[1] The elements required for an injury sustained by a worker while using a facility within a place of business during recess hours constitute an occupational accident

[2] The case holding that an act constitutes an occupational accident on the ground that it is a physiological or reasonable act accompanying the worker's original act of business, in case where the worker suffers a traffic accident at the product storage where the worker gets a food at the premises of the shop during the recess hours, and the above act constitutes an occupational accident

[3] The meaning of the final binding force where an administrative disposition or an administrative appeal ruling becomes final and conclusive due to the lapse of the appeal period

[1] Since free action is permitted to an employee during a recess, it cannot be deemed that an ordinary employee is under the control and management of the employer. Therefore, if an employee is injured while doing any act using a facility within the workplace during the recess, it shall not be deemed an occupational accident. On the other hand, since the act of an employee during the recess is related to the provision of labor after the recess, it shall be recognized as an occupational accident if the act of an employee during the recess is deemed to be under the control and management of the employer.

[2] The case holding that an act constitutes an occupational accident on the ground that it is a physiological or reasonable act accompanying a worker's original act of business, in case where a worker suffers a traffic accident at the product storage, which causes an ordinary food at the premises of the premises during recess hours, and such act constitutes an occupational accident

[3] In general, in a case where an administrative disposition or an administrative appeal ruling becomes final and conclusive due to the lapse of the appeal period, its final and conclusive power means that a person whose legal interest is infringed on by such disposition can no longer dispute the validity of the disposition or ruling, and further, the res judicata such as the judgment is not recognized. Thus, the factual or legal judgment, which forms the basis of the disposition, becomes final and conclusive, and the parties or the court cannot make arguments or judgments inconsistent with it.

[1] Article 4 subparagraph 1 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act / [2] Article 4 subparagraph 1 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act / [3] Article 1 of the Administrative Litigation Act (general) and Article 37 of the Administrative Appeals Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 92Nu1107 delivered on October 9, 1992 (Gong1992, 3152), Supreme Court Decision 94Da60509 delivered on May 26, 1995 (Gong1995Ha, 2258), Supreme Court Decision 95Nu1463 delivered on August 23, 1996 (Gong1996Ha, 286) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 92Nu17181 delivered on April 13, 1993 (Gong193Sang, 1409), Supreme Court Decision 93Nu5437 delivered on August 27, 1993 (Gong193Ha, 2648)

Lee Jong-seok et al.

East Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Seoul Law Firm, Attorneys Kim Jong-joon et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul District Court Decision 99Na55907 delivered on December 16, 1999

Of the judgment of the court below, the part of the judgment against the defendant against the defendant who ordered the defendant Lee Jong-soo to pay in excess of 13,330,000 won each to the plaintiff Lee Jong-chul, Lee Gyeong-gu, Lee Young-gu, Lee Young-gu, and Lee Jong-dong, which is ordered to pay in excess of 13,30,000 won, shall be reversed, and the case

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. In this case, upon citing the reasoning of the first instance judgment, Nonparty 1, the driver of the truck owned by Nonparty New Industry Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Nonindicted Company”), was driving the truck at the product storage space of the non-party company, and caused the death of the non-party Kim Jong-young, who was employed by the non-party company as an employee of the non-party company, and was employed as the above truck during the break time, and caused the death, the court below determined that the defendant is the insurer of the non-party company's comprehensive motor vehicle insurance contract with the non-party company, and that the plaintiff, the heir of the above deceased, is liable for the damages caused by the accident in this case. The above accident constitutes an occupational accident that can receive accident compensation under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, and thus it is difficult to conclude that the above accident constitutes an occupational accident, and even though the plaintiffs claimed for lump-sum compensation and funeral expenses under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act with respect to the above accident, the Korea Workers' Compensation and Welfare Service did not have any further proceeding against the plaintiffs.

2. However, since free action of workers is permitted during the recess, an ordinary worker cannot be deemed to be under the control and management of the employer. Therefore, if a worker was injured while performing any act by using a facility within the workplace during the recess, it cannot be deemed an occupational accident. Meanwhile, since the worker's act during the recess is related to the provision of labor after the recess, if the process of the act is deemed to be under the control and management of the employer, such as the worker's act of performing his/her own duties or preparing or arranging his/her duties, or physiological act recognized as incidental to social norms, or reasonable and necessary act, it should be recognized as an occupational accident (see Supreme Court Decision 95Nu1463, Aug. 23, 196). According to the records, since the above deceased's act during the recess is about the accident of this case, he/she is about the accident of this case, and the accident of this case is about the accident of this case, which is the worker's daily life or the accident storage of this case's work.

Therefore, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on occupational accidents under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, which determined that the instant accident does not constitute occupational accidents.

In general, in a case where an administrative disposition or an administrative appeal ruling becomes final and conclusive due to the lapse of the appeal period, its final and conclusive power means that the person against whom the legal interest has been infringed due to the disposition can no longer dispute the effect of the disposition or ruling, and further, the judgment does not recognize res judicata as identical to that of the judgment, and thus, the factual or legal judgment which forms the basis of the disposition is final and conclusive, and it does not make the parties or the court impossible to make any assertion or judgment inconsistent with it (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 93Nu5437, Aug. 27, 1993; 93Nu21927, Nov. 8, 1994). Accordingly, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine as to the final and conclusive force of the administrative disposition.

Therefore, all of the grounds of appeal are justified.

Therefore, among the part of the judgment below against the defendant, the part of the judgment below ordering the defendant to pay in excess of 20,000,000 won to the plaintiff Lee Jong-dae, Lee Young-gu, Lee Young-gu, Lee Young-dong, and Lee Jong-dong, respectively, in excess of 13,30,000 won is reversed. This part of the case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Seoul District Court. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jack-dam (Presiding Justice)