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(영문) 대법원 1997. 6. 13. 선고 96누12559 판결
[양도소득세부과처분취소][공1997.7.15.(38),2074]
Main Issues

[1] Whether an inevitable reason under Article 6 (4) 1 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act, which is exempt from taxation at the time of transferring one house for one household, includes a case where a house is acquired (affirmative), and whether the fact of residence is required (negative)

[2] The case holding that it constitutes an inevitable cause under the above / [1] where it was ordered to work abroad without leaving the place for work due to the circumstances of the apartment sales contract after the apartment sales contract

Summary of Judgment

[1] An inevitable reason under Article 6 (4) 1 of the former Enforcement Rule of the Income Tax Act (amended by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Finance and Economy No. 1913 of March 2, 1993) that is exempt from taxation even if the owner of one house does not reside in the house in question for three or more years includes not only the case where it occurred after the acquisition of the house in question, but also the case where it occurs during the period before the acquisition of the house due to liquidation of the remainder after the purchase contract or completion of the registration of transfer of ownership, etc.

[2] The case holding that in the case where an apartment house is transferred to another local area due to the situation of work after the apartment sale contract, in which the remaining price was settled, the ownership was transferred to the apartment site again, but it was not ordered to work abroad, it constitutes an inevitable cause under Article 6 (4) 1 of the former Enforcement Rule of the Income Tax Act (amended by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Finance and Economy No. 1913 of March 2, 1993)

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Article 5 subparagraph 6 (i) (see current Article 89 subparagraph 3) of the former Income Tax Act (amended by Act No. 4661 of Dec. 31, 1993), Article 15 (1) 3 (see current Article 154 (1)) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13802 of Dec. 31, 1992), Article 6 (4) 1 (see current Article 71) of the former Enforcement Rule of the Income Tax Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Finance and Economy No. 1913 of Mar. 2, 1993) / [2] Article 5 subparagraph 6 (i) (see current Article 89 subparagraph 3 (i) of the Income Tax Act), Article 15 (1) 3 (see current Article 154 (1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 14661 of Dec. 31, 1993) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act)

Reference Cases

[1] Supreme Court Decision 92Nu12988 delivered on January 19, 1993 (Gong1993Sang, 763), Supreme Court Decision 92Nu16546 delivered on July 13, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 2318), Supreme Court Decision 94Nu5434 delivered on August 26, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 2561), Supreme Court Decision 95Nu670 delivered on December 26, 1995 (Gong196Sang, 612), Supreme Court Decision 95Nu1012 delivered on April 9, 196 (Gong196Sang, 1441)

Plaintiff, Appellant

immigration income tax

Defendant, Appellee

Head of Seocho Tax Office

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 96Gu3984 delivered on July 25, 1996

Text

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2 are also examined.

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged that the plaintiff was working as the prosecutor of Busan District Prosecutors' Office on September 29, 198, other than the location of the apartment house of this case (Seoul), and was working as the prosecutor of the Gun Office of the Jeonju District Prosecutors' Office on September 1, 1989 and was working as the public prosecutor of the Gun Office of the Jeonju District Public Prosecutors' Office on March 4, 1991, who was ordered as the public prosecutor of the Seoul District Prosecutors' Office on March 4, 1991 and was living in the relative's house located in Seocho-dong 1482-3, Seocho-gu, Seocho-gu, Seoul, and thereafter, on September 21, 192, the plaintiff was notified of the confirmation of the person to be dispatched for long-term overseas training on December 29, 199, and the plaintiff could not be found to have any inevitable reason for the plaintiff's relocation of the apartment house of this case to Japan on March 30, 19993.

2. However, an inevitable reason under Article 6 (4) 1 of the Enforcement Rule includes not only the case where the house was acquired, but also the case where the remaining price was settled after the purchase contract was concluded, or the registration of ownership transfer was completed, which occurred during the period prior to the acquisition of the house (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 92Nu12988, Jan. 19, 1993; 95Nu1012, Apr. 9, 196). Further, since the acquisition of the house, if an inevitable reason under the above provision occurs while the owner or his family did not reside in the house, it shall be exempt from taxation without examining whether the owner or his family resides in the house, or there is any inevitable reason for not residing there is a new reason for not moving in the house, but also it shall be deemed that the plaintiff's new reason for temporary placement of the apartment after the issuance of the new apartment after the expiration of the period of service at the time of his temporary placement to the local government's office (see Supreme Court Decisions 92Nu164, Jul. 13, 1993).

Nevertheless, the court below may anticipate the circumstances that the plaintiff could not move into the apartment of this case due to the fact that the plaintiff was already working in the local area at the time of the above acquisition, and thus, it is obvious that the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the inevitable reasons under the above rules, or by misunderstanding facts due to the violation of the rules of evidence, and that such errors affected the conclusion. There is a reason to point this out.

3. Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Yong-hun (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-서울고등법원 1996.7.25.선고 96구3984