damaging damage around the back team.

D. On September 16, 2008, the sports assistant belonging to the headquarters of the instant trade union, including part of the plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as the "sub-members of the instant trade union"), stipulated that the reservation of the business trip against the plaintiff 41 on September 16, 2008 was improper, and the sports was delayed in succession to the P.M. by refusing the business trip for 40 minutes in the morning.

E. On September 17, 2008, the branch members of the instant case, including the Plaintiffs, participated in the demonstration by dividing five teams into five teams on September 17, 2008 and two o’clocks, and dividing them into five teams on two occasions, and 20-30 minutes each, respectively. On September 17, 2008 and September 18, 2008, the branch members of the instant case, including the Plaintiffs, participated in the demonstration by taking the part of “I would see the appropriateness of the organization.” From September 19, 2008 to September 24, 2008, posted a notice on the free bulletin board of the Internet homepage of the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs, which is 99 times against Plaintiff 41’s reservation of business trip, problems in the operation of the instant golf course, the manager’s crossing dissemination, etc.

F. On September 24, 2008, the Defendant issued a expulsion disposition against Plaintiff 41 on the ground that “The Defendant did not have any reflect or improvement intent even though the punishment was under deliberation in relation to neglect of the progress of the competition, and rather took part in the distribution of false facts, the distribution of company’s image, such as resistance to the company policies, and the demonstration of diskettes, and the fact that he participated in the business obstruction” (hereinafter “instant expulsion disposition”).

G. The defendant, between November 4, 200 and November 26, 2008, as to the plaintiff 36, on the grounds of the harm caused by the behavior of the golf course users and the defamation caused by the false ex officio, etc., the defendant notified the plaintiffs other than the above plaintiffs of each business trip reservation disposition (hereinafter referred to as "the reservation disposition of each business trip of this case") on the grounds of interference with the business, defamation caused by false ex officio ex officio, etc., and "it is recognized that related facts are recognized, and if a written reply and a written oath are submitted to prevent future recurrence, the defendant will take measures immediately in the business trip reservation notice of November 26, 2008."

H. Meanwhile, on February 4, 2009, a considerable number of the plaintiffs submitted an rebuttal and a written oath against the defendant on the basis that the defendant's submission was made [the defendant's voluntary rules on Gyeonggi Assistants (which seems to be the rules established by the "Autonomous Association", which was prepared from July 2008 and established around October 2008 because of the withdrawal of the branch of the trade union of this case or the hostile game assistants to the branch of the trade union of this case)], and thus, it was rejected for the reason that the defendant did not object to the measures such as sanction in accordance with the Gyeonggi Assistant Voluntary Rules and prohibition of providing game auxiliary services, etc. In the event of the violation, each business trip reservation measure of this case is continued until the closing of argument in the trial. However, the non-party 3, 4, 5, and 6, who were the members of the branch of the trade union of this case, withdrawn from the branch of the trade union of this case between February 13, 2009 to February 16, 2013.

I. The defendant's expulsion measures against the plaintiff 38, 39, and 40 are as follows.

(1) On November 30, 2008, the president of the instant trade union sent a letter to the Defendant, and Plaintiff 39, the president of the instant trade union, and Plaintiff 40, the accounting auditor, requested cooperation for the partnership activities from December 2, 2008 to December 31, 2008. On December 2, 2008, the Defendant sent a letter to the president of the instant trade union, stating that “The number of persons necessary for the normal operation of the trade union is insufficient, making it difficult to cooperate in the partnership activities during working hours due to the lack of the number of persons necessary for the normal operation of the trade union. In the future, on the grounds that the details of the partnership activities are clearly stated, the said plaintiffs did not permit the above plaintiffs’ resolution. However, the said plaintiffs did not travel to the games allocated by the Defendant for the same period.

(2) On December 16, 2008, the president of the instant trade union requested the Defendant to cooperate with the Plaintiff on December 17, 2008, the head of the instant trade union, from December 17, 2008 to February 28, 2009, Plaintiff 38, the head of the instant trade union, and Nonparty 7, the advisory members of the Plaintiff 39, 40, and the headquarters, from January 1, 2009 to February 28 of the same year. The Defendant sent to the branch of the instant trade union a public letter with the same contents as the public letter on December 2, 2008, and rejected the Plaintiff 38, 39, and 40 resolution.

(3) On December 18, 2008, the division of the instant trade union asserted that the number of sports assistants is not short by sending official doors to the Defendant on December 18, 2008, and that the said period is a non-passer, and thus, the said Plaintiffs’ association did not interfere with normal business operation, and that if a company requests consultation with a company, such consultation is possible, even if the period of closure is not included in the period of closure, it may be conducted. The Defendant sent an official document to the same effect as the official document again sent prior to December 28, 2008, and rejected the said Plaintiffs’ association.

(4) On December 30, 2008, the head of the instant trade union branch sent official doors to the Defendant, and confirmed that the meeting is being held every day because the problems, such as the disposition of reservation, etc. of each business trip of this case, have not been resolved with respect to the specific contents of the association activities. As to the period of the establishment, the head of the instant trade union branch requested cooperation with regard thereto by adjusting the period from January 1, 2009 to the 14th of the same month. On January 8, 2009, the Defendant stated that sending official doors to the head of the instant trade union branch and again demanding the cooperation to clarify the specific contents of the association activities, and that the said Plaintiffs’ association activities

(5) Despite the Defendant’s rejection of the Defendant’s decision, the said Plaintiffs continued to conduct partnership activities by not going through a business trip from the sequence designated by the Defendant until January 14, 2009. The Defendant issued an order for expulsion of Plaintiff 38,39, and 40 on the ground of an unauthorized decision not less than once on January 14, 2009 (hereinafter “instant second expulsion disposition”).

(j) The branch members of this case were 129 persons around September 2008, but around September 16, 2008, 12 persons between October 10 and January 2009 of the same year, 23 persons around February 2009, and 4 persons from March 2009 to April 2 of the same year respectively, and 55 persons in total withdraw.

【Unsatisfyal grounds for recognition】 Insatisfy, Gap evidence Nos. 14, 25 through 27, 34, 37, 38, 77, 80, 94, 114, 121 through 123, 127, Eul evidence Nos. 4, 6, 8, 10, 15, 31, 36, 48 through 50 (including paper numbers, and part of Gap evidence No. 123), Gap evidence No. 1-6, 8, 2-1 through 4, Eul evidence No. 3-2, 3-9-7, and non-party No. 8’s testimony and whole pleadings

2. The parties' arguments and the issues of this case

A. The plaintiffs' assertion

(1) First, under the premise that the plaintiffs are workers under the Labor Standards Act, each of the instant dispositions against the plaintiffs 41 against the plaintiff 49, 40, and 38 on the title 2 against the plaintiff 39, 40, and 38 (the title "each of the instant dispositions for title 1 and 2" refers to the title "the title "each of the instant dispositions for title 1 and 2") and the remaining plaintiffs (the plaintiffs listed in the separate list No. 2) constitutes an unfair disadvantage (Disciplinary action) disposition and thus is null and void.

(2) Preliminaryly, under the premise that the plaintiffs are workers under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (hereinafter “Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act”), the disposition of reservation and expulsion of each business trip of this case constitutes unfair labor practices involving unfavorable treatment and intervention in control of the legitimate business activities of the branch members of this case. (B) Even if the plaintiffs do not constitute workers under the Labor Standards Act or Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, it should be deemed that the plaintiffs and the defendant entered into a trade secret contract similar to the trade relationship. The defendant's disposition of reservation or expulsion of each business trip of this case against the plaintiffs constitutes anti-social order or abuse of rights under the principle of good faith and thus becomes invalid.

B. Defendant’s assertion

(1) The Plaintiffs, who are sports assistants of the instant golf course, are not workers under the Labor Standards Act or the Labor Relations Adjustment Act, which provide the Defendant with labor for the purpose of wages or wages, etc. under the subordinate relationship with the Defendant, even if the Defendant concluded a collective agreement with the instant trade union, such agreement was inevitably concluded by the pressure of the instant trade union, and thus, is not effective as a collective agreement under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, and no legal relationship exists between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant.

(2) Therefore, the defendant's disposition of reservation or expulsion of each of the instant dispositions against the plaintiffs is merely a mere factual act, and there is no interest to seek confirmation of invalidity.

(3) Even if the plaintiffs are viewed as workers under the Labor Standards Act or the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, there are justifiable grounds for the defendant's disposition of business trip reservation or expulsion based on various offenses committed by the plaintiffs.

C. Key issue of the instant case

In light of the above arguments by the parties, under the premise that they are workers under the Labor Standards Act, the plaintiffs are the workers under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, or seek confirmation of the validity of each business trip reservation disposition and expulsion disposition against the plaintiffs under the premise that they are the parties under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act. Therefore, in order to determine the validity of such disposition, the issue of whether the plaintiffs are the workers under the Labor Standards Act is the first issue

Therefore, in accordance with the concept of workers under the Labor Standards Act and the concept of workers under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, we first examine whether the plaintiffs who are business assistants of the golf course of this case are workers under the Labor Standards Act or the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, and then examine the legitimacy of each business trip reservation or expulsion.

3. Whether the concept of workers and the concept of workers under the Labor Standards Act are identical.

A. Relevant provisions

(1) Constitution

Article 32 (1) All citizens shall have the right to work. The State shall endeavor to promote the employment of workers and guarantee appropriate wages by social and economic means, and implement the minimum wage system under the conditions as prescribed by Act.

(3) The standards for working conditions shall be determined by Acts to guarantee human dignity.

Article 33 (1) Workers shall have the right to independent association, collective bargaining, and collective action to improve working conditions.

(2) Labor Standards Act

Article 1 【Purpose】

The purpose of this Act is to ensure and improve the basic livelihood of workers and to ensure the balanced development of the national economy by prescribing the standards of working conditions in accordance with the Constitution.

Article 2 【Definitions】

(1) The terms used in this Act shall be defined as follows:

1. The term "worker" means a person who provides his/her labor for wages or at a business or workplace, regardless of the type of occupation;

5. The term "wages" means wages, salary and any other kind of money or valuables, regardless of their titles, which the employer pays to a worker as remuneration for work;

(3) Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act

Article 1 【Purpose】

The purpose of this Act is to maintain and improve working conditions, improve the economic and social status of workers by guaranteeing the right to organize, collective bargaining, and collective action of workers as prescribed by the Constitution, and to contribute to the maintenance of industrial peace and the development of the national economy by preventing and resolving industrial disputes by fairly adjusting labor relations.

§ 2. 【Definitions】 The definitions of terms used in this Act are as follows:

1. The term "worker" means a person who lives on wages, wages, or any other income equivalent thereto, regardless of the type of occupation;

4. The term "trade union" means an organization or associated organization thereof which is organized by workers as their principal agents in voluntary and collective association for the purpose of maintaining and improving their working conditions and promoting the improvement of workers' economic and social status: Provided, That it shall not be deemed a trade union in any of the following cases:

(d) Where joining a person other than a worker is permitted: Provided, That in case where the dismissed person has requested the Labor Relations Commission to remedy unfair labor practices, it shall not be interpreted as a person other than the worker until the Central Labor Relations Commission makes a decision on review;

(b) Markets:

(1) In Articles 32(1) and 33 of the Constitution, the term “worker” is used as the same term, and such term “worker” under the Constitution does not exist, and the concept of “worker” is also interpreted as having the same meaning as a worker who sells his labor force regardless of the type of occupation, in comparison with the employer, regardless of the concept of occupation, regardless of the type of work, such as wage, wage, and other equivalent income. In addition, it is difficult to understand the meaning of “the same meaning as that of the employee under the Labor Standards Act” as it is, in light of the complexity and specialization of modern society, to reasonably establish the concept of “worker’s duty to provide a certain service in relation to a particular business or workplace,” and to reasonably define the concept of “the duty to provide a worker’s fundamental rights to work, such as the provision of the Act and the provision of the Act and the provision of the Act and the provision of the Act and the provision of the Act and the provision of the Act and the provision of the Act and the provision of the Act and the provision of the Act and the provision of the Act.

(2) The Labor Standards Act was enacted for the purpose of regulating individual labor-management relations based on the labor contract from the viewpoint of "whether there is a need to directly protect those who provide labor to a person who actually provides labor". However, the Labor Standards Act was enacted for the purpose of regulating collective labor-management relations from the perspective of "whether there is a need to guarantee the right to organize between labor suppliers", and the concept of workers is differently defined in accordance with the legislative purpose (Supreme Court Decision 2001Du8568 Decided February 27, 2004).

(3) Whether a worker is a worker under the Labor Standards Act shall be determined by whether the form of a contract is an employment contract or a contract for employment, and in substance, whether an employee provided labor in a subordinate relationship with an employer for the purpose of wages at a business or workplace (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Da99396, Apr. 15, 2010). In the event that all the statements regarding such subordinate relationship (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 94Da22859, Dec. 9, 1994; 95Nu13432, Jul. 30, 1996; 2004Da29736, Dec. 7, 2006) are satisfied, it may be deemed that an implied or marina employment contract was established between the employer and the employee under the Labor Standards Act, but if not, it may not be deemed as an employee under the Labor Standards Act.

(4) On the other hand, in relation to whether a company-level trade union constitutes a worker under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, it may determine whether a company-level trade union constitutes a worker under the same standard as the concept of a worker under the Labor Standards Act (in the case of a worker under the Labor Standards Act, it refers to the first determination of the worker's nature under the Labor Standards Act on the premise that the worker is a worker under the Labor Standards Act as a matter of course) but unlike a company-level trade union, in the case of an industrial, occupational, and regional trade union, etc., unlike a company-level trade union, it is not possible to determine whether a labor contract relation is a worker under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act solely on the fulfillment of the draft of the Labor Standards Act on the user's subsidiary nature, i.e., the legislative purpose of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, i., whether it is necessary to guarantee the right to organize the worker under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act regardless of the fulfillment of the worker's eligibility under the Labor Standards Act. If it is recognized that there is no need for labor.

(5) In this regard, “worker” referred to in the main sentence of Article 2 subparag. 1 and subparag. 4(d) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act includes not only those employed by a specific employer and actually employed, but also those who are temporarily unemployed or who are seeking to find a job, as long as there is a need to guarantee the three labor rights. However, the proviso of Article 2 subparag. 1 and subparag. 4(d) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act is limited to the provisions prepared in preparation for the dismissal of a member of a “corporate-level trade union” in cases where the worker is denied due to the dismissal of a member of a “corporate-level trade union,” and it is interpreted that such provision does not apply to the case of an industrial, occupational, and regional trade union, etc., which does not require a specific employer-subsidiary relationship

(6) After recognizing the worker status under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act in relation to the position of a golf course assistant as in this case, the Supreme Court of Korea recognized the worker status under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act on May 25, 1993. In the Supreme Court Decision 95Nu13432 Decided July 30, 196, the Supreme Court denied the worker status under the Labor Standards Act, but did not abolish the above decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the logic that the Supreme Court should decide on the worker status under the Labor Standards Act and whether the worker status under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act should be determined based on its own independent standard under the Labor Standards Act. The Supreme Court's previous Supreme Court's decision on the criteria for determining the worker status is not clear. However, it is not clear that the Supreme Court's previous Supreme Court's criticism in academic circles on the criteria for determining the worker status under the Labor Standards Act (in determining whether an independent business entity is an independent business entity or not, the Supreme Court's decision on the concept of worker status should be alleviated to the extent of the independent business entity's concept under the Labor Standards Act.

(7) The recognition of the nature of workers under the Labor Standards Act is recognized by the court, regardless of the external legal relationship formed between an employer and an employee, based on the spirit of Article 32 of the Constitution and the reason for the enactment of the Labor Standards Act, and it is recognized that an implied labor contract has been established between the employer and the employee. Accordingly, in order to recognize an implied labor contract relationship between the employer and the employee beyond the passive limit borne by the employee under the Labor Standards Act, it is reasonable and reasonable for the State to impose such burden on the employer. The reason why the Labor Standards Act was established is that if an employer (capital) retains the benefit derived from the provision of labor in the past without paying a price corresponding to the provision of labor to the employee, thereby improving the situation in which the employee’s right to life is threatened by taking advantage of the nature of the employee’s labor contract, and that the employer has a duty to directly and indirectly protect the employee, who is an economically weak person, without any benefit derived from the provision of labor in the modern society, it is necessary for the State to recognize the existence of a certain labor relationship with an employer without any justifiable reason.

Therefore, in determining the employee status under the previous Supreme Court decision, it is more reasonable to judge whether the employer has a direct interest corresponding to the price for the provision of labor to the employee, i.e., whether the employer has a direct interest in the determination of the employee status under the Labor Standards Act, as a premise to recognize the existence of the employment contract, and whether the employer has a direct interest corresponding to the price for the provision of labor to the employee, i.e., whether the employee status is irrelevant to the employment contract. As such, it is irrelevant to the employment contract in determining the employee status under the Labor Standards Act, i.e., whether the employer’s direction, supervision, and whether the employee can independently engage in business on his/her own risk and account, and whether the employee status under the Labor Standards

4. Whether the instant golf course business assistant constitutes a worker under the Labor Standards Act

A. The parties' assertion

(1) The plaintiffs' assertion

① A considerable direction and supervision over the sports assistants of the instant golf course is being performed through the Defendant’s carcers or sports team employees, etc.; ② an implied agreement is concluded between the Defendant and the Gyeonggi assistant at the time when the recruitment of the sports assistant is made with respect to the gydydy that the Defendant pays to the sports assistant. The amount of the gydydy is determined by the Defendant; ③ gydydyds, etc. are paid by the Defendant for the gydydy work that means the gydydyd or damaged gydydydy’s remuneration; ③ gydyds, etc. are also provided by the Defendant; on the other hand, a third party cannot be allowed to act on behalf of the Defendant; and as such, it cannot be said that the independent business operator did not have any danger, such as profit creation and loss, etc.; ④ the gydydydy management through the game assistant service evaluation system, reward, etc.; and the Defendant cannot receive the Plaintiffs’s basic wages or wages.

Taking account of all such circumstances, the Plaintiffs constitute workers under the Labor Standards Act who are subordinate to the Defendant and provide labor.

(2) The defendant's assertion

① The Defendant does not have any form of labor supply contract, such as an explicit labor contract or employment contract, with business assistant. ② The Defendant’s granting a business trip order, keeping a business trip schedule, maintaining the business interval within seven minutes between the sports team, managing the progress of the games, such as designating the transition route, and providing braille education, etc. to the golf course users are merely a means to efficiently perform its duties from the standpoint of arranging the sports assistant’s subsidies to the golf course users, and the game assistant is performing his/her duties according to the specific direction of the golf course users, so the Defendant cannot be deemed to have specific direction and supervision over the business of the Plaintiffs, and ③ Dolddddddddddddddddddddd's directly receives any money and valuables from the Defendant, and the amount of Dold’s wages is not arbitrarily determined by the Defendant, and thus, the Plaintiffs are not subject to the Defendant’s labor income tax, and the Defendant’s business assistant’s income tax is not subject to the Defendant’s self-regulation or employment insurance policy.

(b) Fact of recognition;

(1) If the sports assistant of the instant golf course is insufficient, the Defendant placed an advertisement for recruitment to the Internet or a gymnas Training Institute, etc., received the curriculum and a letter of self-introduction from the applicant, and examined the documents by one-lane. The Defendant’s sports team leader and the gymnasor, etc., recruited the sports assistant by conducting the second interview, and then recruited the driver’s license. After introducing the gymnas, the Defendant added the driver’s license to the qualification requirements and demanded the existing gymnas to acquire the driver

(2) New game assistants should receive 2-3 weeks short for whether they are the courses of the instant golf course, 1 to 3 months in common, and 2-3 months in common (the duration of education differs depending on whether match assistants experience exists). On-site education means that, if the head of the sports team, etc. takes the role of a golf course user, he/she would engage in the practice as shown in the instant room in the instant room while performing his/her game assistant role, and the accompanied education means that the existing line match assistants and new match assistants receive education in the instant room as shown in the instant room by making 2 persons 1. According to the Defendant’s instruction, the game assistants are provided with the arrangement, field education, etc. in the instant training course, and during the curriculum, they do not receive any remuneration except for meals, etc. provided for free.

(3) The duties of sports assistants who worked for the instant golf course are mainly carried out with the golf course users, such as transporting golf bags, taking golf loans out at the user’s request, and cutting off the balls entering the forest, or cutting off the earth. On the other hand, the golf course’s completion rate is adjusted so that the game hours do not go too much, while trying to do so on behalf of the users, such as handing off the dices arising from the display of golf bonds. On the other hand, the direction of topography and distance, the choice of appropriate golf loans, and whether there is a prior provision within a distance prior to the running of the ststroke, should be examined, such as simple rules and the disclosure of the rules of golf to the point of view.

(4) The Defendant, at the time of the business trip, publicly notifies the number of golf teams and reservation hours of the following month before the month during which fluents are going to travel, and the fluents are able to grasp the schedule of the next month in accordance with the sequences (from 2007, the business team in the organization of the Defendant is in charge of the progress of the games and the business assistant management) set by the Defendant’s athletic team (the business team in the organization of the Defendant is set up in the order of employment). On the day immediately preceding the date fluents are held, the Defendant reported the business trip order to be publicly announced, and identified their specific business travel hours. On the date fluents are going to work at 30 minutes prior to the opening of the games and one hour prior to the date fluents are going to work in accordance with their own sequences, and thereafter leave after cleaning the fluor’s flus

(5) On the instant golf course, two sports assistants are assigned only once a day, and they do not travel on the day, and they are present from 30 minutes to 1 hour before the beginning of the first sports team, and are in charge of the cleaning of the sports assistant room, and are in charge of the cleaning of the sports assistant room. If the day on which the day is scheduled to travel under the order of the sports assistant in question, an additional opportunity to travel on the following day is given, but no remuneration is paid for the business itself on the next day. In addition, once the day is closed, one sanction is imposed on the last day of a week.

(6) No match assistant can freely change his business trip, and if he fails to make a business trip at a time, he shall be treated as the site without permission, and only between the match assistant and the defendant who resides in the same office may change the business trip code exceptionally through the process of verification by submitting a certified copy of the resident registration to the defendant.

(7) The Defendant sports team’s regular employees and the sports-related personnel are involved in the golf games. The manager is in charge of the overall duties related to the assignment of sports assistants, the delivery of customers’ complaints, the coordination of business among sports assistants, the preparation of a business trip book, the management of business reports among the sports assistants, the training of the sports team team team on behalf of the sports assistant team team leader, the management of the sports assistant such as game assistants under the Gyeonggi Assistant Rules, and the match progress personnel are in charge of the business, such as the progress of the games, the maintenance of hours, the designation of the stopping location of the electric car, the designation of the travel route between the courses, etc.

(8) The glars implement the glars on the 2nd and fourth P.M. or P.M. Around the 2nd and fourth P.M., the following instructions are also given to repair DNAs, thorough repair, uniforms management, prevention of safety accidents, compliance with glars, management of users’ belongings, compliance with hours, etc. Furthermore, the golf course users’ instructions on the management of users, such as smoking control at a place other than the designated place of the golf course users, and the guidance on the operation of users, such as the guidance for the operation of the glars during the games, are also given in the form of notice or public announcement. In addition, other than the education on the glars ordinarily and occasionally, the status of the repair of DNAs through the bulletin board, etc. around the game assistant's waiting room, the detailed hours of the games, maintenance of 7 minutes or less between the sports team, and sanctions against the sports assistants who do not comply with the code of practice, etc.

(9) In the front line of the instant golf course, the location of each team and the time interval with the front team in real time is reported to the Defendant’s sports team. The game assistants maintained the distance between the front team and the front team by making oral instructions from the head of the sports team, the sports team’s staff, etc., to maintain the distance from the front team into seven minutes, by maintaining the distance between the front team and the front team through the front team’s oral instructions from the head of the sports team, the sports team’s team’s staff, etc., as well as the front line designation, the passage of the front line designation, the passage between the front line and the West, and the passage of the front team after the completion of the sports support work.

(10) For the systematic repair of a set, a glare is providing guidance to designate a sports assistant in charge of repair of a set and the collection of garbage on a regular basis for each hole of Dong and Dong and 18 holes. The sports assistant rules stipulate that a warning may be given once a month to a game assistant who neglected repair of a set, a warning may be given to a game assistant who fails to perform such work on a three-time basis, and a sanction may be imposed once a month at the end of a week in the case of a three-time non-working period, and in the case of a five-time implementation period.

(11) The Defendant prepared an annual budget for the award of Gyeonggi Assistants, and assessed the cost assistant service, absence, early absence, and good conduct, etc. received from the golf course users, and conducted a comprehensive evaluation and reward for the exemplary game assistant.

(12) The defendant, through the company's Internet homepage guide column, posted the daily fee of KRW 140,00 or KRW 160,00 or KRW 180,00 or KRW 180,00 or KRW 210,00 per week during the week, and received only the daily fee from the golf club users. The game assistant fees posted the total fee of KRW 90,000 without distinguishing the daily fee and the weekly fee, and announced that the daily premium is KRW 90,000 even at the time of the Gyeonggi assistant recruitment advertisement (if each of the of the of the of the of the of the of the of the of the of the of the above cases was removed from the Internet homepage or the Gyeonggi assistant recruitment advertisement after the reservation disposition or expulsion disposition, it was allowed to directly pay the daily fee to the game assistant, and if the additional service fee is voluntarily paid to the game assistant, it is allowed to do so by the sports assistant to use the additional service fee for the following reasons.

On the other hand, in a case where game assistants are unable to receive capital from the golf course users or receive less than 90,000 won for usage fees, they shall be deemed to be in charge of capital posters, placement staff, or printing staff, and they may receive capital from the golf course users and deliver it to the game assistants. However, the Defendant did not receive wages or salary directly or under any pretext.

(13) Meanwhile, from July 12, 2001 to every two years, the Defendant entered into a collective agreement with the instant trade union on the premise that the Trade Union constitutes a trade union under the Trade Union Act and thus the Trade Union Act applies. On the other hand, the Defendant enacted the Gyeonggi Assistant Rules (hereinafter “instant Gyeonggi Assistant Rules”) upon the request of the president of the instant trade union, and enacted and enforced August 1, 2001. The business assistant rules of the instant case stipulate sanctions, grounds for expulsions, etc. as to the matters to be observed by Gyeonggi Assistants, vacations, violations of the matters to be observed without permission, early withdrawals, and violations of the Trade Union Act, and the major contents among them are as follows.

Article 1 (Purpose)

The purpose of these rules is to establish order in a golf course and to create a good sports environment and atmosphere by prescribing the duty of rights of sports assistants who assist sports at the ○○○○ club.

Article 3 (Duty of Good Faith)

A company and its assistant shall faithfully observe the matters prescribed by these rules and these rules.

Article 5 (Settlement)

A recruited assistant shall faithfully acquire the duties and roles of the Gyeonggi-do assistant after completing certain education and training, such as theories and on-the-job training.

Article 9 (Maintenance of Order of Assistants)

Assistants shall endeavor to maintain the following order in the business trip:

1. A fixed time shall be strictly observed;

2. No determination shall be made without permission;

3. He/she shall manage urgently the supplies provided by the side of the golf course;

4. He/she shall not pass through the space between greens in the courses;

5. He/she shall be faithful to the course management, including neighborhood remuneration and DNA remuneration;

6. The progress of the games shall not be interrupted, and shall be promptly proceeded with;

7. 티그라운드를 청결히 하고, 티샷시 잡담을 하여서는 아니 된다.

8. The club and belongings of customers shall be well managed and returned accurately;

9. Other persons shall actively cooperate in maintaining order in the operation of golf courses.

§ 10.(Cr. 1 and C.C. cleaning)

(1) Assistants shall be engaged in 30 minutes a day (two persons a day) by the sequence, and shall remain at the end of the day by 30 minutes a first team and by 1 hour a first team.

(2) An assistant may make an additional business trip on the following day after he/she has made a party trip.

(3) Assistants shall attend the course cleaning after completing the inquiry twice a month.

Article 20 (Unauthorized Resolution)

(1) Where an assistant is removed without permission, the penal provisions of the following subparagraphs shall apply:

Once a month: At the end of a week, No. 4th day at the end of a week, twice: At the end of a week, three times: At the end of a week: At the end of a two consecutive weeks.

4 times: Suspension of a business trip for three months, and at least five consecutive months: Expulsion.

Article 24 (Violation of Rules)

(1) Where an assistant contravenes any of the following matters to be observed under Chapter III, penal provisions shall apply:

3. Non-performance of repair of greens and DNAs during business trips;

Once a month - Warning, 3 times - 18 holes cleaning, 5 times a week

7. Noncompliance of inquiry: Cleaning of the 18 story course.

8. Demand for additional service charges: No more than one week.

(2) Where any act prescribed in the preceding paragraph is habitually committed or the degree thereof is serious, a separate penal provision may apply thereto.

(14) On the other hand, the instant golf course Gyeonggi-do assistant, who operated a dong-owned vehicle owned by the Defendant, provides sports auxiliary services to the Defendant, and the golf course users are prohibited from driving a dong-driving vehicle. Nevertheless, if a user drives a dong-driving vehicle, he/she is subject to the separate rules on the dong-Only Vehicle.

On the other hand, the sports assistants of the instant golf course are supplied with and used by the Defendant, such as soil inserted or Gyeonggi Assistants, and soil inserted, etc. can be directly used by the users.

(15) The sports assistants of the instant golf course do not pay the labor income tax, and do not subscribe to the National Pension, Employment Insurance, and Workplace Health Insurance, and the Defendant does not withhold the Plaintiffs’ labor income tax.

(16) The sports assistants of the instant golf course include the Defendant’s leave of absence, and even if the sports assistants are unable to provide services without any cause attributable to the Defendant, they are not paid business suspension allowances, and are not compensated for the reduction of revenues due to the reduction of the users of the golf course, and are not subject to the Defendant’s rules of employment or personnel regulations.

【Unsatisfyal grounds for recognition】In the absence of dispute, Gap’s 4 through 12, 17 through 24, 35, 38 through 42, 44 through 46, 50 through 54, 56 through 65, 67 through 73, 85, 86, 89, 92, 94, 95, 97, 102 through 109, 111, 114, 115, 125, 130, 131, 134 (part), 135, 139 through 151, 15 through 158, 162, 165, 27, 28, 33, and 38 (including testimony number), Gap’s evidence No. 13-1, 38-1, 3-3, 9-1, 3-1, 9-1 of the witness evidence No.

【Court-Appointed Evidence】 Part of Non-party 8’s testimony of Nonparty 23, 24, 41 through 46, Eul’s evidence Nos. 38-2,

(c) Criteria and identification of employee status;

According to the previous Supreme Court’s view that the standard for determining workers’ nature is that the form of contract is an employment contract or a contract for work, and whether a worker has a subordinate relationship with an employer for the purpose of wages should be determined depending on whether the employer provided labor. Whether a dependent relationship is determined by the content of work, and whether the employer has a considerable direction and supervision in the course of performing work, whether the employer is designated as working hours and working place, whether the employer is bound by the employer, whether the employer is able to operate his/her business on his/her own account by holding equipment, raw materials, working tools, etc., or by employing a third party and acting on his/her behalf, and whether the risks such as the creation of profits and losses, whether the characteristic of remuneration is the nature of work itself, whether the basic salary or fixed wage has been determined, whether the wage has an exclusive relationship with the employer and its degree, and whether the status of the worker has been recognized by the statutes on social security should be determined by comprehensively taking into account various economic and social conditions such as economic status of the worker.

The concept of each worker under the Labor Standards Act and the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act are separately identified and in determining the worker's nature under the Labor Standards Act, whether each of the criteria for determining the worker's nature can be seen as having direct interests corresponding to the price of the worker's labor provision in the previous Supreme Court decision, i.e., whether the employer can be seen as having direct interests corresponding to the price of the worker's labor provision, based on the table of the criteria for determining whether the employer has the direct interests corresponding to the worker's labor provision.

(d) Examining the workers' sexual chart under the Labor Standards Act;

(1) In addition to the above legal principles, we examine whether the sports assistants of the instant golf course can be seen as workers under the Labor Standards Act.

However, according to the facts found in the above (b)(12), (15), and (16), the defendant operating the golf course of this case has treated sports assistants as not workers under the ordinary Labor Standards Act. However, the fact that one of the parties denies the nature of workers against the other party cannot be a critical standard for determining whether or not the other party denies the nature of workers, which is a legal concept, is a matter of whether or not the other party has provided work in a subordinate relationship for the purpose of wages. However, in determining whether the other party is a worker under the Labor Standards Act, the dependent relationship, which serves as the most important standard in its judgment, is general to be understood as a relationship that the other party has complied with specific directions or orders of the other party to whom the labor is provided, but it does not necessarily mean that the other party has a somewhat limited relationship between the parties for other reasons, such as maintenance of order, and thus, it does not necessarily constitute a subordinate relationship with use.

On the other hand, the issue of whether a sports assistant is a worker under the Labor Standards Act is directly connected to the issue of which relationship between a golf course user, a sports assistant, and a user, and the view that a sports assistant is a worker is concluded between a golf course user and a user, and the sports assistant is a person who provides services for the use of a golf course and the provision of sports supporting services incidental thereto. On the other hand, the view that a sports assistant is regarded as a worker under the Labor Standards Act, while a golf course user and a golf course user are regarded as a person who provides services for the provision of sports supporting services, the view that a sports assistant is not a worker under the Labor Standards Act is merely a contract for the use of a golf course between a golf course user and a user, and a separate contract between a golf course user and a sports assistant are concluded for the provision of sports supporting services. In relation to a sports assistant and a golf course user, the sports assistant, which can be regarded as a independent business entity, is not a

(2) In light of the following circumstances, the sports assistants of the instant golf course provide certain labor to the Defendant in a very subordinate relationship, which are recognized by comprehensively taking account of the evidence as revealed earlier,

A) The Defendant, as necessary, shall recruit sports assistants, and the head of the sports team of the Defendant’s sports team and the person who will work at the instant golf course. The golf course users will receive sports support services from the sports assistant assigned by the Defendant, and do not participate in the business assistant’s choice, and do not enter into any other contracts, such as service contracts or delegation contracts. The Defendant, through its instruction, provides a new sports assistant with education on his quality as the sports assistant, which the Defendant requires without compensation from the new sports assistant. The sports assistant shall carry out duties according to the existing practices, the contents of education received from the Defendant, the sports assistant rules, and the contents of the education received from the Defendant, the sports assistant rules, and the contents of the Defendant’s from time to time orders through the sports team leader or the glale posters, and shall be subject to sanctions or rewards according to the results of the performance. If the sports assistant neglects his/her business support duties, he/she shall be subject to various sanctions, such as expulsions, etc. by the Defendant, in addition to his/her business assistant rules.

B) In providing a golf course user with its own security services, sports assistants are subject to sanctions from the Defendant in accordance with the Defendant’s instruction, such as the Defendant’s sports team leader, athletic progress personnel, and gPS’s letter, electrical and gPS screen, etc., at any time, to maintain a distance of time within seven minutes from the front team and the front team, to travel the courses, to designate the street location, and to control the users’ smoking, and to carry out the management of the users, as well as to carry out business activities for the use of the golf course at no cost, even if they do not travel, or to carry out business activities for the use of the golf course at no cost, such as transporting or cleaning the golf fund room of the users at a time, and to collect garbage or garbage on the hole designated by the Defendant as a package, and if neglecting this, it is difficult to see that the above business activities do not fall under the original sports assistant’s business activities, and in light of the Defendant’s interests, it is ultimately difficult to see the Defendant’s business activities to improve the use of the golf course through rapid golf games and the distance.

C) Gyeonggi assistants are given instructions from the Defendant for the match auxiliary services themselves through prior education, point education, and occasional public announcements, and do not separately receive specific and direct command and supervision for each match auxiliary services. However, the hours of attendance, work, and leave are determined according to the order of the Defendant’s determination and the scheduled hours of business trip ( Gyeonggi assistants shall work for 30 to 1 minutes prior to the prescribed business trip hours; the head of the Defendant’s sports team, the match progress personnel, and the solar, etc. in the course of conducting the match auxiliary services, provide instructions for the maintenance of hours within 7 minutes before and after the end of the business, and demand for their implementation, if they fail to maintain a proper interval at a proper time, they shall be subject to sanctions such as without remuneration, changes in the order of business trip, or suspension of business trip, and thus, they may not be seen to have arbitrarily prepared the match assistant’s instruction and supervision through regular business hours, the number of hours of attendance, etc., and the number of hours before and after the end of the business trip and its implementation, etc., and the number of working assistants can not be changed.

D) Gyeonggi assistants are being provided with work tools, such as electric vehicles, earth insertions, and work clothes, which are necessary in the course of performing the business auxiliary duties, so they do not have to invest their capital, except for their labor. As seen earlier, they are not allowed to arbitrarily change the business trip order, leave the business trip on the business trip, or leave the business without any justifiable reason, and thus, they cannot be allowed to act on behalf of a third party. The contents of the business are strong aspects of providing simple labor, and the business trip opportunities are provided by the sequence designated by the Defendant, so they cannot be allowed to freely choose or replace the users, and the amount of glicks cannot be allowed to be arbitrarily determined by the business assistants without the Defendant’s permission, and it is difficult to see the business assistants as independent business operators because they do not bear any risk, such as creating profits and losses, etc. through the provision of labor by themselves.

E) The sports assistants of the instant golf course do not have the number of working days, such as a business trip, for at least 20 days in one month, and for at least 15 days in one month during the instant golf course. A business trip is conducted in accordance with the order of business trips determined by the Defendant, and cannot be accurately predicted at any time and time due to the increase or decrease of users or climate change, etc. of the users, and it seems practically impossible to carry out the business auxiliary in other golf courses than the instant golf course because they cannot be allowed to work on behalf of others at their own intervals as seen earlier, and therefore, it seems that the sports assistants are exclusively dedicated to the Defendant and are recognized as having continued to work.

F) As seen earlier, the business affairs, such as adjusting the proper rate of the progress of the games, maintaining an appropriate interval between the sports teams, prompt repair of a set, keeping cleanliness for the golf course facilities, etc., will ultimately contribute to maximize the Defendant’s profit from the operation of the golf course by increasing the number of times of the courses, raising the satisfaction of the users by enhancing the image of the golf course, and ultimately, the Defendant, by recognizing the importance of the game support business in the golf course in this case, has continuously directed and supervise the game assistants through the sports team leader, the sports progress personnel, and the carcers from time to time, and through GPS, electricity, oral instructions, etc. while engaging in the game support business, and by devising measures to strengthen this, the Defendant has maintained various additional benefits through providing labor for the game assistants.

G) In light of the fact that the Defendant enacted the business assistant rules according to the demand and consultation by the branch of the instant trade union branch, and the business assistant rules stipulate matters concerning the working conditions and the service regulations of the business assistant, such as the business assistant's matters to be observed, preliminary leave, physiological leave, additional business trip, holiday, holiday, childbirth leave, vacation, vacation, sick leave, expulsion, reasons for expulsion, and sanctions for violation of the rules, etc., there is no room to regard the instant business assistant rules as the rules of employment under the Labor Standards Act.

(3) On the other hand, in light of the following circumstances, which are recognized by comprehensively taking account of the evidence as mentioned above acknowledged facts, it is difficult to view that game assistants provided labor to the defendant in a subordinate relationship with the defendant for the purpose of receiving wages from the defendant.

A) The Defendant’s operation of the instant golf course is entitled to prohibit the entry into the instant golf course by a third party other than the users who entered into the instant agreement on the use of the golf course. As such, granting permission to only the third party who accepts such terms and conditions belongs to a legitimate exercise of rights. From the Defendant’s standpoint, sports assistants bring about various additional benefits as seen earlier in the instant golf course operation. On the other hand, even if the Defendant’s use of the golf course is not premised on labor contract relations with the Defendant, if the Plaintiff consented to certain terms and conditions presented by the Defendant, and if the Plaintiff’s use of the golf course as sports assistant is approved, it can be seen that the Plaintiff would use the golf course’s operation facilities, which are the Defendant’s place of business, to a certain extent exclusive status, and thus, it is possible for the Defendant to have the right to use the golf course as well as the Plaintiff’s operation assistant, even if there is no such an opportunity to view the Plaintiff’s use of the golf course as the Plaintiff’s operation assistant’s usage of the instant golf course.

B) In addition, the Defendant publicly announced that it is KRW 90,000 capital on the Internet homepage or the Gyeonggi assistant recruitment advertisement, etc. The Gyeonggi assistant did not enter into an explicit agreement with the users independently, and the Gyeonggi assistant rules stipulate that if Gyeonggi assistant demands additional service fees exceeding the above amount to the users, the Gyeonggi assistant would be subject to sanctions. In fact, the Gyeonggi assistant would demand additional service fees and be subject to sanctions. If the Gyeonggi assistant receives less than KRW 90,000 from the users, he would have the Defendant’s employees receive the insufficient amount on behalf of the users, and the Defendant’s employees would receive the insufficient amount, such as the fact that the Gyeonggi assistant received the shortage from the users, and the management of cleanliness for the progress of the games and the golf course facilities, etc., by increasing the number of times of the courses and raising the satisfaction of the users through the improvement of the image of the golf course, and ultimately, the Defendant would not be considered as having directly equivalent to the Defendant’s employees’ benefits in light of the following circumstances.

The case holding that the defendant's disclosure of gldddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddgdddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd.

In addition, as seen earlier, sports assistants are the only source of revenue from the users, and they did not receive any money from the Defendant, regardless of the name of the business assistant such as the Defendant’s closure, or even in cases where the income has decreased due to the reduction of the golf course users, they did not receive business closure allowances or import reduction compensation from the Defendant. In addition, the Defendant paid the golf course usage fees under the name of the user, and the Defendant should have differentiated the daily fee and the weekend fee from the user for the purpose of maximizeizing the operating profit, while allowing the user to directly pay the capital, which is the price for the provision of labor by the game assistant, to the business assistant, and without any difference between the daily fee and the weekend fee for the business assistant’s use of the golf course in consideration of the Defendant’s general conditions of use of the business assistant’s use of the golf course, the Defendant should have been viewed to have provided the business assistant’s use of the business without any reasonable direction and supervision of the business assistant who is the employer under the Labor Standards Act (in view of the Defendant’s specific circumstances of the business assistant’s use of the business assistant’s use of the business subsidy.

Thus, the defendant does not have direct interest such as capital equivalent to the consideration for the provision of labor by sports assistants through their mutual activities with business assistants, and does not bear the duty to pay capital to the business assistants. Thus, it is difficult to view that the business assistants have the nature of labor itself provided to the defendant.

C) The rules of employment, personnel regulations, etc. established by the Defendant do not apply to the instant golf course game assistants.

On the other hand, the business assistant rules established by the defendant after consultation with the branch of the labor union in accordance with the demands of the branch of the trade union in this case provide matters concerning the working conditions and the service regulations of the business assistant, such as the business assistant's matters to be observed, preliminary leave, vocational leave, additional business trip, background leave, childbirth leave, vacation leave, vacation leave, expulsion of sick and wounded leave, expulsion reason, and sanction for violation of the code of practice. However, unlike the ordinary rules of employment (the rules of employment established by the defendant, in particular, the rules of employment), in light of the fact that there is no specific provision regarding working hours, commuting, overtime work, overtime work, holiday work or vacation work, allowances therefor, wages and retirement allowances, etc., the business assistant rules in this case are merely for the defendant to efficiently control the business assistants through a collective agreement with the business assistant in relation to the operation of the golf course in

(4) Ultimately, taking into account all the above circumstances, sports assistants provide labor to the defendant in a certain degree in a subordinate relationship, but the other party to the sports support service, which is the main labor, is a golf club user who directly pays gldddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd

E. Sub-committee

Therefore, business assistants, such as the plaintiffs, cannot be deemed as workers under the Labor Standards Act who provide labor to the defendant in a subordinate relationship with employment for the purpose of wages, since they cannot be deemed as those who need direct protection to the extent that the various protection systems under the Labor Standards Act should be applied entirely to the state’s management and supervision.

Therefore, the plaintiffs' primary argument that is premised on the plaintiffs' status as workers under the Labor Standards Act is without merit.

5. Whether the instant golf course assistant constitutes a worker under the Labor Relations Adjustment Act

A. The Labor Standards Act and the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act define differently the concept of workers according to their legislative purpose, and the concept of workers under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act established for the purpose of regulating collective labor-management relations from the perspective of "whether it is necessary to guarantee the right to organize, etc. among labor suppliers." The concept of workers refers to not only a person employed by a specific employer but also a person who lives on wages, wages, or other revenues equivalent thereto, regardless of the type of occupation, regardless of the type of work.

B. The criteria for determining the worker status under the Labor Standards Act and the Labor Relations Adjustment Act are still valid in determining the worker status under the Labor Relations Adjustment Act by separately identifying the concept of each employee under the Labor Standards Act and the Labor Relations Adjustment Act. However, the criteria for determining the worker status under the Labor Relations Adjustment Act are still valid in the previous Supreme Court’s decision. However, since the existence of an implied employment contract in order to be recognized as an employee under the Labor Standards Act does not exist, the following criteria are mainly dependent on the business of the employer’s command, supervision, and whether the labor provider is capable of operating the business on his/her own risk and account.

C. The instant golf club workers including the Plaintiffs have been provided with labor services to Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 as the sole revenue source for each of the instant golf club workers, and the Defendant, if necessary, shall conduct the instant business activities as sports assistant, and the Gyeonggi-do Governor and Defendant shall conduct the business activities according to the existing practice, the education provided by Defendant, and the sports team leader or the Defendant’s order from time to time, with the view to the fact that each of the instant golf club workers including the Plaintiff’s sports union branches was not allowed to use the instant golf club units. As such, the instant golf club workers are not allowed to use the Plaintiff’s business activities for each of the instant case’s 10-year business hours by providing them with labor, and the Defendant is not allowed to use the Plaintiff’s business activities for each of the instant case’s 10-year business hours, and it is difficult to view that the Defendant’s business assistant, other than those for the instant golf club workers to use the Plaintiff’s own 9-year business hours, by providing them with prompt golf games and distance.

According to the above facts, even if it is impossible to recognize an implied labor contract relationship between the business assistant of the golf course of this case including the plaintiffs and the defendant, the business assistant of this case falls under the "a person who lives only with gldddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd

Therefore, the plaintiffs are legitimate members of the labor union of this case, which is not premised on the labor contract relations between the defendant and the labor union, and the defendant is not the employer under the Labor Standards Act, but is not the employer under the Labor Standards Act. However, the defendant is the employer under the Labor Standards Act, and thus, the employer under the Labor Standards Act bears the obligation under the Labor Standards Act.

6. Validity of each business trip, reservation disposition, and expulsion disposition of this case;

A. Criteria for determining whether to engage in unfair labor practice

(1) As seen earlier, the instant branch members, who are sports assistants of the instant golf course, constitute workers under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act. Accordingly, the Defendant’s each business trip reservation and expulsion disposition of the instant case constitutes unfair labor practices under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act and the judicial effect of the instant branch members is to first be examined as to whether it is denied.

(2) Whether an employer’s act constitutes an unfair labor practice under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act shall be determined by a comprehensive review of all the circumstances to presume the existence of an employer’s intent to engage in unfair labor practice. Since the burden of proof of unfair labor practice lies in an employee or trade union who asserts it, even after conducting a necessary review, if it is unclear whether the employer intended to engage in unfair labor practice exists and it is impossible to determine the existence thereof, the risks or disadvantages therefrom shall be borne by the employee or trade union that made the assertion.

In relation to this, if an employer took a disciplinary measure, dismissal, etc. against a worker, but it is found that there was a justifiable reason to conduct such a measure, it cannot be readily concluded that such unfavorable measure was taken solely on the intent of unfair labor practices (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Du4120, Nov. 15, 2007, etc.).

B. Determination as to whether each business trip reservation disposition of this case constitutes unfair labor practice

(1) The defendant's assertion

The defendant asserted that the reservation of each of the instant business trip was justifiable since the plaintiffs' refusal to take a business trip on September 16, 2008 and the demonstration with false facts on September 17, 2008 through September 19, 2008, and the spread of false facts on the free bulletin board on the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans' Internet homepage, thereby hindering the defendant's business and impairing the defendant's reputation and credit. In particular, there were cases where the plaintiff 36, as well as the plaintiff 36, caused an unforeseen speech and behavior against the golf course users, spreading false facts, and causing an accident of electric cars.

(2) Determination:

(A) First, we examine the rejection of the collective business trip dated September 16, 2008.

On September 16, 2008, the fact that the business activity of the branch members of this case, including the plaintiffs, was delayed on the day o'clock due to the act of refusing business trip of the branch members of this case including the plaintiffs, is as seen above, and this constitutes an industrial action that obstructs the defendant's business by suspending the provision of labor in order to resist the disposition of reservation of business trip by plaintiffs 4

In addition, as long as the legitimacy of such industrial action is not recognized, it constitutes an act of interference with the normal operation of business by multiple force (Supreme Court Decision 90Do2961 delivered on April 23, 1991) and the act of refusing business trip by the plaintiffs constitutes a tort against the defendant unless the legitimacy of the industrial action is recognized.

On the other hand, in order for an industrial action of workers to be justified, the subject must be a trade union capable of concluding collective bargaining or collective agreement, and its purpose should be to create autonomous negotiations between the labor and management to improve working conditions, and the period shall begin when the employer has refused to conduct collective bargaining or refused such a demand in the workplace of collective bargaining with respect to the specific demand for the improvement of working conditions of workers, and barring any special circumstance, it shall go through legal procedures, such as the decision of the union members, as prescribed by the Acts and subordinate statutes, and the method shall be to stop the provision of passive labor in whole or in part, and shall be in accordance with the principle of fairness in light of the principle of good faith in labor-management relations, and shall not be accompanied by violence or destruction, as well as by the employer's ownership and other property rights, and the purpose here means that the requirements to be achieved by the dispute may constitute collective bargaining (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 94Da4042, Sept. 30, 1994).

On the other hand, the plaintiffs' refusal to make a business trip is intended to accomplish the defendant's request for the cancellation of the disposition of reservation against plaintiff 41, so it cannot be deemed that it falls under the matters concerning autonomous negotiations between labor and management to improve working conditions. On September 16, 2008, the time of September 16, 2008 is the following day after the business delay case of plaintiff 41 occurred, and the defendant executives and the division of the trade union of this case were at the time of provisional disposition of reservation of a business trip in order to grasp the possibility of the business delay case between the defendant executives and the division of the trade union of this case and discuss the possible disposition against plaintiff 41. Thus, in a situation where there is a punishment against plaintiff 41, a collective refusal to refuse a business trip and interfere with the defendant's business by collectively refusing to interfere with the defendant's business,

(B) Next, we examine the act of demonstration by citing a ticket containing false facts from September 17, 2008 to September 19 of the same month.

As seen earlier, there is no dispute between the parties as to the facts of the plaintiffs' demonstration by taking the PPet around September 17, 2008, but it is insufficient to recognize it only with health class, Eul's video, as alleged by the defendant, as to whether the plaintiffs conducted a demonstration by taking the PPPet as alleged by the defendant from September 18 to September 19 of the same year, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it.

Meanwhile, the plaintiffs' act of demonstration as above on September 17, 2008 cannot be deemed as refusing to offer labor or interfering with the defendant's business by active means, such as violence, but if a demonstration is conducted during the hours of using the golf course of this case, it can seriously interfere with the external increase and reputation of the golf course of this case, which is the facility found for the leisure activity by users, and thereby make it difficult for them to maintain their normal management due to serious harm to the external increase and reputation of the golf course of this case. Thus, it constitutes grounds for sanctions unless the above requirements for legitimacy of industrial action are met.

The purpose of the demonstration is to resist Plaintiff 41's disposition of reservation of business trip and to cancel the measure. The issue of the business trip speed, which caused the reservation of business trip, is about the working conditions applicable to all business assistants of the golf course of this case, and the disposition against the above Plaintiff due to the business delay can be seen as a problem of the treatment of the business assistant who can face at any time to all of the business assistants. Thus, this is closely related to the maintenance and improvement of working conditions and the improvement of workers' economic status. Thus, the purpose of the demonstration can be recognized as legitimate because it is the object of collective bargaining because it is closely related to the maintenance and improvement of working conditions and the improvement of workers' economic status. However, in light of the fact that it does not meet the procedural requirements such as the pro-con voting of union members, and thereby it does not seriously undermine the external increase and balance of the golf course of this case, and therefore, it cannot be seen as a justifiable reason for sanctions.

(C) We continue to examine the acts of spreading false information on the free bulletin board on the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs’ website.

In full view of the above-mentioned facts and evidence Nos. 26 and 38 (including the paper numbers), the contents of the above-mentioned free bulletin board are as follows: (a) the Defendant’s re-promotion of the game-related services; (b) the manager’s abusive language; (c) urging the correction of violence; and (d) the game assistant’s suppressions and difficulties; and (c) it is judged that the Defendant’s reputation is sought to appeal to the supervisory body the current situation in which the game assistant is faced, rather than for the purpose of impairing and slandering the reputation or image of the executives and employees of the company as alleged by the Defendant; and (d) even if the Defendant’s reputation is damaged due to such notice, it is consistent with the truth in its major part; and (e) it is not irrelevant to the public interest (including the public interest of a particular social group or its members, including the interest and interest of all its members). Therefore, the illegality of the above-mentioned free bulletin board

However, in the posted article, some excessive expressions can be found, such as "a false speech, will secret language, brut and thoroughly bullying". However, as seen above, the circumstances leading up to the occurrence of the case, i.e., among the sports teams supported by Plaintiff 41 on September 15, 2008, the defendant's head of the sports team, although the game was delayed due to the inconvenience of the bridge among the sports teams supported by Plaintiff 41 on September 15, 2008, did not look at the situation before and after the game, and even if the game was delayed, the defendant's sports team leader took the best consideration of the customer's inconvenience, and once the defendant allowed the game, it should also be deemed that the defendant's sports team's employees or sports assistant's important duties are the defendant's sports team's important duties. However, in light of the fact that Nonparty 1 merely received the defendant's representative director's opinion, the head of the sports team took a serious desire against Plaintiff 41 merely because it did not go against the plaintiff 41's's labor position.

(D) Furthermore, we examine the reasons for the disposition of reservation for business trip against Plaintiff 36.

With respect to the Defendant’s assertion that the Defendant’s instant golf course users are infinitely friendly and false information, it is insufficient to recognize it solely on the basis of the written evidence Nos. 75 and No. 30-1 of the evidence No. 30.

However, according to the statement of Eul No. 30-1, it can be recognized that the plaintiff 36 was faced with the part of the back of the previous car that the former car driven by the plaintiff 36 was in front, which is caused by the above plaintiff's violation of the duty of care as to the operation of the former car, which is a ground for sanctions.

On the other hand, according to the above evidence, the above collision accident is a minor accident that did not cause human life damage. In light of the distance and frequency of driving, driving speed, driving environment, etc. of game assistants mentioned in this case, it is difficult to regard the above accident as a heavy cause for sanctions.

(E) If so, the grounds that are justified as sanctions against the remaining plaintiffs except for plaintiffs 38, 39, 40, and 41 (hereinafter referred to as "Buss plaintiffs"), as stated in the list of the plaintiffs (attached Form 2), are the diskettes of September 16, 2008 and the demonstration of September 17, 2008, and the plaintiff 36, as to the plaintiff 36, have caused an accident during the operation of the previous vehicle. As long as the grounds for sanctions are acknowledged, it is difficult to view that the above sanctions were imposed against them to constitute unfair labor practices immediately.

However, the fact that each business trip reservation disposition against the rest of the plaintiffs is maintained without the time limit until the date of closing argument in the trial, and such indefinite reservation disposition is not a temporary measure taken prior to a certain disciplinary measure, but a serious disadvantage disposition that makes the rest of the plaintiffs' livelihood a fatal compromise (the defendant asserts that each business trip reservation disposition of this case is merely an act of fact, but as seen above, the defendant entered into a collective agreement with the labor union branch of this case to which the plaintiffs belong, and as long as the defendant enacted and implemented the business assistant rules after consultation pursuant to the collective agreement, the business assistant rules of this case has the nature of collective agreement and its effect on the defendant as well as the business assistant rules of this case, and thus the defendant's disposition has the nature of legal act related to the status of the business assistant under the collective agreement). In light of the above facts and the circumstances and contents of the above recognition and the above sanctions, it is difficult to view the remaining sanctions against the rest of the plaintiffs as a serious reason for sanction that should be taken as such indefinite reservation disposition.

(F) The circumstance that a disciplinary decision is unreasonable is that even if it becomes one of the materials to determine whether it constitutes an act of unfair labor practice, such circumstance alone cannot be immediately recognized (Supreme Court Decision 96Nu4220 delivered on March 28, 1997). Thus, we examine whether there are circumstances other than the circumstance that a disciplinary measure is unreasonable in each business trip reservation disposition of this case, and whether it constitutes an act of unfair labor under the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act.

As seen earlier, (1) while the Defendant issued a written reservation and a statement of reasons for its submission, he/she would not accept if he/she complies with the above voluntary rules for business assistants and would accept measures without objection, such as sanction pursuant to the self-regulation rules for business assistants, prohibition of provision of business assistance, etc. If he/she violates them; and (2) the rest of the Plaintiffs return reflects and pledges prepared and submitted by a majority of them to the branch of the trade union, and the above self-regulation rules for business assistants were to have been established at the 10th unit of the labor union under the Act on the Establishment of 10th unit of the labor union, and it was difficult for the Defendant to accept the remaining 6th unit of the labor union members to have been forced to withdraw from the 1st unit of the labor union under the Act on the Establishment of 1st unit of the 1st unit of the labor union; and (3) the Defendant could not be forced to do so for the remaining 6th unit of the labor union members under the Act on the Establishment of the 1st unit of the labor union.

(G) In addition, even though each business trip reservation disposition of this case does not constitute an unfair labor practice, the reservation disposition of this case was deprived of business assistants' opportunity for each business trip until the defendant accepted the conditions required by the defendant, and according to the business assistant rules of this case, which correspond to the collective agreement governing the relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendant, the effect of suspending business trip is similar to that of the defendant, the period of one month or three months for each reason for sanctions. Thus, even though the degree of sanctions for the reservation disposition of each business trip of this case is much more than that of the previous business trip in advance, its ground cannot be found in accordance with the business assistant rules (Article 24(2) of the same case, where the degree of the acts as provided in Article 24(1) of the same Act is excessive, the disposition of this case's business trip of this case's business trip of this case's case's business trip of this case's business trip of this case's case's business trip of this case's business trip of this case's case's case's business trip of this case's case's case's business trip of this case's case's term.

C. Determination on each of the instant expulsions against Plaintiffs 38, 39, 40, and 41

(1) The validity of the instant second expulsion disposition against Plaintiffs 38,39, and 40

A) Determination on the Plaintiffs’ assertion that the instant expulsion disposition is invalid as an unfair labor practice

1) According to the above facts of recognition, Plaintiffs 38, 39, and 40 are subject to expulsion under Article 20 of the rules on business assistant in the instant case, without the Defendant’s approval, at least five times.

In addition, Article 10 of the collective agreement concluded between the defendant and the trade union of this case provides that the activities of the trade union during the working hours of the union members shall be permitted to the extent that does not impede the normal operation of the trade union. Therefore, the activities of the union branch of this case shall be conducted within the extent that does not impede the normal operation of the trade union.

2) In light of the fact that the period of the determination requested by the above plaintiffs was more than two months or more, the defendant was unable to easily predict the demand for the game assistants during such a period at the time of the request for the determination for the association activities of the above plaintiffs, and there was no time to sufficiently cope with the unforeseeable demand by the game assistants while a considerable number of business trips were reserved. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the determination requested by the above plaintiffs would not cause interference with the normal business operation.

In addition, if the period of a partnership is considerably long, it is necessary to grasp the reasons for the conclusion in order to determine whether to approve it. Thus, unlike the practice approved without any specific reasons as to union activities that are temporarily conducted daily, the defendant must demand the presentation of specific reasons for the application for the partnership. According to the written evidence Nos. 14, 33, 84, and Nos. 10, 21, 84 (including the provisional number), the division of the trade union in this case has specified the previous applicant and the reasons in detail, but the documents related to the request for the partnership of the above plaintiffs, which are subject to the second expulsion disposition in this case, were specified for a long period of time, and can be recognized as having not specified the specific business activities.

Therefore, it is difficult to readily conclude that the Defendant’s act of expulsion 2 of this case was based on the intent to engage in unfair labor practice, without permitting the instant determination under such circumstances, by treating the said Plaintiffs as an unauthorized settlement place during the said period.

3) In addition, even if the business assistant, at least twice a day during the period of absence requested by the above plaintiffs, was not more than three days as a result, the defendant's failure to permit the above plaintiffs' application for the above plaintiffs was retroactively unreasonable, or the conclusion of the above period is not illegal, on the ground that the union division of this case expressed the defendant on December 30, 2008, which was prior to the period of absence, that the union division of this case sent an official document to the defendant on December 30, 2008, which was prior to the period of absence, and the above plaintiffs were absent without consultation or approval. Accordingly, once the defendant was ordered to take the second expulsion of this case, the above evidence and the statements stated in Gap 29-1, 2, and 31, it is difficult to recognize that the union division of this case had actually carried out the above consultation several times, and that the union division of this case was actually engaged in the labor activity during the period of absence, and therefore, it is difficult to recognize that the labor activity of this case was actually conducted during the above period of absence.

4) The above plaintiffs also asserted that all of the dispositions of this case, including the expulsion Disposition 2 of this case, are unfair labor practices conducted by the defendant's prior decision to establish the branch of the trade union of this case in order to obtain the maximum amount of the charges against the trade union and the proceeds from the sale of the golf course of this case.

In light of the above facts and records, as long as there exist grounds for sanctions as to the above plaintiffs as stated in the grounds for expulsion, the above facts and records or images of Nos. 25, 27, 43, 56, 78 through 80, 82, 83, 87 through 89, 93, 96, 99, 100, 110 through 119, 120, 121, 124, 125, 136 through 138, 159 through 161, 163, 166 through 173, and 51, 52 (including serial numbers), the defendant's assertion that the above branch of the labor union of this case was not deemed to have been included in the labor union division of this case, and the defendant's assertion that the above branch of the labor union of this case was not deemed to have been required by the law as to the execution of the plan for the promotion of public enterprises.

5) Therefore, this part of the plaintiffs' assertion is without merit.

B) The determination on the plaintiffs' assertion that the second expulsion disposition of this case constitutes an anti-social juristic act derived from the purpose of harming a trade union or an abuse of rights against the good faith principle

In light of the above, as long as the expulsion Disposition No. 2 of this case is deemed not to constitute unfair labor practices, in order to invalidate the expulsion Disposition No. 2 of this case, it should be recognized that there are grounds for invalidation, such as the expression of intent, etc. of this case, or special circumstances making it difficult to accept the validity of the expulsion Disposition No. 2 of this case. The evidence submitted by the above plaintiffs alone is insufficient to acknowledge that there are such special circumstances. There is no other evidence to acknowledge it, and it is difficult to view that the defendant, on the ground of the above plaintiffs' long-term refusal of business trips, expulsion violates the good faith principle, or abused the authority of the defendant with regard to sanctions prescribed by the Gyeonggi Assistant Rules. Thus, the above plaintiffs' assertion is without merit.

(2) The validity of the instant first expulsion disposition against Plaintiff 41

(A) As examined in the part of the validity of each of the instant dispositions against Plaintiffs 38, 39, and 40 and the instant second disposition against Plaintiffs 38, 39, and 40, the grounds for sanctions against Plaintiffs 41 merely provide the grounds for industrial action or partnership activities by other Plaintiffs excluding the said Plaintiffs, and it is not in itself deemed directly related to the trade union activities, and therefore, it cannot be concluded that the Defendant’s first disposition against Plaintiff 41 constituted unfair labor practices, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge them otherwise.

Therefore, this paper will examine whether the first expulsion disposition against the above plaintiff is permissible as a legitimate sanction.

(B) Defendant’s assertion

The above plaintiff 41's act of business delay on September 15, 2008, verbal abuse and intimidation against the non-party 1 of the team leader of the sports team, the campaignet or demonstration on which false facts are stated, and the defendant's business obstruction and defamation by spreading false facts on the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs website on September 23, 2008, etc., there are justifiable grounds for the above plaintiff's expulsion disposition against the above plaintiff, and since the company's employees and executive officers of the division of the trade union of this case held a meeting for the business delay act of the plaintiff 41 and gave opportunities for the above plaintiff to attend and vindicate the above plaintiff, there is no defect in the procedure.

(C) Provisions relating to sanctions

1) As seen earlier, the sports assistants of the instant golf course, including the Plaintiffs, do not constitute workers under the Labor Standards Act. Therefore, in determining the propriety of the Defendant’s instant first expulsion disposition against Plaintiff 41, the provisions related to dismissal under the Labor Standards Act cannot be applied as they are.

However, the defendant established the business assistant rules of this case after consultation with the branch of the Trade Union in accordance with the demands of the branch of the Trade Union of this case, and managed, supervised, and punished business assistants based on such rules. Gyeonggi assistants also agree with the defendant's measures pursuant to the business assistant rules; the legal relations among the defendant, users, and game assistants provide sports assistant services to the users in return for graddddy; while the defendant's general and specific direction and supervision of the defendant's business in return for receiving business trip opportunities, it can be viewed that the defendant conducts business such as business speed adjustment, repair, cleaning, and free repair in relation to the users who are not in charge of them; and the business assistant rules of this case include some of the matters stipulated in the ordinary rules of employment as stipulated in the business assistant rules, which are similar to the rules of employment. Thus, it is reasonable to view the defendant as business assistant rules of this case as being a kind of collective agreement with the defendant, the branch members of the Trade Union of this case and its branch members, and it can be viewed that the defendant is a business assistant.

2) However, according to the business assistant rules of this case, sports assistants may actively cooperate in maintaining order in the operation of the golf course (Article 9 subparag. 9), suspend business trips for one month (Article 24(1)9), and penal provisions (Article 24(1)11) and penal provisions (Article 24(1)11) applicable to other acts to be observed (Article 24(1)11) and penal provisions (Article 24(1)1 through 10) applicable to other acts to be observed. If the business assistant habitually commits any act falling under each subparagraph of Article 24(1) or has a significant degree, the defendant may apply separate penal provisions (Article 24(2)). The defendant may appoint the business assistant if the business assistant violates other rules on several occasions and has no improvement thereof (Article 26(1)3) and if there is no improvement thereof, he/she shall give the business assistant an opportunity to explain it (Article 26(2)6(2)6).

(D) Determination as to the legitimacy of the reason for expulsion

1) First, we examine the economic delay on September 15, 2008.

As seen earlier, Plaintiff 41’s daily event, which supported the game on September 15, 2008, was due to the inconvenience of Nonparty 2, who was the part of the game team that supported the game, and the game was delayed even if the above Plaintiff 2 promoted the game, and as long as the Defendant permitted the game to the users, giving maximum consideration to the users who suffered inconvenience shall be deemed to constitute an important duty of the game assistant. Therefore, it is difficult to view that the game was delayed due to Plaintiff 41’s causes attributable to Plaintiff 41, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge this.

2) Next, we examine whether there was verbal abuse and intimidation against Nonparty 1 by the head of the sports team.

In full view of the statement No. 37-1, No. 37-2, No. 3-1, No. 3-2, and Non-Party 1’s testimony (excluding the non-trusted part) of Non-Party 1 of the first instance trial, it may be acknowledged that on September 15, 2005, Non-Party 1 stated that “I will go to the above plaintiff,” and “I will go to the plaintiff,” and “I will go to the President,” and the plaintiff 41 stated that “I will go to the head of the sports team,” and that the above mentioned part of the plaintiff’s above is unlawful as it constitutes verbal abuse to the status of Non-Party 1 and constitutes a ground for sanctions under the Gyeonggi Assistant Rules.

3) Furthermore, we examine whether the instant trade union's subdivisions of the trade union interfered with the Defendant company's business and damaged honor by spreading false facts on the scket demonstration containing false facts on September 16, 2008, and on the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs' homepage, which included false facts on September 23, 2008.

The plaintiff 41 appears to have provided a cause for the above act and urged the branch members of the trade union of this case to participate in the above act, so the above act of the plaintiff 41 constitutes a ground for sanctions under the Gyeonggi assistant rules. The plaintiff's act constitutes a ground for sanctions under the business assistant rules.

However, with respect to the distribution of false information on the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs website, most of the contents are prepared for the purpose of appealing the situation in which the sports assistants, including Plaintiff 41, etc., such as Plaintiff 41, etc., are faced with the truth in major parts, and the illegality is avoided because they are not irrelevant to the public interest. In light of the developments leading up to the business delay controversy that occurred on September 15, 2008, some excessive expressions are not against the social rules, and thus, the Defendant cannot be subject to sanctions.

4) If so, the grounds for sanctions against Plaintiff 41 are limited to the abusive language against Nonparty 1, the act of inciting to refuse to take a business trip of September 16, 2008 against the branch members of the instant trade union, and the act of using a pocket ticket, stating false facts on September 23, 2008.

(E) Whether the first expulsion disposition of this case is justifiable or not

In full view of the above circumstances, it is difficult to view that an individual act recognized as a ground for sanctions against Plaintiff 41 constitutes a case significantly serious compared to other sanctions prescribed by the Gyeonggi Assistant Rules (the verbal abuse against Nonparty 1 is similar to the case of assault boms among boms under Article 24(1)9 of the Act, which is the reason for suspending a business trip for one month). Since there is no evidence to acknowledge that the above Plaintiff violated the sports assistant rules several times and there is no prior opening (Article 26(1)3), the instant order to order Plaintiff 41 immediately without undergoing any other sanctions prescribed by the sports assistant rules, the instant order to order Plaintiff 41 is null and void since the Defendant deviates from or abused discretion on the sanctions against the sports assistant imposed by the Gyeonggi Assistant Rules.

(f) Determination of procedural legitimacy

또한, 피고가 경기보조원을 제명하기 위해서는 경기보조원 수칙에 정한 바에 따라 원고 41에게 소명의 기회를 부여하여야 함은 앞ㅋ원고 41에게 소명의 기회를 부여하였는지 살펴본다.

At around 13:00 on September 16, 2008, the first meeting was held to take place in order to examine the situation of the business delay of the above plaintiff while the defendant's executives, the executives of the trade union of this case, and the executives of the trade union of this case were present. At the above meeting, the plaintiff 41 showed "the fact that the business progress was delayed and that the team leader did not have a duty to act." As the defendant did not decide the disposition against the above plaintiff, the defendant agreed on the disposition of the plaintiff 41 while the defendant's executives and the executives of the trade union of this case were present at around 17:00 on the same day, but did not reach the conclusion between the defendant and the trade union of this case, there is no dispute between the parties.

However, the above meetings discussed the above plaintiff's expulsion, rather than giving the plaintiff an opportunity to defend himself against the reason for expulsion, with a primary aim to grasp the situation of the game delay and the situation of the trial with the non-party 1. The defendant's actual reason for expulsion includes the plaintiff 41-9. 15. 2008. The defendant's act of business delay, other than the non-party 1's abusive language, the acts of spreading false facts on the plaintiff 1's free bulletin board of the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans, etc. In addition, since the above date was made after September 16, 2008, it is difficult to view that the plaintiff 41 was given an opportunity to vindicate the reason for expulsion, even if the plaintiff 3-1 was given an opportunity to vindicate the sports delay and the non-party 1's verbal abuse, and the defendant's act of spreading false facts on the non-party 1's free bulletin board of the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge the defendant's additional opportunity to explain prior to the plaintiff 1.

D. Sub-committee

Therefore, each of the instant dispositions against the remaining plaintiffs constitutes unfair labor practices, and thus the instant disposition against the plaintiff 41 is null and void as it is without substantive and procedural justification. Since the defendant asserted the validity of each of the above dispositions and did not provide the remaining plaintiffs and the plaintiff 41 with an opportunity to make a business trip, the remaining plaintiffs and the plaintiff 41 have a legal interest in seeking confirmation of the invalidity of each of the above dispositions to recover the status of the previous business assistant, but the second expulsion disposition against the plaintiff 39, 40, and 38 is valid due to justifiable grounds.

7. Conclusion

Therefore, the remaining plaintiffs and plaintiffs 41' claims are accepted in their respective grounds, and all claims of plaintiffs 38, 39, and 40 are dismissed as they are without merit. Among the judgment of the court of first instance, since the parts of plaintiffs 38, 39, and 40 in the judgment of the court of first instance are unfair by different conclusions, the above plaintiffs' claims in the judgment of the court of first instance are revoked, and all of the above plaintiffs and 41 in the judgment of the court of first instance are dismissed. The remaining plaintiffs and 41 in the judgment of the court of first instance are different reasons, but they are just in conclusion, and they are all dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.

[Attachment]

Judges Kim Yong-maid (Presiding Judge)