A. Whether Articles 18(2) and 18(3) and 20 of the Administrative Litigation Act, which provide for cases where the procedure of the preceding trial may not be followed, apply to a tax lawsuit (negative)

B. In a case where the grounds for the initial taxation disposition and the illegality of the increased disposition are common, whether a taxpayer who had undergone the pre-trial procedure for the preceding disposition should undergo a separate pre-trial procedure in filing an administrative litigation against the reorganization disposition (negative)

(c) The case holding that the request for review and the request for review were dismissed on the ground that the specific reasons for the request for review concerning taxation were not listed, but that they underwent legitimate procedures for trial

(d) The scope of "expenses directly disbursed for the transfer of land, etc." under Article 59-2 (3) 2 of the Corporate Tax Act, which shall be deducted from the transfer value of land, etc. in determining the tax base of special surtax.

E. Whether the case where a construction business operator temporarily and temporarily leases part of a building constructed for the purpose of sale until it is sold in lots is deemed a so-called self-supply under the Value-Added Tax Act (negative)

(f) Whether an entrepreneur may compensate for damages caused by a defect in the construction in the following year in the year following the year in which the supply of a service was completed, or whether the contract itself may be deducted from the output tax amount in the following year (negative)

A. Articles 18(2) and 18(3) and 20 of the Administrative Litigation Act do not apply to a tax suit that provides that an administrative suit may be instituted without going through a prior trial procedure pursuant to Article 56(2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes.

B. In the event that the tax authority increased or changed the taxation subject to the dispute while the appeal procedure for the taxation is in progress, and the grounds for illegality are common, the tax authority may file an administrative suit seeking revocation of the increased or decreased taxation without going through a separate procedure for the pre-assessment, as long as the pre-assessment procedure was followed by

C. In making a request for a review as to a taxation disposition, the request for a review is dismissed because the party did not list the specific reasons in daily, but did not comply with the request of the Commissioner of the National Tax Service for correction, and even if the request for a trial is dismissed for the same reason, the disposition agency stated that it was an objection to the taxation disposition in whole and stated the reasons for objection as a written opinion on the request for a review, and it is reasonable to view that the defect is cured if it was corrected and corrected properly while making the request for a review thereafter. Thus, it can

D. In determining the tax base of special surtax, the "expenses directly paid for the transfer of land, etc." under Article 59-2 (3) 2 of the Corporate Tax Act, which shall be deducted from the transfer value of the land, etc., refers to the expenses for the preparation of the contract, notarial expenses, stamp, introduction expenses, etc. disbursed after the purchaser's determination, and the advertising expenses, etc. to attract many and unspecified persons to the purchaser before the purchaser's determination, which are deemed reasonable by social norms. The personnel expenses and expendable expenses incurred at the construction site of the transferred new building, are the general management expenses or the expenses for the new construction and acquisition of the building, and cannot be deemed as direct expenses for the transfer of the building.

E. Article 6(2) of the Value-Added Tax Act and Article 15(1)1 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act cannot be deemed as "the case of direct use and consumption for self-business, where a building constructed by a building business operator for the purpose of sale is not sold in lots due to economic depression, etc. and part of it is sold in lots until a house is sold in lots with the condition that no objection is raised even during the lease period."

F. In a case where a construction business operator completed the supply of services (the interior facility construction of a building) in 1983 and completed the sales report after receiving the payment, it cannot be deducted from the sales amount in 1984 on the ground that he was liable for damages due to the defect in the construction in 1984. The contract itself for the interior facility construction itself was rescinded, and there was no supply of services based on its retroactive effect. Accordingly, even if the sales itself did not have existed from the beginning, it is a matter of refund, etc. of value-added tax returned and paid in 1983, and the taxable period is not a nature of deduction from the sales amount in 1984.

(a)(b)Article 18(a) of the Administrative Litigation Act; Article 20(2)(c) of the Framework Act on National Taxes Article 62 and Article 63(d) of the Corporate Tax Act; Article 6(2)(f) of the Value-Added Tax Act Article 3, Article 9-2(3)2(e) of the Value-Added Tax Act; Article 15(1)1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act;

A. Supreme Court Decision 88Nu7996 delivered on November 10, 1989 (Gong1990,38). Supreme Court Decision 90Nu1892 delivered on August 28, 1990 (Gong1990,2042) D. Supreme Court Decision 87Nu83 delivered on October 13, 1987 (Gong1987,1724). (e) Supreme Court Decision 83Nu30 delivered on January 24, 1984 (Gong1984,377).

[Defendant-Appellee] Kim Jong-chul Co., Ltd.

the director of the tax office

Seoul High Court Decision 86Gu55 delivered on February 7, 1990

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against each party.

1. We examine the grounds of appeal No. 1 by the defendant litigation performer.

(1) According to Article 18 (3) 2 of the Administrative Litigation Act, when one of the dispositions related to each other has already been adjudicated by an administrative appeal, the court below held that the lawsuit in this case cannot be deemed unlawful, even if the plaintiff filed the lawsuit in this case in this case, that the plaintiff sought revocation of the disposition of June 20, 1985 and the procedure of the previous trial had been lawfully conducted, since the disposition of July 2, 198, as a disposition to revise the disposition of increased tax amount, is related to the contents of the above disposition, and it did not go through the previous trial procedure separately.

However, it is interpreted that the provisions of Articles 18(2) and (3) and 20 of the Administrative Litigation Act shall not apply to tax litigation in accordance with Article 56(2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes (see Supreme Court Decision 88Nu7996, Nov. 10, 1989). Thus, the court below's explanation as legitimate in this case's lawsuit in accordance with Article 18(3)2 of the Administrative Litigation Act is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles. On the other hand, if a reorganization disposition is issued after a tax authority imposed a tax disposition, the initial disposition will lose its existence value independent by absorbing the reorganization disposition. Thus, the execution of the previous trial procedure should also be determined as the object of a reorganization disposition. If the tax authority has increased or changed the taxation disposition subject to a dispute while the appeal procedure was in progress, and if the grounds were common, the tax authority may review the basic facts and legal issues already and have been given the opportunity to request the taxpayer to cancel the previous trial procedure without going through a separate judgment of 1989Du19896,980.

According to the records, the plaintiff had gone through a pre-trial procedure on June 20, 1985, and the defendant had issued a disposition of the increased portion of tax assessment on July 2, 1988. Since the increased portion of tax assessment is related to the original tax assessment and it can be known that there are all illegal contents. Thus, even if the plaintiff did not go through a pre-trial procedure on the increased portion of tax assessment, the plaintiff can seek its revocation. Therefore, it is unreasonable for the court below to conclude that the lawsuit in this case is unlawful because it is justified in its conclusion to reject the defendant's main defense.

In addition, it is not inconsistent with the judgment of the court below, which is the same as the judgment of the court below, which is decided on September 23, 1986 by the defendant performer.

(2) According to the court below's determination, in the plaintiff's request for examination of this case, the plaintiff stated that the disposition of this case was improper, and did not list the specific grounds for the cancellation, and the request for examination was dismissed because it did not comply with the request of the Commissioner of the National Tax Service to correct the specific grounds for objection. However, the defendant who received the above request for examination was dismissed for the same reason. However, since the defendant submitted the request for examination as a written opinion about the grounds for imposition of value-added tax of this case, namely, the disposition of this case, the disposition of value-added tax of this case and the reasons for objection against the plaintiff's own supply, the Commissioner of the National Tax Service could fully know the reasons for the disposition of this case and the disposition of this case, and the plaintiff who received the decision for rejection of the above request for examination, made a concrete assertion about the illegality thereof, and it is reasonable to see that the plaintiff's request for examination was just and correct after the disposition of this case was made by stating the whole grounds for appeal and the specific grounds for appeal as value-added tax as well.

2. We examine the grounds of appeal No. 2 and the grounds of appeal No. 2 by the defendant litigation performer.

According to the provisions of Article 59-2 (3) 2 of the Corporate Tax Act, the tax base of the special surtax shall be the amount obtained by deducting the expenses directly paid for the transfer of land, etc. from the transfer value of land, etc. in addition to the acquisition value. "Expenses directly paid for the transfer of land, etc." refers to the expenses for the transfer of land, etc., such as the cost of preparation of the contract, notarized cost, stamp, introduction cost, etc. that are disbursed after the buyer became final and conclusive, and the cost for the transfer of land, etc., such as advertising cost to attract many and unspecified persons to the buyer before the buyer becomes final and conclusive, which is deemed reasonable by social norms (see Supreme Court Decision 8

Therefore, other than the introduction expenses, the expenses for advertisement and publicity of the plaintiff's assertion are included in the transfer expenses, but the personnel expenses, such as salary and bonus, office supplies, and the consumption expenses, such as water and mineral heat costs, are not limited to the expenses for the new construction and acquisition of general management expenses or buildings, even though the plaintiff had a separate collection and accounting system for each construction site, but not only the expenses for the new construction and acquisition of the building. All arguments are groundless.

3. We examine the grounds of appeal No. 3 by the defendant litigation performer.

Article 6(2) of the Value-Added Tax Act and Article 15(1)1 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provide that goods produced and acquired by an entrepreneur in relation to his/her own business shall be deemed the supply of goods if they are used and consumed directly for the business for which value-added tax is exempted. This means that, in the event that an entrepreneur directly uses or consumes goods produced and acquired in relation to his/her own business, the output tax does not occur if he/she directly uses or consumes them for the business for which value-added tax is exempted, and the transfer of value-added tax is suspended. Thus, in the event of direct use. This means that the entrepreneur intends to maintain the basic structure of value-added tax by deeming them as the supply

Therefore, as determined by the court below, it cannot be deemed that the case of direct use and consumption for the so-called self-supply, in a case where the two households are temporarily and temporarily leased until the sale of a house during the lease period under the condition that no objection is raised even if they are sold in lots, as determined by the court below, as the plaintiff constructed for the purpose of sale. The argument is groundless.

(See Supreme Court Decision 83Nu30 delivered on January 24, 1984)

4. We examine the grounds of appeal No. 4 by the defendant litigation performer.

According to the records, in addition to the total amount of KRW 276,70,00,00 which the plaintiff recognized as the construction cost of the commercial building and the Austria building, there is no error in violation of the rules of evidence, such as the theory of lawsuit, which found that the plaintiff paid KRW 18,50,000 to the Taejin Industrial Co., Ltd. in the first period of 1984, gold 6,500,000, gold 11,926,200, and gold 18,426,200, respectively, to the Seocho Industrial Co., Ltd. in the second period of 1984. The arguments are groundless.

5. We examine the Plaintiff’s attorney’s ground of appeal No. 1.

The court below affirmed the decision of the court below that the plaintiff's return of 132,816,370 won in the first half of 1984 in relation to the above facility construction on the ground that the plaintiff completed the supply of services in the year 1983 and included in the sale price after issuing a tax invoice and receiving the payment for the services, and completed the return of value-added tax for the year 1983. Since the plaintiff's return of 8,945,456 won in total and 132,816,370 won in the second half of 1984 was confirmed, the supply of services such as the facility construction can not be returned once it is supplied in its nature. Since the plaintiff can only solve the defects in the construction, if he completed the supply of services in the year 1983, and completed the sale declaration after receiving the payment for the services, it cannot be deducted from the sales price for the first half of 1984, the plaintiff's return of 1984 in the first half of 198.

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against each party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Yong-dong (Presiding Justice)