[1] In a case where a drilling accident occurred by a motor vehicle followed by a motor vehicle behind which the preceding motor vehicle stops on the road without taking safety measures due to the occurrence of an accident, etc. on the expressway, whether causation is acknowledged between the suspension due to the failure to take safety measures or the occurrence of a preceding accident, etc., and the accident that occurred in the future as a result of the subsequent accident (affirmative in principle), and whether in such a case, the scope of sharing liability for damages caused by the subsequent vehicle driver’s negligence should be considered when determining the scope of sharing liability (affirmative)

[2] Whether there is a need for common intent or common recognition among joint tortfeasors in the establishment of joint tort (negative)

[3] The case holding that in the case where Gap 1 was driving on an expressway while driving on an expressway, and the driver 2 of the vehicle following the driver 1 stopped on the two-lane and stopped on the two-lane, without taking safety measures, due to the fact that the inside of the vehicle was so long as the driver 1 was on the expressway while driving on the expressway, and the driver 2 of the vehicle driving the vehicle following the driver 1 stopped on the two-lane and stopped on the two-lane, but the driver 2 stopped on the road without taking safety measures, and the driver 3 of the vehicle driven on the expressway caused a drilling accident on the two-lanes on the two-lane, and the driver 3 of the vehicle 3 was on the other string of the vehicle, and the driver 1 was on the other 3-lane string of the vehicle, and the driver 1 was on the other 4-lane string of the vehicle, and was on the other 4-lane string of the other string of the vehicle.

[1] According to the Road Traffic Act and subordinate statutes, a vehicle shall not stop or park on an expressway unless there are special circumstances, and when the driver of a motor vehicle is unable to drive a motor vehicle on the expressway due to breakdown or other reasons, the "vehicle sign" as prescribed by the Enforcement Rule of the Road Traffic Act shall be installed on the road, and necessary measures, such as moving the motor vehicle to a place other than the expressway (hereinafter "safety measures").

In addition, in the event that the preceding vehicle stops on the road without taking safety measures for reasons such as an accident, etc. and the subsequent vehicle is likely to collision with the preceding vehicle and even if the preceding vehicle could take safety measures after stopping due to a stop without taking safety measures, it is sufficiently anticipated that the latter vehicle may collision with the preceding vehicle and further conflict with other vehicle or people around it. Thus, even though the preceding vehicle driver could not take safety measures after stopping, if the suspension results from his negligence, such as the preceding vehicle's failure to take safety measures or the occurrence of the preceding vehicle's negligence, if the suspension results from the preceding vehicle's failure to take safety measures, the subsequent vehicle's fault should be considered when determining the scope of liability for damages caused by the preceding vehicle's failure to take safety measures or the preceding vehicle's fault. In light of the ideology of the damage compensation system, the preceding vehicle's fault should be considered when determining the scope of liability for damages.

[2] In the establishment of a joint tort, there is no need for common intent or common recognition among the joint tortfeasors, and there is an objective common nature related to each act, and if damages were incurred due to the relevant joint act, the liability for damages cannot be exempted.

[3] The case holding that, even if the accident occurred after the driver's failure to take safety measures, as the accident occurred after the driver's failure to take measures against the driver's failure to take measures against the driver's failure to take measures against the driver's failure to take measures against the driver's failure to take measures against the driver's failure to take measures against the driver's failure to take measures against the driver's failure to take measures against the driver's failure to take measures against the driver's failure to take measures against the accident after the driver's failure to take measures against the driver's failure to take measures against the driver's failure to take measures against the driver's failure to take measures against the driver's failure to take measures against the driver's failure to take measures against the driver's failure to take measures against the driver's failure to take measures against the accident after the driver's failure to take measures against the driver's failure to take measures against the driver's failure to take measures against the driver's failure to take measures against the driver's failure to take measures against the accident.

[1] Articles 393, 396, 750, and 763 of the Civil Act, Articles 64 and 66 of the Road Traffic Act, Article 40 of the Enforcement Rule of the Road Traffic Act / [2] Article 760 of the Civil Act / [3] Articles 750, 760 of the Civil Act, Articles 64 and 66 of the Road Traffic Act, Article 40 of the Enforcement Rule of the Road Traffic Act

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 2010Da28390 Decided August 17, 2012 (Gong2012Ha, 1541) / [1] Supreme Court Decision 2009Da64925 Decided December 10, 2009 (Gong2010Sang, 117), Supreme Court Decision 201Da10692 Decided March 29, 2012 / [2] Supreme Court Decision 87Da2951 Decided April 12, 198 (Gong198, 842), Supreme Court Decision 2008Da22481 Decided June 26, 2008

National Freight Trucking Federation (Law Firm Southern River, Attorneys Kim Jae-in, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Reference Non-Life Insurance Co., Ltd. and two others (Law Firm Sejongyang et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2017Na65342 Decided March 28, 2018

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul Central District Court Panel Division.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1, 2, and 3

A. In this case, on the premise that the Plaintiff, the insurer of a vehicle causing an injury to pedestrians walking on the first lane of the Yellow Sea as an insurer of the vehicle causing an accident in the Yellow Sea as a large-scale chain and a fire accident occurred in the Yellow Sea in 2006, and then the Defendants, the insurer of the vehicle causing an accident in the second lane, are liable for joint tort, the lower court determined that there is no proximate causal relation as an accident where there is no fault in the accident in the second lane of the Defendants and the accident in the Plaintiff occurring in the first lane.

B. According to the Road Traffic Act and subordinate statutes, no motor vehicle shall stop or park on an expressway, and when the driver of a motor vehicle is unable to drive a motor vehicle on an expressway due to breakdown or other causes, the driver of the motor vehicle shall install a "vehicle sign" as prescribed by the Enforcement Rule of the Road Traffic Act on the road, and take necessary measures, such as moving the motor vehicle to a place other than the expressway (hereinafter "safety measures").

In addition, in the event that the preceding vehicle stops on an expressway without taking safety measures for reasons such as an accident, etc. and the subsequent vehicle is likely to collision with the preceding vehicle and even if the preceding vehicle is unable to take safety measures for reasons such as insufficient time or injury after the suspension, if the preceding vehicle is negligent in taking safety measures after the suspension, or due to the preceding vehicle's negligence, if the suspension occurs due to the preceding vehicle's negligence, such as the preceding vehicle's failure to take safety measures or the occurrence of the preceding vehicle's accident, the causal relationship exists between the subsequent vehicle's failure to take safety measures or the subsequent subsequent accident and the subsequent accident that has occurred on a chain of time due to the occurrence of the preceding vehicle's accident. In light of the ideology of the damage compensation system that fair sharing of damages, the preceding vehicle's negligence should be considered when determining the scope of sharing liability for damages due to the use of the preceding vehicle after the suspension (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 200Da16298, Feb. 29, 2009).

Furthermore, the establishment of a joint tort does not require the common intent or common recognition among the joint tortfeasors, and is objectively related to each act, and the liability for damages cannot be exempted if the damage was incurred due to the pertinent joint act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 87Meu2951, Apr. 12, 198; 2008Da22481, Jun. 26, 2008).

C. According to the reasoning of the first instance judgment as cited by the lower court, on October 3, 2006, the non-party 1 driven the non-party 25t truck (vehicle number 1 omitted); the non-party 1 driven the non-party 1’s vehicle on the 3-lane 279 km; the non-party 3-lane 1’s vehicle was driven by the non-party 4 vehicle on the 3-lane off the coast; the non-party 1’s vehicle was driven by the non-party 2-lane 1’s string off the 3-lane 279 km; and the non-party 1’s vehicle was parked by the non-party 1’s 2-lane 1’s string off (the non-party 1’s 2-lane 1’s string off the 3-lane 1’s string off on the 3-lane string off; and the non-party 2-party 1’s string off the said vehicle.

Examining these facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, Nonparty 1, the driver of Defendant 1, caused the instant preceding accident, which was the first cause of the instant accident by negligence, such as the violation of the duty of care at the front time, and caused the subsequent accident by the following vehicles: (a) even if Nonparty 1 did not have time to take safety measures after the accident, it is deemed that the subsequent accident was negligent in the subsequent accident; (b) Nonparty 1, the driver of the instant vehicle, who was the driver of the instant vehicle, was negligent in the subsequent accident even if he did not have time to take safety measures after the accident; and (c) Nonparty 1, the driver of the instant vehicle, as well as the driver of the instant vehicle, was driving the instant vehicle on the second time after driving the instant vehicle on the 2-lane road; and (d) Nonparty 2, as well as the driver of the instant vehicle, could have been found to have failed to take a reasonable causal relation between Nonparty 1 and the driver of the instant vehicle and Defendant 2, who did not have been negligent in the subsequent accident.

Although Nonparty 4 was evacuated from Defendant 3 to Defendant 1, the fact that Nonparty 4 was evacuated by Nonparty 1, etc. is due to a sudden subsequent accident resulting from the instant prior accident caused by Nonparty 1, etc., and a fire resulting therefrom. As to the instant case, in a case where multiple drivers’ negligence, as in the instant case, caused a fire, there was no direct shock between the Plaintiff’s vehicle and the Defendants, it cannot be deemed that the causal link between Nonparty 1, Nonparty 2, and Nonparty 3’s negligence and the instant subsequent event at the end of the instant event, on the ground that there was no direct shock between the Plaintiff’s vehicle and the Defendants’ vehicle, and it cannot be deemed that the causal relationship between the subsequent event at the end of the instant accident was severed. It is not different on the ground that the subsequent accident occurred in the first lane.

D. Nevertheless, even if the Defendants did not perform their duty to take safety measures, such as moving the prior accident of this case and the vehicle involved in the accident to a safe place due to the Defendants’ violation of the duty of front-time watch and the duty of safety distance, or setting up an indication in the event of malfunction, etc., it is reasonable to view that the Defendants’ negligence and the subsequent event of this case exist entirely separate from the Defendants’ negligence in light of all the circumstances revealed in the argument of this case, such as the prior accident of this case, the circumstances surrounding the subsequent accident of this case, and the Plaintiff’s vehicle and Nonparty 4’s negligence. Therefore, it is difficult to view that there exists a proximate causal relation between the prior accident of this case and the subsequent event of this case. In so determining,

2. Conclusion

Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jo Hee-de (Presiding Justice)