[1] In the event that the preceding vehicle stops on an expressway while taking safety measures on the expressway due to an accident, etc. and the subsequent accident occurred, whether the causal relationship between the suspension due to the failure to take safety measures or the occurrence of the preceding accident and the subsequent accident and the subsequent accident resulting from the subsequent accident is acknowledged (affirmative in principle); and in such a case, whether the scope of sharing the liability for damages caused by the subsequent accident by the driver’s negligence on the preceding vehicle should be considered (affirmative)

[2] Whether there is a need for common intent or common recognition among joint tortfeasors in the establishment of joint tort (negative)

[3] The case holding that the judgment below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as to proximate causal relation and the establishment of joint tort, in case where Gap, while driving a motor vehicle on an expressway while driving a motor vehicle on the expressway, did not see the motor vehicle that was driven by the front and stopped on the road, and there was a fire on the front and rear gasoline, etc., which is attached to the motor vehicle that was driven by Eul while leaving another motor vehicle for another accident, and the motor vehicle that was driven by Eul, was driving a motor vehicle on the expressway, there was an error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the subsequent exercise of the motor vehicle and the establishment of joint tort

[1] In the event that the preceding vehicle stops on the road without taking safety measures on the expressway due to an accident, etc. and the subsequent vehicle stops without taking safety measures, and thus, it can be sufficiently anticipated that the preceding vehicle may conflict with the preceding vehicle and further conflict with others or peoples around the vehicle. Thus, even if the preceding vehicle driver could have taken safety measures after stopping, he/she could not take such measures due to negligence even though he/she could have taken such measures after stopping, or he/she could not take safety measures due to insufficient time or injury after stopping, if the suspension results from his/her negligence, such as an accident caused by the preceding vehicle driver's negligence, barring any special circumstance, between the suspension due to the failure to take safety measures or the occurrence of the preceding vehicle and the occurrence of the preceding vehicle's accident caused by the preceding vehicle's accident. In light of the ideology of the damage compensation system that fair sharing of damages, the preceding vehicle driver's negligence should be considered when determining the scope of liability for damages due to the use of the preceding vehicle after stopping.

[2] In the establishment of a joint tort, there is no need for common intent or common recognition among the joint tortfeasors, and there is an objective common nature related to each act, and if damages were incurred due to the relevant joint act, the liability for damages cannot be exempted.

[3] The case holding that the judgment below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as to proximate causal relation and joint tort, in case where Gap and Eul, as joint tortfeasor, are liable for joint and several liability for damages caused by a fire, since Gap and Eul, as joint and several liability for damages caused by a fire, are different since Eul's negligence, failing to take necessary measures after the preceding accident, and Eul's negligence, due to failure to take necessary measures, and due to failure to maintain the safety distance, caused a fire, and the subsequent accident and subsequent exercise are related to a series of chain chain accidents that occurred near time and place, and are objectively co-related to the subsequent accident, as part of a series of chain chain accidents that occurred near time and place, and thus, Gap and Eul are liable for joint and several liability for damages caused by a fire.

[1] Article 750 of the Civil Code, Articles 64 and 66 of the former Road Traffic Act (amended by Act No. 7969 of Jul. 19, 2006), Article 40 of the former Enforcement Rule of the Road Traffic Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs No. 350 of Oct. 19, 2006) / [2] Article 760 of the Civil Code / [3] Article 760 of the Civil Code, Articles 64 and 66 of the former Road Traffic Act (amended by Act No. 7969 of Jul. 19, 2006), Article 40 of the former Enforcement Rule of the Road Traffic Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs of Oct. 19, 2006)

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2009Da64925 Decided December 10, 2009 (Gong2010Sang, 117) Supreme Court Decision 201Da110692 Decided March 29, 2012 / [2] Supreme Court Decision 87Da2951 Decided April 12, 198 (Gong198, 842) (Gong1988, 2008Da22481 Decided June 26, 2008)

Dongbu Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Square, Attorneys Park Ho-ho et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant)

ELa District Damage Insurance Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Sejongyang, Attorneys Kim Mine-hun et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2009Na9985 decided February 19, 2010

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

This part of the grounds of appeal is merely an error of the selection of evidence and fact-finding, which belongs to the free trial of the court below, which is the fact-finding court, and each traffic accident confirmation officer and traffic accident report prepared by the police are admitted as evidence, and the time of each accident of this case and the judgment below which recognized the cause of the fire of this case did not err in violation of logical and empirical rules and free evaluation of evidence.

2. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 2 and 3

A. According to Article 64 of the former Road Traffic Act (amended by Act No. 7969 of Jul. 19, 2006; hereinafter the same), where a driver stops or parks a motor vehicle at a place where safety signs are installed so as to allow the stopping or parking on an expressway or a stop, or where the driver stops or parks a motor vehicle at the edge of a road (including the side) due to breakdown or other inevitable reasons (Article 3), except in special circumstances such as where the driver temporarily stops or parks a motor vehicle on an expressway when the driver cannot drive on an expressway due to traffic congestion or other inevitable reasons (Article 66 of the former Road Traffic Act, Article 40 of the former Enforcement Rule of the Road Traffic Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs No. 350 of Oct. 19, 2006); Article 20 of the former Enforcement Rule of the Road Traffic Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs No. 350 of Oct. 19, 2006). 208

In a case where the preceding vehicle stops on an expressway without taking safety measures on the road due to an accident or any other cause, it is sufficiently anticipated that the latter vehicle may collision with the preceding vehicle and even if the latter vehicle could take safety measures after stopping due to a stop without taking safety measures. Thus, even though the preceding vehicle's driver was negligent in taking safety measures after stopping, or could not take safety measures due to insufficient time or injury after stopping, if the suspension results from his negligence, such as due to a preceding accident caused by the preceding vehicle's negligence, the occurrence of the preceding vehicle's failure to take safety measures or the occurrence of the preceding accident. In light of the ideology of the damage compensation system that fair sharing of damages, the preceding vehicle's negligence should be considered when determining the scope of liability for damages due to the subsequent use of the preceding vehicle and the preceding vehicle's negligence (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 200Da1629, Apr. 29, 2005).

(4) On the other hand, Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 1 were driving of the above 7-lane 4 vehicle without Nonparty 1’s driver’s license on the front side of the 7-lane 1 and the front side of the 7-lane 4-lane 1 and without Nonparty 1’s license on the front side of the 7-lane 4-lane 1 and the front side of the 7-lane 4-lane 1 and the 7-lane 5-lane 1 omitted. The 7-lane 1 and the 5-lane 4-lane 1 and the 5-lane 7-lane 1 and the 5-lane 1 and the 5-lane 4-lane 1 and the 7-lane 4-lane 1 and the 5-lane 7-lane 1 and the 5-lane 1 and the 7-lane 1 and the 7-lane 1 and the 5-lane 1 and the 7-lane mick.

Examining these facts in light of the aforementioned legal principles, Nonparty 1, the driver of the Defendant vehicle, caused the preceding accident of this case, which was the first cause of the accident of this case due to negligence, such as violation of the duty to stop on the road, and the occurrence of the subsequent accident by the vehicle following which was stopped on the road without taking safety measures after the accident, so even if Nonparty 1 did not have enough time to take safety measures after the accident, it is deemed that there was negligence on the subsequent accident of this case, even though the accident of this case occurred after the accident, the accident of this case occurred due to the subsequent subsequent subsequent shock, and the accident of this case led to the fire of this case. Nonparty 1, the driver of the Defendant vehicle, who was the driver of this case, could not have been able to look at the Defendant vehicle parked on the road of this case at the same time after driving on the road of this case, and even if Nonparty 1 had no time to take safety measures after the accident of this case, it can be said that there was a sudden causal relation between the accident of this case and the subsequent stop after the accident of this case.

B. In the establishment of a joint tort, there is no need for common intent or common recognition among the joint tortfeasors, and there is objective co-ownership with regard to each act, and the liability for damages cannot be exempted if the damage was incurred due to the pertinent joint act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 87Meu2951, Apr. 12, 198; 2008Da22481, Jun. 26, 2008).

Examining the facts in light of the aforementioned legal principles, the fire in this case caused the prior accident in this case, and neglected to take necessary measures after the accident, and neglected to perform the duty of the prior accident and the duty of safety distance maintenance, and thus, caused the collision between the negligence of Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 16, the driver of the Plaintiff, who caused the subsequent event in this case, and the prior accident in this case and the subsequent event in this case are part of a series of series of series of series of series of series of chains of events that occurred near time and place, and are objectively related to such act. Thus, the non-party 1 and the non-party 16, as joint tortfeasor, shall be jointly and severally liable for the damage caused by the fire in this case.

C. Nevertheless, the court below acknowledged that Nonparty 1 contributed to the occurrence of the preceding accident in this case and the subsequent accident, but even though Nonparty 6 and Nonparty 14 stopped after witnessing the preceding accident in this case, it is difficult to recognize that there is co-existence in time and place because there is a considerable difference between the preceding accident in time and the subsequent event and the fire in time and place, and it is difficult to view that Nonparty 1 is liable for the second accident in this case and the fire as joint tortfeasor. In so determining, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on proximate causal relation and the establishment of joint tort, which affected the conclusion of the judgment, by misapprehending the conclusion of the judgment.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Yang Chang-soo (Presiding Justice)