A. The meaning of "the date when the person becomes aware of the damage and the identity of the perpetrator, which serves as the starting point for the statute of limitations for claim for damages

(b) The case holding that "if the result of a close inspection is known as a result of the close inspection, the damage and the perpetrator are known" when the result of the close inspection was diagnosed to be not caused by the accident after the accident, although the first diagnosis was not caused by the accident;

A. Article 766(1) of the Civil Act, which is the starting point for the short-term extinctive prescription of a claim for damages due to a tort, provides that "the date when the tortfeasor becomes aware of the damage is caused by the tortfeasor's illegal act." Thus, it is also required to know that there is a causal relationship between the harmful act and the occurrence of the damage in order to find the tortfeasor known of the damage and the tortfeasor.

B. The case holding that it is reasonable to view that the victim's chest pressure frame was diagnosed to be an existing disease unrelated to an accident when the accident occurred after the accident occurred, i.e., the alley of the truth, and if the result of a close inspection proves that it was not an alley of the truth, and then the medical examination was approved only after it was confirmed that it was not an alley of the truth, the victim who is a general person was aware of the fact that the defendant was caused by the accident, even if it was soon as possible, the result of the close inspection was found, and the chest pressure frame was also known that the accident was caused by the accident.

Article 766(1) of the Civil Act

A. (B) Supreme Court Decision 92Da2011 delivered on April 14, 1992 (Gong1992, 1598) (Gong1995Sang, 1148 delivered on February 3, 1995). Supreme Court Decision 88Da32371 delivered on September 26, 198 (Gong1989, 1560), Supreme Court Decision 93Da59304 delivered on April 26, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 1468), Supreme Court Decision 87Da2005 delivered on December 27, 198 (Gong1989, 223) (Gong192Da42583 delivered on December 8, 1992).

Plaintiff

Defendant-Appellant Choi-ho, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Incheon District Court Decision 95Na832 delivered on June 21, 1995

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Incheon District Court Panel Division.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged the Plaintiff’s pressure on July 2, 191 to pressure pressure on the above part of the Nonparty, who is the Defendant’s employee, at the time of this case’s pressure, and found the accident of this case’s 4-5 pressure. The Defendant, if the Plaintiff suffered injury due to industrial accident, shall be deemed to have known of the damage when the victim suffered injury. As such, the Plaintiff’s claim for damages due to the accident of this case was extinguished by prescription of 3 years after the date of the accident. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s diagnosis that the Plaintiff suffered from 12 chest pressure at the time of the accident was not caused by the accident of this case, but by the date of the above 19-year medical examination, the Plaintiff was found to have been subject to the above 19-year medical prescription after the date of the above 1-year medical examination and the date of the above 1-year medical examination. As such, the Plaintiff was found to have obtained approval for the above 1-year medical prescription after the date of this accident.

2. Article 766(1) of the Civil Act, which is the starting date of the short-term extinctive prescription of a claim for damages due to a tort, provides that "the date when the person becomes aware of the damage and the perpetrator" is known that the damage was caused by the tortfeasor's tort. Thus, in order to say that the person was aware of the damage and the perpetrator, it is necessary to know that there was causation between the harmful act and the occurrence of the damage (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 88Meu32371, Sept. 26, 1989; Supreme Court Decision 93Da59304, Apr. 26, 1994).

As determined by the court below, if it was diagnosed as an existing disease that had not been related to the accident of this case in the first time after the occurrence of the accident of this case, that is, the medical care approval was obtained only after it was determined as not to be a structural frame as a result of a close inspection, it is reasonable to deem that the plaintiff, who is a general person, was aware of the fact that the pressure frame of the first chest pressure was caused by the accident of this case, even as soon as possible, the above close inspection result was conducted and the pressure frame of the chest pressure is also known as a result of the accident of this case.

In ordinary cases, it should be deemed that the injured party was aware of the injury when the injured party suffered the injury. However, as in this case, the injury was diagnosed by a doctor who is an expert at the time of the first medical examination after the accident that the injury was not caused by the accident, and as such, it should not be viewed as a case where there was a proper diagnosis from the doctor who is an expert at the time of the accident that the injury was not caused by the accident, and since the scarcity and the scarcity are different from each other, the scarcity and the scarcity are not necessarily accompanied by the scarcity. Thus, even if the plaintiff knew that the scarcity was caused by the accident at the time of the first medical examination, it cannot be said that the plaintiff was aware of the damage caused by the scarcity damage at that time. Meanwhile, according to the statement of evidence No. 1-26 (Physical Appraisal Report) of this case, it is mainly caused by the injury that the plaintiff lost the ability to work due to the remaining scarcity and pressure pressure.

Ultimately, with respect to the damages caused by the pressure pressure pressure at least, it shall be deemed that the Plaintiff was aware of the damages and the perpetrator on November 14, 1991, when the above close inspection was conducted, and it is clear from that time that 3 years have not elapsed since November 9, 1994, the Plaintiff’s claim for damages in this case where the Plaintiff claimed damages based on the above evidence No. 1-26, cannot be said to have expired by prescription. However, the lower court’s determination that the damages claim in this case was extinguished by prescription on the grounds as stated in its reasoning is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the short-term extinctive prescription, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. Accordingly, the argument on this point is with merit.

3. Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Yong-hun (Presiding Justice)