[1] The case affirming the judgment of the court below which held that since the proprietor of a business establishment harmful to juveniles employed juveniles and engaged in the business, it cannot be viewed that he did not obtain the benefit under Article 49 (1) of the former Juvenile Protection Act even if he did not actually provide entertainment with some of them in a waiting room

[2] In accordance with the delegation of Article 49(2) of the former Juvenile Protection Act, whether the amount of a penalty surcharge of KRW 10,000 is set for each one employed person for a violation of prohibition of employment of juveniles under Article 40(1) [Attachment 6] of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act is invalid for a violation of the parent law or beyond the intent of delegation (negative)

[3] The standard for determining whether a punitive administrative disposition deviates from or abused the scope of discretion

[1] The case affirming the judgment of the court below which held that even if the proprietor of a business establishment harmful to juveniles employed juveniles and engaged in the business, he did not obtain the benefit of Article 49 (1) of the former Juvenile Protection Act (amended by Act No. 6164 of Jan. 12, 200), even if he did not actually provide entertainment with some of them in a waiting room, he did not actually provide entertainment

[2] In light of the legislative purport of Articles 24(1) and 49(1) of the former Juvenile Protection Act (amended by Act No. 6164 of Jan. 12, 200), one of the purpose of the enactment is to regulate juveniles' access to harmful business establishments and protect and relieve juveniles from various harmful environments so that juveniles can grow into healthy character, the legislative purport of Article 24(1) and Article 49(1) of the same Act is to prevent individual juveniles from being exposed to various harmful environments due to their employment in business establishments. Thus, the provision of Article 49 of the same Act that allows them to impose penalty surcharges on the longer persons should be interpreted as individually imposing penalty surcharges on their employment in order to achieve such legislative purpose. Accordingly, it is not intended to impose a comprehensive sanction on their employment in order to achieve such legislative purpose, so it shall not be deemed that the delegation of Article 40(1) [Attachment Table 6] of the same Act does not violate the legislative purport of Article 49(2) of the same Act.

[3] Whether a punitive administrative disposition deviates from or abused the scope of discretion under the social norms shall be determined by comparing and comparing the degree of infringement on public interest and the disadvantage suffered by an individual due to the administrative disposition, by objectively examining the content of the violation as the ground for the disposition, the public interest to be achieved by the disposition, and all relevant circumstances.

[1] Articles 24(1) and 49(1) of the former Juvenile Protection Act (amended by Act No. 6164 of Jan. 12, 2000) / [2] Articles 24(1) and 49(1) of the former Juvenile Protection Act (amended by Act No. 6164 of Jan. 12, 200), Article 40(1) [Attachment 6] of the Enforcement Decree of the Juvenile Protection Act / [3] Articles 1 [general] and 27 of the Administrative Litigation Act

[3] Supreme Court Decision 9Du9100 delivered on April 13, 2001 / [3] Supreme Court Decision 88Nu3079 delivered on April 25, 198 (Gong1989, 830) Supreme Court Decision 91Nu1097 delivered on October 11, 1991 (Gong1991, 2745) Supreme Court Decision 92Nu2851 delivered on June 23, 1992 (Gong192, 2293), Supreme Court Decision 93Nu1679 delivered on December 21, 1993 (Gong194, 545), Supreme Court Decision 98Du179 delivered on April 7, 200 (Gong1989, 209, 209Du1797989 delivered on April 29, 209)

Plaintiff

The head of the Gu of the Busan Metropolitan City

Busan High Court Decision 2000Nu4323 delivered on November 23, 2001

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

1. As to the mistake of facts

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged the fact that the plaintiff, the owner of the instant entertainment bar business, in violation of Article 24 (1) of the former Juvenile Protection Act (amended by Act No. 6146 of Jan. 12, 200, hereinafter the same) operated the said bar business by employing four juveniles, including the non-party, in violation of Article 24 (1) of the former Juvenile Protection Act. In light of the records, the court below's fact finding is just and there is no error of law

The ground of appeal on this point is without merit.

2. As to the misapprehension of the legal principles on the Juvenile Protection Act

Article 24 (1) of the former Juvenile Protection Act prohibits the employment of juveniles by a business owner of a business establishment harmful to juveniles, and Article 49 (1) of the same Act provides that a penalty surcharge not exceeding KRW 10,000 shall be imposed and collected against a person who has acquired profits in violation of the above provision. The court below held that, as alleged by the plaintiff, as long as the plaintiff employed juveniles and engaged in the ran tavern business in this case, the plaintiff did not acquire profits in accordance with Article 49 (1) of the same Act even if some of them were in the atmosphere in the atmosphere and did not actually engage in entertainment, as alleged by the plaintiff, even if they did not actually engage in entertainment, the plaintiff did not acquire profits in accordance with the provision of Article 49 (1) of the same Act. Since the judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, the argument in the

In addition, the legislative purpose of Articles 24(1) and 49(1) of the former Juvenile Protection Act is to prevent individual juveniles from being exposed to a harmful environment due to employment in a business establishment harmful to juveniles, in light of the fact that one of the legislative purposes of the former Juvenile Protection Act regulates juveniles' access to a business establishment harmful to juveniles, and protect and relieve them from various harmful environments so that juveniles can grow into a sound character, and therefore, Article 49 of the same Act provides that the legislative purpose of Article 49 of the same Act provides that individual juveniles shall be to prevent any exposure to a harmful environment due to employment in a business establishment harmful to juveniles, so it shall be interpreted that individual sanctions are imposed on their employment activities in order to achieve such legislative purpose, and it shall not be subject to any sanctions on their employment activities by employing juveniles themselves, and therefore, the delegation of Article 49(2) of the former Juvenile Protection Act does not violate Article 40(1) [Attachment 6] of the same Act by stipulating 10,000 won per single person for violating the prohibition of employment of juveniles, or shall not violate the delegation provisions.

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles of the Juvenile Protection Act.

The argument in the grounds of appeal on this point is not acceptable.

3. As to abuse and deviation of discretionary power

Whether a punitive administrative disposition deviates from or abused the scope of discretion by social norms or not shall be determined by objectively examining the content of the act of violation as the ground for the disposition and the public interest to be achieved by the disposition and all the circumstances pertaining thereto, and comparing and comparing the degree of infringement on public interest and the disadvantage suffered by an individual due to such disposition (see Supreme Court Decision 98Du11779 delivered on April 7, 200).

Considering the circumstances asserted by the Plaintiff, the lower court determined that the instant disposition cannot be deemed as a deviation from or abuse of discretionary power due to excessively harsh degree compared to the degree of the violation, even if considering the circumstances asserted by the Plaintiff, given that the Plaintiff is a student attending the second grade of high school. In light of the records, the lower court’s determination appears to be justifiable and did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on abuse and deviation of discretionary power.

The argument in the grounds of appeal as to this point is not acceptable.

4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Song Jin-hun (Presiding Justice)