[1] The meaning of "legal act against social order" under Article 103 of the Civil Code

[2] The case holding that an act of appointing a religious corporation does not constitute a juristic act contrary to social order as stipulated in Article 103 of the Civil Code, even though it was known that there was an agreement to transfer or take over a traditional temple's well-known position in return for a large amount of money

[1] A juristic act which becomes null and void under Article 103 of the Civil Act includes not only cases where the contents of the juristic act violate good morals and other social order, but also cases where the contents thereof are legally enforced, or where the juristic act has the nature of anti-social order because it is contrary to social order conditions or money consideration is made, and where the motive of the juristic act indicated or known to the other party is anti-social order.

[2] The case holding that an act of appointing a religious corporation does not constitute a juristic act contrary to social order under Article 103 of the Civil Code, even though it is known that there is an agreement to transfer or take over a traditional temple's widely-known position for a large amount of money and valuables, and the act of appointing a religious corporation implicitly

[1] Article 103 of the Civil Code / [2] Article 103 of the Civil Code

[1] Supreme Court Decision 92Da7719 delivered on November 27, 1992 (Gong1993Sang, 242) Supreme Court Decision 96Da21706 delivered on July 23, 199 (Gong1999Ha, 1705) Supreme Court Decision 9Da5683 delivered on February 11, 200 (Gong2000Sang, 686)

Plaintiff (Attorney Park Hong-soo, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant Incorporated Association (Attorney Park Han-soo et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Busan High Court Decision 98Na1928 delivered on June 16, 1999

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Busan High Court.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. Summary of the judgment below

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that the disciplinary action in this case should be null and void, since the defendant corporation did not go through the disciplinary procedure stipulated in the Religious Order, while dismissing the plaintiff, and accepted the defendant's assertion that there is no legal interest in seeking nullification of the disciplinary action in this case, since the well-known appointment of the plaintiff is null and void as an act contrary to good morals and other social order.

In other words, the court below, upon consultation with the president of the defendant corporation, agreed to take over the temple belonging to the defendant corporation in fact with the intention to take over the temple belonging to the defendant corporation, and to pay KRW 300 million in return for taking office after the plaintiff retired from office as well as being known to the public by the plaintiff. If the plaintiff 2 invested funds, the court below decided that the plaintiff was not aware of the fact that the agreement was made on April 24, 1995 by receiving KRW 220 million from the non-party 2 to the non-party 1, and that the agreement was null and void, and that the plaintiff would not have been aware of the fact that the agreement was made against the above administrator's good customs, and that the plaintiff did not have been appointed as the non-party 1,50 million won in return for the above act. The court below determined that the plaintiff was not aware of the fact that the non-party 1 did not have been appointed as the plaintiff's inspector's general duty, and that the agreement was null and void after being so known to the plaintiff 1000 million won.

2. The judgment of this Court

A. In light of the records, the decision of the court below that recognized the fact that the plaintiff paid KRW 300 million to the non-party 1 who was the chief minister of the above temple in return for the chief minister's resignation from the office and that the defendant corporation was appointed as the chief inspector of the above temple shall be justified, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the facts against the rules of evidence.

B. However, we cannot accept the judgment of the court below that the appointment of the plaintiff was null and void for the following reasons.

The above agreement between the plaintiff and the non-party 1, who was the full-time knowledge of the temple, is a contract to transfer or take over the above traditional temple's well-known position, which is a traditional temple under the Preservation of Traditional Temples Act, for a large amount of money and goods, and its contents shall be deemed null and void as an act contrary to good morals and other social order. Meanwhile, a juristic act null and void under Article 103 of the Civil Act shall not only be deemed to violate good morals and other social order, but also include a juristic act in itself, even though its contents are not contrary to social order, where it legally enforces the legal act, or is associated with a condition or monetary consideration that is contrary to social order, and where the motive of the juristic act indicated or known to the other party is contrary to social order (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da719, Nov. 27, 1992).

However, in this case, even if the defendant corporation appointed the plaintiff as widely known with the knowledge that there was the above agreement between the plaintiff and the non-party 1, it cannot be deemed that the appointment itself goes against good morals and other social order, and it cannot be deemed that the appointment itself is legally forced, or the juristic act has the nature of anti-social order as well as the motive of the juristic act indicated or known to the other party constitutes anti-social order.

C. Nevertheless, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the violation of social order, which affected the conclusion of the judgment, and the part of the grounds of appeal assigning this error is with merit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on the remaining grounds of appeal, the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Jin-hun (Presiding Justice)