A. In a case where land on the public register is used for another purpose, whether it constitutes a housing site subject to the regulation of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites

(b) The significance of a plan for use to be submitted by the owner of a housing site exceeding the upper limit on the ownership of each household at the time of the enforcement of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites, and the requirements for the owner to be excluded from the object

(c) The criteria for determining whether the building is “a site where de facto construction is impossible” in the latter part of Article 20(1)3 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Site;

A. If it is understood that the determination should be made according to the current status of use of land regardless of whether the land is a housing site under the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites, it would rather lead to encouraging a disguised ownership of a housing site and ensuring the effectiveness of the Act. Although land on the public register is used for other purposes, it can be easily used as a housing site without going through any particular procedure, and even if such land is used for other purposes, it shall be deemed as a housing site subject to the regulation of the same Act.

B. In full view of the provisions of Articles 10 through 15 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites, Article 2 of the Addenda, Article 10 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, and Article 3 (1) of the Addenda of the same Act, the term "use plan under the provisions of Articles 10 through 15 of the Act" in Article 2 (2) of the Addenda of the same Act that should be submitted by the owner of a housing site in excess of the upper limit of the ownership of each household at the time of the enforcement of the same Act shall refer to the use plan that meets the criteria for the permission for the acquisition of the housing site under the provisions of each subparagraph of Article 11 (1) of the same Act, and in order for the owner of the housing site to be excluded from the imposition of excess ownership charges, the relevant use plan shall be disposed of

C. The term “batch site that cannot be constructed” stipulated as a housing site that is excluded from the subject of the imposition of excess ownership charges under the latter part of Article 20(1)3 of the Act on Ownership of the Housing Site refers to a housing site that cannot be constructed due to the physical reasons inherent in that housing site itself, and it is not necessary to determine according to the objective criteria as to who owns the housing site or who is unable to construct it, but to determine according to the subjective circumstances of the housing site

(a) Article 2 subparag. 1 (b) of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites; Article 11(1)(b) of the Addenda on the Ownership of Housing Sites; Article 2(2) of the Addenda on the Ownership of Housing Sites; Article 10 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites; Article 3(1)(c) of Addenda on the Ownership of Housing Sites; Article 20(1)3 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites;

A. Supreme Court Decision 94Nu11064 delivered on April 21, 1995 (Gong1995Sang, 1981). Supreme Court Decision 93Nu2071 delivered on April 26, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 1514) 93Nu20252 delivered on May 13, 1994 (Gong194Sang, 1721)

Plaintiff 1, et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

The head of Jung-gu Daejeon Metropolitan City

Daejeon High Court Decision 93Gu720 delivered on September 23, 1994

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. On the first ground for appeal

The Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") provides that land prescribed by the Presidential Decree (as prescribed by the Presidential Decree (as defined in subparagraph (b) of Article 2 of the Act) among land on which a permanent building is not constructed among land, the land category of which under the provisions of the Cadastral Act appears to have high possibility to be used as a site for a future house in order to achieve the purpose of ensuring the stability of the residential life of the people by inducing the people to own the housing site evenly and promoting the supply of the housing site (Article 2 subparagraph 1 (a) of the Act). If it is understood that the determination should be made according to the current status of land use regardless of its land category on the public register as to whether it is a housing site prescribed by the Act, it would result in a disguised outcome of ownership of the housing site and would not be possible to secure the effectiveness of the Act, and even if land on the public register is used for other purposes, even if it is used for other purposes, it shall be deemed that it still falls under the category of land subject to the regulation of this Act (see Supreme Court Decision 196Nu4.

In this regard, the court below is just in holding that the land of this case constitutes a housing site under Article 2 subparagraph 1 (b) of the Act, notwithstanding the actual status of land being used as an ornamental tree site, so long as the land category on the public register is a site, regardless of the fact that the land is changed to the site, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal. The ground of appeal on this point cannot be accepted.

2. On the second ground for appeal

In full view of the provisions of Article 2 of the Addenda of the Act, Articles 3 (1), 10 through 15 of the Addenda of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites (hereinafter referred to as the "Enforcement Decree"), Article 10 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act, etc., the term "use plan under the provisions of Articles 10 through 15 of the Act" under Article 2 (2) of the Addenda of the Act shall refer to a use plan that meets the criteria for the permission for the acquisition of housing sites under the provisions of each subparagraph of Article 11 (1) of the Act, and the above owner of housing sites shall be excluded from the imposition of excess ownership charges. In order for the owner of housing sites to be excluded from the imposition of excess ownership charges, it shall be necessary to dispose of, use and develop the housing site in accordance with the relevant use plan that meets the criteria for the

In the same purport, the court below is just in holding that the land in this case is deemed permitted to be owned by the plaintiff pursuant to Article 2 (1) of the Addenda of the Act, but the plan for use submitted by the plaintiff cannot be deemed as satisfying the criteria for permission for the acquisition of housing sites under each subparagraph of Article 11 (1) of the Act. There is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as pointed out in the ground of appeal, and there is no particular meaning as the content of the plan for use submitted by the plaintiff does not fall under any of the items of the above laws and regulations, and even if the defendant did not recommend the change or adjustment of the plan, the disposition in this case is not against the principle of trust of the defendant

3. On the third ground for appeal

"Bed site where de facto construction is impossible" stipulated as a housing site that is excluded from the subject of imposition of excess ownership charges under the latter part of Article 20(1)3 of the Act refers to a housing site that cannot be constructed due to physical reasons inherent in the relevant housing site itself, and it shall be determined according to the objective criteria as to who owns the relevant housing site or who is unable to construct it, and it shall not be in the nature of determination by the subjective circumstances of the housing site owner (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 93Nu20771, Apr. 26, 1994; 93Nu20252, May 13, 1994).

In the same purport, the court below is just in holding that the land of this case cannot be deemed as a land that is practically impossible to construct under the Act solely for the reason that the sale of the ornamental trees is not performed well because the value of the ornamental trees planted on the land of this case is a large amount or that the funds are used to transplant the trees, and there is no error in finding facts in violation of the rules of evidence or in incomplete deliberation as pointed out in the ground of appeal. The grounds of appeal on this point are not acceptable.

4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff-Appellant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all Justices who reviewed the appeal.

Justices Park Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)