(a) Degree of duress and the validity of its declaration of intention;

(b) An act of anti-social order invalidated under Article 103 of the Civil Act;

A. A declaration of intention made in a state of full deprivation of freedom of decision-making by the other party or a third party’s coercion is null and void, as it lacks internal intent corresponding to the intention of effect. However, if the duress does not fully deprive of freedom of decision-making and the degree of restriction is limited, the declaration of intention can be revoked, and it cannot be deemed null and void.

B. An act of anti-social order null and void under Article 103 of the Civil Act includes not only cases where the contents of rights and obligations, which is the object of the juristic act, violate good morals and other social order, but also cases where the content itself legally enforces it, or lacks social order conditions or monetary consideration to it, and where the motive of the juristic act indicated or known to the other party is anti-social order.

A. Article 110(b) of the Civil Act

Supreme Court Decision 73Da1143 delivered on February 26, 1974

Plaintiff

Han-tae, Attorney Kim Tae-tae, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Seoul High Court Decision 83Na3117 delivered on May 23, 1984

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

The defendant's attorney's grounds of appeal are examined.

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, if the non-party 1, known to the plaintiff and the non-party 2, was detained on charges of fraud from the defendant, the court below decided that the non-party 1's wife, and the plaintiff met with the non-party 1 while finding the plaintiff, was responsible for driving the plaintiff's head debt and died on the non-party 1, and did not deduction the husband's body, and it was committed an assault on the non-party 2's request for the cancellation of the registration of transfer of the plaintiff's personal seal impression to the non-party 2, by making it difficult to view that the non-party 2's act was against the plaintiff's order for sale and purchase of the plaintiff's real estate by using a bomb, bomb, knife, etc., at any time and after the plaintiff's residence, and that the non-party 1's act was against the plaintiff's order of sale and purchase of the plaintiff's real estate, and that the plaintiff's above act was against the non-party 2's order for sale and sale of the plaintiff.

2. In arranging the contents of the above original adjudication, the plaintiff's act on the real estate of this case is first, the plaintiff's act of causing registration is invalid since it is a defective expression of intent made in the state of deprivation of the plaintiff's free will due to the act of assault, intimidation, and confinement of the non-party 2. Second, it is summary to the effect that the above act of cause for registration is invalid as it goes against good morals

(1) However, an expression of intent made in a state where the freedom of decision-making was completely deprived by health team, the other party, or a third party’s coercion with respect to the defect in a declaration of intention, is null and void, since there is no internal intent corresponding to the intention of effect. However, if it is limited to the extent that it does not fully deprive the freedom of decision-making, the declaration of intent can be revoked, and it cannot be deemed null and void.

In light of the records, the plaintiff was found to have taken the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer of the real estate in this case upon the completion of assault, intimidation, confinement, etc. from the non-party 2 as at the time of the original judgment. However, according to the statement of No. 3-15 and No. 21 (each statement of statement of the court below) employed by the court below and the witness testimony of the court below, according to the witness testimony of the court below, the plaintiff was injured by the non-party 2 while the plaintiff was killed by the non-party 2, but the non-party 2 was involved in the non-party 2, who was living in the plaintiff's house, and refused to intervene in his private life. Thus, it is difficult to view that the plaintiff was in a state of being deprived of the freedom of full decision-making due to the non-party 2's coercion, and therefore, it cannot be deemed that the defect of the declaration of intention made by the non-party 2

(2) On the following grounds, the act of anti-social order, which is invalidated under Article 103 of the Civil Act, is against good morals and other social order as well as the contents of rights and obligations which are the object of the juristic act, even though it does not violate good morals and other social order, and its content itself is legally forced, or its juristic act has the nature of anti-social order because it is contrary to social order, and the motive of the juristic act indicated or known to the other party is anti-social order.

However, according to the facts at the time of the above original adjudication, the juristic act on the registration of ownership transfer with the special agreement for repurchase of this case was used only in an unlawful way such as coercion in the process of its establishment, and the content of the rights and obligations aimed at it cannot be viewed as a matter contrary to the social order, and there is no room to regard the legally compelling the performance of the obligation to transfer registration as an anti-social order, and there is no difference between the anti-social order and monetary payment, and the motive of the said juristic act is contrary to social order. Thus, it cannot be viewed as null and void as a juristic act contrary to social order, regardless of the fact that the cancellation can be made on the ground of the defect of expression of intent by such coercion.

3. Ultimately, the judgment of the court below is justified since it constitutes a ground for reversal under Article 12(2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings, etc., and it constitutes a ground for reversal under Article 12(2) of the same Act.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below shall be reversed, and the case shall be remanded to the court below for a new trial. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Lee Lee Sung-soo (Presiding Justice)