[1] The legal nature of the criteria for imposing penalty surcharges according to the category of violation under Article 40 [Attachment 6] of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act pursuant to delegation of Article 49(1) and (2) of the former Juvenile Protection Act (=the statutory order) and the meaning of the number of penalty surcharges (=the maximum

[2] The standard for determining whether a punitive administrative disposition deviates from or abused the scope of discretion

[1] Article 49(1) and (2) of the former Juvenile Protection Act (amended by Act No. 5817 of Feb. 5, 1999) provides for an appropriate amount of penalty surcharge according to the category of violations under Article 40 [Attachment 6] of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 16461 of Jun. 30, 199) under Article 49(1) and (2) of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 16461 of Jun. 30, 199). However, even if a violation of the same type is committed in light of the content and purport of the delegation provision of the parent law, and the principle of excessive prohibition under the Constitution and the principle of equality under the Constitution, the amount of penalty surcharge shall be determined by comprehensively taking into account the personal circumstances of other circumstances and actors who were punished by other Acts due to such violation,

[2] Whether a punitive administrative disposition deviates from or abused the scope of discretion under the social norms shall be determined by comparing and comparing the degree of infringement on the public interest and the disadvantage suffered by an individual due to the disposition, by objectively examining the content of the act of violation as a ground for the disposition, the public interest to be achieved by the act of disposition, and all relevant circumstances

[1] Article 49(1) and (2) of the former Juvenile Protection Act (amended by Act No. 5817 of Feb. 5, 1999); Article 40 [Attachment 6] [Attachment 6] of the former Enforcement Decree of the Juvenile Protection Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 16461 of Jun. 30, 199); Article 27 of the Administrative Litigation Act

[2] Supreme Court Decision 88Nu3079 delivered on April 25, 1989 (Gong1989, 830) Supreme Court Decision 91Nu1097 delivered on October 11, 1991 (Gong1991, 2745) Supreme Court Decision 92Nu2851 delivered on June 23, 1992 (Gong192, 2293), Supreme Court Decision 93Nu16796 delivered on December 21, 1993 (Gong194, 545) (Gong2000, 1204)

Plaintiff

Juvenile Protection Committee (Attorney Yellow-hwan, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 98Nu13647 delivered on March 24, 1999

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

Article 49(1) and (2) of the former Juvenile Protection Act (amended by Act No. 5817 of Feb. 5, 1999; hereinafter referred to as the "Act") Article 49(1) and (2) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 16461 of Jun. 30, 199; hereinafter referred to as the "Enforcement Decree") provides that the standards for imposition of penalty according to the category of violation under [Attachment 6] of Article 40 [Attachment 6] of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act shall be a statutory order, but even if the violation of the same type is committed in light of the contents and purport of the delegation provision of the mother Act, the principle of excessive prohibition under the Constitution, and the principle of equality, the amount of penalty surcharge shall be determined in accordance with the case, comprehensively taking into account the individual circumstances of the offender and the amount of penalty imposed by other Acts due to the violation, the amount of penalty surcharge shall be the maximum amount, not the fixed

In addition, whether a punitive administrative disposition deviates from or abused the scope of discretion under the social norms shall be determined by comparing and comparing the degree of infringement on public interest and the disadvantage suffered by an individual due to the disposition, by objectively examining the content of the offense committed as the ground for the disposition, the public interest to be achieved by the relevant disposition, and all the relevant circumstances (see Supreme Court Decision 98Du11779, Apr. 7, 200).

The court below is justified in holding that the disposition of this case imposing a penalty surcharge of KRW 16,00,00, which is two times the upper limit is the maximum amount under the above [Attachment Table 6], and it is unlawful in light of all the circumstances such as the fact that the act of violation is not a minor violation, but the employment period is relatively short of seven days, and there is no profit gained therefrom, and the plaintiff is subject to a disposition of suspension of business for 15 days under the Food Sanitation Act due to the same violation, etc., the disposition of this case is unlawful as it goes beyond the limits of discretionary power, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the legal nature of the above [Attachment Table 6], as pointed out in the ground of appeal.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Han-gu (Presiding Justice)