The probative value of the same fact in a civil trial, which has already become final and conclusive, is found guilty.

In the original civil trial, even if it is not bound by the fact-finding of the criminal trial, the fact that the criminal trial already finalized on the same factual basis is a flexible evidence, and thus, it cannot be recognized that there is no special circumstance where it is difficult to adopt the fact-finding of the criminal trial in light of other evidence submitted in the civil trial.

Article 187 of the Civil Procedure Act

Supreme Court Decision 90Da11028 delivered on January 29, 1991, 91Da37690 delivered on May 22, 1992, 92Da31453 delivered on January 15, 1993

Plaintiff

High-man and one other

Gwangju District Court Decision 93Na4263 delivered on July 1, 1994

The judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to Gwangju District Court Panel Division.

We examine the Plaintiff’s ground of appeal.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below confirmed the fact that each registration under the name of the defendants was made with respect to the real estate in this case at the time of original adjudication for which the registration of ownership transfer was completed under the name of the plaintiff, and rejected the plaintiff's claim on the ground that, around June 5, 1984, the non-party 1 borrowed money from the non-party 1 on or around March 11, 1985, he arbitrarily completed the registration of the establishment of a new mortgage by using the above seal and completed each registration in the future of the defendants because each registration under the name of the defendants was completed, and there was no other evidence to prove it.

However, even if the original civil trial is not bound by the finding of facts in the criminal trial, the facts found guilty of the same facts are significant evidence. Thus, in light of other evidences submitted in the civil trial, the facts against this cannot be recognized unless there are special circumstances where it is deemed difficult to adopt the factual judgment in the criminal trial (see Supreme Court Decision 90Meu21886, Dec. 7, 1990; Supreme Court Decision 90Da11028, Jan. 29, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 92Da31453, Jan. 15, 1993; etc.). In this case, it is difficult for Nonparty 1 to obtain the above facts under the name of the original notarial deed from the original notarial deed and to obtain the notarial deed from the defendant on June 5, 1984.

However, the court below's statement on the ground of rejection of the above criminal judgment is based on Gap evidence Nos. 4-4 and Eul evidence Nos. 1-3 (Examination of Suspects) and testimony by a witness of the court below. First, since the plaintiff succeeded to the land, etc. of this case from his father but was living in Daejeon at the time when he was succeeded from his father, the non-party 1 and his mother were managed by him. Second, the non-party 1 stated that the plaintiff's consent was obtained in the trial process of the criminal defendant's case. However, the above reasons are different from the circumstances as to whether the registration of establishment of the above root on the real estate of this case constitutes expression representation, etc., and the above reasons are merely nothing more than the statement that the non-party 1 did not go against the plaintiff's will and thus, it cannot be deemed that the defendant's testimony cannot be viewed as a witness's testimony in this case, and the above facts cannot be viewed as a witness's testimony in this case's criminal judgment.

Nevertheless, the court below's rejection of the evidence consistent with the plaintiff's above argument without adopting a factual judgment on the grounds that the court below could not be a special reason for not adopting a factual judgment, and there is an error of law that affected the conclusion of the judgment by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations or violating the rules of evidence. Therefore, the argument pointing this out has merit.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Chocheon-sung (Presiding Justice)