Main Issues
[1] The meaning of the acquisition date of real estate (=the registration date of ownership transfer) and the judgment under Article 187 of the Civil Code with respect to the donation of general real estate that is not a donation using the case of Article 187 of the Civil Code
[2] Whether the extension of the period for imposing gift tax constitutes retroactive taxation upon the amendment of the Framework Act on National Taxes before the expiration of the period for filing a gift tax return (negative)
[3] The degree of tax payment notice
Summary of Judgment
[1] Under our legal system that takes the form principle as to the change in real rights due to a juristic act, the acquisition date of real estate shall be the time when the registration of transfer of ownership is made according to the donation, in case of the donation of general real estate which is not a donation using the case of Article 187 of the Civil Code. In this case, the decision is limited to the formation decision which has the formation effect of real rights due to the judgment itself, and the execution decision or confirmation judgment shall not be applicable.
[2] The principle of prohibition of retroactive taxation is not applicable to any taxation requirement that is closed before the enactment or amendment of tax laws and subordinate statutes, or when there is any change in the interpretation or guidelines of the tax authority concerning the relevant laws and regulations, and it does not limit the application of new laws and regulations to the facts that have been continued before or after the expiration of the period, and so-called in-called "in-service" legislation that operates the current ongoing facts is allowed as a matter of principle. Thus, Article 26-2 (1) 1 of the former Framework Act on National Taxes (amended by Act No. 4277 of Dec. 31, 190) stipulating the exclusion period of imposition of gift tax (amended by Act No. 4277 of Dec. 31, 1990) is amended before the lapse of the period of prohibition of retroactive taxation.
[3] Article 9(1) of the National Tax Collection Act provides that when the head of a tax office intends to collect a national tax, he/she shall issue to a taxpayer a written notice specifying the taxable year, tax item, tax amount, grounds for calculation, deadline for payment, and place of payment of the national tax. Article 25-2 of the former Inheritance Tax Act (amended by Act No. 5193 of Dec. 30, 1996) and Article 19 of the former Inheritance Tax Act (amended by the Presidential Decree No. 15193 of Dec. 31, 1996), the head of a tax office must notify a taxpayer of the tax base and tax calculation statement when he/she determines or revises the tax base and tax amount of gift tax, not just for the convenience of tax administration, but for the principle of no taxation without law prescribed by the Constitution and the Framework Act on National Taxes. In addition, the above provisions purport that the taxpayer should be notified of the determination of the imposition of tax in detail, and purpose and purpose of the tax collection statement to the extent that it should be made specific tax administration and specific.
[Reference Provisions]
[1] Article 187 of the Civil Act / [2] Article 26-2 (1) 1 of the former Framework Act on National Taxes (amended by Act No. 4810 of Dec. 22, 1994), Article 2 of the Addenda (amended by Presidential Decree No. 14076 of Dec. 31, 1990), Article 12-3 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Framework Act on National Taxes (amended by Presidential Decree No. 14076 of Dec. 31, 1993), Article 20 of the former Inheritance Tax Act (amended by Act No. 4805 of Dec. 22, 1994), Article 68 of the current Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act / [3] Article 9 (1) of the National Tax Collection Act, Article 26-2 (1) 4 of the former Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act (amended by Act No. 5193 of Dec. 30, 196), Article 197-1 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Inheritance Tax Act
Reference Cases
[1] Supreme Court Decision 82Da129 delivered on October 12, 1982 (Gong1982, 1078), Supreme Court Decision 92Nu4529 delivered on November 27, 1992 (Gong1993, 1480), Supreme Court Decision 93Nu23985 delivered on December 9, 1994 (Gong1995, 5199), Supreme Court Decision 96Da5025 delivered on July 28, 1998 (Gong1998Ha, 2267) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 97Nu7493 delivered on September 5, 1997 (Gong197, 1969, 97Hun-Ba, 1989, 97Hun-Ba, 97Hun-Ba, 1969, 97Du97989 delivered on July 29, 198
Plaintiff
Maximum Sung-do (Attorney Hong-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)
Defendant
The Director of Gangnam District Office
Text
1. The Defendant’s disposition of imposition of KRW 97,539,00,00 for the gift tax of 1990 imposed on the Plaintiff on May 1, 1997 and KRW 97,539,00 for the defense tax of KRW 585,234,00 for the gift tax of 190 shall be revoked.
2. The plaintiff's remaining claims are dismissed.
3. The costs of lawsuit shall be divided into seven parts, one of which shall be borne by the defendant, and the other by the plaintiff.
Purport of claim
The Defendant’s disposition of imposition of KRW 585,234,00 for the gift tax of 1990 imposed on the Plaintiff on May 1, 1997 and KRW 97,539,00 for the defense tax of KRW 97,539,00 for the Plaintiff shall be revoked.
Reasons
1. Details of the disposition;
The following facts are recognized in full view of the whole purport of the pleadings in the descriptions of Gap evidence 1, 2, 3, 4, and Eul evidence Nos. 1 to 5:
A. Nonparty 2, the Plaintiff’s husband, is the owner on the register of 10,808 square meters of woodland 10,808 square meters of the Gangnam-dong 212, Gangnam-gu, Seoul (a forest was divided into June 9, 1994 and May 25, 1995) and 1/10 shares of 212 square meters of 6 forest land of 212, the same Dong-dong 212 (hereinafter “the real estate of this case”). The Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the said stuffing State for claiming ownership transfer registration against the said real estate, and obtained a favorable judgment on August 8, 190, and completed the registration of ownership transfer under the Plaintiff’s name on October 24, 1990, but did not submit a gift tax report.
B. On October 24, 1990, the Defendant issued the instant disposition imposing KRW 585,234,000 for the gift tax of 1990 on May 1, 1997 and KRW 97,539,00 for the defense tax, on the ground that the said country donated the instant real estate to the Plaintiff.
2. Whether the disposition is lawful;
(a) The acquisition time of donated property;
(1) The plaintiff asserts that the time of acquiring the real estate of this case is July 14, 1990, the date when the title trust is terminated as the date of the title trust as the date of the date when the title trust is acquired under Article 187 of the Civil Act, and that the date of sentencing is August 8, 1990, which is the date when the judgment is rendered. In addition, each of the above dates asserts that the disposition of this case, which was based on the officially announced land price, calculated under the Public Notice of Values and Appraisal of Lands, etc. Act, was unlawful since before August 30, 1990, which was the date when
(2) Under our legal system that takes the form principle as to the change in real rights due to a juristic act, the date of acquisition of real estate in the donation of general real estate is the time of the registration of transfer of ownership due to the donation (see Supreme Court Decision 92Nu4529 delivered on November 27, 1992). In this case, the judgment is limited to the formation judgment which has the formation effect of the acquisition of real right to real estate by itself, and the execution judgment or confirmation judgment does not fall under the above (see Supreme Court Decision 82Da129 delivered on October 12, 1982).
According to the evidence evidence No. 1 as to this case, since the judgment that caused the plaintiff to acquire the real estate of this case is a performance judgment ordering the execution of the procedure for registration of transfer of ownership, the acquisition date of the real estate of this case shall be the date of the judgment or the date of termination of title trust, which is not the date of the judgment or the date of termination of title trust which caused it, and it is obvious that the officially assessed individual land price of the real estate of this case has already been publicly announced before October 24, 1990, it is obvious that the plaintiff's assertion that
(b) the exclusion period;
(1) According to the former Framework Act on National Taxes, the Plaintiff asserts that the instant disposition was unlawful since it was conducted five years after the exclusion period was granted, and if the exclusion period was extended by the amended Act after the date of acquisition, it is unconstitutional to infringe on property rights by retroactive legislation.
(2) Article 26-2 (1) 1 of the former Framework Act on National Taxes (amended by Act No. 4277 of Dec. 31, 1990) provides that gift tax and defense tax may not be imposed after the lapse of five years from the date on which they are assessable. Meanwhile, the above Act was amended by Act No. 4277 of Dec. 31, 1990 (amended by Act No. 4277 of Dec. 31, 1990 and Article 26-2 (1) 1 of the former Framework Act on National Taxes (amended by Act No. 4810 of Dec. 22, 1994; hereinafter referred to as the "Framework Act on National Taxes") provides that gift tax may not be imposed after the lapse of five years from the date on which it is assessable, but Article 19 of the former Inheritance Tax Act (amended by Act No. 4283 of Dec. 31, 190; hereinafter referred to as "the above provision of Article 19 of the Act").
Meanwhile, according to Article 20(1) of the Act, Article 26-2(3) of the Framework Act on National Taxes, and Article 12-3 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Framework Act on National Taxes (amended by Presidential Decree No. 14076, Dec. 31, 1993), a donee shall report the type and value of donated property within six months from the date he/she becomes aware of the donation, and the date on which gift tax may be imposed shall be the day following the deadline for submission of the above report. As such, the Plaintiff shall not submit a report on gift tax by April 24, 1991, which is the reporting period, after acquiring the instant real estate from the donation on October 24, 1990, and the Plaintiff did not submit a report on gift tax by April 24, 1991, among the dispositions of this case on May 1, 199, it is apparent that ten years have not elapsed since the exclusion period under the Framework Act on National Taxes, but it is apparent that five years have passed since the exclusion period in respect.
On the other hand, with respect to whether the Framework Act on National Taxes, which provides a exclusion period, was revised before the expiration of the period for filing a gift tax return after the acquisition of the gift tax, violates the Constitution prohibiting retroactive taxation, the principle of prohibition of retroactive taxation cannot be applied to the facts of taxation requirements which are closed before the validity of the amendment of the tax statutes or the tax authorities' interpretation or guidelines for disposition, etc., and it does not restrict the application of new Acts and subordinate statutes to the facts of taxation requirements that have been pending before or after the expiration of the period for filing a gift tax return (see Supreme Court Decision 97Nu6476 delivered on December 23, 198). The so-called so-called in-called in-called in-called in-depth fact-finding legislation that serves as the current fact-finding is allowed in principle (see Constitutional Court Order 97Hun-Ba58 delivered on November 26, 1998), and the period for which gift tax can be imposed due to the gift of this case as a gift of this case, which has not been enforced retroactively by the amendment of the National Tax Act.
C. Whether procedural defects are procedural defects
(1) The plaintiff asserts that the disposition of this case is unlawful since specific facts and grounds for taxation requirements, such as laws and regulations, which serve as the basis for the determination method of tax base and taxation disposition, are not specified or mistakenly stated.
(2) Article 9(1) of the National Tax Collection Act provides that when the head of a tax office intends to collect a national tax, he/she shall issue to a taxpayer a written notice specifying the taxable year, tax item, tax amount, basis for calculation, payment period, and place of payment of the national tax. Article 25-2 of the Act and Article 19 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides that when the head of a tax office determines or revises the tax base and tax amount of gift tax, he/she shall notify a tax payment notice along with the calculation statement of the tax base and tax amount. The above provision is not merely a decoration provision for the convenience of tax administration, but rather a decoration provision for the convenience of tax administration, but rather a provision for the exclusion and careful and reasonable disposition of a taxpayer in accordance with the principle of no taxation without law as prescribed by the Constitution and the Framework Act on National Taxes to ensure the fairness of tax administration and to provide the taxpayer with a detailed notice of the details of the disposition and convenience in filing an objection to it (see Supreme Court Decision 83Nu404, Feb. 9, 1988).
According to the statement of evidence No. 2 as to this case, the tax notice issued pursuant to the disposition of this case clearly stated the taxable year, tax item, tax amount, grounds for calculation, payment period, and place of payment. Since it can be acknowledged that the tax base of gift tax and the amount of tax are attached to the calculation statement, it cannot be concluded that the disposition of this case is defective as alleged by the plaintiff. The decision of gift tax cannot be concluded that there is any error as to the disposition of this case because the tax authority's internal data does not indicate the contents of the disposition of this case, nor does it interfere with the decision of objection as to the tax disposition of this case and the appeal thereof. Therefore, the plaintiff's above assertion is without merit.
3. Conclusion
Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is partially reasonable, and the remainder is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.
Judge Gangnam-gu (Presiding Judge) shall have a civil interest