A. The meaning of negligence in offsetting negligence

(b) Legal obligations of a person parking an automobile at the edge of a road at night;

(c) The method for calculating the exchange price, where the secondhand car has been damaged by another person's illegal act;

D. Whether payment of rent for lease and lending can be claimed in lieu of temporary rents during the period of repairing a motor vehicle damaged by tort (affirmative)

A. The comparative negligence set-off system stipulated in Articles 763 and 396 of the Civil Act differs from actively imposing liability for damages on a tortfeasor, and its purport is different from that of actively taking into account not only the victim’s liability for damages and the same subordinate principle as to the occurrence of damages in accordance with the equitable principle, which is the guiding principle of the compensation system, in determining the amount of damages that the victim should compensate in a case where the victim failed to fulfill his/her duty of care required in the course of community life. Thus, not only the victim’s breach of a strict duty of care required for the establishment of tort but also the victim’s expansion of damages due to mere negligence may be deemed as the victim’s fault and set-off

(b) A person who parks a motor vehicle at the edge of a road at night, even though the place is not in a place where parking is prohibited pursuant to the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, has the legal obligation to keep the driver of another motor vehicle parked by turning on the taillight and the width of the motor vehicle so that it can easily identify the parking fact of the motor vehicle, as well as the legal obligation to ensure that

(c) Where a secondhand car is damaged by another person’s tort, the exchange price at the time of the tort shall, in principle, be determined in accordance with the value required for acquiring the vehicle in the middlehand market, such as the same type of motor vehicle, the type, type, the degree of use, and the odometer.

D. As damage for the period of repairing a motor vehicle damaged by a tort, the borrower is entitled to claim the payment of rent in lieu of the temporary rental damage, as the damage for the period of repairing the motor vehicle.

(a) Articles 396 and 763 of the Civil Act; Articles 30 and 32 of the Road Traffic Act; Articles 10 and 13(1)(d) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act; Article 763 of the Civil Act (Article 393)

B. Supreme Court Decision 90Meu8760 delivered on November 9, 1990 (Gong1991, 41) 91Da13564 delivered on November 26, 1991 (Gong1992, 277). Supreme Court Decision 91Da5150 delivered on July 12, 1991 (Gong191, 2147)

Plaintiff

Attorney Park Young-young, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Seoul Civil District Court Decision 91Na21267 delivered on December 20, 1991

The part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant is reversed.

The case concerning this part shall be remanded to the Seoul Civil District Court Panel Division.

1. Judgment on the first ground for appeal by the defendant's attorney

A. On October 14, 1990, the lower court rejected the Defendant’s assertion that the Plaintiff was liable to compensate the Plaintiff for damages incurred due to the Plaintiff’s negligence on the ground that the Defendant’s operation of the instant passenger car, which was parked at the right edge of the instant road (vehicle No. 2 omitted) by putting the instant passenger car in front of Yongsan-gu Seoul (hereinafter “Road No. 1 omitted”) by driving a motor vehicle on a presson (vehicle No. 1 omitted), and driving on the front of Yongsan-gu, Seoul (hereinafter “Road No. 4.8m”). The lower court determined that the Defendant was not liable for damages incurred by the Plaintiff’s failure to compensate the Plaintiff for the damages incurred by the Plaintiff’s operation of the instant passenger car, on the ground that the Defendant’s operation of the instant passenger car, which was parked at the right edge of the instant road (vehicle No. 2 omitted), caused the instant passenger car to conflict with the vehicle that was parked in front of the instant road without permission due to the damages caused by the Plaintiff’s negligence.

In other words, even if the Plaintiff without permission parked a truck without using the taillights and sidelightss, the truck at the time of the accident is parked at the right edge of the road, which is about 4.8 meters from the center line of the road to the edge of the road, and is parked at the right edge of the road, and there is no particular obstacle to the traffic of other vehicles. The accident of this case not only did the Defendant drive a vehicle owned by him but also found the above truck late, but also it was the wind to change the direction of the truck just by the overworking of the steering gear. Thus, there is no proximate causal relation between the accident of this case and the unauthorized parking of the truck of this case (see Supreme Court Decision 90Meu8760, Nov. 9, 190), and there is no reason for the Defendant’s argument for offsetting negligence.

B. However, the comparative negligence set-off system stipulated in Articles 763 and 396 of the Civil Act differs from actively imposing liability on the tortfeasor for damages. In a case where the victim fails to fulfill his/her duty of care required under the good faith principle in social life, the victim’s liability for damages and liability for damages should be taken into account in accordance with the equitable principle, which is the guiding principle of the compensation system, in determining the amount of damages that the victim should compensate for. Therefore, the victim’s liability for damages is not only where the victim breached his/her strict duty of care required for the establishment of tort, but also where the damage is expanded due to simple negligence, it can be said that there is negligence on the part of the victim.

Article 30 of the Road Traffic Act (amended by Act No. 4243 of Aug. 1, 1990; hereafter referred to as the "Act") provides that "the method and time limit of stopping or parking on the road, or the method and prohibition of parking on the road parking lot shall be prescribed by the Presidential Decree". Article 10 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13147 of Oct. 24, 190; hereafter referred to as the "Decree") provides that "All vehicles shall stop on the road at the right edge of the roadway," and Article 30 of the same Act provides that "if it is necessary to park on the road without distinction between the roadway and sidewalk, it shall stop at least 50 cm from the right edge of the road, and if it is necessary to park at least 13 cm from the right edge of the road, it shall be regulated that it shall not interfere with the motor vehicle safety standards as prescribed by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Home Affairs."

Therefore, even if the accident in this case is not a place where parking is prohibited pursuant to the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, the plaintiff parked a motor vehicle at the edge of the road at night, so that the driver of another motor vehicle can easily identify the parking lot by using the taillights, etc., as well as the legal obligation to park the motor vehicle so that it does not interfere with other traffic. According to the Gap evidence 2 (Confirmation of Traffic Accidents) employed by the court below and Eul evidence 7 (on the spot map), and the testimony of the witness 1, the court below should have set a distance of about 40 centimeters from the right edge of the roadway, which is the first line of vehicular road, and the court below should have determined that the plaintiff parked a motor vehicle at the right edge of the road without any other sign that can identify the parking lot of the motor vehicle at night, and the defendant should not have any further known that the plaintiff parked the motor vehicle in this case at the right edge of the road without any further distance from the front side of the road.

C. Nevertheless, without examining the above points properly, the court below rejected the defendant's allegation of comparative negligence because the plaintiff parked a truck only on the ground that it did not interfere with the passage of other vehicles due to the plaintiff's parking of the truck, and the accident of this case was caused by negligence by the defendant's operation of the passenger vehicle provision system. Thus, there is no proximate causal relation between the plaintiff's illegal parking of the truck without permission and the accident of this case, and rejected the defendant's assertion of comparative negligence. The court below did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the plaintiff's negligence, which should be considered in determining the duty of care and liability for damages due to traffic accident, and the amount of the accident, which should be considered in accordance with related Acts and subordinate statutes, and it is obvious that such illegality affected the conclusion of the judgment, and therefore, there is a reason to point this out.

2. Determination on the ground of appeal No. 2-A.

In case where the so-called height of a truck is damaged by another person's tort, the exchange price at the time of the accident of the truck shall, in principle, be determined according to the price required for the acquisition of the vehicle in the middle height market, such as the same type of the vehicle, type, shape, condition of use as well as mileage (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 91Da5150, Jul. 12, 1991). According to relevant evidence and records, it cannot be deemed that the market price stated in the list of the present condition of used cars submitted by the court below is the used car prices calculated according to the above methods, and there is no evidence to prove that the exchange price at the time of the accident of this case of the truck owned by the plaintiff is the same as the defendant's assertion, and it is reasonable to reject the claim as above by the defendant's theory on the premise that the replacement price at the time of the accident of this case exceeds the exchange price at the time of the accident of this case, and there is no reason to conclude that there is any error in the misapprehension of law as to the extent of damages

The Supreme Court Decision 90Meu7569 Decided August 14, 1990 ruled that in case where the repair cost of a motor vehicle damaged by a tort exceeds the exchange price at the time of the tort, barring any special circumstance, the party members are liable for damages only within the extent of exchange price. Thus, it is not appropriate to invoke the case differently.

3. Determination on the ground of appeal No. 2-B.

The court below determined that, barring special circumstances, the Defendant is liable to pay the Plaintiff the above rent of KRW 2,340,00 (gold KRW 60,000 x 39) per day to the Plaintiff, barring the above rent of KRW 2,340,00,00, which is the aggregate of the above rent of KRW 60,00,00, which is the expenses necessary for operation, because the Plaintiff was engaged in the transportation of building materials, etc. after he was involved in the repair of the truck after he was affected by the instant accident, and paid KRW 60,00 per day for 39 days from October 15, 190 to November 22, 1990, which was used for the repair of the truck. Thus, the Defendant’s assertion that the amount of the above rent of KRW 60,000 includes all expenses required for operation, and thus, the Defendant’s claim that the damages incurred by the Plaintiff from operation of the truck during the repair period should be calculated based on the amount of damages for the above 16th, which the Plaintiff claimed the above rent of KRW 30.

According to relevant evidence and records, the above recognition judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and the judgment of the court below does not contain any violation of the rules of evidence, such as the theory of lawsuit, and there is no reason to discuss.

4. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant shall be reversed, and the case shall be remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition with the assent of all Justices who reviewed the appeal.

Justices Yoon Jae-ho (Presiding Justice)