A. Whether the rules of employment are valid or modified to workers without consent by the method of collective decision-making by the workers group (negative)

B. Whether the amendment of a provision on remuneration can be said to have obtained the workers’ implied consent to the amendment of the provision on remuneration solely on the basis of the fact that the amendment was reported on a daily newspaper, the revision was distributed to workers, and some workers received retirement allowances in accordance with the revised provision on remuneration (negative)

C. Whether it is reasonable in light of social norms that may not be subject to workers' consent if the provision on remuneration is modified disadvantageously in accordance with the governmental policy on the ground of financial pressure on management and profit-making activities of government-invested institutions and equity between the level of remuneration for general public officials (negative)

A. When the preparation or revision of the rules of employment under Article 95(1) of the Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 4099, Mar. 29, 1989) imposes unfavorable working conditions by deprived of the rights or interests of the workers' acquisition and loss, the consent by the method of collective decision-making by the workers' group that was subject to the previous rules of employment or the rules of employment should be obtained, and the rules of employment prepared or revised without such consent shall be null and void unless it is recognized that it is reasonable under the social norms.

B. It cannot be said that the amendment of a provision on remuneration was made in a daily newspaper, and the company distributed and perused the content thereof to its officers and employees after the amendment, and some retired employees received retirement allowances in accordance with the provision on remuneration after the amendment, and the employees of the company did not obtain implied consent to the amendment of the provision on remuneration.

C. Even if the amendment of remuneration regulations is made in accordance with the Government’s adjustment policies on the grounds of the fact that the level of remuneration for the executives and employees of government-affiliated invested institutions is too high, financial pressure on the management and profit-making activities of government-invested institutions and equity with the level of remuneration for the general public officials, it cannot be deemed that it is reasonable in light of social norms that may not be subject to the consent

Article 95 of the Labor Standards Act

A.B. (C) Supreme Court Decision 92Da49331 delivered on January 26, 1993 (Gong1993, 259). Supreme Court Decision 92Da30566 delivered on November 10, 1992 (Gong1993, 87), Supreme Court Decision 91Da31753 delivered on November 24, 1992 (Gong1993, 213), Supreme Court en banc Decision 91Da45165 delivered on December 22, 1992 (Gong193, 546). Supreme Court Decision 92Da32357 delivered on November 27, 1992 (Gong193, 259), Supreme Court Decision 90Da15457 delivered on March 12, 1991, Supreme Court Decision 90Da198389 delivered on August 28, 198 (Gong1997).

[Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellant-Appellee-Appellant]

Attorney Lee Sung-ho et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Seoul High Court Decision 92Na18605 delivered on October 13, 1992

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

With respect to the First Ground:

In a case where the preparation or revision of the rules of employment under Article 95(1) of the Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 989, Mar. 29, 1989) imposes unfavorable working conditions by deprivation of the right or interest of the workers' acquisition and loss, the opinion is that the consent by the method of collective decision-making by the workers' group that was subject to the previous rules of employment or the rules of employment should be required, and that the rules of employment prepared or revised without such consent should be deemed null and void unless it is reasonable

According to the facts duly admitted by the court below, the defendant company revised the remuneration provision as of January 1, 1981, and did not obtain the consent of the employees of the defendant company, and there was no change in the basic method calculated by multiplying the retirement allowance amount by the retirement allowance payment rate according to the period of service at the time of retirement, but the monthly salary rate was adjusted lower than the previous one, and the meaning of the monthly salary does not mean the monthly average wage at the time of retirement, as in the previous three-month period from the date immediately preceding the date of retirement, but it means three percent of the total sum of the basic salary and annual leave allowances and bonus allowances paid in the previous three-month period from the date immediately preceding the date of retirement, and if the defendant company did not obtain the above remuneration provision by the resolution of the board of directors of the defendant company at the time of the amendment, it is clear that the above provision was not applied to the employees of the above company, and thus, it was not applied to the above revision to the above employees, and thus, it should be justified.

Furthermore, the court below rejected the above assertion by the defendant company on the ground that the amendment of the above remuneration provision was widely announced through the newspapers at the time of the amendment, and the defendant company distributed and perused the remuneration provision after the amendment to its employees, and the employees who retired thereafter received retirement allowances under the remuneration provision after the amendment without objection, and the employees belonging to the defendant company consented to the amendment of the above remuneration provision. Accordingly, the court below acknowledged that the above amendment was made in daily newspapers, and distributed and perused the contents thereof after the amendment, and distributed it to the employees of the defendant company after the amendment, and the employees who retired therefrom received retirement allowances under the above remuneration provision after the amendment, but did not obtain the implied consent of the employees belonging to the defendant company on such circumstance alone, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge that the employees of the defendant company gave implied consent to the payment provision after the amendment. In light of the records, the court below's findings of fact is justified.

The judgment of the court below is not unlawful by misapprehending the legal principles under Article 95 of the Labor Standards Act. The arguments are without merit.

With respect to the second ground:

In this case, the court below held that the plaintiff's lawsuit in this case cannot be deemed to be in violation of the principle of good faith only with the fact that the plaintiff filed a lawsuit after about one year and six months from August 31, 1989, the date of retirement. The above judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and there are no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the principle of good faith as pointed out by the theory of lawsuit. It is without merit.

With respect to the third point:

The court below rejected the above assertion by the defendant company on the ground that the amendment of the above provision on remuneration to the defendant company's assertion, that is, the amendment of the above provision on remuneration is reasonable in light of the government's adjustment policy on the ground that the above amendment was made in accordance with the above purport of the government's policy, even though the amendment of the above provision on remuneration to the above purport was made in accordance with the above purport of the government's policy, it does not seem to be reasonable in light of social norms that could cause the worker's consent without the worker's consent. The above determination by the court below is just and acceptable, and it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to Article 95 (1) of the Labor Standards Act. There is no ground for appeal.

Ultimately, the appeal is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.