A. Whether a new rejection disposition should be considered as a new rejection disposition in the case where a new application was filed after a new rejection disposition was issued (affirmative)

(b) The case holding that even though the name of the application is the subject of an objection, the declaration of rejection is a new application which is different from that of the previous rejection disposition, and the declaration of rejection is also an independent rejection disposition.

A. The rejection disposition is established by clearly expressing the intention of the competent administrative agency to refuse the request of a party, and if the parties have again filed a request after the rejection disposition is issued, the new rejection disposition shall be deemed to have been made as long as the competent administrative agency has again rejected the new application, regardless of the title of the application.

B. The case holding that even though the name of the application is the subject of an objection, the declaration of rejection is a new application that is more separate than the filing of an objection against the previous rejection disposition, and the declaration of rejection is also a new rejection disposition independent

Articles 2 and 19 of the Administrative Litigation Act

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Gyeong, Attorneys Lee Dong-young et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

[Judgment of the court below]

Attorney Ansan-do et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Seoul High Court Decision 91Gu1034 delivered on December 19, 1991

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

The Plaintiff’s attorney’s ground of appeal is examined.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged that the plaintiff owned a house within the Gyang-si District Project District, which is one of the relocation measures, and applied for the supply of a housing site to the plaintiff around May 1990, and that the plaintiff made a written notification to the plaintiff around January 17, 1991 that the plaintiff is not eligible for the supply of the housing site, and that the plaintiff made a reply to the defendant that the plaintiff's objection is excluded from the above relocation measures as of January 17, 1991. The defendant's rejection disposition in this case was made by notification around May 1990, and therefore, the plaintiff should be the object of the revocation lawsuit of the above disposition around May 1990, and therefore, the plaintiff should be considered as the object of the plaintiff's response to the plaintiff's objection as of January 17, 1991.

However, the rejection disposition is established by clearly expressing the intention of the competent administrative agency to refuse the application of the parties externally, and if the parties have again filed the application after the rejection disposition is issued, the new rejection disposition shall be deemed to have been made as long as the competent administrative agency again rejected the application, notwithstanding any of the items of the application (see Supreme Court Decision 90Nu10292 delivered on June 11, 1991).

Examining the facts of the decision of the court below and the records, the plaintiff filed an application for the supply of a housing site to the defendant on January 1, 1990, on the ground that the above building was donated to the plaintiff on May 1, 1990, the defendant notified the plaintiff in writing that he is not subject to the supply of the housing site. After the lapse of about eight months, the plaintiff filed an application for the supply of the housing site with the defendant by stating that the plaintiff is subject to the supply of the housing site with detailed mentioning the ownership, possession, registration relations, etc. of the house of this case and attaching evidentiary documents attached to the evidence, and that the plaintiff is subject to the supply of the housing site. In conclusion, the plaintiff cannot be subject to the supply of the housing site as of January 17, 1991, because the plaintiff is not a person residing and owned in the relevant housing as of the date of the public notice of the compensation plan, and therefore, the plaintiff cannot be subject to the supply of the housing site as already returned.

In light of the above facts, although the plaintiff's above application on January 1, 1991 was named as an objection, it is reasonable to regard the plaintiff's application as an application for the supply of a new re-resident housing site even more different than the filing of an objection against the previous rejection disposition in light of the time of the application and the contents of the application. Thus, the defendant's expression of refusal to the above application is subject to a revocation lawsuit as an independent rejection

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the establishment of the rejection disposition, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below shall be reversed and remanded, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Justice)