2019No1937 A. Bribery (the promise to partially alter the crime)

(b) Violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Economic Crimes;

(c) Violation of the Act on the Regulation and Punishment of Criminal Proceeds Concealment.

(d)Violation of the Act on Testimony, Appraisal, etc. before the National Assembly;

1.(a)(c) A;

2.(a)(c) B

3.(a)(c) C

4.(a)(c) D

5. (a)(c) E;

Both parties

Special Prosecutor Park Jong-young ( Prosecution and Public Trial)

Special Prosecutor Sweak-type, Sweak-type, Sweak-type, Sweak-type, Dispatched Prosecutor Park Jong-young,

Gangwon-do, Kimhae-do, Promotion for Family Heading, Haak-gu, Gangwon-do, and New Young-gu (Public trial)

Law Firm HU, JV, JV, JW, I, JX, LO, LP, Q, LR

(For the accused)

Law Firm K, Attorneys L, JY (for the defendant)

Attorney J (for the accused)

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2017Gohap194 Decided August 25, 2017

Seoul High Court Decision 2017No2556 Decided February 5, 2018

Supreme Court Decision 2018Do2738 Decided August 29, 2019

January 18, 2021

The judgment of the court below is reversed.

Defendants shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than two years and six months.

However, with respect to Defendant B and E, the execution of each of the above punishments shall be suspended for four years from the date this judgment becomes final and conclusive. Defendant A shall be confiscated by Defendant A.

1. Scope of the judgment of this court;

A. Litigation 1)

1) Of the facts charged against the Defendants, the lower court found the Defendants guilty on some of the bribe offering (service charge, AT2), AT insurance premium, AU3), AU. AV insurance premium, violation (Embezzlement) of the Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Offenders (hereinafter "Special Economic Crimes Act"), (service charge, AU. AV purchase price, AU. AV insurance premium, part of the violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (property transfer money in the name of a foreign country), violation of the Act on the Regulation and Punishment of Criminal Proceeds Concealment (hereinafter "Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment"), violation of some of the Act on the Regulation of Specific Economic Crimes (hereinafter "Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment"), violation of the Act on the Regulation of Specific Economic Crimes (hereinafter "Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment"), violation of the Act on the Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment (AU.V purchase price, AU-AV insurance premium), violation of the Act on the Regulation of Benefit-Making Support, part of the players related to the offering of bribe, vehicle transport vehicle (transport vehicle and vehicle transport vehicle's insurance premium), violation of the Act (AT).

2) In addition, the lower court acquitted Defendant A, C, and D of the offering of bribe related to the AW Center (hereinafter “AW Center”) among the facts charged against Defendant A, C, and D, and of the violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (Embezzlement). In addition, the lower court acquitted Defendant A of the offering of bribe related to the offer of bribe related to the Incorporated Foundation BF and the Incorporated Foundation BG (hereinafter “each Foundation”) and the violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (Embezzlement).

3) Furthermore, the lower court convicted Defendant A of violating the Act on Testimony, Appraisal, etc. at the National Assembly (hereinafter “National Assembly Testimony Act”) among the facts charged against Defendant A.

4) The Defendants filed an appeal on the guilty portion of the judgment of the court below on the grounds of mistake of facts, misunderstanding of legal principles, and unreasonable sentencing, on the grounds of erroneous determination of facts and misapprehension of legal principles, and unfair sentencing.

5) In the first instance trial prior to remanding, the special prosecutor modified the previous facts charged by adding the V former president (hereinafter referred to as the "former president") and Defendant A to September 12, 2014 with regard to the offering of a bribe in relation to riding support, and (2) added the additional charges that changed the contents of the bribe in relation to the provision of a bribe in relation to horse riding support from the "purchase price and insurance premium, the vehicle's purchase price and profit equivalent to the premium, the vehicle's free use of the vehicle," and (3) added the preliminary charges corresponding to the offering of a bribe in relation to the offering of a bribe in relation to riding support to "the fact of the offering of a bribe corresponding to the third party's offering of a bribe corresponding to the offering of a bribe in response to the offering of a bribe in relation to the third party's offering of a bribe," and added the "the first preliminary charges to the offering of a bribe corresponding to the offering of a bribe to the third party's offering of a bribe with W," and then deleted the "additional charges related to the A 2000th bill.

6) The judgment of the court below prior to the remanding of the case is reversed on the ground that: ① the part of the bribe offering related to the horse riding support, ② the part related to the AW Center purchase price and insurance premium, ③ the part related to the violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (Embezzlement), ④ the part related to the violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (Embezzlement) related to the AU.A.V. purchase price, ④ the part related to the AU.A.V insurance premium, ⑤ the part related to the AW Center related to the violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (Embezzlement), ⑤ the part related to the transfer of accounts in the AR's name among the parts related to the violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (Embezzlement), 6 the part related to the AUV purchase price, AU-AV insurance premium, the part related to the AU-AV insurance premium, 7 the part related to the violation of the Act on the Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment due to the disguised Use of Criminal Proceeds, and the judgment of the court below should also be reversed on the ground that there is a relation with the above reversal or concurrent relation with the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act.

7) The first instance court prior to remanding: ① the service cost out of the offering of a bribe related to riding support; ② the benefit of free use of AT.A.A.V.; ② the service cost part out of the fact of violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (Embezzlement); ③ the service cost part out of the violation of the Act on the Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment; ④ the violation of the National Assembly Testimony Act; ② among the violation of the Act on the Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment; ② the first instance part, and the second part, the first instance court found the Defendant guilty; and the remainder was acquitted.

8) As to the guilty portion of the judgment of the lower court prior to remand, the Defendants filed each appeal against the entire judgment of the lower court prior to remand.

9) On the premise that the special prosecutor’s argument in the grounds of appeal is partly reasonable, the Supreme Court should reverse the portion of the judgment of the court prior to remanding the following: (a) the offering of a bribe related to the horse of horse riding support to the Defendants; (b) the violation of the Act on the Regulation of Specific Economic Crimes (Embezzlement) related to the purchase price; (c) the violation of the Act on the Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment; (d) the offering of a bribe related to the Defendant A, C, and D; and (e) the violation of the Act on the Specific Economic Crimes (Embezzlement). The remainder of the offering of a bribe related to horse riding support and the offering of a bribe commitment; (e) the violation of the Act on the Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment; (e) the violation of the Act on the Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment; (e) the violation of the Act on the Punishment of Specific Economic Crimes (Embezzlement); and (e) the violation of the Act on the Punishment of Specific Economic Crimes (Embezzlement); and (e) the violation of the Act on the Punishment of Criminal Proceeds to the Defendants A, C, and D.

10) The special prosecutor changed the facts charged as to the promise of the offering of a bribe in the trial following the remanding of the case to the effect that “the promise of the offering of a bribe was made”, and applied for the modification of the indictment with the content of the criminal proceeds as ‘service cost, AT, AU. AV or its purchase price, free use of the vehicle,” among the facts charged as to the violation of the Act on the Regulation of the Concealment of Criminal Proceeds Concealment due to the most recent criminal proceeds. The special prosecutor permitted this.

B. Since the part of the defendants' violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (property concealment in a foreign country), the offer of bribe to each of the foundations of this case, and the violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (Embezzlement) by the Supreme Court's dismissal of appeal, the above facts charged are excluded from the scope of the judgment of this court.

2. Summary of reasons for appeal 10);

A. Grounds for appeal by the Defendants

1) As to the admissibility of BW business pocketbooks and CX business logs

A) With respect to the fact that there was a conversation between the former president and the Defendant A, etc., the BW business pocket book cannot be used as direct evidence, indirect or circumstantial evidence, as it constitutes hearsay evidence, since it is inadmissible as it constitutes hearsay evidence, and this is also true when combining BW’s statements.

B) The content of the CX work log shall be admissible only as circumstantial evidence of an indirect fact unrelated to the authenticity of its content in the work log itself or as circumstantial evidence.

2) As to the details of horse riding support

At the request of the former president on July 25, 2015, the Defendants did not plan or prepare for horse riding support for AH prior to the private interview.

3) The transfer of marina ownership is the substantial right to use and dispose of the ownership, not ownership, and the Mail premium was not provided to W.

4) As to whether the crime of violating the Specific Economic Crimes Act (Embezzlement) was established, there was no intent to obtain unlawful profits or embezzlement against the Defendants.

5) Even based on the judgment of the court below that the ownership of AU and AV was transferred to W on whether the crime of violation of the Regulation on Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment Act was established, since the method of transfer is that M Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “M”) first acquired the ownership of Mail and then transferred to W, it cannot be deemed that the sales contract for acquisition of ownership was false or most committed.

6) As to whether a crime of violating the National Assembly Testimony Act was established, Defendant A did not have received a request from the former president and a request for contribution from the former president relating to the foundation contribution.

7) Unreasonable sentencing

The sentence of the lower court against the Defendants (five years in prison, five years in prison, five years in prison, three years in prison, three years in prison, four years in prison, four years in prison, and four years in prison, two years in prison, and six years in prison) is too unreasonable.

B. Grounds for appeal by the special prosecutor

1) As to the existence of illegal solicitation, the lower court omitted determination on whether there was an implied illegal solicitation in a single meeting to strengthen management rights defense, which is an individual pending issue, and to alleviate investment attraction and environmental regulations related to the bio-project. 2) As to the establishment of the crime of offering of a bribe related to riding support, and the crime of offering of a bribe

A) Between the former president and the Defendant A, the offer of bribe in an amount was made.

B) It should be deemed that W acquired the benefit of free use of the vehicle as a bribe.

3) Since the ownership of AT itself is transferred to W as to whether the crime of violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (Embezzlement) and the crime of violation of the Regulation on the Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment, it constitutes a bribe. In this regard, the crime of violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (Embezzlement) and the crime of violation of the Regulation on the Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment is established.

4) Unreasonable sentencing

The court below erred in determining the aggravated factors among the special sentencing factors of the sentencing criteria, and the sentencing of the Defendants is inappropriate because the sentencing of the Defendants is too unhutiled.

3. Ex officio determination

As seen earlier, the Defendants have reasons to reverse ex officio due to changes in the indictment. However, there is no ground to reverse ex officio, and there is no ground to reverse the facts and misapprehension of legal principles by both parties.

Since it is the object of the judgment, it will be examined.

4. Judgment on the misunderstanding of facts and misapprehension of legal principles by the Defendants

A. As to the admissibility of BW business pocketbooks and CX business logs

1) As to the admissibility of BW business pocket book

A) The judgment of the court below

The lower court determined that the BW’s business pocket book is admissible as evidence, not hearsay evidence, but hearsay evidence for indirect facts to recognize the contents of the BW’s business pocket book and the conversation between the former president and the Defendant or between the individual visitors, and that it is not admissible as evidence by the rules of hearsay evidence, but it is admissible as circumstantial evidence for indirect facts unrelated to the authenticity of the entries. In combination with the BW’s statement to the effect that the former president accepted the contents of the former president’s expression and did not increase or decrease his idea, the former president’s instruction to BW, the contents of the conversation between the former president and the Defendant, etc., and the contents of the conversation between the former president and the Defendant, etc., are admitted as evidence, not hearsay evidence, but hearsay evidence.

B) The judgment of this Court

(1) Legal principles

Article 310-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act does not recognize the admissibility of hearsay evidence, in principle, and recognizes it exceptionally only when the requirements prescribed in Articles 311 through 316 are met. Whether a statement made by another person constitutes hearsay evidence is determined depending on what constitutes a fact requiring proof. In a case where a fact that constitutes another person’s statement, namely, the content of the original statement, is a fact requiring proof, said fact is hearsay evidence; however, in a case where the existence of the original statement itself is a fact requiring proof, said fact is deemed original evidence and not hearsay evidence (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Do2937, July 26, 2012).

In a case where a document recording a statement is used as direct evidence of a crime, the document is considered hearsay evidence; however, said document is not always considered hearsay evidence when it is used as circumstantial evidence for an indirect fact unrelated to the authenticity of the statement (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Do16001, Jun. 13, 2013). However, in a case where the admissibility of a document recording a statement is recognized on the grounds that it would be used as circumstantial evidence of the fact that the statement was made itself, and where said fact is again used as an indirect fact proving the contents of the statement or its authenticity, said document constitutes hearsay evidence. This is because the document is used to substantiate a fact comprising the original statement written therein, and becomes a fact requiring proof. In such a case, said document is inadmissible unless it satisfies the requirements prescribed in Articles 311 through 316 of the Criminal Procedure Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Do2738, Aug. 29, 2019).

(2) Determination

BW’s business pocketbooks, etc. include the contents of conversation between the former president and the individual visitors, which the former president left to BW after a single interview (hereinafter referred to as “part of the contents of dialogue”) and the contents of the former president’s direction to BW (hereinafter referred to as “part of the direction”).

In a case where the part of the conversation, such as W W’s business pocket book, is a statement to prove the contents of conversation between the former president and an individual visitor, it is admissible as evidence only when the person making the original statement is unable to make a statement due to death, illness, foreign residence, unknown whereabouts, or any other similar cause, and when it is proved that the said statement was made under particularly reliable circumstances pursuant to Article 316(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act. This case’s business pocket book, etc. does not satisfy this requirement. Therefore, it is not permissible to use BW’s business pocket book, etc. as evidence of indirect facts that can inferred the contents of conversation between the former president and an individual visitor. This is because permission would eventually result in using it as evidence to prove the contents of conversation.

The Defendants’ assertion pointing this out is with merit. 11)

2) As to the admissibility of CX work logs

A) The judgment of the court below

The lower court determined that the admissibility of evidence can be recognized as an indirect fact unrelated to the authenticity of the entries, rather than an original evidentiary document with respect to the existence of such descriptions in the work log of CX, rather than a hearsay evidence, which is a document, which is an evidentiary material, and that the circumstantial evidence of an indirect fact unrelated to

B) Judgment on the appeal before remanding

The court prior to the remand judged that it is not admissible as evidence if it is used as circumstantial evidence for an indirect fact that acknowledges the authenticity of the contents of the statement through the existence of what contents are recorded in the work log of CX.

C) Judgment on remanding

The appellate court determined that it was inappropriate for the appellate court prior to remand to render a judgment without distinguishing the requirements for admissibility according to its content, but it did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the hearsay rule and omitting judgment, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal by the special prosecutor, and thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment.

D) The judgment of this Court

In light of the fact that “N Group Management - Monitling” is indicated in the work log of the EX, which was the head of the EET, on June 20, 2014, the lower court recognized that the contents related thereto are highly likely to have been reported to the President by the head of ET, but such fact-finding seems to have no impact on the substance of the crime (see, e.g., the defense counsel’s opinion (28)).

Therefore, in relation to this, there is no violation of the rules of evidence or misapprehension of the legal principles as to the hearsay rule which affected the judgment.

B. As alleged by the Defendants, the Defendants did not plan the horse riding support from July 25, 2015 before the sole meeting was held on July 25, 2015, and even if there were some errors in the lower court’s fact-finding, such erroneous determination of facts cannot be deemed to have affected the conclusion of the judgment, and therefore, the Defendants’ allegation in this part is without merit.

C. As to the transfer of Mail ownership

1) As to the assertion that the power of actual use and disposal, other than ownership, has been transferred

A) Legal principles

If a bribe recipient, even if he/she does not meet the legal requirements for acquiring ownership, acquired possession of the goods provided as a bribe and did not request the return of the bribe recipient or legal owner, he/she shall be deemed to have the authority to actually use and dispose of the goods and have the authority to receive the said goods as a bribe (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Do735, Apr. 27, 2006).

B) The judgment of the court below

The lower court recognized that the Defendants transferred the ownership of AT, AU, and AV to W and offered the said Morse as a bribe.

C) The judgment of this Court

Comprehensively taking account of the evidence duly adopted and examined by the lower court and the lower court, it can be recognized that there was a mutual agreement between W and the Defendant that there was the actual right to use and dispose of the horses to be purchased in the future between W and B on November 15, 2015. From November 15, 2015, the Defendants provided WW with AT, AU, and AV equivalent to the purchase price as a bribe, and W ought to be deemed to have received the said horses from the Defendants as a bribe.

Furthermore, the circumstances alleged by the Defendants do not affect the establishment of the crime of offering of a bribe, as seen earlier, even if the bribe recipient did not meet the requirements for the acquisition of legal ownership, if he/she had the authority to use and dispose of the goods as a bribe. As such, the circumstances alleged by the Defendants do not affect the establishment of the crime of offering of a bribe. This part of the Defendants’ assertion is without merit (However, as seen earlier, partial revision of the facts charged

2) As to the assertion that the premium was not provided

A) The judgment of the court below

The lower court recognized that the Defendants provided the amount equivalent to the premium for the horses as a bribe.

B) The judgment of this Court

There is no evidence to deem that the insurance benefit under the insurance contract related to the horses was transferred from M to W. In the event of an insured incident, if the insurance proceeds are paid to M, and if the insurance proceeds are delivered to and provided with the insurance proceeds to thisW such as Defendant B and Defendant E, etc., or the horses are purchased with the insurance proceeds, the new crime of acceptance of bribe is established at that stage. In light of these circumstances, it is difficult to readily conclude that W received the amount equivalent to the insurance premiums for the horses from Defendant BO

D. As to the establishment of a crime of violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (Embezzlement)

1) The judgment of the court below

The lower court determined that the Defendants embezzled the amount of insurance premium for AU and AV on the premise that the Defendants provided the amount equivalent to the insurance premium for the horses as a bribe.

2) The judgment of this Court

As seen above, it is difficult to recognize that the Defendants provided the amount equivalent to the premium for the horses as a bribe, and it is difficult to recognize that the Defendants embezzled the amount equivalent to the premium for AU and AV.

The defendants' assertion pointing this out is with merit.

E. As to the establishment of a crime of violating the Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment Act

1) The judgment of the court below

The lower court determined that the sales contract for AU and AV was the act of "the act that disguises the origin of criminal proceeds as stipulated in Article 3 (1) 2 of the Regulation on Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment."

2) The judgment of this Court

A) Legal principles

"The act of pretending the fact about the origin of criminal proceeds" under Article 3 (1) 2 of the Regulation on Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment means the act of pretending as if there exist no facts about the origin of criminal proceeds, or as if there exist no facts about the origin of criminal proceeds (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2014Do4408, Sept. 4, 2014).

B) Determination

In light of the following circumstances, it is difficult to recognize that the sales contract for AU and AV is merely the most unfair transaction. In conclusion, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal principles and misunderstanding of facts. The Defendants’ assertion pointing this out is with merit.

(1) As seen earlier, the AU and AV itself were accepted as a bribe, and it is necessary to acquire the ownership of the said MU and AV on that premise for M to deliver AU and AV to W as a bribe.

(2) In fact, M purchased AU and AV in accordance with the sales contract, and paid the price thereof, and acquired ownership of the said MU and AV. On January 27, 2016, M entered into a sales contract with BA to purchase AU and AV from BA, and on February 4, 2016, M paid to BA a purchase price of KRW 2 million (2.66,8820,00) according to the said sales contract.

F. As to the establishment of a violation of the National Assembly Testimony Act

1) The judgment of the court below

The lower court found the Defendant guilty of violating the National Assembly Testimony Act.

2) Judgment of the court prior to remand

The judgment of the court before remanding the case was rendered to the effect that it is difficult to readily conclude that Defendant A had made a false statement against memory that it was difficult to conclude that Defendant A had made a false statement on July 25, 2015 with respect to the part (i) of violation of the National Assembly Testimony Act, and that Defendant A was guilty of the part (i) during a hearing on the grounds of violation of the National Assembly Testimony Act.

3) Judgment on remanding

In relation to ① the special prosecutor, Defendant A filed each appeal on the part of the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of Korea, the

4) The judgment of this Court

As above, since the special prosecutor and Defendant A’s assertion in their respective grounds of appeal were rejected, this part of the grounds of appeal should be followed prior to the remand.

Defendant A’s assertion on its part is with merit.

5. Determination of misunderstanding of facts and misapprehension of legal principles by the special prosecutor

A. In regard to the existence of illegal solicitation, the special prosecutor asserts to the effect that the lower court’s omission of judgment on the establishment of implicit illegal solicitation in relation to the offering of bribe related to AW Center’s acquisition of management rights as an individual pending issue, which constitutes the succession work, and the mitigation of bio business-related investment attraction and environmental regulation, affected the conclusion of the judgment.

However, as long as a quid pro quo relationship can be acknowledged by the former president’s act and benefit provided by the former president, it is not necessary to establish a quid pro quo relationship with the specific pending issues as part of the succession, and thus, it is not necessary to accept the prosecutor’s assertion. 14) As to the establishment of the crime of offering of a bribe and the crime of offering of a bribe

1) As to the assertion that the offer of a bribe was made in an amount yet to be paid

A) Legal principles

In a case where the court of final appeal reversed the entire part of another crime in relation to a single comprehensive crime or concurrent crime while it is judged impossible to accept the grounds for final appeal, and then re-convened by the court below as concurrent crimes after remanding the entire part of the case, the part rejected by the court of final appeal on the ground that the grounds for final appeal cannot be accepted at the same time as the judgment rendered by the court of final appeal, and the defendant cannot contest against this part, and the court remanded cannot make a decision contrary thereto. Thus, the defendant cannot make a claim as to this part as the grounds for final appeal (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2015Do15031, Apr. 15, 2016). The same applies where a new argument is added with regard to the part for which the final judgment occurred (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2018Do1263

Such principle is equally applied even where prosecutor’s assertion in the grounds of appeal is rejected (see Supreme Court Decision 2020Do9836, Jan. 14, 2021).

B) Determination

The judgment below and the judgment of the court below held that the defendants could not be deemed to belong to the former president and W. The special prosecutor asserted that the judgment of the court before remanding the case that "the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the establishment of a bribe offering promise, the specific amount of the donor's intent, etc., and the intention of the donor, etc., and by omitting judgment or exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, etc." However, the special prosecutor rejected the special prosecutor's allegation in the grounds of appeal. However, although the remanded portion was reversed and remanded on the ground that the part of the bribe offering agreement was a single comprehensive crime with the reversed portion, the final judgment could no longer be raised at the time of the judgment of the court of appeal, and this court cannot make a decision inconsistent with the above, the special prosecutor's allegation in this part is rejected (the special prosecutor did not change the new part of the indictment, but it did not violate the principle of equal representation with the newly binding part of the indictment.

2) As seen earlier, the special prosecutor added the ancillary charges that changed the contents of the bribe in relation to the provision of the bribe in relation to the provision of the bribe related to the horse riding support from the "vehicle purchase price" to the "vehicle's profit free of charge." Even though it is difficult to recognize that W has received the vehicle's own or purchase price as a bribe, it is reasonable to view that W has offered the vehicle's profit free of charge as a bribe. The special prosecutor's assertion pointing this out is reasonable. The special prosecutor's assertion on whether W violated the Specific Economic Crimes Act (Embezzlement) related to horse riding support, and the Act on the Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment (Embezzlement) related to the Regulation of Specific Economic Crimes (Embezzlement) related to the violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (Embezzlement), was established in the trial prior to remand, the special prosecutor added the ancillary charges to the "AT itself" as to the crime of violating the Act on the Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment due to the most fact that the causes of crime occurred in the remanded trial, and the Defendants' assertion that the crime was modified to "AT's violation of the Specific Economic Act" itself.

6. Conclusion

Therefore, among the judgment below, the offering of a bribe related to riding support, the violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (Embezzlement), and the violation of the Act on the Regulation of Concealment of Criminal Proceeds due to most of the facts about the cause of the occurrence of criminal proceeds, there exist grounds for ex officio reversal as seen above, and the defendants A' assertion of misunderstanding of legal principles as to each of the above parts, and mistake of facts as to the violation of the National Assembly Testimony Act, and the misapprehension of legal principles as to the part concerning the violation of the Act on Testimony and Appraisal of Specific Economic Crimes (Embezzlement) shall be reversed. Furthermore, since the violation of the Act on the Regulation of Regulation of Concealment of Criminal Proceeds due to most of the facts about disposition of criminal proceeds was imposed on the AW Center on the ground that the above part is a single punishment or a concurrent crime under the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the judgment of the court below is reversed

[Grounds for multi-use Judgment]

Criminal facts and summary of evidence

The summary of the facts constituting an offense and evidence recognized by this court is identical to that of the judgment below, and it is also cited in accordance with Article 369 of the Criminal Procedure Act, except for partial revision as follows.

○○ The lower judgment: (a) purchased the horse A for horse riding training and riding conference with M on October 21, 2015 at KRW 74,9150,000 (580,000) for MM on November 15, 2015; (b) transferred the right to actually use and dispose of the said AT to W; (c) again, 2.15 billion 60,000,000 won for MM on February 4, 2016 at KRW 2.5 billion for MM; (d) purchased the horse A for EM training and 2.5 billion for EM; and (e) provided the Defendants with MM 2.15 billion for MM to W; and (e) again, 2.81 billion won for MM on February 4, 2016 at KRW 2.5 billion for EM 266 billion for EM; and (e) provided the Defendants with MM 184,000,0000 won for MM 14.2

The defendants in collusion with the defendants 12th 10 to 15th 12th 10 billion won of the judgment of the court below (2.5 billion won) by paying a total of 3.63,484 million won (2.89 million won) in the name of AR as the service price to AR in return for the illegal solicitation that help them succeed to the defendant's succession work, and by providing the amount equivalent to 3.41,797 billion won (2.5 billion won) in the aggregate by providing 7.5 billion won (2.8 billion won) in the form of a MR with a total of 3.63,484 billion won (2.9 million won) in the name of AR in return for the payment for the service price, or by providing the vehicle use and profit-making profit-making profit-making to M in lieu of W, as follows.

A person shall be appointed.

Pursuant to the list of crimes (1-1), the court below's decision 13th to 15th 13th 13th m3th m3th m3th m3th m3th m360,000 of the market price was arbitrarily used by transferring the right of actual use and disposal of AT over six times the market price of 74,9150,000 to W, and transferring M's total funds to the AR account under the control of W or paying in lieu of the purchase price of the horse to W.

The 14th 3 to 5th 14th eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth e.g. e. e. e. e. e. g. e. e. e. e. e. e. e. e. e.

A person shall be appointed.

The judgment of the court below 14th to 15th 8th e.g.

○ 원심판결 15쪽 17행 내지 16쪽 8행 "피고인 A, 피고인 C, 피고인 D는 피고인 B, 피고인 E에게 위와 같은 계획을 이행하도록 지시하였고, 피고인 B, 피고인 E는 W과 함께 2015. 8. 26, AR와 M 간에 2015. 8.경부터 2018. 12.경까지 승마훈련 비용 등을 지급한다는 내용으로 용역계약을 체결하는 형식을 취함으로써 정상적인 용역계약인 것처럼 가장하고, 승마 선수단의 해외 전지훈련 관련 용역대금인 것처럼 내부품의서를 만드는 등의 방법으로 말과 훈련비용 상당액 등을 제공하기 위해 정상적인 용역계약에 따라 M가 용역대금을 지급하고 말을 소유하면서 AH에게 빌려주며 차량을 무상으로 사용하게 하는 것처럼 가장하여, 2015. 9. 14. M에서 810,520유로(한화 10억 8,687만 원 상당)를 AR 명의 계좌로 송금한 것을 비롯하여, 그 때부터 2016. 7. 26.까지 별지 범죄일람표(3) 순번 1, 2, 5, 6 기재와 같이 총 4회에 걸쳐 합계 282만 9,969유로(한화 36억 3,484만 원 상당)를 같은 방법으로 AR 명의 계좌로 송금하고, 2015. 11. 15. AT, 2016. 2. 4.경 AU, AV 또는 그 구입대금 등 합계 258만 유로(한화 34억 1,797만 원 상당)를 제공하였다."로 변경 15)이 원심판결 18쪽 18행 내지 19쪽 15행 "피고인 A은 BF 재단 및 BG 재단에 출연할 당시 C 등으로부터 출연을 보고받은 사실이 있었고, C, D 등 N그룹 임원들에게 지시하여 W의 딸 AH에 대한 독일 승마훈련 비용을 지원하게 하였다. 그럼에도 피고인 A은 위 국정조사 특별위원회 BH 앞에서 선서한 후, ①0 BI 위원의 '회장에게 보고 없이 재단에 기부가 된 것입니까?'라는 물음에 '예, 이런 일 갖고 저한테 일일이 보고하지 않고 있습니다'라고 답변하고, ② BJ 위원의 '지난 해(2015년) 8월 M는 독일의 AS와 컨설팅 용역계약을 체결하고 네 차례에 걸쳐서 37억 원을 송금했네요. 이때 W 씨를 아셨습니까?'라는 물음에 '저는 몰랐습니다'라고 답변하고, 'AH는 어떤 사람이라고 알고 있었어요?'라는 물음에 '몰랐습니다'라고 답변하고, ③ BK 위원의 '어느 누구도 A 부회장에게 승마 관련 지원 사실을 알리지 않았습니 까?'라는 물음에 '그런 문화 지원이라든지 스포츠 지원을 저한테 일일이 다 보고를 하지 않습니다'라고 답변함으로써 N그룹 임직원들로부터 BF 재단 및 BG재단에 후원금 등을 지급한다거나, 승마 관련 지원을 한다는 보고를 받지 못하여 자금 지원 사실을 알지 못했으며, W, AH가 누구인지도 몰랐다는 취지로 증언하였다."로 변경

○ Change to 19th 18th 19th 19th 19th and 19th 19th "the offering of bribe and the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc.

○○○ The lower court’s judgment: (a) 21-4 through 9-H (1, (b) CW pocketbookss, No. 390, BW’s business pockets, (b) 1138, CB’s copy (b) 1-2, (c) 1-2, 2852, 1-1-2, and BW pockets (c) 1-2, 2896, 2896, 2896, 1-2, 1-2, BW pockets (290, 290, 290), and 1-2, BW pockets (b) 1-2, 2015, 241-2, 216, 216-4, 216-4, 2015).

○ Change of the list of offenses (1) of the lower judgment 269 to the list of offenses (1-1) in attached Form 269

Application of Statutes

1. Article relevant to the facts constituting an offense and the selection of punishment;

A. Defendant A: Articles 133(1), 129(1), and 30 (a), 133(1), 130, and 30 (AW Center-related offering of bribe) of the Criminal Act; Articles 133(1), 130, and 30 (AW Center-related offering of bribe); Articles 3(1)1 of the Criminal Act of the Specific Economic Crimes Act; Articles 356, 35(1), and 30 (1) and 35(1) of the Criminal Act of the same Act; Articles 3(1)2 of the Specific Economic Crimes Act; Articles 356, 35(1), and 30 (1), and (2) of the Criminal Act; Articles 35(1), and 35(1)2 of the Criminal Act; Article 30 (1)2 of the Act on the Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment; Article 30 (1) of the Criminal Act’s most causes of crime; Article 130(1) of the Criminal Act; Article 130(1) of the Act of the Act of the Act of the Act

The Defendants asserted that the service cost portion and the horse riding support portion were in the relation of substantive concurrent crimes, not a single comprehensive crime, and sought ex officio judgment (see the counsel’s opinion (2) in November 19, 2019), but it is reasonable to view them as a single comprehensive crime (see, e.g., Seoul High Court Decision 2017No2556, Feb. 5, 2018; 2017No2550, Feb. 5, 2018; 2019Do1962, 2657, Jul. 10, 200). However, it is reasonable to view that the special prosecutor related to the offering of horse riding support was related to the crime of comprehensive crime of embezzlement (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2019Do1938, Feb. 14, 2020).

B. Defendant C and D: Articles 133(1), 129(1), 30(a), 133(1), 130, and 30(a) of the Criminal Act; (b) Articles 3(1)1 of the Criminal Act; (c) Articles 3(1) and 30(a) of the Criminal Act; (d) Articles 356, 35(1), and 30(1), 35(1), and 30 of the Criminal Act; (e) Articles 35(1), 35(1), and 35(1)2 of the Specific Economic Crimes Act; (e) Articles 356, and 30(1) and 30(a) of the Criminal Act; (e) Articles 130(1), 30(1), and 30(b) of the Criminal Act; (e) Articles 130(1), 130(1), 30(1)2 of the Act on the Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment; (ging and Profiting of the Criminal Act; (e.) Articles 130(1) of the Criminal Act);

1. Aggravation for concurrent crimes;

Defendants: the former part of Article 37, Article 38(1)2, and Article 50 of the Criminal Act (an aggravated punishment for concurrent crimes prescribed in the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (Embezzlement) concerning horse riding support with the largest punishment)

1. Discretionary mitigation;

Defendants: Articles 53 and 55(1)3 of the Criminal Act (see, e.g., Articles 53 and 55(1)3)

1. Suspension of execution;

Defendant B and E: Article 62(1) of the Criminal Act (hereinafter referred to as the following grounds for sentencing) 1. Confiscation

Defendant A: the first sentence of Article 134 of the Criminal Act

The confiscation and collection of ○ is reasonable to confiscate AV from Defendant A in cases where the consignee has kept the bribe as it is and returned it to the receiver (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Do10290, Mar. 27, 2008). As long as W returned the real use of Mail AV and its physical distribution authority to Defendant A who is the receiver, it is reasonable to confiscate AV from Defendant A [see, e.g., a counsel’s written opinion on November 30, 2020 (26)];

Reasons for sentencing

1. Defendant A

(a) Scope of applicable sentences under law: Imprisonment with prison labor for a period of two years and six months from June to June 22, and the scope of recommended sentences for sentencing;

1) Violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (Embezzlement)

[Determination of Punishment] 01; Embezzlement/Misappropriation / Breach of Trust / [Type 4] 5 billion won or more; and 30 billion won or less (Special Convict) mitigation element: In cases where punishment is not granted or a significant damage has been recovered, the aggravation element: 17)

[Recommendation and Scope of Recommendation] Basic Field, 4 years to 7 years of imprisonment

2) Class 2 crime (Bribery)

[Determination of Type] 100 million won or more for the offering of a bribe

[Special Contributors] Reduction element: Where a person complies with the affirmative demand of the briberyer: Where the details of the solicitation are related to illegal or unjust performance of duties;

However, Defendant A actively offered a bribe with an intention to purchase a job-related act in order to obtain benefits by accepting the demand of the former president’s bribe (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Do13792, Aug. 29, 2019) in that the former president first demanded a bribe, but the former president actively offered a bribe in that process (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Do13792, Aug. 29, 2019); and (g) made an illegal solicitation during that process. It is unreasonable to view it as a mere passive offer (a.g

[Recommendation and Scope of Recommendation] Aggravation, 3 years to 5 years of imprisonment

3) Group 3 (Violation of the Act on Testimony, Appraisal, etc. at National Assembly)

【Determination of Punishment】 Malicious or Evidential Malics Malics 01. Malics Malics Malics Malics Ba

【Special Convicted Person】

[Recommendation and Scope of Recommendations] Basic Field, 10 months to 2 years of imprisonment

4) Scope of recommendations based on the standards for handling multiple crimes: Imprisonment with prison labor for a period of four years to ten years. Determination of sentence shall be made.

1) Defendant A was the first offender, the former president first demanded a bribe, and the damage to the crime of occupational embezzlement was recovered in the trial before remanding.

2) However, Defendant A actively offered a bribe by accepting the former president’s demand for bribe, and made an illegal solicitation for requesting the use of the president’s authority to assist the former president’s succession process. Unlike the case where a bribe is offered to the president with a vague expectation to the extent that assistance is likely to be received or damage is not likely to be inflicted upon the president, there is a big difference in the nature of the crime in that if an illegal solicitation is made in the process of granting a bribe, the president would have the relevant public official, etc. exercise unfair influence during the process of performing the solicitation. Defendant A embezzled M’s funds worth KRW 868,0810,00 to solve the problem of succession to management rights and provided it as a bribe. Defendant A concealed the crime by concluding a false service contract, etc., as well as carried out the above evidence at the National Assembly.

Considering such circumstances, the sentence of imprisonment and the statutory detention of Defendant A are inevitable.

3) However, Defendant A’s embezzlement of funds is due to the fact that the former president demanded support under the name of M, and as seen earlier, the damage of the crime of occupational embezzlement was completely recovered in the trial prior to remanding. Furthermore, considering the fact that it is very difficult for the president to refuse to accept a bribe in the event that the president demands a bribe in reality, it is somewhat unreasonable to apply the sentencing guidelines as it is even if the sentence is imposed on Defendant A. In addition, taking account of the circumstances surrounding the crime and the circumstances after the crime, etc., which are the conditions for sentencing specified in the instant argument, including the circumstances surrounding the crime and the circumstances after the crime

D. Whether to reflect the sentencing of the compliance monitoring system

1) As the Commercial Act amended on April 14, 201, a listed company whose asset size exceeds a certain level should establish compliance guidelines and appoint compliance officers. The N Group accordingly has a compliance officer for M et al., but did not prevent the occurrence of the instant case even though it had a compliance officer for M et al.

2) After the judgment of reversal and remanded, the National Assembly established an independent N Compliance Commission from an affiliate, referring to the U.S. compliance monitoring system, and prepared a more strengthened compliance monitoring system in combination with the existing compliance monitoring system.

3) The circumstance that the total number of companies strengthening compliance system after the occurrence of corporate crime cases constitutes “a situation after the commission of crime” under Article 51 subparag. 4 of the Criminal Act, and thus, one of the conditions for sentencing can be considered.

4) However, in order for corporate crime cases to be considered as one of the conditions for sentencing to strengthen compliance monitoring system after the occurrence of corporate crime, its effectiveness should be verified very strictly. The reasons are as follows.

A) The internal compliance monitoring system in the U.S. has become more important for preventing a bribe crime of a company since a large-scale bribe incident in the 1970 to 80s, and has been regulated in the part of sentencing for corporations, etc. in 191 after undergoing social discussions for several years, and has been recognized as judicially in 191, and has been evaluated as contributing to the establishment of a compliance ethics culture in the future.21) The provisions related to the compliance monitoring system in the U.S. federal sentencing guidelines form a form of encouraging and promoting the introduction of compliance monitoring system by providing incentives that reduce liability if the company has been effectively operated with an adequate compliance monitoring system when criminal liability of an organization, such as an enterprise, etc.

B) However, in order to induce the voluntary operation of the compliance surveillance system as above, strict penalties for illegal acts and illegal acts should be premised on the perception that illegal acts are to be detected. This is because, even though a company committed an illegal act, if it considers that the plant is punished or that the plant is unlikely to be exposed even though it committed an illegal act, the reason for the voluntary operation of the compliance surveillance system will cease to exist even when it brought costs. This is more true in view of the fact that there is a low possibility that illegal profits may be gained due to the compliance surveillance.

C) In light of this point, it is very careful to reflect the situation in which the compliance monitoring system was introduced or strengthened as a positive factor in sentencing. This is because, if a sentence is reduced based on the compliance monitoring system that is not effective as the basis of the compliance surveillance system, it is likely to undermine the premise of strict punishment against illegal acts. In particular, in a case where the compliance monitoring system has been strengthened after the Supreme Court’s judgment was rendered on the grounds of the same case, as in this case, after the Supreme Court’s judgment on the reversal and return of the case, it is more likely that the company will introduce or strengthen the compliance monitoring system if it is found guilty after both factual and legal issues are disputed. The essence of the compliance monitoring system is not a sense of preventing illegal acts.

5) The Defendants asserts to the effect that the N Group’s strengthened monitoring system is effectively operated. The Defendants’ authenticity and effort to enhance the effectiveness of the compliance monitoring system, including the authority and role of an independent NCompliance Commission from individual affiliates, the organic linkage between N Compliance Commission and its affiliate monitoring organization, and the establishment of a compliance reporting system, can be positively assessed. However, in light of the following circumstances, it is difficult to find that N Group’s compliance monitoring system satisfied the above effectiveness criteria.

A) Effective monitoring of compliance begins from the evaluation of legal risks. 22) To ensure effective compliance surveillance of listed companies according to the standard law control standards, ① evaluation of legal risks by reviewing the size and frequency of occurrence of legal risks, etc., and by assessing major legal risks (Article 12), ② management of assessed legal risks (Article 13), ③ operation of compliance education and training programs corresponding thereto (Article 14), daily compliance assistance and compliance inspection must be conducted (Articles 15 through 17). It seems that the above process is a series of processes, and thus, its meaning should be lost as a whole. 23) Operation of compliance programs, compliance guidelines and reporting activities by compliance officers should also be conducted to the maximum extent possible in preparation for possible violation of compliance guidelines and compliance guidelines (Article 15 and 17).

C) Furthermore, it seems necessary to supplement the N Group’s compliance monitoring system in the following parts:

(1) Examining the past N Group’s past N Group’s illegal acts, it can be found that the illegal act was committed through an organization that serves as a "contrawer such as the Restructuring Headquarters and the R," but the current N Group’s compliance monitoring system does not specifically provide countermeasures against the illegal act through an organization that serves as a "contrawer".

(2) In order for the highest management company to commit an illegal act for the purpose of management succession, it is inevitable to mobilize the organization within the company. However, since the compliance monitoring system has been strengthened and the activities of the compliance monitoring organization have actively been conducted, it is difficult to commit an illegal act by using the organization within the company compared to the past.28) In this regard, LZ professional examiners can not complete illegal and corruption unless they perform the act at the level of the representative director or the working-level (e.g., purchase or sale of stocks for payment, merger, etc. of external support payments). In the stage of the implementation at the related company level, it is possible for the compliance monitoring activities of the related company compliance officer at the stage of the implementation at the related company level, so the proviso of the highest management progress, such as the total number, etc., and the proviso of the highest management progress, can be seen as effective at least at the stage of the implementation act as above. However, in order to recognize that such implementation is reasonable, an independent compliance system should be established in an independent compliance committee with respect to affiliated companies.

At present, M, Q Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Co., Ltd.”) among N Group’s affiliates, entered into an agreement on the establishment and operation of the compliance monitoring committee with M, QY, FY, FZ, AB, AE, and AE, and AINS, and is engaged in compliance monitoring activities with the above companies. 30) AB’s illegal conduct may occur in companies other than M, Q, FY, FY, FY, AB, AE, and FS (as at the time of the low-price issuance of AB bonds, AB was an emergency company, support for BG and S were mobilized, and a number of criminal cases related to EY have occurred recently). Ultimately, in order to control management succession-related illegal conduct at the stage of implementation, most NY’s affiliates have to be effectively complied with, but it seems that it is unreasonable at the present time of NY’s compliance Committee alone.

(3) The part that did not initiate an investigation on a merger between Q and Il-il on the ground that the NPS was not established or that the court's first trial decision was not yet pronounced is not persuasive.31) The essence of the NPS is to prevent a violation, not a sanction, and to analyze the past records of the company in the compliance surveillance is one of the essential tasks to analyze the legal risks expected to occur in the future and to prepare countermeasures against them.

(4) In order to block the offering of a bribe in political power, effective supervision over the creation of non-financial funds should be conducted. Since the disbursement of non-financial support amounting to KRW 10 million or more is subject to deliberation by the N Compliance Commission as an agenda item, the risk of offering a bribe to political power can be prevented through this process. However, as seen in the instant case, the offering of a bribe to the former president and the offering of a bribe to political power can be conducted by pretending the appearance of a false service contract, and thus, it is difficult to deem that strengthening the examination of the external support fund alone is sufficiently responding.

Since the issue of whether it falls under the part of the Council’s provision of external support payments is determined regardless of the form, it may be conducted by the N Compliance Commission even in the case of the most external appearance. However, it is not realistic to expect that the related parties who concluded a false service contract in order to offer a bribe to the political power reveal that the substance of the contract is the offer of bribe and refer it to the N Compliance Commission for deliberation. Rather, as long as NN becomes aware of the fact that the conclusion of a false service contract for offering a bribe constitutes a case in which the Act on the Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment is violated, it is necessary to evaluate and manage it as an independent legal risk, and to prepare countermeasures against it by analyzing the method of raising funds by NN in the offering of a bribe case against the past MA, MC, MD, and V President.

(5) Since the legal risks to be managed are not limited to the existing legal risks, the holding of borrowed-name shares, which mobilized executives and employees, should also be deemed as the legal risks to be controlled.

① The holding of a borrowed-name share is mobilized by the officers and employees of the company, and ② This may lead to a violation of the duty to report the holding of shares in bulk (Article 147 of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act), a corporation may also be punished (Article 44 Subparag. 18, Article 445, Article 20, and Article 448 of the same Act), and ③ The holding of a borrowed-name share in the names of executives and employees may also be a financial resource for offering a bribe. However, the defense counsel asserts that there is no borrowed-name share at present, which shall be considered in the process of determining priority by evaluating the possibility of occurrence of risks.

2. Defendant C, D

(a) Scope of applicable sentences under law: Imprisonment with prison labor for a period of two years and six months from June to June 22 months;

(b) Scope of recommendations based on the sentencing criteria;

1) First Crime [Violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (Embezzlement)]

[Determination of Punishment] Embezzlement and Breach of Trust [Type 4] Embezzlement 5 billion won or more, and 30 billion won or less] Reduction element: In case where punishment is not granted or a significant damage is recovered, the Aggravation element is very poor.

[Recommendation and Scope of Recommendation] Basic Field, 4 years to 7 years of imprisonment

2) Class 2 crime (Bribery)

[Determination of Type] 100 million won or more for the offering of a bribe

[Special Contributors] Reduction element: Where a person complies with the affirmative demand of the briberyer: Where the details of the solicitation are related to illegal or unjust performance of duties;

[Recommendation and Scope of Recommendation] Aggravation, 3-5 years of imprisonment

3) Scope of recommendations based on the standards for handling multiple crimes: Imprisonment with prison labor for a period of four years to nine years. Determination of sentence shall be made

1) Defendants C and D were the primary offenders, the former president first demanded a bribe, and the damages incurred in the crime of occupational embezzlement in the trial before remanding the case are recovered.

2) However, Defendant C and D also actively offered a bribe to the former president’s demand for bribe, and there was an illegal solicitation in the process. Defendant C took overall charge of the duties of the R Office as the president of the R Office (the president) and Defendant D took overall charge of the duties of the R Office as the deputy head of the R Office (the president). The degree of participation is significant in that they planned the overall crime and made a substantial decision and made a substantial decision.

Considering these circumstances, the sentence of sentence and the statutory detention of Defendant C and D are inevitable.

3) However, even if a sentence is imposed in light of the following: (a) the embezzlement of M’s funds was made due to the former president’s demand for the support of Mwit; (b) the damage of occupational embezzlement was completely recovered; (c) the refusal of the president’s demand is very difficult; and (d) the benefit arising from the success of the succession work does not directly belong to Defendant C and D, it is somewhat unreasonable to apply the sentencing criteria as it is, even if a sentence is imposed. Other circumstances, such as the circumstances leading to the crime, the circumstances after the crime, etc., and the circumstances after the crime, etc., which form the conditions for the sentencing specified in the instant argument, are

3. Defendant B and E

(a) Scope of applicable sentences under law: Imprisonment with prison labor for a period of two years and six months from June to June 22 months;

(b) Scope of recommendations based on the sentencing criteria;

1) First Crime [Violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (Embezzlement)]

[Determination of Punishment] Embezzlement and Breach of Trust [Type 4] Embezzlement 5 billion won or more, and less than 30 billion won (special person] mitigation element: In cases where punishment is not granted or a significant damage is recovered, the aggravation element is very poor in the number of crimes.

[Recommendation and Scope of Recommendation] Basic Field, 4 years to 7 years of imprisonment

2) Class 2 crime (Bribery)

[Determination of Type] 100 million won or more for the offering of a bribe

[Special Contributors] Reduction element: Where a person complies with the affirmative demand of the briberyer: Where the details of the solicitation are related to illegal or unjust performance of duties;

[Recommendation and Scope of Recommendation] Aggravation, 3 years to 5 years of imprisonment

3) Scope of recommending punishment based on the standards for handling multiple crimes: Imprisonment with prison labor for a period of four to nine years; a decision of sentence shall be made.

1) Defendant B is only one time of fine, and Defendant E is the primary offender, the former president first demanded a bribe, and the damage to the crime of occupational embezzlement was recovered in the trial before remanding.

2) However, Defendant B and E actively participated in the crime of offering a bribe by accepting the demand of the former president’s bribe, and the nature of the crime is not good.

3) However, considering the fact that the benefits from the success of the succeeded work do not belong to the defendant B and E, and that the defendant B and E committed the crime but it appears that they did not plan the crime itself, there is a harsh aspect in sentencing them. Other circumstances, such as the circumstances leading to the crime and the circumstances after the crime, etc., which form the conditions for the sentencing specified in the instant pleadings, are comprehensively taken into account, and the sentence is determined as ordered.

Not guilty part 36)

1. Offering of a bribe or promise to offer a bribe related to riding support;

A. The main facts charged

1) Summary of the facts charged

On September 12, 2014, the former president and W solicited Defendant A to provide horse-riding assistance and to accept a bribe. The former president demanded horse-riding assistance to the same effect as stated in paragraph (2) of the criminal facts while holding a single interview with Defendant A on September 12, 2014, in addition to the date and place specified in paragraph (2) of the criminal facts. Defendant A accepted it and agreed to accept the bribe in return for illegal solicitation between Defendant A and the former president.

Since then, according to the orders of Defendants A, C, and D, the Defendants B and E agreed to purchase the above bribe of KRW 2.5 billion for the aggregate of KRW 1.65 billion for the purpose of KRW 2.7 billion on August 26, 2015 and KRW 2.1.5 billion from August 2015 to December 2018, KRW 2.1.68 billion on a service contract with KRW 2.65 billion on a total of KRW 3 billion for the purpose of purchasing the above bribe of KRW 2.65 billion ( KRW 1.668 billion on a list of KRW 1.65 billion on a list of KRW 1.66 billion on a list of KRW 2.65 billion on a list of KRW 96 billion on a list of KRW 1.65 billion on a list of KRW 1.65 billion on a list of KRW 1.65 billion on a list of MT 2.61 billion on a list of MT 21.21.25 billion on a list of KRW 281.2685 billion on a.28

2) Determination

A) Without any reasonable doubt, the evidence alone submitted by the special prosecutor on September 12, 2014, which was presented by the special prosecutor, is difficult to readily conclude that Defendant A had a single interview with the former president on September 12, 2014, or that the promise of offering of a bribe by horse riding support was made on that job.

B) The commitment of offering of bribe

As seen above 5-b. 1) In relation to this part, there was no further dispute as to this part due to the occurrence of the final binding force at the time of the pronouncement of the judgment of remand, and this court cannot make any judgment contrary thereto. Thus, this part of the facts charged is not acceptable.

C) The part on the offering of bribe for the purchase cost of mail and for the money in the name of insurance premium

It is reasonable to view that the Defendants provided AT, AU, and AV as a bribe, not for the purchase cost of Mail, and it is difficult to recognize that money in the name of insurance premium was provided as a bribe, as seen in the above 4-C. 2.

In light of the fact that the portion of the offering of a bribe to the money in the name of the purchase cost of the vehicle and the confirmation document prepared by the AR indicate that the ownership of the vehicle is in M, and that M sells the vehicle for the team on the first half of February 2016 and the vehicle for the horse transport to another German company on April 12, 2017 and receives the price, there is insufficient proof that the Defendants offered the purchase price of the vehicle to W as a bribe.

3) Sub-decisions

Thus, since the facts charged in this part of the facts charged are when there is no proof of crime, it should be pronounced not guilty pursuant to the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act. However, as long as the court found the Defendants guilty of the crime of offering a bribe related to the horse riding support in the judgment of the Defendants related to the above

B. The ancillary charge part

1) Summary of the facts charged

The former president and W agreed to accept a bribe upon requesting the Defendant A to provide horse riding support. On September 12, 2014, in addition to the date and place specified in paragraph (2) of the criminal facts, the former president demanded horse riding support to the same effect as stated in paragraph (2) of the criminal facts. Defendant A and the former president agreed to accept it and agreed to accept bribe in return for an unlawful solicitation. Defendant A, C, and Defendant D purchased AT through Defendant B and Defendant E with KRW 280,000,000 (65,830,000,000,000,000) from KRW 165,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 won (hereinafter referred to as “MT”) and KRW 281,000,000,000,000,0000,000,000 won (hereinafter referred to as “MT”).

2) Determination

As seen in the above 4-C. 2, it is difficult to recognize that the benefit equivalent to the insurance premium was provided as a bribe. Accordingly, since this part of the conjunctive charge premised on this premise also constitutes a case where there is no proof of a crime, it should be pronounced not guilty pursuant to the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act. However, as long as the lower court found the Defendants guilty of the offering of a bribe relating to riding support related to the crime of single-

2. Violation of the Act on the Specific Economic Crimes (Embezzlement);

A. Summary of the primary and preparatory facts charged

Defendant A, as a vice president of M, is a person in charge of overall affairs including fund management of N Group’s entire N Group’s affiliates through the N Group R office. Defendant A, in return for illegal solicitation that helps former N Group’s succession work, etc., was committed with intent to support AH’s German riding training with the funds of N Group’s affiliates.

Defendant A was aware that the use of M’s funds under the unilateral initiative of Defendant A was contrary to the purpose of establishing and operating M’s juristic person, without sufficiently examining the nature and relevance of the work, as well as the fact that the R was established in Germany in order to receive financial support from M.

Nevertheless, Defendant A instructed Defendant C, Defendant D, and Defendant B to pay horse riding training expenses, and Defendant B and Defendant E pretended to be a normal service contract by concluding a service contract, and embezzled the money of KRW 149,369,000 (149,717 U.S.) in lieu of the purchase amount of AT purchased by M in lieu of the purchase amount of the AT vehicle, as if it were to purchase the vehicle, by means of “(i) arbitrarily remitting the money of KRW 24,4180,00 (186,87 U.S.) owned by the victim M, which was kept in business on October 14, 2015, on five occasions until February 19, 2016 (149,717 U.S.), and embezzled the money of KRW 284,000,000,000 in lieu of the purchase amount of the AT vehicle, the EM vehicle and the vehicle purchased by MM in lieu of the purchase amount of the purchase amount of the vehicle.

A person shall be appointed.

B. Determination

The Defendants should be deemed to have embezzled the AT itself, rather than the purchase cost of the AT, and as long as it is difficult to recognize that the purchase price of money or vehicles under the name of the insurance premium was provided as a bribe (No. 1, 3, 4, and 5 of the above table), the Defendants cannot be deemed to have embezzled the amount equivalent to the said amount.

C. Conclusion

Therefore, since the facts charged around this part of the primary and preliminary facts charged are when there is no proof of crime, it should be pronounced not guilty pursuant to the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act. However, as long as it is found to be guilty of violating the Act of the Specific Economic Crimes (Embezzlement) concerning horse riding support for the defendants who are related to the above not guilty part, the sentence of

3. Violation of the Regulation on Concealment of Criminal Proceeds Act;

A. Summary of the facts charged

The Defendants embezzled the M company’s funds to the former president in return for illegal solicitation in the direction of Defendant A’s desire for succession, and provided W with the amount equivalent to KRW AH’s horse and training expenses. However, the Defendants planned to pay the purchase price of the horses necessary for overseas off-line training and training for the horse riding group belonging to M not having completed, as if M was owned by M, to conclude that the ownership of the horses is false, and to conclude the origin of criminal proceeds. Defendant A, Defendant C, and Defendant D instructed Defendant B and Defendant E to implement the said plan. Defendant B and Defendant B provided three players’ vehicle vehicles and one horse transport vehicle with property benefits related to free use by means of a sales contract with the content of purchasing horses at their own assets.

As a result, the Defendants pretended to the origin of criminal proceeds caused by bribery and occupational embezzlement in collusion with W.However, the judgment is made.

1) The part concerning the sales contract for AT, AU, and AV

As seen in the above 4-E. 2, it is difficult to recognize that the sales contract for AU and AV is merely the most unfair transaction. It is difficult to recognize that the sales contract for AT is merely the most unfair transaction. For the same reason, it is difficult to recognize that the sales contract for AT is the most unfair transaction.

2) The portion of profits from free use of the athletes’ vehicles and horse transport vehicles

As seen earlier, the part rejected by the court of final appeal on the ground that the assertion in the grounds of final appeal is groundless shall be no longer disputed as to this part due to the occurrence of the final binding force at the same time as the rendering of the judgment, and the court that has been remanded shall not render a judgment contrary thereto. The same shall also apply to the case where new arguments are added as to

The judgment of the court below and the judgment of the court prior to remand did not recognize the purchase price of vehicles as criminal proceeds on the premise that the Defendants cannot be deemed to have given the purchase price of vehicles as a bribe, and that they cannot be deemed to have embezzled the purchase price, etc. of vehicles. In this regard, the special prosecutor asserted that in the remanded trial, “the purchase price of the vehicle was given as a bribe,” even if the use of the vehicle was offered as a bribe, so long as the above use profit is crime proceeds offered as a bribe, it is obvious that the above use profit would not be determined as a bribe and the crime proceeds would not be violated the Act on the Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment, but the remanded trial rejected the special prosecutor’s allegation in the grounds of appeal. However, the remanded trial reversed and remanded this part on the ground that this part was related to the reversed part and the comprehensive crime, but no further dispute could be raised due to the final judgment of the court at the same time, and this part of the facts charged cannot be recognized (this is the same as in the previous part of the indictment, even if other parts after the remanded part, which became final and conclusive.).

4. Violation of the National Assembly Testimony Act

A. Summary of the facts charged

At around 10:00 on December 6, 2016, Defendant A appeared at the third conference of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea (No. 245) located in Yeongdeungpo-gu Seoul National Assembly as the doctor of Yeongdeungpo-gu, Seoul, and took an oath as a witness of the first hearing of the National Assembly "Investigation for the Truth of the State's Cruel Incident by Civilian, including W of the Government," and Defendant A was demanded to provide support for the establishment of BF Foundation and BG Foundation on two occasions on July 25, 2015 and February 15, 2016. Nevertheless, Defendant A took an oath before the Special Committee for the Investigation of the National Assembly, and thereafter Defendant A testified to the effect that “I was unable to cause any contribution to the former president’s contribution?” “I have no memory.”

Accordingly, Defendant A made a false statement contrary to his memory and presented perjury.

B. Determination

As seen in the above 4-f above, it is difficult to readily conclude that Defendant A made a false statement contrary to memory as stated in this part of the facts charged. Therefore, this part of the facts charged constitutes a case where there is no proof of crime, and thus, the acquittal should be pronounced pursuant to the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act. However, inasmuch as Defendant A, who is related to this part of the facts charged, is guilty of a violation of the National Assembly Testimony Act as stated in the judgment against Defendant A,

The presiding judge, appointed judge and associate judge

Judges Song-young

Judges Gangseo-Appellee

1) As to the progress of a lawsuit, the proceedings were arranged in the attached sheet and attached thereto.

2) T and thereafter, the name was changed into JZ (JZ). "AT".

3) The term “AU” and “AU” are abbreviationd.

4) The term “AV” and “AV” are abbreviationd.

5) BI’s member ① “I’s day (at a private meeting with the former president on July 25, 2015) 1 Does we talk about the donation?”

Part replyed to "I do not have such memory" (hereinafter referred to as " Part I") and 100 BI members "I report to the president."

without regard to whether donation has been made to the Foundation? “I do not report this day and do not report this day to the Foundation.”

Part of the reply (hereinafter referred to as the “part”), part of the reply to the question of the BJ member, which was one of the two parties, (hereinafter referred to as the “part”);

(a) was found guilty of all the parts responding to the question of the Committee Member B (hereinafter referred to as "part").

6) The part of AT itself, AT insurance premium, AU. AV itself, AU. AV insurance premium.

7) The purport of the Defendants’ assertion of mistake of facts and misapprehension of legal principles is that there is reasonable ground.

8) The lower court did not render a judgment of innocence.

9) The Defendants’ assertion in the grounds of appeal was rejected or omitted.

10) After the remand, the grounds for appeal was withdrawn from the trial. The defense counsel’s written opinion dated November 30, 2020 (25), and the person on December 7, 2020

Defense Counsel’s written opinion (27), 13 pages, 2020, 12.4. Special Prosecutor’s opinion (17), and 41 pages of the trial records dated December 7, 2020.

11) The Defendants are aware of the lower court’s determination on the admissibility of BW business pocket book as to the substance relevant to the violation of the National Assembly Testimony Act.

The State also supports the argument that there was a solicitation for individual pending issues, and that the sentencing also affects the sentencing.

[See the counsel’s written opinion (28) dated December 14, 2020]

12) We refer to Supreme Court Decision 2010Do8735 Decided November 25, 2010 as precedents for the same purport.

13) See the protocol of the trial dated December 7, 2020.

14) Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Do13792 Decided August 29, 2019 see Supreme Court en banc Decision 21 Decided August 29, 2019;

15) As seen earlier, the indictment was modified after the remand in relation to this part. The Defendants were changed.

It is the position that the facts charged are not recognized and disputed (see the counsel's written opinion on December 21, 2020 (29)).

16) BW’s work pocket book and statement are used as evidence to prove the contents of conversation divided by the former president and individual visitors.

b. The same shall also apply to the part of Doz.

17) Where the means and methods of a crime have been closely planned in advance, and a large number of persons have been organized by sharing their roles.

18) The program was implemented under a court order that the compliance monitoring program of the company was carried out voluntarily;

LT and TRson Story: Bild Ancs and Commons and Commons

Program, 5 Drakke Law 305 (200), 333.

19) With respect to the process of the judicial approval of the compliance monitoring system of the United States, LT and the Company’s Story: Bils Ethics

Law 305 (200), 311-326; LU, Leter vs.

Sirit: Posti business Ethics 46thics, American Law Journi business 453 (2009);

457-468See 457-468

20) The United States in the demonstration conducted by the U.S. Ethics Officer after the enforcement of Chapter 8 of the Federal sentencing guidelines.

Part VIII of the sentencing guidelines has significantly influenced the company's practice of business ethics through the adoption of compliance monitoring program.

One half of the answers, and more than 60% of the respondents are business ethics (busi business ethics) itself, which is contradictory to 1970-80

The general perception in the world seems to have been believed that the ethical dynasty was not to be able to avoid business.

According to the EOA, most of the business employees today can combine management and ethics.

It shows that ethical dynasty is believed to be reduced. LV, the Construction Enterprise Doideline for LV, the Construction Enterprise Doides

Organas: A Decade and Common Finance and Ethics, 87 Deala Law Review 697 (2002), 710;

711. LV, written in the above writing, is the 8th Federal Appellate Court Judge (1994-2018) of the United States, the Chairman of the Federal Sentencing Committee (1999-2004).

There is nothing more than anything else.

21) LW and Poolmincing Cor Rate Self-Poling, Routers Unis Law Review

421 (2017), 423, 424

22) LW and Poolmincing Cor Rate Self-Poling, Routers Unis Law Review

421(2017), 448; LX and Effance: A Holistic Aproach SEC and DOJ;

94 Wlasington Law Review 851 (2019), 867

23) LY, listed companies’ compliance management and reasonable and efficient compliance guidelines, No. 9 of 2015, Korea Stock Exchange

Council (2015), 16 pages

24) Review of practical issues concerning LY, commercial law compliance programs, and measures to improve legislation, and 33 rights research on commercial law

heading 2, Korea Commercial Law Association (2014), 138 pages

25) S8B2.1. Effy and Pro ratas

(a) To Do Governor Ancuance and ethics program (ES) Ancu shall

(1)The Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Maritime Affairs and Fisheries ; and

(2)Incurages eth physical andcom management Doz. Doz. Doz. Doz.

Dorance. Dorance. Dorance.

(b) Domination 이이 이이이 이이 이이이 이이 이이 이이 이이 이이이 이이 이이이 이이 이이 이이

Terms and Conditions Governing Doz. Dogr Dogr Dogr. Dogr Dogr Dogr Dogr.

Trring: (Instrue)

(c) Doing sub-Section (b) of the Convention on the Promotion of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries by the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries.

Fair Trade Commission and shalls to be taken at a premium rate, 100 00 00 000 0000 Domth 5000

2. 2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2. 3.2. 3.2. 3.2.2.

Furthermore, in the relevant note, ① nature and seriousness of criminal conduct, and ② possibility of occurrence

(likelihood to occur), ③ 기관의 전력(prior history of the organization) 등을 평가한 후 ④ 범죄행위의 심각

According to the possibility of the occurrence of performance, it is required to periodically set the priorities for the corresponding measures.

26) With respect to this, the opinions of three professional examiners are consistent with the ME, MG, and LZ (Specialized Examination Examiner of December 14, 2020).

Sheet 8 pages)

27) It extracted three professional examiners' opinions and attached them in attached Form.

28) Report on professional examiners 21 pages (ME professional examiners part)

29) 64 pages of the report on professional examiners (referring to the part on which the professional examiners write the LZ).

30) Reference materials to be submitted by a defense counsel 276 see 1.

31) Report on professional examiners is 16 pages, 18 pages, 39 pages, 53 pages, 81 pages.

32) In Chapter 8 of the Federal Sentencing, in relation thereto, the following is mentioned (see Section 8B2.1.(c). (See Section 8).

222222, 193 2322, 2012, 2012, 2012, 2002, 201.

33) Reference materials to be submitted by a defense counsel are see the defense counsel’s written opinion (35) dated 31, 2020, 276 10 and 34.

34) See his defense counsel’s written opinion on January 7, 2021 (36) 14.

35) The defense counsel’s written opinion dated January 7, 2021 (see Supreme Court Decision 36) 16 pages.

36) As seen earlier, Defendants’ reexamination of the violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (property flight abroad), Defendant A, C, and D respectively.

Provided, That the offer of related bribe and the violation of the Specific Economic Crimes Act (Embezzlement) are finalized by dismissal of appeal by the Supreme Court's judgment

this section does not require separate determination.

37) The special prosecutor’s appellate brief 222,223 pages.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.