A. Whether Article 4(1) of the Addenda to the Criminal Act applies to the relationship between the former Criminal Act and other Acts, not between the former Criminal Act (negative)

B. Whether the application of the Water Quality Conservation Act to the act of discharging water pollutants that began before the enforcement of the Water Quality Conservation Act and ends after its enforcement is contrary to the legal principles and the principle of non-payment of law (negative)

C. The meaning of “a person who does not operate normally emission and preventive facilities” under Article 56 subparag. 3 of the same Act, and whether Article 8 of the same Act goes against the principle of no punishment without law (negative)

A. Article 4(1) of the Addenda to the Criminal Act is a transitional provision that sets forth the scope of application in relation to the former Criminal Act, and does not fall under the general provisions of this Act, which provides that Article 8(1) of the Criminal Act shall also apply to crimes as provided by other Acts and subordinate statutes. Moreover, the establishment and punishment of crimes is not appropriate in that it excludes the application of the Act that is enforced when the act is terminated as an interpretation of Article 1(1) of the Criminal Act, which provides that the establishment and punishment of crimes shall be governed by the Act at the time of the act. Thus, the above provision of this Act shall not be applied or applied by analogy

B. The act of discharging water pollutants that has been in force before and after February 1, 1991 while the Water Quality Conservation Act was in force on and after March 20, 191 cannot be deemed to be the act of discharging water pollutants that has been terminated on and after March 20, 191, and the application of the Water Quality Conservation Act, which is in force at the time of the termination of the act, is not contrary to the legal principles and the principle of non-payment in law.

C. In Article 56 subparagraph 3 of the Water Quality Conservation Act, the term "a person who fails to operate normally the discharge facilities and prevention facilities" means a person who discharges pollutants in excess of the permissible emission levels by designing and constructing the discharge facilities or prevention facilities, which are determined to discharge pollutants below the permissible emission levels under Article 8 of the same Act, and thereby failing to normally operate the discharge facilities or prevention facilities, which are determined as appropriate. Thus, it cannot be deemed that the acts prescribed as subject to punishment under Article 56 subparagraph 3 of the same Act are not specific and clear, and it cannot be deemed that the acts prescribed as subject to punishment under Article 56 subparagraph 3 of the same Act are not prescribed specifically and clearly, and the provisions of Article 8 of the same Act are delegated to the Prime Minister to be determined by the Ordinance of the Prime Minister, etc., instead of

(a) Articles 4(1), 8, and 1(1) of the Addenda of the Criminal Act; Article 15(c) of the Addenda of the Water Quality Conservation Act; Article 56 Subparag. 3, 8, and 15(1) of the Addenda of the same Act;

A. Supreme Court en banc Decision 86Do1012 Decided July 22, 1986 (Gong1986,152) 86Do1379 Decided September 23, 1986 (Gong1986,2968) 89Do570 Decided May 23, 1989 (Gong1989,1037)

Defendant 1 and six others

Defendants

Attorney Lee Young-soo et al.

Daegu High Court Decision 91No769 delivered on January 15, 1992

All appeals are dismissed.

1. The decision on the first ground of appeal by the defense counsel on the first ground of appeal (the grounds of supplementary appeal as stated in the supplementary appellate brief that was submitted after the deadline for the supplementary appellate brief was not timely filed by the defense counsel of the defendant and his defense counsel of the defendant 1 is examined to the extent of supplement in case of the supplemental appellate brief).

Examining the evidence admitted by the court of first instance as cited by the court below in comparison with the records, it can be sufficiently recognized that the defendants violated the Water Quality Conservation Act in this case, especially one of the two kinds of wastewater due to the wastewater pollution prevention facilities installed in the old factory of the defendant 2 stock company, and the remaining one is under circumstances that all of the wastewater generated in the production process of ethyl resin can not be incinerated. Thus, since some of the pollutants not meeting the permissible emission levels were discharged from October 21, 1990 to March 20, 191, and the remaining defendants who are responsible for operating the business to ensure that pollutants discharged from the above factory meet the permissible emission levels are discharged clearly or impliedly under contact with the intentions of both the above factories, and there is no error of law by violating the rules of evidence or by misunderstanding the legal principles as to co-principal, which affected the conclusion of the judgment, as in the theory of the court below.

In conclusion, we cannot accept the judgment of the court below since it merely criticizes the determination of evidence and the recognition of facts belonging to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court below, or criticizes the court below that there was an error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to joint principal offender in the judgment of the court below on the premise of facts

2. Determination on the ground of appeal No. 2

Article 4 (1) of the Addenda to the Criminal Act which provides that "if one of the crimes was committed across and after the enforcement of this Act, it shall be deemed that the crime was committed before and after the enforcement of this Act" is a transitional provision that sets forth the scope of the application in relation to the former Criminal Act. In addition, Article 8 (1) of the Criminal Act does not apply to the crimes provided for in other Acts and subordinate statutes. In addition, the interpretation of Article 1 (1) of the Criminal Act which provides that the establishment and punishment of a crime shall be governed by the Act at the time of the act is not appropriate from the point that the act is excluded from the application of the Act when the act is completed. In relation between other Acts and subordinate statutes, not between the new and the former Criminal Act, it shall not be applied or analogically applied (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 86Do1012, Jul. 22, 1986; 89Do570, May 23, 1989).

In addition, since Article 15 of the Addenda to the Water Quality Conservation Act provides that the crime of this case, which has been continued after February 1, 1991, cannot be seen as "violation of the previous Environmental Conservation Act committed before this Act enters into force", the application of penal provisions to the crime of this case under Article 15 of the Addenda to the same Act shall not be based on the Environmental Preservation Act, which is the previous provision.

For the same purpose, we cannot accept the discussion of the lower court that applied the relevant provisions of the Water Quality Conservation Act, which are in force on March 20, 1991, when the act was terminated, by deeming the Defendants as continuing criminal acts of this case, and criticizes the lower court that there was an error of law by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the legal principles on the legal principles and the principle

3. Determination on the ground of appeal No. 3

According to the provisions of Article 8 of the Water Quality Conservation Act, the permissible discharge standards of pollutants emitted from wastewater discharge facilities shall be determined by the Ordinance of the Prime Minister after hearing the opinions of the head of the relevant central administrative agency (paragraph (1)), and when the Minister of Environment deems it necessary for preventing water pollution in special measures areas under the provisions of Article 22 of the Framework Act on Environmental Policy (paragraph (2)). According to the provisions of Articles 11(1), 12 and 14 of the same Act, when a person who has obtained permission for the installation or alteration of discharge facilities installs or alters the discharge facilities, he shall install water pollution prevention facilities to ensure that pollutants emitted from the discharge facilities are discharged below the permissible discharge standards under Article 8. In principle, the person who has registered his preventive facilities shall design and construct the discharge facilities, and the person who has completed the installation or alteration of the discharge facilities and the preventive facilities shall, when he completes the installation or alteration of the discharge facilities, undergo an inspection within the period designated by the Minister of Environment after reporting it to the Minister of Environment, the business operator shall not operate the discharge facilities without conformity with the normal operation standards.

In light of the above relevant laws and regulations, it is clear that the phrase “a person who fails to operate normally emission and preventive facilities” under Article 56 subparag. 3 of the Water Quality Conservation Act refers to a person who discharges pollutants in excess of the permissible emission levels by designing and constructing emission facilities or preventive facilities, which are determined to discharge pollutants below the permissible emission levels under Article 8 of the same Act, and by failing to operate normally emission facilities or preventive facilities, which are determined to be determined to be in conformity with the permissible emission levels under Article 8 of the same Act. Thus, the acts under Article 56 subparag. 3 of the same Act are not specified specifically and clearly as the theory of lawsuit. In addition, the acts under Article 56 subparag. 3 of the same Act do not constitute a violation of the principle of no punishment without law, on the ground that Article 8 of the same Act was delegated to be determined by the Ordinance of the Prime Minister without directly prescribing the permissible emission levels

We cannot accept the argument that the judgment of the court below that there was an error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the principle of no punishment without law.

4. Therefore, all appeals by the Defendants are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Yoon Jae-ho (Presiding Justice)