[1] The legislative intent and contents of Article 27 of the Installation and Utilization of Sports Facilities Act / Where a third party is selected to receive new stocks, etc. issued by a sports facility business entity in the rehabilitation procedure for the sports facility business entity, and the rehabilitation claim held by a member, such as a refund bond, is determined in the rehabilitation plan with the purport that the obligation is repaid with the acquisition price of new stocks, etc., whether the rehabilitation plan goes against Article 27 of the Installation and Utilization of Sports Facilities Act

[2] Meaning of “fair and equitable” in the rehabilitation plan under the former part of Article 243(1)2 of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act as a requirement for authorization for the rehabilitation plan

[3] In cases where an immediate appeal is filed against a decision to authorize a rehabilitation plan, the standard point of time to determine whether the rehabilitation plan satisfies the requirements for authorization (i.e., when the appellate court determines the appellate court) / Whether the appellate court should consider the circumstances that occurred after the decision to authorize the rehabilitation plan (affirmative), and whether the implementation of the rehabilitation plan as scheduled at the time of the decision to authorize the rehabilitation plan should also

[4] Whether it is unlawful for the court to divide the same type of right holder falling under each subparagraph of Article 236(2) of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act into two or more categories by classifying a provision for a resolution on a rehabilitation plan (negative in principle)

[5] In a case where an objection is raised in the course of the claim inspection as to the existence and content of the reported rehabilitation claim, but no objection is raised to the exercise of the voting right at the meeting of interested persons, whether the voting right can be exercised according to the reported amount (affirmative), and whether the aforementioned legal principle likewise applies to cases where an objection is raised only to the amount of the voting right of the rehabilitation claim reported in the course

[6] The court held the assembly of related persons to deliberate on the rehabilitation plan and the assembly of related persons to resolve on the rehabilitation plan. The revised rehabilitation plan before the date of the assembly of related persons to deliberate on the rehabilitation plan ends; thus, all interested persons, including rehabilitation creditors, could not serve a copy or summary of the amendment plan before the assembly of related persons for the resolution on the rehabilitation plan is held; and in a case where the revision of the rehabilitation plan does not cause any minor disadvantage to the interested parties, the court

[7] Meaning of “ability” under the latter part of Article 243(1)2 of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act as a requirement for authorization of rehabilitation plan

[1] In light of the purport of Article 27 of the Installation and Utilization of Sports Facilities Act (hereinafter “Sports Facilities Act”) is to maintain a management system established in relation to the authorization and permission of a business and to protect the interests of many members who have established a sports facility business with a sports facility business entity, notwithstanding the change of the business entity, Article 27 of the Sports Facilities Act provides that where essential facilities according to the standards for the business operation or sports facility business of a sports facility business entity are transferred to another person due to a reason falling under Article 27(1) or (2), a transferee of a business or a transferee of an essential facility succeeds to an agreement under the private law concluded before a sports facility business entity and its members have a reason for business transfer, etc.

However, in the rehabilitation procedure for a sports facility business entity, the rehabilitation plan stating that the debtor selects a third party to acquire new stocks, etc. issued by the sports facility business entity and the third party to repay the obligation with the acquisition price of new stocks, etc. paid by the third party is to maintain the status of the sports facility business entity as it is and only the shareholder of the sports facility business entity is changed. As such, the rehabilitation plan cannot be deemed as a "person who acquires the business by transfer of business" under Article 27(1) of the Sports Facilities Act or "any other person who acquires the essential facilities in accordance with the facility standards for the sports facility business in accordance with the procedures corresponding to Article 27(2)1 through 3 of the Sports Facilities Act" under Article 27(2) of the Sports Facilities Act. In such a case, the rehabilitation plan does not violate Article 27 of the Sports Facilities Act on the ground that the rehabilitation plan

[2] In the rehabilitation procedure, the court may decide to grant authorization for the rehabilitation plan only where the rehabilitation plan satisfies the requirements stipulated under each subparagraph of Article 243(1) of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act (hereinafter “Rehabilitation Act”). The purport of the strict provision of the requirements for authorization for the rehabilitation plan is to ensure that the content of the rehabilitation plan is fair and equitable in the rehabilitation procedure, and at the same time, the efficient rehabilitation of the debtor or the business, which is the object of the rehabilitation procedure, is achieved, since the rehabilitation procedure has a change of rights by a resolution of another creditors’ interests in the rehabilitation procedure.

Therefore, in order for the court to grant authorization of the rehabilitation plan, the rehabilitation plan should be fair and equitable pursuant to the former part of Article 243(1)2 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act. The term “fair and equitable” in this context refers to: (a) the terms and conditions of the rehabilitation plan should be fairly and equally differentiated among the right holders taking into account the order of rights under Article 217(1) of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act; and (b) the terms and conditions of the rehabilitation plan should be equally differentiated among the right holders of the same type under the conditions as prescribed by Article 218(1) of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act; (c) the equality in this context refers not to the formal meaning of equality, but to the substantive equality that is not contrary to the concept of fairness and equity; (d) the right in the rehabilitation plan should be uniformly divided into five kinds of rights under Article 217(1)1 through 5 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act and treated equally; and (e) the reasonable distinction between the rights and the repayment period, including the rights of the debtor, within the scope of the rehabilitation claim or the rehabilitation security right.

[3] In principle, whether the rehabilitation plan satisfies the requirements for authorization shall be based on the time when the rehabilitation court determines whether to grant authorization, i.e., when the rehabilitation plan is to be based on the time when the rehabilitation court decides whether to grant authorization, in light of the inherent nature of the appellate court, when an immediate appeal is filed against the decision to grant authorization of the rehabilitation plan, it shall be determined based on the time when the appellate court decides whether to grant authorization. The matters to be considered by the appellate court include the situation that occurred after the rehabilitation court decides to determine whether to grant authorization by examining whether there is any change after the rehabilitation plan is granted, unlike the consideration of the rehabilitation court at the time when the appellate court decides to grant authorization. Thus, it is not necessary to determine whether the rehabilitation plan satisfies the requirements for authorization,

[4] Except where it is required to classify rehabilitation secured creditors, rehabilitation creditors, shareholders, and equity right holders as different Articles, the court may classify persons falling under two or more subparagraphs into one group or persons falling under one subparagraph into two or more group, taking into account the nature of the rights and interests of the persons provided by each subparagraph of Article 236(2) of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act (Article 236(3) of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act), and recognizes the court’s discretion as to the integration and subdivision provided by Article 236(3) of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act (Article 236(3) of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act). Therefore, barring any special circumstance to deem that a court exceeded the scope of discretion, barring such special circumstance as to deeming that the same type of right holders falling under each subparagraph of Article 236(2) of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act has not been subdivided into two or more groups, it cannot be deemed unlawful.

[5] Even if an objection is raised to the existence, contents, etc. of a reported rehabilitation claim in the course of the claim inspection, so-called “objected claim” in which an objection is not established, insofar as an objection is not raised to the exercise of the voting right based thereon at the meeting of interested persons, the voting right may be exercised according to the reported amount. The foregoing legal doctrine likewise applies to cases where an objection is raised only to the amount of the voting right of the rehabilitation claim

[6] According to Article 232(1) and (2) of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act, in principle, the court shall call an assembly of related persons for the resolution of the rehabilitation plan and deliver a copy or summary of the rehabilitation plan, the amendment of which is completed, to the interested parties, including rehabilitation creditors, when the revision of the rehabilitation plan is completed.

However, in a case where the court decides to hold a joint meeting of interested persons for the examination of the rehabilitation plan and the meeting of interested persons for the resolution of the rehabilitation plan, the court may not serve copies or outlines of the amendment before the meeting of interested persons, such as rehabilitation creditors, etc. for the resolution of the rehabilitation plan is held on the expiration of the date of the meeting of interested persons for the examination of the rehabilitation plan, and may not serve copies or outlines of the amendment on all interested persons, including the rehabilitation creditors, etc. before the meeting of interested persons is held for the resolution of the rehabilitation plan. Barring any special circumstance, the court shall, barring any special circumstance, postpone the holding of the meeting of interested persons for the resolution of the rehabilitation plan and, at the same time, provide interested persons, such as rehabilitation creditors, etc., who are not present at the meeting of interested persons for the resolution of the rehabilitation plan, with an opportunity to resolve the rehabilitation plan with the permission of the court prior to the expiration of the meeting of interested persons for the examination of the rehabilitation plan (see Article 228 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act), and the revision of the rehabilitation plan does not change to mean

[7] The court may implement the rehabilitation plan pursuant to the latter part of Article 243(1)2 of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act (hereinafter “Rehabilitation Act”). The term “performance possibility” in this context refers to the possibility that the debtor is able to perform all of the repayment plans for the obligations under the rehabilitation plan and not enter the rehabilitation plan again.

In addition, Article 243(1)6 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act provides that “Any matter requiring the permission, authorization, license or other disposition of an administrative agency under the rehabilitation plan shall not differ from the opinion of the administrative agency provided for in Article 226(2) in an important point of view,” which requires the authorization of the rehabilitation plan as a requirement for the authorization of the rehabilitation plan. This is the requirement for the authorization of the rehabilitation plan, given that if the rehabilitation plan is premised on the permission, etc. of the administrative agency, the possibility of implementing the rehabilitation plan

Meanwhile, Article 226(2) of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act provides, “The court shall hear the opinion of the relevant administrative agency regarding the rehabilitation proposal that provides for the matters requiring the permission, authorization, license and other disposition of the administrative agency.” In a case where the court omits any opinion hearing provided for in Article 226(2) of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act, it does not satisfy the requirement that “the rehabilitation procedure conforms to the provisions of the Act” provided for in Article 243(1)1 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act among the requirements for authorization for the rehabilitation plan, and cannot be deemed as failing to satisfy the requirements provided for in Article 243(1)6 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act relating to the possibility of implementing the rehabilitation plan.

[1] Article 27(1) and (2) of the Installation and Utilization of Sports Facilities Act, Article 193 of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act / [2] Articles 217(1), 218(1), and 243(1)2 of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act / [3] Articles 243 and 247 of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act / [4] Articles 236(1), (2), and (3) of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act / [5] Articles 161, 187, and 18(2) of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act, Article 68(1) of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act / [6] Articles 224, 228, and 232(1) and (2) of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act / [2] Article 243 and Article 247 of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act, Article 236(2) and (2) of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2013Da85417 Decided December 23, 2015 (Gong2016Sang, 185) / [2] Supreme Court Order 98Da11 Decided August 28, 1998 (Gong1998Ha, 2493), Supreme Court Order 99Da35 Decided January 5, 200 (Gong2000Sang, 539), Supreme Court Order 20157 Decided December 29, 2015 (Gong2016Sang, 2266) / [3] Supreme Court Order 2005Da147 decided June 17, 2008 (Gong208Ha, 1023) / [5] Supreme Court Order 2013Ma1636, Feb. 13, 2014

[Attachment 1] List of Re-Appellants (Law Firm Inulul et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul High Court Order 2013Ra1505 dated July 30, 2014

All reappeals are dismissed.

The grounds of reappeal (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed) are examined.

1. As to the ground for reappeal of the re-appellant listed in Appendix 2 List

A. As to the ground of reappeal relating to the violation of Article 27 of the Installation and Utilization of Sports Facilities Act (hereinafter “Sports Facilities Act”).

Article 27 (1) of the Sports Facilities Act provides that "when a sports facility business entity dies or transfers his/her business, or when a corporate sports facility business entity is merged, the heir, the transferee of the business, the corporation surviving the merger, or the corporation established by the merger shall succeed to the rights and duties (where members are recruited pursuant to Article 17, including the matters agreed upon between the sports facility business entity and its members) upon the registration of or reporting on the relevant sports facility business." Paragraph (2) of the same Article provides that "An auction under the Civil Execution Act (Article 1), realization under the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act (Article 2), the realization of seized property under the National Tax Collection Act, the Customs Act, or the Framework Act on Local Taxes (Article 3) and other procedures corresponding to subparagraphs 1 through 3 (Article 4) shall apply mutatis mutandis to a person who acquires essential facilities in accordance with the standards for facilities of sports facility business prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, or the corporation established by the merger, etc. shall be deemed to have been held by the transferee of the sports facility business under Article 27 Paragraph (1).

However, in the rehabilitation procedure for a sports facility business entity, the rehabilitation plan stating that the debtor selects a third party to acquire new stocks, etc. issued by the sports facility business entity and the third party to repay the obligation with the acquisition price of new stocks, etc. paid by the third party is to maintain the status of the sports facility business entity as it is and only the shareholder of the sports facility business entity is changed. As such, the rehabilitation plan cannot be deemed as a "person who acquires the business by transfer of business" under Article 27(1) of the Sports Facilities Act or a "any other person who acquires the essential facilities in accordance with the facility standards for the sports facility business in accordance with the procedures corresponding to Article 27(2)1 through 3 of the Sports Facilities Act" under Article 27(2) of the Sports Facilities Act. In such a case, the rehabilitation plan does not violate Article 27 of the Sports Facilities Act on the ground that the rehabilitation plan stipulated

The lower court determined that the instant rehabilitation plan’s acquisition of sports facility business from the debtor company or acquisition of essential facilities in accordance with the standards for the facilities of sports facility business by a third party is not contrary to Article 27(1) of the Sports Facilities Act, and thus, the lower court held that it did not constitute the procedure under Article 27(2)1 through 37 of the Sports Facilities Act, on the grounds that it is difficult to view that the instant rehabilitation plan’s acquisition of new stocks and convertible bonds, which is an investor, by means of partial cash payments, conversion into equity investment, etc., and the acquisition of new stocks and convertible bonds, which are changed in rights by making repayment funds for the acquisition of new stocks and convertible bonds, which are paid by a golf common agreement consortium, an investor, and the acquisition of new stocks and rehabilitation security bonds, which are changed in rights, does not constitute the procedure under Article 27(1) of the Sports Facilities Act and Article 27(2)4 of the Sports Facilities Act, since there is no third party to succeed to the rights and obligations of the members.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and there is no violation of the Constitution, Act, order, or rule that affected the judgment.

B. As to the ground of reappeal regarding violation of the principle of equality

(1) In rehabilitation procedures, the court may decide to grant authorization for the rehabilitation plan only when the rehabilitation plan satisfies the requirements set forth in each subparagraph of Article 243(1) of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act (hereinafter “Bankruptcy Act”). The purport of the strict provision of the requirements for authorization for the rehabilitation plan is to ensure that the contents of the rehabilitation plan are fair and equitable, and at the same time, the efficient rehabilitation of the debtor or his/her business, which is the subject of the rehabilitation procedure, is achieved, inasmuch as the priority order in the rehabilitation procedure is modified by a resolution of different creditors.

Therefore, in order for the court to authorize a rehabilitation plan, the rehabilitation plan should be fair and equitable under the former part of Article 243(1)2 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, the term “fair and equitable” refers to: (a) the terms and conditions of the rehabilitation plan should be fair and equitable in consideration of the order of rights under Article 217(1) of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act; and (b) the terms and conditions of the rehabilitation plan should be equal among the right holders of the same type as prescribed by Article 218(1) of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act; (c) the same refers to equal equality not in formal meaning but in substantive equality that is not contrary to the concept of fairness and equity; (d) all rights in the rehabilitation plan ought to be uniformly divided into five kinds of rights under Article 217(1)1 through 5 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act and treated equally; and (e) the same shall not apply to cases where the repayment period is determined within 90 percent of the debtor’s right or the right under Article 217(1)1 through 5 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act, taking into account the reasonable nature of the rehabilitation claim or the rehabilitation right.

(2) According to the records, with respect to the rights of members, the instant rehabilitation plan provides that 17% of the principal and interest accrued prior to the commencement of the payment in cash, shall be extinguished in addition to the payment in cash. On the other hand, with respect to the trust-related loan claims (hereinafter “trust-related loan claims”) secured by priority interest of the Federation of Community Credit Cooperatives (hereinafter “SOC”) which is the priority beneficiary under the security trust agreement and the Busan Mutual Savings Bank (hereinafter “SU Savings Bank”), the principal shall be paid in cash as well as the payment in cash of 67.13% of the principal amount.

However, according to the records, the community credit cooperatives and the Busan Savings Bank are the priority beneficiaries of a real estate security trust agreement with golf course facilities, including the golf course of the debtor company as trust property. Since golf course facilities, etc., which are trust property, are property owned by the trustee of a security trust agreement rather than property owned by the debtor company inside and outside of the country (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Da18685, May 30, 2003, etc.). It cannot be deemed that community credit cooperatives or Busan Savings Bank have the right to receive a repayment prior to other general creditors with loans related to the debtor company's trust-related claims against the debtor company. Meanwhile, where the debtor company has a reason such as transfer of business as stipulated in Article 27 of the Sports Facilities Act, where the debtor company has a right to receive a refund of membership fees, etc., it cannot be deemed that the debtor company has the right to receive a repayment prior to other general creditors. Therefore, it constitutes a "general rehabilitation claim" under Article 17 (1) 2 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act, not a general rehabilitation claim.

(3) According to the records, as a priority beneficiary of a security trust contract for golf course facilities, the community credit cooperative or the Busan Savings Bank may request the trustee to dispose of golf course facilities essential for golf course business at any time insofar as the credit related to the debtor company is not fully repaid. Even if the community credit cooperative, etc. is repaid in accordance with the repayment terms stipulated in the rehabilitation plan, it cannot affect any right to benefit under the security trust contract including the right to request disposal of golf course facilities, which are trust assets held against the trustee unless the credit related to the trust is fully repaid (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Da9267, Jul. 13, 2001, etc.). In order to implement the rehabilitation plan of this case premised on golf course business, it is necessary to obtain consent from the community credit cooperative or the Busan Savings Bank, etc. to waive the right under the trust contract or terminate the trust contract. To this end, it cannot be deemed unreasonable to accept the demand of the community credit cooperative, etc., the priority beneficiary of the security trust contract, and determine the conditions of rehabilitation claims related to community credit cooperatives, etc.

Of course, in light of the legislative intent of the Sports Facilities Act, such as allowing a transferee of the sports facilities to succeed to an agreement under the private law between the former sports facilities business entity and its members, and protecting the rights of many members who have established a use relationship with the sports facilities business entity, etc., if there is any circumstance to deprive the legislative intent of the Sports Facilities Act by failing to consider the special nature of membership in determining the conditions for repayment of the rights related to the membership of members in the rehabilitation plan without any reasonable reason, such circumstance may be deemed to violate

However, there are reasonable grounds as seen earlier in determining the terms and conditions of repayment regarding the rehabilitation claims of the members of the instant rehabilitation plan compared to the trust claims of community credit cooperatives, etc., who are the priority beneficiaries of the security trust agreement. Furthermore, according to the records, the rehabilitation plan of this case provides that the rehabilitation claims of general creditors, such as financial institutions, etc. shall pay in cash only 6.81% of the principal and interest prior to the commencement of principal and interest, and shall pay in cash only 0.4748% of the principal and interest prior to the commencement of principal and interest with respect to the rehabilitation claims of confirmed guarantee creditors, while it provides that the repayment of principal and interest prior to the commencement of principal and interest with respect to the rehabilitation claims of the members shall be 17% of the principal and interest prior to the commencement of principal and interest with respect to the rehabilitation claims of the members, if the terms and conditions of repayment are set superior to the rehabilitation claims of other rehabilitation creditors, such as general loan creditors, or the degree of discrimination with respect to the rehabilitation claims of members are considerably insufficient (in light of the amount of individual trading claims or the total amount of membership rights, reasonable reasons to determine the terms and conditions of equity agreement.

Therefore, there is a reasonable ground to differentiate between the trust-related rehabilitation claims of community credit cooperatives, etc., the priority beneficiary of the security trust agreement, and the rehabilitation claims of members, and it is difficult to view that the degree of distinction is in violation of the principle of equality, contrary to the concept of fairness and balance

(4) The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just and acceptable, and there is no violation of the Constitution, law, order, or rule that affected the trial.

C. As to the ground of reappeal relating to violation of the principle of liquidation value guarantee

The Re-Appellants listed in the attached Table 2 asserts that since the golf course facilities that were mortgaged trust facilities belong to the debtor company due to the termination of the trust after the authorization of the rehabilitation plan, the lower court should calculate the liquidation value by taking into account the ownership of the above golf course facilities.

In principle, whether the rehabilitation plan satisfies the requirements for authorization shall be based on the time when the rehabilitation court determines whether to grant authorization, i.e., the time when the rehabilitation court determines whether to grant authorization. However, in cases where an immediate appeal is filed against the decision to grant authorization of the rehabilitation plan, in light of the nature of the appellate court’s inner nature, it shall be determined at the time of the decision to grant authorization of the rehabilitation plan. Matters to be considered by the appellate court include circumstances that arise after the decision to grant authorization of the rehabilitation plan of the rehabilitation court (see, e.g., Supreme Court Order 2005Da147, Jun. 17, 2008). However, the purport of the appellate court’s decision is to examine whether the rehabilitation plan satisfies the requirements for authorization by examining whether there is any change after the authorization is granted, unlike the consideration of the rehabilitation court at the time of the decision to grant authorization

According to the records, the ownership of real estate trusted as claimed by the Re-Appellants as stated in the attached list 2 is due to the repayment of rehabilitation claims according to the implementation of the rehabilitation plan of this case, i.e. the result of implementation as stipulated in the rehabilitation plan. Therefore, the appellate court does not consider it in determining the legitimacy of the approval decision of the rehabilitation plan of this case. Accordingly, the aforementioned Re-Appellant

D. As to the ground of reappeal relating to the classification of Article

The resolution on the rehabilitation plan shall be adopted according to the provisions of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act and the provisions classified by the court’s decision (Article 236(1) of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act); in principle, rehabilitation creditors, rehabilitation security rights, shareholders and equity right holders shall be categorized as rehabilitation secured creditors (Article 236(1)1), rehabilitation creditors holding general preferential rights (Article 23), rehabilitation creditors, other than rehabilitation creditors provided for in subparagraph 2 (Article 3), shareholders and equity right holders (Article 4), and shareholders and equity right holders (Article 236(2)5) who hold shares or equity shares having preferential rights in the distribution of residual assets (Article 236(2) of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act), and shareholders and equity right holders (Article 236(2)2 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act, with the exception that the rehabilitation secured creditors, rehabilitation creditors, shareholders and equity right holders shall be categorized into different categories, and the court may not, in accordance with Article 236(2)2 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act, divide persons who do not fall under any of the following subparagraphs into at least one group of persons into the same discretion under Article 36(36).

The court below held that since the rehabilitation court does not divide the community credit cooperatives, Busan Savings Bank and other rehabilitation creditors who are the priority beneficiaries of the security trust contract into separate groups and classify both the community credit cooperatives, the priority beneficiaries of the security trust contract, and the other rehabilitation creditors into the group of rehabilitation creditors under Article 236 (2) 3 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act, the decision of classification of the rehabilitation court cannot be deemed unlawful.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and there is no violation of the Constitution, Act, order, or rule that affected the judgment.

E. As to the ground of re-appeal relating to the exercise of voting rights by the U&A limited liability company (hereinafter “N&A”), as to the ground of re-appeal

At the meeting of interested persons, rehabilitation creditors, etc. may raise an objection against the voting rights of other rehabilitation creditors, etc. (Article 187 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act); whether to permit them to exercise voting rights as to any right to which an objection is raised; and the amount or number of voting rights are to be exercised by the court (Article 188(2) of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act); and any rehabilitation creditor, who has not raised an objection, may exercise voting rights according to the reported amount (Article 68(1) of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act). Therefore, even if so-called “interest claim” that is raised in the course of investigating the claim’s existence and content, etc. as to which an objection is filed and is not confirmed, insofar as an objection is not raised against the exercise of voting rights based thereon at the meeting of interested persons, voting rights shall be deemed to be exercised according to the reported amount (see Supreme Court Order 2013Ma1306, Feb. 21, 2014). The foregoing legal doctrine likewise applies to cases where the amount of voting rights reported in the claim investigation procedure is limited to the amount reported.

According to the records, ① the administrator of the debtor company raises an objection to the existence and amount of the joint and several surety claims reported by U&A in the course of claims investigation, on the ground that the principal obligation was not satisfied and only the amount of voting rights was not confirmed, and the other interested parties did not raise any objection. ② Interested parties, including the debtor company’s administrator and the re-appellant, including rehabilitation creditors, do not raise an objection to the exercise of voting rights based on Article 187 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act as to the exercise of voting rights based on the amount of 104,716,230,395 of the joint and several surety claims reported by U&A in the meeting of interested persons for resolution of the rehabilitation plan

In light of the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, the U&A may exercise its voting rights of KRW 104,716,230,395, which is the amount of joint and several surety claims reported by the U&A. Therefore, the rehabilitation court cannot be deemed unlawful to allow U&A to exercise its voting rights of KRW 104,716,230,395.

Although there are some inappropriate parts for the reasoning of the order of the court below, the conclusion of the court below's decision that allowing the rehabilitation court to exercise voting rights in the above KRW 104,716,230,395 against U&A is just and acceptable, and there is no violation of the Constitution, Act, order, or rule that affected the judgment.

F. As to the ground of reappeal regarding the revision procedure of rehabilitation plan

(1) Article 232(1) of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act provides, “When the court does not issue an order to revise a rehabilitation proposal that has undergone an examination of the assembly of related persons to examine the rehabilitation proposal, the court shall convene a meeting of related persons on a fixed date to resolve on the rehabilitation proposal.” Paragraph (2) of the same Article provides, “In the case of paragraph (1), the court shall deliver in advance a copy of the plan or a summary thereof to the rehabilitation creditors, etc., who are entered in the list or reported on the list.” In principle, when the revision of the rehabilitation plan is completed, the court shall, in principle, call and deliver a copy or summary of the rehabilitation plan for which the revision has been completed to interested persons, including rehabilitation creditors, etc.

However, in a case where the court decides to hold a joint meeting of interested persons for the purpose of examining the rehabilitation plan and the meeting of interested persons for the resolution of the rehabilitation plan, if all interested persons, including rehabilitation creditors, were unable to serve a copy of the revised rehabilitation plan or a summary of the revised rehabilitation plan before the date of the meeting of interested persons for the examination of the rehabilitation plan ends, and if the revision of the rehabilitation plan affects the interested parties, the court, barring any special circumstance, shall, upon delay in holding the meeting of interested persons for the resolution of the proposed rehabilitation plan, provide interested persons, including rehabilitation creditors, with an opportunity to sufficiently understand and examine the contents of the plan, and at the same time, provide interested parties, such as rehabilitation creditors, etc., who are not present at the meeting of interested persons for the resolution of the rehabilitation plan, with the permission of the court prior to the expiration of the meeting of interested persons for the examination of the rehabilitation plan (see Article 228 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act), and the aforementioned interested parties cannot be deemed to have any different effect on the amendment of the rehabilitation plan.

(2) The record reveals the following: ① The administrator of the debtor company submitted the amendment to the contents of the instant rehabilitation plan on September 25, 2013, which is the day on which the assembly of related persons for the examination of the instant rehabilitation plan was held; ② the contents include contents unfavorable to its members, including the summary of the rehabilitation plan delivered in advance, such as the rate of cash repayment of the security deposits to its members is from 30% to 17%; ② the rehabilitation court grants permission for the amendment of the instant rehabilitation plan submitted by the debtor company’s administrator at the assembly of related persons for the examination of the instant rehabilitation plan; ② the rehabilitation court held a meeting of related persons for the resolution of the rehabilitation plan and completed the examination of the said amendment; ③ the rehabilitation court failed to deliver the copy or summary of the above amendment to interested persons, etc.

In light of the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, the amendment to the rehabilitation plan submitted by the debtor company at the assembly of related persons for the examination of the rehabilitation plan of this case may adversely affect its members, such as that the rate of cash repayment for the claims to return membership fees, etc. of its members is significantly low. As such, the rehabilitation court should postpone the holding of the assembly of related persons for the resolution of the scheduled rehabilitation plan and deliver a copy or summary of the amendment to the rehabilitation creditors, etc. to the persons who exercise voting rights, such as the rehabilitation creditors, etc., and give them an opportunity to sufficiently understand the contents of the plan and to review the contents of the plan, and at the same time give them the opportunity for the resolution, not implement the above procedure,

(3) However, even in cases where the procedure up to the decision on whether to grant authorization of the rehabilitation plan violates the provisions of the Act, when it is deemed inappropriate not to grant authorization of the rehabilitation plan, the court may decide to grant authorization of the rehabilitation plan (Article 243(2) of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act). In other words, the following circumstances revealed by the records: ① the rehabilitation court permitted the revision of the rehabilitation plan submitted by the debtor company's administrator at the assembly of related persons for the purpose of examining the rehabilitation plan of this case; ② the interested parties present at the assembly of related persons did not raise any objection to holding the assembly of related persons for the resolution of the rehabilitation plan on the same day; ② The interested parties, such as the rehabilitation creditors who did not attend the assembly of related persons for the examination and resolution of the rehabilitation plan, have no choice but to consider that they would refuse to consent to the submission of the rehabilitation plan, regardless of the revision of the terms and conditions of the rehabilitation plan; ③ The main reason for delivering the rehabilitation plan prior to the assembly of related persons is to guarantee the opportunity for the resolution of the rehabilitation plan; ③ the rehabilitation creditor company's progress to meet the above requirements for the rehabilitation plan.

(4) Although the reasoning of the order of the court below was inappropriate, the conclusion of the court below's rejection of the above-appellant's assertion that the procedure for revising the rehabilitation plan was erroneous is acceptable, and there is no violation of the Constitution, law, order or rule that affected the judgment

G. As to the ground of reappeal regarding the feasibility of implementation of the rehabilitation plan

(1) In order to authorize a rehabilitation plan, the court shall be able to implement the rehabilitation plan pursuant to the latter part of Article 243(1)2 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act. The term “performance possibility” referred to in this context means the possibility that the debtor is able to fully implement the repayment plan of the debt prescribed in the rehabilitation plan and re-enter the rehabilitation plan.

In addition, Article 243(1)6 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act provides that “Any matter requiring the permission, authorization, license or other disposition of an administrative agency under the rehabilitation plan shall not differ from the opinion of the administrative agency provided for in Article 226(2) in an important point of view,” which requires the authorization of the rehabilitation plan as a requirement for the authorization of the rehabilitation plan. This is the requirement for the authorization of the rehabilitation plan, given that if the rehabilitation plan is premised on the permission, etc. of the administrative agency, the possibility of implementing the rehabilitation plan

Meanwhile, Article 226(2) of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act provides, “The court shall hear the opinion of the relevant administrative agency regarding the rehabilitation proposal that prescribes the matters requiring the permission, authorization, license and other disposition of the administrative agency.” In a case where the court omits any opinion hearing provided for in Article 226(2) of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act, it does not satisfy the requirement that “the rehabilitation procedure conforms to the provisions of the Act” provided for in Article 243(1)1 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act among the requirements for authorization for the rehabilitation plan, and it does not constitute a lack of the requirement provided for in Article 243(1)6 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act relating to the possibility of implementation of the rehabilitation plan.

(2) According to the records, Chapter 6 of the instant rehabilitation plan included “the conversion of a public golf course” in matters necessary for the debtor company’s rehabilitation, such as the debtor company’s administrator initiates an administrative procedure for converting the company into “public golf course” after authorization of the rehabilitation plan. The debtor company did not obtain approval for the change of a business plan regarding “the conversion of a public golf course” from the Gyeonggi-do Governor

However, considering the following circumstances revealed by the reasoning of the order of the court below and the record, i.e., ① the most important point for the implementation of the rehabilitation plan in this case, such as deposit of subscription price and repayment of debt, ② the administrator of the debtor company, by filing a revocation lawsuit against the return of the approval on the modification of the business plan by the Governor of the Gyeonggi-do, which is the competent administrative agency, against the disposition of the Governor of the Gyeonggi-do, and disputing it, and the public golf course can be converted as a result, it cannot be deemed that the order of the court below did not take any administrative disposition on the “transfer of the public golf course” necessary for the rehabilitation of the debtor company until the time of the order of the

Meanwhile, in light of the records, the fact that the rehabilitation court did not present an opinion on the matters requiring disposition related to the “the conversion of public golf course” to the Governor of the Gyeonggi-do having jurisdiction over the competent administrative agency, but considering the overall circumstances as seen earlier, the omission of opinion by the rehabilitation court may not affect the contents of the instant rehabilitation plan concerning the possibility of implementation, and thus, it is impossible to authorize the rehabilitation plan for this reason. Moreover, even if the violation of the provisions of the rehabilitation procedure Act, it may be deemed that the omission of opinion by the rehabilitation court constitutes cases where it is deemed inappropriate to authorize the rehabilitation plan due to the violation of the

(3) Although the reasoning of the order of the court below is somewhat inappropriate, the order of the court below that judged that there is a possibility to implement the rehabilitation plan of this case is just in its conclusion, and there is no violation of the Constitution, Act, order or rule that affected the judgment.

2. As to the remaining re-appellants' reappeals

When the re-appellant does not clearly state specific and explicit reasons as to what point of the order of the court below is in violation of the law by specifying the grounds for re-appeal submitted by the re-appellant (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2000Da29356, Mar. 23, 2001).

However, the remaining re-appellants are bound to have not submitted the re-appeal statement or because there is no content that can be re-appeals or re-appeals.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all reappeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

[Attachment 1] List of Re-Appellants: omitted

[Attachment 2] Re-Appellants who have submitted a written ground for reappeal containing specific and explicit reasons: omitted

Justices Park Poe-young (Presiding Justice)