Requirements for nullification of a juristic act by duress

In order to become null and void, the degree of coercion is not limited to the cancellation of a defective declaration of intention of a juristic act by duress, but the degree of coercion is not to make the other party feel fears, but it is to be limited to the degree that the declaration of intention was made in a state of completely deprived of the intention of decision making, and only the external form of the juristic act was made.

Article 110 of the Civil Act

Supreme Court Decision 84Da719 delivered on December 11, 1984 (Gong1985, 163), Supreme Court Decision 92Da7719 delivered on November 27, 1992 (Gong1993Sang, 242), Supreme Court Decision 94Da3432 delivered on April 26, 1996 (Gong196Sang, 167), Supreme Court Decision 95Da1460 delivered on October 11, 1996 (Gong196Ha, 3285)

[Defendant-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 2 others (Attorney Park Jae-sik, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

International Commercial Co., Ltd. and one other (Defendant-Appellee et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Busan High Court Decision 91Na10725 delivered on October 10, 1996

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

The court below, based on evidence, held the shares of Non-Party Joint Steel Industry Co., Ltd. and Non-Party Joint Steel Co., Ltd. (which is its affiliated company) and the Joint Development Co., Ltd. (which are changed to an International Co., Ltd. on December 20, 197), and held management rights of the plaintiffs on February 26, 197. The court below concluded a series of sale contracts which sell the shares of the plaintiffs to the Defendants or to the Korean Co., Ltd. incorporated into the defendant International Co., Ltd., Ltd., with each of the above companies after the above contract was concluded with the view to maintaining the order of public authority, on the premise that the above contracts were not completely invalidated by the plaintiffs' expression of intent to exercise public authority, and thus, the above contracts were not completely invalidated by the plaintiffs' expression of intent to exercise public authority. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' allegation that the above contracts were invalid or invalid by the defendant's declaration of intention to the extent that they were not unlawful in terms of public authority's unlawful decision-making and order.

The judgment of the court below on a juristic act by the legal act or coercion of the anti-social order is just in accordance with the established opinion of party members (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 84Da719, Dec. 11, 1984; 92Da7719, Nov. 27, 1992; 94Da34432, Apr. 26, 1996); and further, considering relevant evidence, the court below is just in holding that the contract in this case was made in a state where the freedom of decision-making of the plaintiffs was completely deducted or there is no evidence to find that the plaintiffs' s spawress are significantly unfair acts. Thus, the court below's decision cannot be said to have erred in the misapprehension of legal principles, such as theory of lawsuit, incomplete hearing, or violation of the rules of evidence. The argument is without merit.

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Final Young-young (Presiding Justice)