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(영문) 서울고등법원 1997. 04. 24. 선고 95구37997 판결
법인세 과세처분 취소[기타]
Title

Revocation of corporate tax disposition

Summary

The case holding that since the decision of acquisition time of non-business real estate shall be deemed to be the time when the juristic person can profit from the use of the real estate by delivery, the disposition of non-business real estate is justifiable after non-taxation of interest paid

The decision

The contents of the decision shall be the same as attached.

Text

1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed. 2. The costs of lawsuit are assessed against the plaintiff.

Reasons

1. Details of the instant disposition;

The following facts are no dispute between the parties, or evidence of subparagraph 4, evidence of subparagraph 5-1 through 4, evidence of subparagraph 6-1, 2, evidence of subparagraph 7, evidence of subparagraph 7-1 through 7, evidence of subparagraph 8-1 through 4, evidence of subparagraph 9, evidence of subparagraph 10-1 through 3, evidence of subparagraph 11-1, 2, Gap, 13, 14, 16, evidence of subparagraph 17-1, 2, evidence of subparagraph 21-1, 2, evidence of subparagraph 21-2, evidence of subparagraph 25-1 through 3, evidence of subparagraph 29-1, evidence of subparagraph 39-1, evidence of subparagraph 39-2, evidence of subparagraph 40, evidence of subparagraph 41-1, evidence of subparagraph 42, evidence of subparagraph 42, evidence of subparagraph 1 through 43-1, evidence of subparagraph 1-2, evidence of subparagraph 1 through 3-2, evidence of each evidence.

"(1) 원고는 1965. 12. 31. 콘크리트 파일, 전주 등의 콘크리트제품을 제조・판매하는 것을 주요 목적사업으로 하여 설립된 회사로서, 1967년경 ㅇㅇ도 ㅇㅇ군 ㅇㅇ읍 ㅇㅇ리 437에 위와 같은 콘크리트제품 등을 생산하는 공장을 건립한 이래 그 곳에서 같은 제품들을 생산하여 이를 수도권 지역에 판매하여 왔는데, 1987. 12.경 시행인가된 ㅇㅇ 제1・2지구 토지구획정리사업지구에 위 공장부지가 편입되고, 그에 따라 소외 ㅇㅇ군수가 1988. 4. 20. 이래 여러 차례에 걸쳐 원고에게 위 공장을 철거하고 다른 곳으로 이전할 것을 요구하자, 원고는 새로운 공장을 건설하기 위한 공장용지를 물색하던 중 위 생산제품의 부피가 크므로 제품의 수송비를 줄이기 위하여 수도권지역에 공장부지를 마련하기로 하되, 제품의 생산재료를 보관하고 제품을 생산하고 완제품을 야적하기에 충분한 넓은 공장용지를 마련하기로 하여 ㅇㅇ도 ㅇㅇ군 ㅇㅇ면 지역을 신공장부지의 최적지로 선정하고, 그에 따라 새로운 공장부지로 사용하기 위하여 별지 〈비업무용부동산명세표〉(이하별지'라 한다) 기재와 같이 1990. 5. 7.부터 1992. 2. 12.까지 사이에 소외 오ㅇㅇ 등으로부터 그 전부터 국토이용관리법상의 산림보전지역 또는 경지지역이거나 수도권정비계획법상의 자연보전권역으로 지정되어 있던 ㅇㅇ ㅇㅇ군 ㅇㅇ면 ㅇㅇ리 317의 8 전 4,681㎡ 등 17필지의 토지(이하이 사건 토지'라 한다)를 매수하여 그 경 잔금을 청산한 후 이를 인도받음으로써 이 사건 토지를 취득하였다.",(2) 원고는 이 사건 토지 이외에도 1990. 4. 25.부터 1990. 9. 28.까지 사이에 ㅇㅇ도 ㅇㅇ군 ㅇㅇ면 ㅇㅇ리 산 85 등 25필지의 토지를 취득하였고, 그 취득 후 1년이 지난 1991. 10. 14. 그 토지에 관하여 개발행위착공신고를 하고 1991. 10. 18. 공장설립신고를 하였으며, 1992. 1. 4. ㅇㅇ군수로부터 건축허가를 받아 1992. 12.경 공장(1차 공장)을 준공하였는데, 그 공장의 생산만으로는 공급량이 부족하여 다시 이 사건 토지를 매수・취득하여 이 사건 토지상에 2차 공장을 건축하기 위하여 수도권정비계획법 및 국토이용관리법 소정의 심의 및 국토이용계획변경절차를 거치기는 하였으나 이 사건 토지를 취득한 날부터 1년이 훨씬 지난 1994년경까지 건축허가를 받지 못하였음은 물론 이 사건 토지를 원고 법인의 업무에 직접 사용하지 못하였다.

"(3) 한편, 원고가 피고에게 1993. 3. 30. 1992. 사업연도(1992. 1. 1.〜1992. 12. 31.) 귀속 법인세의 과세표준 및 세액(신고세액 금 132,014,893원)을, 1994. 3. 30. 1993. 사업연도(1993. 1. 1.〜1993. 12. 31.) 귀속 법인세의 과세표준 및 세액(신고세액 금 15,268,097원)을 각 신고하였으나, 피고는 원고가 이 사건 토지를 취득한 후 1년 이내에 이를 업무에 직접 사용한 사실이 없어 이 사건 토지는 당초의 취득시점부터 비업무용 부동산에 해당한다고 인정하여 그 차입금에 대한 지급이자 중 1992. 사업연도에 금 259,026,706원을, 1993. 사업연도에 금 174,485,290원을 각 손금불산입하여 1994. 7. 16. 원고에 대하여 1992. 사업연도분 법인세로 금 137,734,010원(금 137,734,014원이나 10원 미만 버림, 합계 금 269,748,906원)을 더 부과하고, 1993. 사업연도분 법인세로 금 36,097,730원(금 36,097,734원이나 10원 미만 버림, 합계 금 51,365,831원)을 더 부과하는 각 증액경정처분을 하였다(이하 위와 같이 각 증액경정된 처분을 통틀어이 사건 부과처분'이라 한다).",2. 당사자의 주장

The defendant asserts that the disposition of this case is lawful in accordance with the above disposition grounds and related Acts and subordinate statutes, and the plaintiff asserts that the disposition of this case is unlawful on the ground that the land of this case does not constitute non-business real estate under the Corporate Tax Act in the business year of 1992 and the business year of 193, and therefore, the disposition of this case is unlawful.

"(1) 첫째, 이 사건 토지는 원고가 이를 취득하기 이전부터 국토이용관리법상의 산림보전지역 또는 경지지역이거나 수도권정비계획법상의 자연보전권역으로 지정되어 있었는데, 원고가 토지구획정리사업지구 지정에 따라 ㅇㅇ군수로부터 종전의 공장을 이전하라는 요구를 받고 합리적인 경영판단 끝에 부득이하게 이 사건 토지를 새로운 2차 공장부지로 선정하여 취득하였으며, 이 사건 토지를 실질적으로 취득하기 이전부터 이를 공장부지로 사용하기 위하여 온갖 노력을 기울여 왔으나 국토이용관리법이나 수도권정비계획법 등 관련법령상의 각종 제한과 행정당국의 업무처리 지연 등으로 말미암아 이 사건 토지를 공장부지로 사용하는 데 무려 2년 이상의 기간이 소요되었는바, 원고가 위와 같이 이 사건 토지를 취득한 동기와 경위 및 이 사건 토지를 업무에 사용하기 위하여 노력한 점 등에 비추어 보면 이 사건 토지는원고가 지가상승으로 인한 이익을 취득하기 위하여 보유하는 부동산'이라고 볼 수 없으므로 법인세법 소정의 비업무용 부동산에 해당되지 않는다.",(2) 둘째, 설령 이 사건 토지가 형식상 법인세법시행규칙 제18조 제3항 소정의 비업무용 부동산에 해당한다 하더라도 조세법률주의와 헌법의 포괄위임입법금지의 원칙 등에 비추어 볼 때, 법인세법시행규칙 제18조 제3항 은 모법의 위임 없이 법인세법 제18조의3 제1항 과 법인세법시행령 제43조의2 제1항 의 각 규정이 상정하고 있는 비업무용 부동산의 개념에 반하는 내용을 규정한 것으로 무효이므로 그러한 점에 비추어 보더라도 이 사건 토지는 법인세법 소정의 비업무용 부동산에 해당되지 않는다.

(3) Third, in light of the motive and circumstance of acquiring the instant land by the Plaintiff, and the fact that the procedures under the laws and regulations necessary to use the land as factory sites are faithfully followed, the instant land is deemed to fall under the case where it is excluded from non-business real estate due to justifiable reasons not directly using it for business purposes. Thus, the instant land does not fall under the category of real estate for non-business purposes prescribed in the Corporate Tax Act. (4) Fourth, the legislative intent of the Corporate Tax Act imposing sanctions against non-business real estate holding by the Corporate Tax Act as non-business real estate under the provision of the Corporate Tax Act is to prevent the deterioration of the financial structure of the company due to unreasonable corporate expansion, to prevent the improper corporate expansion of real estate by financial assets of large enterprises, thereby inducing the economic activities of the company through the production and operation of corporate funds, and to promote the efficient use of the land, and the Plaintiff is not required to use the pertinent real estate for non-business purposes through the provision of Article 18(4) and (5) of the Enforcement Rule of the Corporate Tax Act, which is not required for the period of acquisition of the pertinent real estate.

(5) 다섯째, 이 사건 토지는 국토이용관리법 제21조의2 의 규정에 따라 건설교통부장관이 지정한 토지거래허가지역에 속하는 토지로서, 원고가 1992. 2.경까지 매수대금을 전부 지급하고 이 사건 토지를 매수하긴 하였지만 ㅇㅇ군수로부터 토지거래허가를 받은 것은 그 이후인 1993. 3. 26.부터 1994. 3. 28.까지 사이로, 국토이용관리법상의 토지거래허가지역 내에서의 매매계약 등 거래계약은 관할관청의 허가를 받아야만 그 효력이 발생하고 허가를 받기 전에는 물권적 효력은 물론 채권적 효력도 발생하지 않아 무효라는 점에 비추어 보면, 원고가 이 사건 토지에 대하여 매수대금을 지급한 것만으로 1992. 사업연도와 1993. 사업연도에 비업무용 부동산을 취득하였다고 볼 수 없으므로 원고가 그 각 사업연도에 비업무용 부동산을 취득하여 보유하고 있음을 전제로 한 이 사건 부과처분은 위법하다.

3. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

(a) Related Acts and subordinate statutes;

Article 18-3 of the Corporate Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) provides that a domestic corporation which acquires or holds assets falling under any of the following subparagraphs shall not be included in its deductible expenses in calculating its income amount for each business year. Article 18-1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act provides that the amount of interest on loans paid during each business year shall not be included in the calculation of its income amount, and subparagraph 1 of the same Article provides that the real estate shall be deemed as holding for the purpose of acquiring profits arising from the increase in land prices because it is not directly related to the corporation’s business or is not prescribed by the Presidential Decree, and Article 43-2 (1) 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Enforcement Decree of the Corporate Tax Act”) provides that the real estate falling under subparagraph 3 of the same Article 18-3 (1) of the Act or subparagraph 1 of the same Article (hereinafter referred to as the “real estate for non-business purposes”) shall not be included in the scope of Article 9-1 of the Act.

(1) We examine the Plaintiff’s first argument.

원고가 이 사건 토지를 취득하기 이전부터 이 사건 토지는 국토이용관리법상의 산림보전지역 또는 경지지역이나 수도권정비계획법상의 자연보전권역으로 지정되어 있었던 사실, 원고가 1차 공장 준공 후 그 공장의 생산만으로는 공급량이 부족하여 다시 이 사건 토지를 매수・취득하여 이 사건 토지상에 2차 공장을 건축하려고 하였으나 수도권정비계획법 및 국토이용관리법 소정의 심의 및 국토이용계획변경절차를 거치는 바람에 이 사건 토지를 취득한 날부터 시행규칙 제18조 제3항 제1호 소정의 1년이 훨씬 경과할 때(이 사건 토지에 건축물 또는 시설물이 없었다)까지 건축허가를 받지 못하였음은 물론 이 사건 토지를 원고 법인의 업무에 직접 사용하지 못한 사실은 앞서 본 바와 같다(앞서 채용한 증거들에 의하면 원고가 이 사건 토지에 2차 공장을 건설하기 위하여 수도권정비계획법에 따라 1992. 4. 2. 수도권정비심의위원회에 대하여 같은 법상 자연보호권역으로 지정되어 있는 이 사건 토지상에 콘크리트 조립 구조재 및 철강보조제품 제조업 공장의 신설・증설이 가능하게 하여 달라는 내용의 심의신청을 한 결과 1993. 2.경 조건부 승인을 얻은 사실, 또 원고가 1993. 6. 22. ㅇㅇ지사에게 경지지역과 산림보존지역에 속한 이 사건 토지 등을 콘크리트 조립구조재 제조업 공장의 신설・증설이 가능한 개발촉진지역〈시설용지지구〉로 변경하여 달라는 국토이용계획변경신청을 한 결과 1994. 2. 2. 국토이용계획변경결정을 받은 사실은 이를 인정할 수 있으나, 그러한 사실만으로는 원고가 위 기간 중 이 사건 토지를 원고의 업무에 직접 사용하였다고 볼 수 없다).

Therefore, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff acquired the land of this case in order to acquire profits from the increase in land price, the land of this case constitutes real estate for non-business use as stipulated in Article 18-3 (1) 1 of the Act, Article 43-2 (1) 1 and (3) of the Enforcement Decree, and Article 18 (3) 1 of the Enforcement Rule of the Enforcement Rule, so the above part of the plaintiff's assertion is unnecessary to further examine the motive and background of acquiring the land of this case and the fact that the plaintiff made efforts to use the land of this case for business use.

(2) We examine the second argument of the Plaintiff.

Article 18-3 (1) 1 of the Act provides that the purpose of the provision is to prevent the aggravation of the financial structure of an enterprise due to unreasonable corporate expansion by other person's capital, to prevent corporate investment in real estate and non-productive type of business by financial assets of a large enterprise, to induce the sound economic activities of an enterprise through the productive management of corporate funds, and to promote the efficient utilization of land (see Supreme Court Decision 94Nu7638 delivered on December 27, 1994, etc.). Article 43-2 (1) of the Enforcement Decree provides a general standard for determining non-business real estate in order to realize such legislative purpose or legislative purpose, and Article 18-3 (3) of the Enforcement Decree provides that the detailed form of non-business real estate can be prescribed by the Enforcement Decree in accordance with the changing social and economic situation, and Article 18 (3) of the Enforcement Rule provides that the establishment of the criteria for determination shall not be deemed to have been delegated to the Enforcement Rule in light of the specific form and content of non-business real estate.

In addition, Article 18 (3) 1 of the Enforcement Rule applied in this case, where a corporation does not directly use the land for a certain period after acquiring the land of the corporation, the uniform regulation of non-business real estate is reflected in the social and economic demand to restrain the acquisition of the corporation's reckless land by delegation by the Corporate Tax Act and the Enforcement Decree thereof in the aspect of tax policy. It is difficult to conclude that the content is unreasonable or unfair in light of the legislative intent and purpose, etc. In addition, in the case of tax laws and regulations, it is inevitable to adopt the criteria for a uniform standard under the legislative technology, and to some extent, it is also inevitable to consider that the above provision violates the principle of no taxation without law or the principle of prohibition of comprehensive delegation by the Constitution, and thus, it cannot be deemed that the provision of invalidation which unfairly expands the taxation requirement beyond the delegation scope of the Corporate Tax Act or the Enforcement Decree thereof is not a provision (see Supreme Court Decisions 91Nu1643, Oct. 27, 192; 94Nu738, Dec. 27, 1994).

Therefore, under the premise that Article 18(3) of the Enforcement Rule is null and void, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the land of this case does not constitute real estate for non-business use cannot be accepted.

(3) We examine the third argument of the Plaintiff.

Article 18(3) of the Enforcement Rule provides that "The reasons for exception to real estate for non-business use, which are individually listed in each subparagraph of Article 18(3) of the Enforcement Rule, shall be listed in paragraph (4) of the same Article (this does not mean that real estate falling under subparagraph 1 of paragraph (3) of the same Article cannot be determined as non-business real estate unless the reasons for exception under each subparagraph of paragraph (4) of the same Article exist. Further, Article 18(3)1 of the Enforcement Rule provides that land which is not directly used for the business of a juristic person for a certain period after its acquisition as real estate for non-business use and the so-called "justifiable reasons" is not defined as general reasons for non-business real estate (the above provision was amended to allow only real estate not used for the business of a juristic person without just cause under Ordinance of the Ministry of Finance and Economy No. 1968 of March 12, 194). Thus, it is not clear that the legitimate grounds for exception under subparagraph 1 of paragraph (3) of the same Article 4) of the Enforcement Rule can not be applied to the reasons for non-taxation.

Therefore, we cannot accept the part of the plaintiff's above assertion that "the land of this case is equivalent to Article 18 (4) of the Enforcement Rule," and (4) We examine the plaintiff's fourth argument.

(A) As to the criteria for determining the time of acquisition of non-business real estate under the Corporate Tax Act

As seen earlier, Article 18(3)1 of the Enforcement Rule provides that a real estate for which one year has passed after its acquisition as one of non-business real estate for which the interest paid in relation thereto is excluded from deductible expenses and which is not directly used for the business of the juristic person concerned. However, there is no separate provision in Article 18-3 of the Act, Article 43-2 of the Enforcement Decree, Article 18 of the Enforcement Rule, and Article 18 of the Enforcement Rule, etc.

However, Article 59(4) of the Act which provides for special surtax of a corporation (amended by Act No. 3270 of Dec. 21, 1982) and Article 124-2(11) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 10978 of Dec. 31, 1982), which provides that Article 53 of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 14467 of Dec. 31, 1994) shall apply mutatis mutandis to the time of acquisition of the target real estate (amended by Presidential Decree No. 1467 of Dec. 31, 1994), and Article 59(4) of the same Act (amended by Act No. 4804 of Dec. 22, 1994), which provides that the aforementioned provision shall apply mutatis mutandis to the year of acquisition of non-business real estate (amended by Presidential Decree No. 14678 of Dec. 31, 1994).

Therefore, in light of the legislative intent, purpose, and contents of the provision that provides for the possession of real estate for non-business use as a requirement for the exclusion of interest paid to a corporation's loan, the time of acquisition of real estate, which is the basis for the calculation of the grace period above, shall be the time when the corporation can use and benefit from the real estate after being delivered the real estate, and the specific time of use and benefit from the real estate refers to the situation of de facto control after settling the balance.

In the case of this case, since the plaintiff purchased the land of this case from May 7, 199 to February 12, 192 from the non-party heat, etc. to the non-party heat, etc. from May 7, 1990 and settled the balance and received delivery of it, each time shall be deemed the time of acquisition. Therefore, all of the land of this case shall be the real estate for which one year has passed after its acquisition and which is not used directly for the business of the juristic person concerned." (B) Further, Article 18(4) of the Enforcement Rule of the 199, which lists the reasons for exclusion from the real estate for non-business purpose of this case, and provides that "after acquiring the real estate, it becomes impossible to use it by the limitation of the law." Thus, it is clear that it does not constitute an exception if prior to the acquisition of the real estate, as alleged by the plaintiff, it does not constitute a reason for exception, and thus, it cannot be accepted as a result, since the restriction was imposed under the law prior to the acquisition of the real estate.

(5) Finally, we examine the plaintiff's fifth argument regarding land transaction permission under the Act on the Utilization and Management of the National Territory.

In light of the contents of the relevant provisions regarding permission for land transaction contract within the regulation zone under the Act on the Utilization and Management of the National Territory and the purpose of legislation, the transaction contract shall become effective only with permission from the competent authority, and shall be deemed null and void as well as with the effect of the real right before obtaining permission (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 90Da12243 delivered on December 24, 1991). Even if it is a contract based on the premise that permission is granted, it shall not be completely different from the case of final invalidation until permission is granted, but the contract shall be retroactively effective for the transfer or creation of rights, such as ownership, as in the case of this case, after obtaining permission from the head of the competent authority. Although it is not appropriate for the Plaintiff to obtain permission from the head of the competent authority, the contract shall be deemed null and void as in the case of this case 9.3 years prior to the conclusion of the sale contract by the head of the competent authority.

Therefore, as long as the Plaintiff did not directly use the instant land within one year, it is legitimate for the Defendant to take the instant disposition by deeming the instant land as real estate for non-business use from the acquisition date thereof.

(6) Therefore, in light of all the above, since the land of this case constitutes real estate for non-business use of the plaintiff corporation, and there is no exception under the law, it is legitimate that the defendant excluded the interest paid in relation to the land and imposed corporate tax on the plaintiff, and it cannot be deemed that there are any other illegal grounds in the disposition of this case. Thus, the disposition of this case is legitimate.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case seeking revocation on the premise that the disposition of this case is unlawful is dismissed as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

April 24, 1997

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