(a) Degree of the corroborating evidence against the confession;

B. Whether the withdrawn charge constitutes a violation of the principle of no accusation that makes it the transitional fact of another crime

C. The meaning of national secrets under Article 3(1) of the former National Security Act (No. 1151 of Jun. 24, 1982)

(a) Reinforcements for confessions are sufficient if the confessions of the accused are not processed, but can be recognized as true, and these evidences are sufficient as well as direct evidence or indirect evidence.

B. As long as the prosecutor does not prosecute a specific facts charged as a separate crime among the facts charged and withdraws it, unless it is clearly stated that the withdrawn facts are included in a crime among other facts charged, the withdrawn facts cannot be subject to a trial since it returned to the beginning that it has not been prosecuted, and thus, it cannot be viewed as a content of other facts charged and transitional facts.

C. A state secret under Article 3(1) of the former National Security Act (No. 1151 of Sep. 24, 1962) is a state secret under Article 2 of the former National Security Act and Article 98(1) of the Criminal Act, since it differs from the importance and value of the state secret under Article 98(1) of the former National Security Act, it refers to a state secret which is higher than that of the latter. Thus, if the information detected and collected can be easily known by anyone, it shall not be deemed a state secret with a high level of importance under Article 3(1) of the former National Security

Articles 310 and 298 of the Criminal Procedure Act; Articles 3(1) and 3(2) of the former National Security Act; Articles 98 and 3(2) of the Criminal Act; Article 98 of the Criminal Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 83Do2436 delivered on November 8, 1983, 84Do1381 delivered on July 9, 1985, and 86Do808 delivered on July 22, 1986, and 87Do705 delivered on June 23, 1987, Supreme Court Decision 68Do754 delivered on July 30, 1968, and 85Do1925 delivered on November 12, 1985; Supreme Court Decision 74Do1477 delivered on April 26, 197, and 82Do285 delivered on April 27, 1982, Supreme Court Decision 86Do2313 delivered on May 26, 1987

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney Lee Im-soo

Seoul High Court Decision 87No1410 decided July 23, 1987

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal by the defendant and his defense counsel are also examined.

(1) Among the evidence of the first instance court maintained by the court below, each protocol of examination of the defendant of the prosecutor's defendant was prepared without notifying the right to refuse to make statements as in the theory of lawsuit, and the court below's decision that accepted the evidence as evidence is just and contains no errors of law such as the theory of lawsuit, since it is hard to find that the statement was not Voluntary or there are grounds to suspect that it is a statement without credibility, since it was prepared in the situation where there is no voluntariness due to the unreasonable prolongedness, etc

In addition, the supporting evidence for a confession is sufficient if it is sufficient to recognize that the confession of the defendant is not processed, but true, and such evidence is sufficient not only to direct evidence, but also to circumstantial or indirect evidence (see Supreme Court Decision 86Do808, Jul. 22, 1986). Thus, various evidence at the time of the first instance trial maintained by the original trial can be the supporting evidence for the confession of the defendant. The court below is just in holding that the confession of the defendant in the prosecutor's office is voluntary confession and that the above confession is true based on other evidence, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to mistake of facts and evidence due to the violation of the rules of evidence, such as the theory of lawsuit.

The issue is groundless.

(2) According to the records, since the court below's explanation of the facts constituting the above anti-government organization is obtained by deducting the part of the facts constituting the crime of the anti-government organization from 63 to 20th of the same month from the original facts constituting the crime of the anti-government organization, and the remaining part of the facts constituting the crime of the anti-government organization is withdrawn by 14, 28 (29), 32 (3), 36 (3) and 42 (espionage), and 61 (espionage), which were entered as it is, for the purpose of discovery of facts constituting the above anti-government organization, and obtained by 20 to 3rd of the facts constituting the crime of the anti-government organization after being indicted of the said 63 anti-government organization, and after being entered as the 5th of the above facts as to the above facts constituting the anti-government organization, it is evident that the remaining part of the facts constituting the anti-government organization is withdrawn by 30 to 1987 and 26th of the same month.

If a prosecutor does not prosecute a specific facts charged as a separate crime among the facts charged, and withdraws it, it can not be the object of a trial because the withdrawn facts return to the beginning that there is no prosecution among the facts charged which have not been withdrawn, and it cannot be the object of a trial. In addition, the first instance court made a decision to dismiss the public prosecution as to the facts withdrawn, and it cannot be the object of a trial. Accordingly, it cannot be viewed as another crime of meeting, locking, a crime of espionage, a report, or a transitional fact (see Supreme Court Decision 85Do1925, Nov. 12, 1985). According to the judgment of the original court, it is evident that the above dismissed facts are stated in all the facts charged, as contents of the order, the report, and the transitional fact, and it cannot be said that the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the principle of no warning.

This paper is reasonable.

(3) The facts constituting a counter-espionage act under Article 18, 21, and 24 of the judgment of the court of first instance maintained by the court below are as follows.

(A) On May 1974, the Defendant: (a) was recommended on May 1, 1974 to travel to 10 gymnasium in a foreign language university or college located in Dongdaemun-gu, Seoul and to travel to 10 gymnasium students from 10 students from gymnasium to gymnasium, and (b) was allowed to travel to gymnasium from 10 students from gymnasium to gymnasium at 1974; (c) five students from gymnasium to gymnasium to gymnasium to gymnasium to gymnasium to gather new public secrets from 10 students from gymnasium to gymnasium to gymnasium to gymnasium, and to gather new public secrets from gymnasium to 197.

However, since the state secrets under Article 3 (1) of the former National Security Act are different from those of the state secrets under Article 2 of the former National Security Act and Article 98 (1) of the Criminal Act, it should be interpreted that the former state secrets refer to the state secrets that are superior to the state secrets in the latter case (see Supreme Court Decision 87Do455 delivered on May 26, 1987; Supreme Court Decision 86Do2313 delivered on February 10, 1987; Supreme Court Decision 82Do285 delivered on April 27, 1982; Supreme Court Decision 82Do285 delivered on April 27, 1982; Supreme Court Decision 82Do285 delivered on April 27, 1982). Since it can be easily known to anyone who is traveling in Jeju-do after viewing television broadcast, it can not be said to have a high level of importance as provided for in Article 3 subparagraph 1 of the former National Security Act.

Nevertheless, the court below maintained the first instance court, which was sentenced to the violation of Article 3 subparagraph 1 of the same Act. Thus, there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles of State secrets as provided by Article 3 of the same Act. Therefore, the court below is justified. The court below is against the above criminal facts as concurrent crimes with other criminal facts. Thus, the judgment of the court below cannot be reversed in its entirety.

(4) Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Yoon Yoon-hee (Presiding Justice)