[1] Criteria for determining dual organizations under Article 7(3) of the National Security Act and whether “natural elements for the South-North Joint Declaration” constitute dual organizations (affirmative)

[2] Requirements and criteria for recognition as pro-enemy pro-enemy contents under Article 7(5) of the National Security Act, and whether the nature of the South-North Joint Declaration constitutes pro-enemy contents (affirmative)

[3] The legal nature of the crime against pro-enemy as stipulated in Article 7 (5) of the National Security Act and the burden of proof for the purpose of pro-enemy act (=public prosecutor) and the method of proving it

[1] [Majority Opinion] (A) Even if an organization does not take place on its face for the purpose of praiseing, encouraging, promoting, or aiding and abetting the activities of anti-government organizations, the organization’s contents, contents of its activities, and connection with the activities of anti-government organizations, etc. in light of the organization’s contents, contents of its activities, and connection with the activities of anti-government organizations, etc., if it is deemed that the organization actually took the above activities as its objective and that the organization has a risk of substantial harm to the nation’s existence and security or democratic fundamental order in its actual activities, such organization shall be deemed as the so-called “foreign organization” under Article 7(1) and (3) of the National Security

(B) Considering the following circumstances: (a) The substantial part of the contents of the specific lecture and practice jointly and severally appearing in the strong order, bylaws, and the launch news report of the South and North Korea (hereinafter “actual natural group”) can be seen as the expression of intent to praise, instigate, promote, or aid and coordinate the activities of North Korea as an anti-government organization in substance; (b) the members of the practical solidarity’ face and documents prepared by them, etc., the practice solidarity appears to be composed of the power to cite and coordinate North Korea’s principal ideology and military politics within the organization; and (c) practice solidarity appears to be externally connected directly and indirectly with North Korea as an anti-government organization; and (d) practice solidarity appears to have been externally connected with North Korea as an anti-government organization. Although the above practice, on the face of the Defendant’s leading activities, registered with the government office as a genuine social organization to meet the formal and procedural requirements prescribed by the Assistance to Non-Governmental Organizations Act, it is sufficient to deem that the actual act constitutes an anti-government organization’s existence and behavior with the risk of actual harm.

[Dissenting Opinion by Justice Park Si-hwan, Justice Kim Ji-hyung, Justice Lee Hong-hoon, and Justice Jeon Soo-ahn] (A) Interpretation of the risk requirement stipulated in Article 7(1) and (3) of the National Security Act, which provides for the crime of forming and joining a pro-enemy organization, should conform to the clear and present risk standard, and even if it conforms to the (clear) risk standard as the Majority Opinion alleviated the standard, the risk should be acknowledged only when the ordinary possibility of a mere tendency or probability of a danger or abstract harm or where there is a practical possibility of a specific harm.

(B) The natural belt of the South and North Joint Declaration is not only the standard for “risk of clear and present existence” but also the standard for “risk of actual harm (clear and clear)” as stated in the Majority Opinion, but also cannot be said to constitute a dual organization with danger to the existence and security of the Republic of Korea or democratic fundamental order.

[2] [Majority Opinion] (A) In order to be recognized as pro-enemy pro-enemy contents under the National Security Act, the contents of the pro-enemy should be active and aggressive to threaten the existence and security of the State and the free democratic fundamental order, which is the legal interest protected by the National Security Act. Whether the contents of the pro-enemy contents are of such nature ought to be determined not only by the whole contents of the expressive materials, but also by taking into account all the circumstances such as the motive for the production, the form and

(B) The nature of the South-North Joint Declaration room’s “The 2008 Regular Assembly Data collection” and the “Korea National Assembly Information Collection” are active and aggressive to threaten the existence and security of the State and democratic fundamental order, which are protected legal interests of the National Security Act. It is sufficient to view the contents as pro-enemy contents beyond the limit of the freedom of expression as constituting pro-enemy contents under the National Security

[Dissenting Opinion by Justice Park Si-hwan, Justice Kim Ji-hyung, Justice Lee Hong-hoon, and Justice Jeon Soo-ahn] (A) In order to become a pro-enemy organization subject to punishment under Article 7(5) of the National Security Act, not only the requirement of “pro-enemy and aggressive expressions” which threaten the safety and free democracy system of the Republic of Korea as required by the Supreme Court precedents and the Majority Opinion, but also the requirement of “risk” as to the existence and security of the State or free democratic fundamental order. The standard of recognizing such risk requirement should also be applied to

(B) We cannot agree with the Majority Opinion that “The 2008 Regular Assembly Data collection” and “Korea People’s Republic of Korea People’s Republic” are pro-enemy materials. This does not constitute pro-enemy materials, which do not meet the risk standards stipulated under Article 7(5) of the National Security Act, and do not constitute pro-enemy materials.

[3] [Majority Opinion] (A) The crime of Article 7(5) of the National Security Act is the production, importation, reproduction, possession, transportation, distribution, sale, or acquisition of documents, paintings, or other expressive materials for the purpose of committing a pro-enemy act as prescribed in Articles 1, 3, and 7(4) of the National Security Act. It is clear that the purpose of the crime is a pro-enemy act. The purpose of the crime is to establish a pro-enemy act, as an excessive subjective element other than intent. As such, even if an actor recognized the nature of expressive materials and committed an act under Article 7(5) of the Act, the element of the crime is not satisfied unless the intent to commit an pro-enemy act is recognized. The prosecutor bears the burden of proving the fact that the actor committed an act under Article 7(5) of the National Security Act, with the knowledge that the actor was an pro-enemy act, and the fact that the actor committed an act under Article 7(5) is not presumed to have an object of pro-enemy act. In this case, if there is no direct evidence to prove that the actor was a pro-enemy act.

(B) On the contrary, Supreme Court en banc Decision 90Do2033 Decided March 31, 1992, which held that if acquired, possessed, produced, or distributed with the recognition of pro-enemy contents, the act is presumed to have a purpose of pro-enemy act, such as the above expressive materials, shall be deemed to have been committed, and other Supreme Court decisions inconsistent with the opinion of the en banc Decision of this case, including the above en banc Decision.

(C) When comprehensively taking into account the following circumstances: (a) the Defendant was actively engaged in activities as executive members and central secretariats of the South and North Korean Joint Declaration room, a dual organization (hereinafter “actual natural group”); (b) the objective of the practice solidarity and the objective of the activities to instigate South and North Korea and its route and North Korea’s activities to instigate, instigate, advertise, or instigate the activities to instigate North Korea; and (c) the Defendant appears to have used the said expressive materials as guidelines for acting as executive members, the Defendant could be deemed to have held the said expressive materials for the purpose of pro-enemy activities, such as praise, encouragement, etc. of the activities of anti-government organizations, by recognizing that the contents of the said expressive materials contain aptitude.

[Dissenting Opinion by Justice Park Si-hwan, Justice Kim Ji-hyung, Justice Lee Hong-hoon, and Justice Jeon Soo-ahn] All acts stipulated in Article 7(5) of the National Security Act constitute an expression act of ideas and must be proven by strict proof that the purpose or intent exists to specifically induce clear and present danger in order to prohibit and punish such act. Therefore, the part regarding a crime related to pro-enemy materials should also be revised to the extent that there is a perception that the crime is a pro-enemy act among the previous Supreme Court precedents, the purpose of pro-enemy act can be acknowledged.

[Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kim Young-ran] In light of the special nature of the purpose of pro-enemy act in possession of pro-enemy, the fact that there was the purpose of pro-enemy act with the intent of pro-enemy act in the possession of pro-enemy act can be acknowledged only when it is proved that there was a plan or intent to act in a pro-enemy act in the future. Therefore, it should be specified in detail how the holder of pro-enemy act in the future praises, encouragess, propagandas, or attempts to act in a pro-enemy

[1] Article 7 (1) and (3) of the National Security Act / [2] Article 7 (1) and (5) of the National Security Act / [3] Article 7 (1) and (5) of the National Security Act, Article 308 of the Criminal Procedure Act

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 9Do2437 delivered on October 8, 199 (Gong199Ha, 2370) Supreme Court Decision 2000Do987 Delivered on July 9, 2004 (Gong2004Ha, 1377) / [1] Supreme Court en banc Decision 2003Do758 Delivered on April 17, 2008 (Gong2008Sang, 718) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 2004Do3212 Delivered on August 30, 204 (Gong204Ha, 1627), Supreme Court Decision 2008Do9163 delivered on January 30, 209, Supreme Court Decision 209Do3969 delivered on March 29, 209 (No. 2009Do1627 decided Oct. 29, 2009)

Defendant

Defendant and Prosecutor

Attorney Seo Chang-il

Seoul High Court Decision 2009No2229 decided January 13, 2010

All appeals are dismissed.

1. The defendant's grounds of appeal are examined.

A. As to the assertion of misapprehension of the legal principles as to joint principal offense in the crime of injury resulting from special obstruction of performance of official duties

In a case where two or more persons jointly process a crime, the conspiracy does not require any legal punishment, but is a combination of intent to realize a crime through the joint processing of a crime by two or more persons. Even if it comes to an implicitly, if there is a combination of intent with several persons, the conspiracy relationship is established if the two or more persons intend to commit the crime, and even those who did not directly participate in the act of the conspiracy are punished as a co-principal (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Do171, May 11, 2007). In addition, the crime of causing obstruction of performance of special duties is established when the crime of causing death by assaulting or threatening a public official performing duties by showing the collective power or carrying dangerous objects and causing death and injury. As a result, the co-principal of the resulting aggravated aggravated crime is established when the person intended to jointly perform the basic act, and there is no need to jointly intend to do so, and even if the result is not intended, the occurrence of the result can be predicted even if it is not intended (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Do919, Jul. 19, 20019).

In full view of the above legal principles and the circumstances acknowledged by the court below, the judgment of the court below that the defendant conspired with other participants of the demonstration on August 10, 2007 to commit violence and injury to police officers who perform their duties of maintaining the order of demonstration by multiple force is just and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to co-principal crimes resulting from the obstruction of performance of special official duties, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

B. As to the assertion of violation of the rules of evidence regarding the violation of the Assembly and Demonstration Act

The Defendant’s allegation in this part of the grounds of appeal is merely to criticize the selection of evidence and fact-finding belonging to the lower court’s full power as a fact-finding.

C. As to the assertion that the provision of general traffic obstruction under Article 185 of the Criminal Code violates the principle of clarity in the principle of no punishment without law

Article 185 of the Criminal Act provides that “a person who makes it difficult to use land or obstructs traffic by any other means” cannot be deemed as contrary to the principle of clarity in the principle of no crime without the law (see Constitutional Court Order 2009Hun-Ga2, Mar. 25, 2010). Therefore, the argument in the grounds of appeal relating to this cannot be accepted.

In addition, the defendant's remaining grounds of appeal related to each general traffic obstruction of this case are merely criticisming the selection of evidences and fact-finding belonging to the court below's exclusive jurisdiction, which is a fact-finding court, and thus cannot be a legitimate

D. As to the assertion of misapprehension of legal principles as to anti-government organizations under Article 2 of the National Security Act

Although North Korea is a partner of dialogue and cooperation for peaceful unification between South and North Korea, North Korea still has the character as an anti-government organization which is bound to adopt our liberal democracy system while enhancing the hostile unification route despite changes in the relationship between South and North Korea, and therefore, it has been established by the Supreme Court that the normative power of the National Security Act regulating anti-government organizations is still valid (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2003Do758, Apr. 17, 2008).

According to the above legal principle, the court below is just in maintaining the judgment of the first instance court to the same purport. Contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to anti-government organizations under Article 2 of the

E. As to the assertion that the natural cost of the South and North Joint Declaration was not a dual organization

Article 7(1) and (3) of the National Security Act refers to the continuous and independent combination formed by a specific number of people for the purpose of praiseing, encouraging, promoting, or aiding and abetting the activities of anti-government organizations or their members or those ordered by them (hereinafter referred to as "government organizations, etc.") with the knowledge of the fact that it may endanger the existence and security of the State or democratic fundamental order. Such interpretation of the elements for establishing and joining an anti-state organization shall be construed as referring to the purpose of the National Security Act (Article 1(1) of the same Act to ensure the national safety and survival and freedom of citizens by regulating the activities of anti-state organizations which may endanger the national security, and it shall be construed as 0 to the minimum extent necessary to achieve the purpose of this Act in interpreting and applying this Act, or unreasonably restricting fundamental human rights of the people, which are guaranteed by the Constitution, with the aim of interpreting and interpreting basic principles of the National Security Act (Article 8(2) of the National Security Act, even if the act is performed by an anti-government organization or organization with the aim of expanding and interpreting its basic principles, etc.).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the following facts are as follows: ① The details of North Korea’s specific strong order that appears in the strong order of the South and North Korea Joint Declaration, the rules, and news reports, etc., are consistent with the contents of the 6.15 Joint Declaration, the 10.4 Joint Declaration, and rather, North Korea’s assertion or activities as an anti-government organization, and the considerable portion of the contents that were consistently asserted and performed by the anti-government organization is consistent with the North Korea’s basic ideology, military politics, strong-state theory, and education on ideas and ideas based thereon; ② North Korea’s use of nuclear power as an anti-government organization, which appears to be an anti-government organization, and thus, North Korea’s organization and/or anti-government organization’s use of nuclear power as an anti-government organization; ② North Korea’s use of nuclear power as an anti-government organization and/or anti-government organization’s use of nuclear power as an anti-government organization.

In light of the above circumstances and the above legal principles, although the defendant's active solidarity, which the defendant joined and led, was registered with the government office as a static social organization and met the formal and procedural requirements prescribed by the Assistance for Non-Governmental Organizations Act, and received government subsidies. However, in substance, it is sufficient to view that the defendant's active solidarity as a pro-government organization is a pro-enemy organization with the purpose of misunderstanding, encouraging, or promoting, or aiding and abetting the activities of North Korea as an anti-government organization, and the actual activities are also likely to pose a risk of substantial harm to the nation's existence and security and democratic fundamental order, and thus, it is reasonable to maintain the first instance court's decision as a pro-enemy organization, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there is no error of misapprehending the legal principles as to the recognition of pro

F. As to the assertion that each of the instant representations did not constitute pro-enemy contents

In order to be recognized as pro-enemy contents under the National Security Act, the contents of the expressive materials must be active and aggressive to threaten the nation’s existence and security and the liberal democratic fundamental order, which are protected legal interests under the National Security Act. Whether the expressive materials have such objection should be determined not only by the overall contents of the expressive materials, but also by taking into account all the circumstances such as the motive for the production thereof, the form of the expressive act itself and matters related to the outside, and the circumstances at the time of expressive act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2008Do9163, Jan. 30, 2009; 2008Do2912, Oct. 29, 2009).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, among the expressive materials of this case held by the defendant, ① the gathering of materials for the 2008 regular assembly and demonstration of the United States Armed Forces in South Korea is entirely shared with North Korea claiming the construction of the Republic of Korea as an anti-government organization, and it is not only the praise, encouraging, or promoting the activities to promote South and North Korea, such as the removal of the iron bars from North Korea in 2012, or the removal of the National Security Act, but also the preparation of the organization and its developments. As seen earlier, most of the instant expressive materials for the 207 regular assembly and demonstration of the Republic of Korea were prepared for the purpose of determining the goal of the anti-government organization in 208 as a whole, or for determining the whole route of the anti-government organization in North Korea as a way to protect the unification of the Republic of Korea as a whole. ② Since North Korea’s new political team and the head of the Korean National Security Act, as an anti-government organization’s new political philosophical ideology, it should be established as an anti-state of society.

In light of the above circumstances and the above legal principles, each of the expressive materials of this case is active and aggressive to threaten the existence and security of the nation, which is the legal interest of the National Security Act, and the democratic fundamental order, and it is sufficient to view the contents as pro-enemy materials under the National Security Act beyond the limit of the freedom of expression. Therefore, the court below's maintenance of the first instance court's decision recognizing the existence of the expressive materials of this case is just, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal

G. As to the argument that the defendant did not have the purpose of immigration action

The crime of Article 7(5) of the National Security Act is the production, importation, reproduction, possession, transportation, distribution, sale, or acquisition of documents, paintings, or other expressive materials for the purpose of committing a pro-enemy act as provided in Article 1, 3, and 4 of the National Security Act. It is evident that the crime is a pro-enemy act. The purpose in the crime of pro-enemy is an excessive subjective element for the establishment of a crime, and it is separately required other than the intent. As such, even if an actor recognized the nature of expressive materials and committed an act as provided in Article 7(5) of the Act, the element of pro-enemy act is not satisfied unless the intent to commit a pro-enemy act is recognized. The prosecutor bears the burden of proving the facts constituting the element of a crime prosecuted in a criminal trial. The fact that an actor committed an act under Article 7(5) of the National Security Act with the knowledge that he was an pro-enemy act and does not presume that the actor committed an pro-enemy act was a pro-enemy act. In this case, if there is no direct evidence to prove that there was a pro-enemy act.

In contrast, Supreme Court en banc Decision 90Do2033 Decided March 31, 1992; Supreme Court Decision 95Do1035 Decided December 23, 1996; Supreme Court Decision 96Do2606 Decided June 13, 1997; Supreme Court Decision 96Do1327 Decided October 24, 1997; Supreme Court Decision 98Do4398 Decided December 7, 199; Supreme Court Decision 98Do4101 Decided May 26, 200; Supreme Court Decision 2002Do246 Decided November 22, 2002; Supreme Court Decision 96Do260 Decided December 24, 2002.

The above legal principles and the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance reveal the following facts: (a) the Defendant joined a pro-enemy organization, i.e., the Korean University Federation of Students in the Republic of Korea, and the Korean Union of Youths in the Republic of Korea; (b) participated in an unlawful assembly or demonstration to acquire, possess, produce, distribute, and inflict an injury on police officers in the suppression of demonstration, etc.; and (c) was serving five years of suspended sentence of imprisonment with prison labor for the crime that inflicted an injury on them; and (d) at the time of the instant case, the Defendant was actively serving as executive members of the practical solidarity and as the Secretariat of the Central Secretariat; and (e) as seen earlier, the Defendants were not aware of the objective of the instant expressive act and the purpose of the instant expressive act, such as pro-enemy activities, etc., such as the organization’s ideology, e.g., military politics, lectureism, and education of ideas and ideas based thereon; and (e) the Defendant did not have any error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the motive or purpose of the instant expressive activities, etc.

2. Prosecutor's grounds of appeal are examined.

The prosecutor's ground of appeal is merely to criticize the selection of evidence and fact-finding which belong to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court below, and it cannot be a legitimate ground of appeal.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices, except for a dissenting opinion by Justice Park Si-hwan, Justice Kim Ji-hyung, Justice Lee Hong-hoon, and Justice Jeon Soo-ahn, Justice Kim Young-ran, Justice Park Si-hwan, Justice Park Si-hwan, and Justice Park Si-hwan, and Justice Park Si-hwan with respect to the purpose of the transfer of anti-government organization, and a concurrence with the majority opinion by Justice Yang Sung-tae, Justice Kim Nung-hwan, Justice Cha Han-sung, and Justice Min Il-young

4. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Park Si-hwan, Justice Kim Ji-hyung, Justice Lee Hong-hoon, and Justice Jeon Soo-ahn, as to whether the representation of each of the instant expressive materials constitutes a pro-enemy pro-enemy organization

A. Basic premise for interpreting the National Security Act

As mentioned in the majority opinion, Article 1 of the National Security Act declares the principle that the purpose of the National Security Act is to ensure the safety, survival, and freedom of the people, and the application of the Act should be limited to the minimum necessary to achieve that purpose, and should not be extensively interpreted or prohibited from unfairly restricting the fundamental rights of the people. Any acts that the National Security Act intends to regulate are acts directly related to the freedom of ideas and freedom of expression, which are directly related to the freedom of expression, and in a case where the regulation is not limited according to strict standards, the freedom of ideas and expression, which can be the core element of the free democracy system, shall be reduced, thereby doing so rather than protecting the free democracy.

Therefore, it should be strictly interpreted when interpreting the elements of various penal provisions under the National Security Act, and in particular, the interpretation of abstract requirements such as “risk that may endanger the existence and security of the State or democratic fundamental order” as stipulated in most of the provisions of the National Security Act or “the purpose of the act of immigration” as stipulated in Article 7(5) should be applied more strict standards so that the National Security Act is not abused or abused.

If an unclear standard of determination as to whether the National Security Act constitutes a constituent element of the National Security Act is permissible, arbitrary and selective indictment and punishment is possible. The National Security Act is at the risk of being abused and abused as a means of political security by suppressing and suppressing the opposing opinions, minority, and non-cooperative persons in government policies, and not as prescribed by the National Assembly Act, which is a legislative body, but as a result of arbitrarily determining the establishment of a crime by the government, investigative agency, or prosecution agency, which is the law enforcement agency, and thus, is contrary to the principle of separation

(b) Criteria for recognition of risks to the existence and security of the State or free democratic fundamental order;

(1) In most cases, the National Security Act provides for a risk element of punishment clause, “ knowingly knowing that it may endanger the existence and security of the State or democratic fundamental order,” and the question is how to determine the meaning and degree of the risk according to any standard.

The United States and European countries, in which the freedom of ideas and expression has been developed earlier, have presented various standards for the freedom of ideas and expression and the limitation thereof through precedents and theories. The presented standards include the criteria for “a clear and present danger that may cause serious harm,” the criteria for “a clear and present danger,” the criteria for “a clear and present danger,” the criteria for “a clear and present danger (clear) danger,” and the criteria for “a clear and present danger,” etc.

(2) As to the meaning and criteria of risks required as elements for the application of the National Security Act, in Supreme Court en banc Decision 2003Do758 Decided April 17, 2008, Supreme Court Decision 2003Do758 Decided April 17, 2008, the separate opinion of Justice Park Si-hwan, Justice Kim Ji-hyung, and Justice Jeon Soo-ahn presented the criteria for "a clear and present specific danger that may substantially harm the existence and security of the State or democratic fundamental order". In light of the purpose and strict interpretation of the National Security Act, and the concerns about misuse and abuse, it is reasonable to apply the strict criteria presented by the above separate opinion. This is not

(3) Meanwhile, the above standards set forth in the U.S. Supreme Court Decisions are widely accepted and widely used in theories, precedents, etc. on the basis of the limitation of freedom of thought and expression in many countries, and most textbooks, etc. of Korea are also introduced in detail. Therefore, when interpreting and applying the National Security Act of Korea or criteria for recognition of risks presented in precedents, etc., it shall be applied separately to each other, taking into account the difference in the above diverse standards in step.

For example, the Constitutional Court's limited constitutional decision on the National Security Act and the Supreme Court's decision that frequently cited "the risk of substantial harm to the existence and security of the nation or democratic fundamental order" should be interpreted as applying more strict standards than the standard of "the tendency or probability to cause harm". Thus, the mere tendency or remote probability of the risk is in violation of the above limited constitutional decision and the purport of the Supreme Court's precedents. Further, the expression "the risk of actual harm (clear)" is different from the standard of "the clear and obvious danger of harm" and the expression "the possibility of occurrence of actual harm" should be deemed as requiring a higher level than the possibility of ordinary harm. Therefore, even if it is in accordance with the legislative purpose of the National Security Act or the majority opinion "the (clear) risk of actual harm", it should be proved that the specific risk of harm and danger should not be permitted, and it should be proved that the specific risk of actual harm and danger should not be acknowledged in light of its abstract and abstract principle.

C. As to whether it is a dual organization of practical solidarity

(1) Article 7(1) and (3) of the National Security Act, which provides for the crime of forming and joining an immigration organization, provides that “A person shall be aware of the fact that it may endanger the existence and security of the State or democratic fundamental order,” so it is natural to interpret the requirements for danger, and thus, it shall conform to the standards for clear and present danger. In addition, even if the criteria are followed by the standards for risk of substantial harm (clear) as the majority opinion, as seen earlier, by relaxing the criteria, the risk is not simple tendency or probability of danger, or the ordinary possibility of abstract harm, taking into account the division between various standards as seen earlier, and it shall be acknowledged only where there is a practical possibility of specific harm.

(2) If the standards for clear and present risks are applied properly, first of all, the ideology of a human body itself belongs to an absolute freedom, and its contents are contrary to the existence and security of the State or democratic fundamental order, and cannot be deemed as satisfying the requirements for danger demanded by a dual organization. Although the contents of the idea conform to or are likely to be consistent with the assertion of North Korea, such as the acceptance of usfk iron, anti-U.S., the conclusion of a peace agreement, the unification of federal systems, and abolition of the National Security Act, etc., in a case where the contents of the idea and its assertion cannot be deemed as a threat to the existence and security of the State and democratic basic order, it shall not be deemed as a dual organization. Furthermore, even if the contents of the idea and its assertion are alleged as incompatible with the basic order of free democracy, it shall not be deemed as being a way contrary to the basic order of free democracy, such as an armed fladism, violence, etc., and if it is intended to realize it by obtaining a large number of support by ordinarily permitted in a free democracy country, it should not reach the degree of clear and present danger.

(3) The Majority Opinion, based on its reasoning, deemed that the Defendant’s practice solidarity was a pro rata organization under the National Security Act. However, examining the record in accordance with the legal doctrine as seen earlier, it is reasonable to view that the practice solidarity does not constitute a pro rata organization on the following grounds.

practical solidarity,

① On October 21, 200, 200, the Joint Declaration of June 15, 200, three organizations such as “The Committee on the Promotion of Fundamental Rights of the People of the Republic of Korea and Japan,” “The Committee on the Promotion of Economic Desertion in the United States of America and Japan,” “The Headquarters for the Prevention of War against the United States and Japan,” “The Committee on the Prevention of War against the United States and Japan’s War against the Republic of Korea,” “The Committee on the Promotion of Autonomous Peace and Unification,” and “The Committee on the Prevention of Peace and Unification against the United States of Korea, etc.,” were established in the form of a gathering to contribute to the unification of the nation-state and the Republic of Korea. On December 15, 2001, the organization was established in the first general meeting of the first general meeting of the Republic of Korea to establish a command-oriented system by enacting the rules, thereby establishing an organization with the appearance of 2,000 members, and all members of the organization were not members of the organization that participated in the activities of the Republic of Korea.

② The purpose of the above organization, which can be seen through the expression of intent inside and outside the country, such as the materials posted on the website of the organization, the teaching materials of 6.15 Driving Schools, various events, etc., is to properly implement the contents of the 6.15 Joint Declaration and thereby to achieve peaceful unification and the construction of the nation-state for the nation, and the construction of the nation-state for the peaceful unification itself does not pose any risk to the existence and security of the Republic of Korea or democratic fundamental order, and to implement the contents of the 6.15 Joint Declaration adopted at the inter-Korean summit, is a complete lawful act, unless it can be deemed unlawful.

③ The assertion, such as anti-Americans, U.S. military iron bars, unification of the Union and federal systems, and solidarity of the progress reform team, presented as specific objectives for the implementation of the above objectives, can be the object of free discussions within the Republic of Korea in which the freedom of ideas and political rights are guaranteed, and has already been raised in the sense of society. In that context, it is not likely to be directly detrimental to the national existence and security or free democratic fundamental order. It is not directly recognized to be the same as the objective of establishing the national sovereignty through the self-governing, democratic and unification strike based on the National People's Democratic Revolution theory (NLPDR) alleged by North Korea.

④ The practice solidarity was mainly engaged in lawful activities such as activities to support the 6.15 Joint Declaration, such as commemorative events of the 6.15 Joint Declaration, unification debate, unification culture agenda, street campaign, etc., and research activities related to the f.15th Joint Declaration. The 6.15th Institute, an affiliated institution, mainly focused on the analysis of the flow of modern philosophy, actual verification of the Korean society, culture of unification spirit agreed between the two Koreas.

⑤ During that process, solidarity was engaged in providing education for young people at the 6.15 Institute of 6.15 Institute by seeking North Korea’s materials, such as records of recording North Korea’s broadcasting, labor newspapers, Gu office lines, North Korean motion pictures, and general records of principal thoughts. However, the degree of introducing ways to operate ideas and systems of North Korea by using North Korean materials as means of understanding unification and North Korea. Furthermore, in some of the contents, the affirmative evaluation of North Korea’s principal ideas and military politics, etc. is not consistent with the majority of the people’s sentiments that support and safeguard a liberal democracy system, even though the overall purport of the evaluation is limited to the degree of evaluation, and it is not deemed that it is intended to actively promote and disseminate the principal ideas, military politics, or theory of hostile Revolution, or to deny or attack the Korean system.

6. In addition, practice solidarity has an aspect of connection with North Korea, such as contact with North Korea in the course of its business, but it is sufficient to be a unification movement organization. In addition, on December 2, 2004, one of the members of practice solidarity held in connection with North Korea, who participated in the conversation with the approved other party within the scope of the purpose approved by the Ministry of Unification, and there is no proof of the circumstance to recognize the clear and present danger, such as the fact that the contents likely to cause harm to the Republic of Korea are discussed or the practice solidarity was performed in accordance with any instruction or order from North Korea.

7) Meanwhile, considering the frequency of physical force and the meaning, importance, etc. of the entire context, the part in which practice solidarity mentioned the justification of civil violence, it is difficult to regard it as a content of active assertion and inciting it as a content of the original theory, and its theoretical feasibility is limited to the degree stated in the original level. It is difficult to see that such assertion became a content of practice solidarity’s route, class, class, activity, or it directly and specifically affected its route, class, class, class, activity, etc.

(8) Even if there is a content that denies a free democracy system and is likely to undermine the national existence and security or the free and democratic fundamental order during the assertion of the practice solidarity, the said organization’s activities for the realization of such assertion are merely activities involving young people, Internet propaganda activities, holding and participating in discussions, assemblies, etc., and expression of opinions, etc. inside and outside the country through the production of various propaganda materials, etc., and it cannot be said that the said organization used a method that is unacceptable by the free democratic system, such as an armed spab or violent revolution, etc.

Therefore, the practice solidarity cannot be viewed as a dual organization with the clear and present risk that may harm the existence and security of the Republic of Korea or democratic fundamental order.

(4) Furthermore, even if the Supreme Court precedents and the standard of risk of actual harm presented by the Majority Opinion are applied, the practice solidarity still cannot be deemed to constitute a dual organization.

The reasons presented by the Majority Opinion are as follows: (a) acting solidarity asserts that it is not directly conflicting with the existence and security of the Republic of Korea or fundamental order in a free democracy state, regardless of its content, and (b) acting jointly and severally and severally with North Korea; (c) praise, encourage, publicize, and aid North Korea’s anti-state theory, etc.; and (d) educate young people with materials citing North Korean materials; and (e) engaging in activities in connection with North Korea as a major axis. However, in a free democracy state where the freedom of thought and expression should be strictly protected, it cannot be said that the assertion that is consistent with the assertion of a hostile group in a hostile relationship or acting jointly and severally with North Korea is not permissible; and (e) most of the contents are not directly conflicting with the existence and security of the Republic of Korea or fundamental order in a democratic society. Considering that working solidarity is a peaceful unification movement organization aimed at peaceful unification through inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, it is natural that it has connections with North Korea to some extent, and that it is inevitable to conclude that it is an inevitable or inevitable approach to the process of unification.

Ultimately, whether there is a risk of substantial harm to the existence and security of the Republic of Korea or democratic fundamental order (clear) shall be deemed to exist in the content of the organization's assertion, the content of the part consistent with and accompanied by North Korea's assertion, the content of the business intended to link and promote with North Korea itself, and the content of the business intended to link and promote with North Korea, and only when it is intended to use a method capable of realizing the claim, it shall be deemed that there is a practical risk of actual harm (clear) as stated in the above criteria, i.e., the risk of actual harm, and if not, it shall be deemed that there is a tendency or abstract possibility of the occurrence of

(5) Furthermore, the Joint Declaration of June 15, 2005, once its activities are lawful in terms of the practice of the content of legitimate inter-Korean negotiations. On August 19, 2005, the Ministry of Unification completed official registration as a non-profit non-governmental organization. In 2006 and 2007, the Ministry of Unification was provided with government subsidies granted for public interest activities by actively evaluating the meaning and role of its activities. Such practice solidarity was established as an organization in 2001, and since it was established as the organization in 2001, it was recognized as an organization in the territory for the nearest ten years until the third change was made, and was also supported by the government.

However, in a situation where there is no criticism that the activities and the substance of the organization have changed rapidly since 10 years since they had been active as a lawful organization, there should be sufficient grounds to understand them as an unlawful dual organization in order to punish them. The prosecutor does not indicate that the organization was a pro rata organization from the original point of view and that it has become aware of the substance so far, or that it has not been proven that the activities and the substance of the organization have been completely changed at this time, it is difficult to avoid criticism that the government and the institution in charge of the public security should be subject to voluntary and selective punishment in accordance with the standards at the time of the change of the substance and activities of the organization. It is difficult to point out that there is a large number of unreasonable in terms of legal stability and trust protection.

(6) Considering that there are more than one point, practical solidarity cannot be said to be a dual organization with danger to the existence and security of the Republic of Korea or democratic fundamental order even if it complies with the risk criteria of substantial harm and danger as alleged by the Dissenting Opinion, as well as the clear and present danger criteria as asserted by the Dissenting Opinion.

D. Whether the expressive materials of the instant case constitute pro-enemy contents

(1) In order to establish a crime such as possession of pro-enemy materials under Article 7(5) of the National Security Act, the expression must first be a pro-enemy organization containing a different aptitude. As to the requirements for forming pro-enemy materials, the Supreme Court’s precedents need to be “pro-enemy and aggressive expressions” threatening the safety and free democracy system of the Republic of Korea. The Majority Opinion argues that each of the instant expressive materials satisfies such requirements.

However, Article 7(5) of the National Security Act, which is a punishment provision for pro-enemy expressive materials, provides that an act of producing, importing, copying, possessing, transporting, distributing, selling, or acquiring documents, books, or other expressive materials shall be punished for the purpose of committing an act under Article 7(1), (3) of the National Security Act, and Paragraph (3) of the same Article provides that the purpose of an act is to commit an act under Article 7(1) of the same Act, and Paragraph (4) of the same Article also assumes the premise of an organization under Article 7(3) of the same Act, and Paragraph (5) of the same Article provides that all of them shall be punished under the premise of Paragraph (1) of the same Article. However, Paragraph (1) of the same Article provides that “A person is aware of the fact that it may endanger the existence and security of the State or democratic fundamental order, as well as other punishment provisions, the crime against pro-enemy expressive materials ought to be deemed to be a constituent element of a State’s existence and security or democratic fundamental order.

(2) As seen earlier, the standard for recognizing the risk requirements necessary to constitute pro-enemy-related contents also should be applied to the standard of “clear and present danger.” As such, it should be deemed that the standard does not meet the above standard to the extent of abstract and present risk or direct and urgent risk. Furthermore, even if the standard is based on the standard of “the risk of substantial harm (clear and clear)” as presented in the Supreme Court precedents and the majority opinion with the concession of that standard, this also does not satisfy the standard solely on the tendency of the risk that does not reach the degree of substantial and obvious danger and the possibility of abstract risk.

(3) The Majority Opinion’s view that each of the instant expressive materials contains the same contents as the assertion of North Korea, such as the principal ideology, the military politics, the US Armed Forces in Korea, and the abolition of the National Security Act, and that praise, rubber, and concerts, and the preparation and preparation details thereof constitutes pro-enemy and aggressive contents that threaten the existence and security of the State and democratic fundamental order. However, examining whether the instant expressive materials are in danger of apparent and present existence or risk of actual harm (clearness) according to the standard for recognition of risk presented above, it is difficult to deem that such standard has been satisfied.

First of all, the main point of the "208 Regular Assembly Data Collection" is to properly implement the contents of the 6.15 Joint Declaration adopted between the two Koreas on June 15, 2000 to achieve independent peaceful unification. To this end, it is necessary to eliminate the interference of the United States and withdraw the United States, and establish the autonomous democratic government on the Korean Peninsula by concluding peace agreements for the peaceful settlement of the Korean Peninsula; to conclude wars; to jointly and jointly carry out the peaceful activities such as the Democratic Labor Party, and to strengthen the ability of strengthening the unification, it is necessary to implement the project for the unification of the United States and to achieve the unification of the Republic of Korea as the goal of the 6.15 Joint Declaration, and to effectively control the unification of the Republic of Korea through the unification of the Republic of Korea. Next, the main point of the "Korean People's Republic of Korea" is to effectively control the unification of the Republic of Korea, such as the conclusion of the unification agreement between the Republic of Korea and the United States Armed Forces, and to effectively control the unification of the Republic of Korea.

The core content of each representation is that the two Koreas properly implement the contents of the 6.15 Joint Declaration adopted to promote unification and the 10.4 Joint Declaration, and that itself is a completely legitimate content. In addition, among the contents presented as a specific action plan, there are some arguments that North Korea has asserted, such as the acceptance of iron in the United States, the abolition of the National Security Act, the conclusion of peace agreements, and the unification of the federal system. However, most of them are difficult to see that the contents irrelevant to the existence and security of the Republic of Korea or conflict with the free democratic basic order, and it is difficult to see that the risk of harm to the existence and security of the Republic of Korea or democratic basic order is obvious or urgent. Accordingly, it is difficult to see that there is a positive content that evaluates the North Korean society and policies, such as the subject, ideology, military politics, etc., and that there is no clear fact that such risk may cause harm or injury merely because they are alleged by the speech.

Furthermore, even if the contents of the instant expressive materials do not conflict with the existence and security of the Republic of Korea or democratic fundamental order, it is difficult to deem that there exists a substantial risk of harm to the State or democratic fundamental order. Moreover, the contents consistent with or consenting to the assertion of North Korea, or the positive assessment of the contents of the North Korean society and policies are alleged as the horses, and it is difficult to deem that there is a high probability of causing a specific and realistic danger.

Therefore, we cannot agree with the majority opinion that each expressive material of this case is a pro-enemy pro-enemy organization, and it shall not be deemed as a pro-enemy organization, which does not meet the risk standard under Article 7(5) of the National Security Act.

E. Whether the purpose of immigration action is recognized

(1) Article 7(5) of the National Security Act stipulates that “The purpose of performing an act under Paragraph (1), (3), or (4) is to commit all crimes related to pro-enemy materials by specifying the requirements for “the purpose of committing an act under Paragraph (1) or (4).” In other words, even if expressive materials recognized as pro-enemy are acquired, possessed, distributed, and sold, the act may be punished only when there is a purpose to praise, instigate, promote, instigate, instigate, or act in concert with, anti

However, with respect to the requirements for the purpose of the act of pro-enemy, the Supreme Court's precedents have recognized that the purpose of the act of pro-enemy is not necessary to make positive or conclusive perceptions about the act of paragraphs (1), (3), and (4) and that it is satisfied with dolusent perceptions. Thus, the contents of the act of pro-enemy are objectively deemed to contain a different character, such as aiding and abetting the act of anti-government organizations, and furthermore, if there is a dolus perception that such act would be a pro-enemy act, it satisfies the elements of the act. In other words, the Supreme Court's precedents are sufficient only with dolusent perceptions about the purpose of the act of pro-enemy, which is the element of the crime of pro-enemy contents, and further presumed to have a dolusent perception.

(2) The majority opinion takes the position that the previous Supreme Court precedents recognize that the act is pro-enemy pro-enemy materials and presumed the purpose of pro-enemy activities from the act is unreasonable, and that such presumption is not permissible, and changes the previous Supreme Court precedents that have been held to that effect.

As such, the Majority Opinion’s position is reasonable and does not differ from that point of view. However, the Majority does not make a clear judgment as to whether the part meeting the requirements for the purpose is maintained when recognizing (not presumption) that there is awareness or dolusent perception of the possibility of an act of transfer among the previous precedents, or that part of the case is modified, and it is recognized that the Defendant can be recognized as having the objective of an act of transfer by integrating various indirect facts in this case without making a clear judgment.

(3) In a case where there is a perception of the possibility of the occurrence of the effect stipulated for the purpose in the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the above crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime of the crime

In general, in a crime of purpose, recognizing the possibility of achievement of the purpose specified as the constituent elements of a crime is extremely different. From among the crime of purpose, if an act is committed, such as the purpose of slandering another person, the purpose of evading arrest of quasi-Robbery, etc., there may be cases where the effect specified for the purpose can occur immediately without any other act. On the other hand, in addition to the objective constituent elements, such as the purpose of the crime of forging documents, the crime of abduction and inducement for marriage, the crime of abduction and inducement for sale, the crime of taking women, etc. for the purpose of divulging documents, and the crime of foreign secret detection and collection for the purpose of leakage, etc., there are cases where the purpose of the act is achieved by adding a separate act by an actor or a third party, other than the objective constituent elements of a crime, and even in the former case where the effect of the purpose without any other act may occur without such act, such as murder and perjury, but only one of several possible effects, such as murder and perjury.

Therefore, it is against the principle of no punishment without the law, the presumption of innocence, or the principle of trial of evidence, which is the principle of interpretation of penal provisions, to recognize that there exists an objective act of a crime for the purpose of the crime. The objective crime is to demand separate purposes from the intentional elements of the crime. Since the objective crime is the excessive subjective elements of the crime, in principle, the prosecutor must prove its existence by strict proof. However, since it is impossible to directly prove it as an internal intention, the objective of the objective crime is to prove it by means of circumstantial facts or indirect facts, etc. according to the ordinary method recognizing the intention of internal deliberation, such as intentional intent, etc., and there is a difference between the possibility of existence of the purpose and the degree of existence of indirect facts or indirect facts necessary for proof corresponding to the degree of probability.

(4) The above legal doctrine is likewise the same in relation to the crime related to pro-enemy materials, which is prescribed as a crime under the National Security Act. Since it is different from the perception of the possibility that pro-enemy materials may be pro-enemy in the event of acquisition, possession, distribution, and sale, and the intent of pro-enemy materials is to be actively expressed, the attitude of the previous precedent that recognizes the purpose of pro-enemy activities is not right, solely on the basis of the perception of the possibility of pro-enemy activities.

Furthermore, as seen earlier, since the crime related to pro-enemy materials constitutes a type of crime, not only an objective element but also an act committed by an actor or a third party in addition to an objective element, or an act committed by an actor or a third party’s separate purpose is not ordinarily accompanied, but also an act that is only one of several possible effects, the objective should be recognized only when the actor’s active desire or plan is admitted as evidence. In addition, the act related to expressive materials is directly related to the freedom of ideas and expression, and thus, a certain proof according to the strict standard should be required to punish the crime.

Therefore, the part that the purpose of pro-enemy act can be recognized only if there is a perception that the previous Supreme Court's precedents might be a pro-enemy act, at least in the crime related to pro-enemy contents.

(5) The elements of a crime regarding pro-enemy materials under Article 7(5) of the National Security Act are as follows: (i) production, import, reproduction, reproduction, possession, transportation, distribution, sale, and acquisition of documents, books, and other expressive materials for the purpose of pro-enemy materials, (ii) production, import, possession, transportation, distribution, and acquisition of documents, books, and other expressive materials for the purpose of praise, rubber, promotion, and aid of anti-government organizations; (iii) organization and joining of a pro-enemy organization as provided in paragraph (1) of the same Article; and (iv) formation and joining of a pro-enemy organization as provided in paragraph (3) of the same Article; and (iv) formation and dissemination of false facts. In full view of these, objective elements of a crime are as follows; (iv) production, import, reproduction, possession, transportation, distribution, and acquisition of pro-enemy materials; and (v) content of a subjective element

Of the above elements, the act of distributing and selling pro-enemy contents among the acts of distributing and selling pro-enemy contents and the act of distributing and selling them during the above purpose constitutes a type that can achieve the purpose by itself even without any separate act. The act of distributing and selling and the act of distributing and selling and forming and joining pro-enemy organizations constitutes a type that can achieve the purpose by adding a separate act. The remainder of the acts except the act of distributing and selling, i.e., manufacturing, importing, copying, possessing, transporting, transporting, acquiring, and selling pro-enemy contents and the entire purpose of the above act constitutes a type that can achieve the purpose only if separate acts falling under praise, rubber, encouraging, promoting, or instigate, etc. are added.

Therefore, in a case where an actor distributes and sells pro-enemy materials, the effect of pro-enemy, rubber, propaganda, or instigates, etc. may be achieved at the same time. However, in the case of the remaining acts, insofar as the actor does not have an intention or plan to additionally engage in pro-enemy, rubber, propaganda, or instigate, etc., then the elements of the act alone are extremely little enough to achieve the above purpose. Therefore, in the case of the remaining acts except for the case of distribution and sale, unless the prosecutor proves that the actor had a plan or intent to engage in pro-enemy, such as praise, rubber, publicity, or instigate, etc., the existence of the purpose cannot be recognized. The fact that the actor did not have such plans or intent and without any special purpose that he produced, acquired, possessed, etc. pro-enemy materials for another purpose or without any specific purpose is contrary to the principle of presumption of innocence and the principle of presumption of innocence under the Criminal Procedure Act.

As to this point, in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Kim Young-ran, we express my opinion that in the case of possession of pro-enemy materials, it should be proved that the purpose should be proved in detail as to what kind of pro-enemy activities have been planned or expressed.

(6) In addition, the mere fact that a person who does not have plans or intent to engage in a pro-enemy act, such as praise, rubber, propaganda, or inciting, acquiring, etc., his/her act of producing, possessing, etc., constitutes an act of benefiting anti-government organizations or pro-enemy organizations is recognized as having the intention to engage in an act of praise, rubber, propaganda, or inciting, etc., by replacing “the purpose that he/she does not wish” with “the (unforeseeable) awareness about the possibility of occurrence of outcome” is replaced by “the purpose that he/she does not wish.” As an excessive subjective element beyond the degree of intention, it does not conform to the purport of separate provisions.

Meanwhile, as seen above, the distribution and sale of pro-enemy materials is likely to achieve the dual effect, such as praise, rubber, propaganda, and inciting, etc., even if there is no separate additional act. However, such possibility is only one possible. The intent or purpose of an act of distributing and selling pro-enemy materials can be diversely in addition to the praise, encouragement, propaganda, or inciting, etc. of anti-government organizations. For example, in a case where a pro-enemy materials are distributed to persons in need of information on North Korea, such as scholars, social sports groups, unification movement groups, political persons, and economic circles, for the purpose of criticism or immediately informing North Korean society, if such materials are distributed as materials to be kept in various organizations such as government offices or schools, if such materials are distributed as materials, the distribution may be carried out as part of the business conducted in simple defense trials, and if such materials are distributed as materials to the surrounding members, it may be deemed that there is no possibility that the act may be an intentional act or an intentional act that does not have any effect on the intent (in such a case, it may be deemed as an intentional act.).

(7) An act of producing, acquiring, possessing, or distributing expressive materials regardless of whether they are pro-enemy materials is related to the freedom of ideas and expression. An act of expressing one’s ideas externally and allowing others to agree thereto is a human’s inherent desire. Such an act is a part belonging to the essential substance of the freedom of ideas and expression at the same time as it deals with the core of the freedom of expression. Considering the important meaning of the freedom of ideas and ideas in the free democracy system, freedom of ideas and freedom of expression should be guaranteed to the maximum extent possible, and a strict requirement is required to limit this. Article 1(1) of the National Security Act declares that the purpose of the Act is to secure the freedom of survival and freedom of citizens, and Article 1(2) of the National Security Act provides that the National Security Act shall be limited to the minimum necessary to achieve the purpose of the Act and shall not be extended or interpreted or unfairly restricted the human rights of the people.

In conclusion, all of the acts stipulated in Article 7(5) of the National Security Act constitute an expression act of ideas and must be proven by strict proof that they have the objective or intent to specifically induce clear and present danger in order to prohibit and punish them. If punishment is imposed on the sole basis of the possibility of pro-enemy effect that they do not intend without such proof, it would be unreasonable to punish all the acts related to pro-enemy contents as crimes, except in exceptional cases where the pro-enemy effect is not accompanied by any incidental effect. Furthermore, it would be difficult to say that ordinary citizens have access to materials related to anti-government organizations, except in the case of a small number of specific status which can be easily recognized as not having a pro-enemy purpose, and it would result in an unreasonable phenomenon that makes it possible for most citizens who have contacted with materials related to anti-government organizations to be subject to investigation and prosecution by anti-state crimes, and to punish those who have opposition to or opposition to the policies of the National Security Act as a means that makes it possible to punish them by means of self-government or counter-government.

(8) In light of the above legal principles, the court below, citing the first instance court, found the defendant guilty on the possession of the expressive materials of this case, on the ground that there was a perception that the expressive materials of this case constituted pro-enemy, and there was a perception that the act constitutes pro-enemy materials, and that there was a perception that the possession of the expressive materials of this case constitutes pro-enemy materials, and therefore, the defendant was the purpose of pro-enemy materials. Furthermore, without showing any specific purpose, whether the defendant intended to use the said expressive materials for any purpose, and whether the defendant was in possession of the said expressive materials with any intention, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the recognition of the pro-enemy materials.

F. Conclusion

The court below's decision that recognized the solidarity as a pro-enemy organization, recognized each of the expressive materials of this case as a pro-enemy organization, and found the defendant guilty of all of the acts of this part of this case by admitting that the defendant possessed them as an pro-enemy organization, was erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles, and thus, should be reversed and remanded to the court below. The majority opinion

5. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kim Young-ran as to the purpose of immigration action

The crime of possessing pro-enemy contents under Article 7(5) of the National Security Act is a crime of possessing pro-enemy contents for the purpose of committing an act under Article 7(1), 3, and 4 of the same Act with the intent of committing an act under Article 231 of the Criminal Act. Although the crime of pro-enemy is a crime intending to achieve a certain purpose, even if it can be proven by means of an indirect fact or circumstantial fact-finding with the inherent awareness of the degree of perception of that purpose, it must be specifically revealed whether the actor intended to commit such act before and after the crime. For instance, the general purpose of the crime of pro-enemy under Article 156 of the Criminal Act is “the purpose of having another criminal punishment or disciplinary punishment,” “the purpose of uttering,” “the purpose of uttering,” “the purpose of uttering of a counterfeited private document” under Article 247 of the Criminal Act, and “profit-making purpose” under Article 247 of the Criminal Act refers to a specific act or result, and thus, it is evident that the act constitutes an act of anti-government or its constituent nature.

Furthermore, unlike external propagation of the pro-enemy contents or other constituent acts that involve the possibility of distribution, distribution, sale, etc. of the pro-enemy contents at issue in the instant case, unlike the act of producing, importing, copying, distributing, distributing, selling, etc. the pro-enemy contents, the act of possessing pro-enemy contents at issue does not necessarily lead to a mere private area guaranteed by the Constitution, such as an individual’s conscience, freedom of thought, or learning. Nevertheless, the reason for punishing the pro-enemy contents solely is that the person possessing the pro-enemy contents has the purpose of pro-enemy activities. In other words, the act of possessing pro-enemy contents with the purpose of pro-enemy acts may lead to the propagation of the pro-enemy contents in the process of accomplishing that purpose, and thus, the act of possessing pro-enemy contents without the purpose of pro-enemy activities is punished, as such,

In light of the nature of the pro-enemy organization’s purpose of pro-enemy organization’s pro-enemy act in the crime of pro-enemy, it can be acknowledged only when it is proven that the possessor of the pro-enemy organization intended to act as a pro-enemy organization with a plan or intent to act as a pro-enemy organization in the future. Therefore, it should be specifically stated how the possessor of the pro-enemy organization intended to act as a pro-enemy organization by using the said expressive materials or the contents of said expressive materials in the future, namely, how to praise, instigate, advertise, or act as a member of the pro-enemy organization. Whether the contents of the pro-enemy organization intended to act as a pro-enemy organization, whether the contents of the pro-enemy organization intended to act as a member of the organization to act as a pro-enemy organization or to act as a member of the organization to which he/she belongs, or not to act as a member of the pro-enemy organization.

Nevertheless, punishment for possession of pro-enemy materials is an excessive restriction beyond the minimum limit necessary to achieve the legislative purpose, such as the existence and security of the State or the protection of free democratic fundamental order, and thus infringing on the freedom of conscience or the freedom of thought.

In the instant case, based on the Defendant’s participation in the Defendant’s work experience and practice solidarity, the lower court maintained the first instance judgment that held that the Defendant was recognized as possessing each of the instant expressive materials for the purpose of praiseing, encouraging, etc., anti-government organizations. However, the lower court did not fully reveal how the Defendant used the instant expressive materials or the contents of the said expressive materials to praise, encourage, publicize, or assist in, the activities of anti-government organizations. Ultimately, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the proof of dual purpose, or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, which affected the conclusion of the judgment, and the Defendant’s ground of appeal pointing this out is with merit.

Therefore, since there is no proof as to the defendant who possessed each expressive material of this case's purpose of a foreign act, the court below found the defendant guilty of this part of the facts charged. Since the court below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the purpose of a foreign act, it is necessary to reverse the judgment of the court below and remand the case to the court below. The majority opinion expresses the dissenting opinion.

6. Dissenting Opinion and concurring opinion by Justice Park Si-hwan as to North Korea’s anti-government organization

A. As to North Korea's anti-government organization

While North Korea is a partner of dialogue and cooperation for peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula, on the other hand, North Korea still has the nature of anti-government organizations that take measures to reverse the liberal democracy system of the Republic of Korea while taking advantage of the hostile unification route, and therefore North Korea maintains the position of the previous Supreme Court precedent that it constitutes anti-government organizations.

However, we cannot agree with the Majority Opinion deeming North Korea as an anti-government organization by itself. As seen in the previous Supreme Court precedents, the two Koreas and North Korea continued dialogue and exchange for several hundred and seventy years since the opening of the Red Cross in 1971. The width and contents of the dialogue have been expanded and realized, and in 191, the UN simultaneous accession in 191, the general and long-term meeting, general and long-term meeting, and large-scale private investment and economic trade, which are made at all times after the opening of the Red Cross in 191, are going to come to and go through several hundred thousand persons each year. Meanwhile, by declaring the principle of peaceful unification in the specialized and Article 4, the dialogue and compromise with North Korea for unification are becoming an essential process, and as part, the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Fund Act was enacted in 190 and the South and North Korea Act was enacted in 205, and the legal order of the Republic of Korea is incorporated into the legal order of the Republic of Korea.

Under such circumstances, the position of the majority opinion and the Supreme Court precedents that consider North Korea as an anti-government organization and that it can be subject to the National Security Act, by emphasizing that North Korea has entered the past state of war with the Republic of Korea and still maintaining the state of military confrontation and maintaining the socialist system itself is unreasonable to regard all matters related to North Korea as being related to anti-government organization in principle. It is unreasonable to view that North Korea has a system and structure different from that of the State and is operating as a State in the international community, and the Republic of Korea is in contact with all kinds of exchanges and exchanges in comparison with North Korea, on the other hand, it cannot be said that North Korea is an anti-government organization in which it is in uniform of the Republic of Korea.

Even if North Korea yet declares its purpose of self-government organization through the Socialist Constitution and the Agreement on the Coordination and Security of the Republic of Korea, and North Korea's anti-government organization has not yet been extinguished, it shall be deemed that such character is merely one aspect of North Korea, and it cannot be denied the fact that the part pursuing the mutual respect between South and North Korea in exchange and cooperation with the Republic of Korea concurrently exists as another aspect. Therefore, when examining North Korea's anti-government organization, it shall be deemed that the provision premised on the anti-government organization in the National Security Act should be applied automatically to all matters related to North Korea, not automatically, but only those matters directly related to North Korea's anti-government organization should be treated as an anti-government organization. In addition, regardless of whether all acts related to North Korea are related to North Korea's anti-government organization, it is unreasonable to interpret Article 7 (1) of the National Security Act as an act related to anti-government organization and be subject to the application of the National Security Act only when it is found that there is no danger and injury to the existence and security of the Republic of Korea.

In a case where the above-mentioned interpretation is not limited as to the anti-government organization of North Korea, the National Security Act applies to all persons who engaged in the act related to North Korea, even if they are the persons who contacted with the anti-government organization, such as the president, high-ranking government officials of the government, economic circles, and religious and cultural personnel, etc., and as a result, they cannot be punished in a case where such act constitutes a governing act or an act that does not pose any danger to the State or democratic fundamental order. As a result, the agency in charge of public security has secured the authority to initiate the investigation into violation of the National Security Act once all persons related to North Korea, and among them, there is a risk of being abused and abused as a means of suppressing the minority and opposing people by exercising the excessive authority to investigate and punish the opposing parties, etc. who do not comply with the government policy. Moreover, as seen below, the current state of enforcement of the Act itself becomes more likely to be applied and applied under the current state of law.

Therefore, we cannot agree with the Majority Opinion deeming that the National Security Act can be applied to all matters related to North Korea as still maintaining the existence of anti-government organization in North Korea. Of the dual character of North Korea, only the matters directly connected to the aspect of anti-government organization should be considered as having been recognized as an anti-government organization and applicable to the National Security Act. Therefore, in determining the dual nature of North Korea, in accordance with the above legal principles, it shall be deemed that the punishment can be imposed only in cases where it is proved that the Defendant’s act was related to the aspect of North Korea’s anti-government organization, and that it satisfies the elements of anti-government organization, or that it was related to North Korea as the other party to the exchange and cooperation pursuing unification from the standpoint of the unification movement organization.

B. Regarding the determination of risk to the existence and security of the State or the free democratic fundamental order

In interpreting the element of “risk to the existence and security of the State or democratic fundamental order,” which is required as a constituent element in the punishment provision of the National Security Act, it is reasonable to apply the standard of “clear and present danger,” which is the most strict standard. In the case of applying the standard of “risk to the (clear) risk,” which is presented by the majority opinion and the Supreme Court precedents, it is reasonable to apply the standard separately by considering the difference with other standards. In this regard, we agree with the dissenting opinion of Justice Park Si-hwan, Justice Kim Ji-hyung, Justice Lee Hong-hoon, and Justice Jeon Soo-ahn-ahn

The Supreme Court precedents and the majority opinions so far are based on the premise that the pertinent organization or individual consistently asserts that it conforms to the content that North Korea has consistently. However, in today’s situation where the exchange and cooperation with North Korea frequently occurred, as well as certain personnel have attempted to engage in unification campaign at a private level or inter-Korean exchange, it is difficult to find any act that is not contrary to the National Security Act among the acts related to North Korea, if it is interpreted that the risk of demanding in the National Security Act is satisfied with the above-mentioned reasons. In the process of exchanging and exchanging with North Korea, it is difficult to find any act that is not necessarily contrary to the National Security Act. There are no items that necessarily consent to the North Korea’s assertion, and any policy that is evaluated as beneficial to Korea as a whole regardless of South and North Korea. If it is determined that there is a danger for the same reason as that of North Korea, the proposal of sound policy based on the freedom of thought and expression of expression of the people and the right to participate in the exchange and contact with North Korea is seriously restricted.

It is true that the United States has a special meaning in the modern nation and has given many help in various aspects, such as politics, economy, and military affairs. However, there is no reason to prohibit other evaluations or crimes with different views on the role and intention of the United States. Even if the U.S. has given a big help in Korea, such relations can be changed in the future, or if we can see the role and intention of the U.S. as well as that of the U.S., we can see it as good in our society or in our view that it can be seen as benefits to us, or that it can be regarded as a unconstitutional and unfair relation with the U.S. Constitution. As such, it can be seen that there is no problem of free evaluation of the relationship between the Republic of Korea and the U.S. Constitution, and that there is no reason to view it as a crime against the Republic of Korea and the U.S. Constitution, and that there is no reason to view it as a crime against the Republic of Korea.

However, if there is the only difference in North Korea, North Korea is strongly taking the position of North Korea, but it is not directly connected to the position of North Korea in the issue of international and diplomatic relations that may have various evaluations and time, and it is not directly connected to the clear risk of present and clear danger or actual harm, but even if such assertion leads to benefit in North Korea in military and diplomatic aspects and disadvantage in the Republic of Korea, it is not possible for the sovereign to prevent the citizens of the Republic of Korea from taking into account their arguments regarding international and diplomatic relations. Considering the fact that the problem of international and diplomatic relations has the above combined character, even if the issue of international and diplomatic relations is more active and consistent with the purpose of benefiting North Korea, it cannot be viewed as an act subject to punishment of the National Security Act unless it is proven that there is an imminent and imminent danger.

Therefore, under the circumstances where foreign forces are stationed in an independent sovereign state today, there is no special circumstance to deem that there is a very exceptional and critical defect in the ability of self-defense in Korea, it is no longer likely that the U.S. military demand for acceptance of the U.S. military force should be prohibited or that it cannot be a crime. Furthermore, even if there is a problem in the national defense power of Korea, even if there is a concern that the U.S. military might face a serious danger, the evaluation of each citizen's self-defense ability cannot be forced in a specific direction, and it is also a matter that belongs to the freedom of thought guaranteed by the Constitution and can be decided by debate in the free market of ideas. Accordingly, the same is also applicable in cases where only a specific direction evaluation is allowed, and it is also a matter that can not be a crime that is prohibited or committed under such premise. Furthermore, even in cases where the U.S. military forces claim for the purpose of active benefit of North Korea, the possibility of imminent danger is apparent and present, or that the possibility of substantial danger is evident as objective data, the National Security Act cannot be punished.

Then, we examine the federal unification scheme. The Constitution of the Republic of Korea declares the principle of peaceful unification in the preamble and Article 4. In the event that a divided country is a method of unification, one side can combine both the absorption unification absorption absorption in the other side with an equal relationship. However, under the premise that peaceful unification is not a forced unification by military force, it is highly likely that the difference of national power can be the equal unification unless one party sleeps into and enters by itself. As long as the Republic of Korea declares peaceful unification in the Constitution, it is most likely that it would be an equal unification method rather than the absorption. Accordingly, the people seeking peaceful unification will seek a specific method of peaceful unification naturally, and in that case, the first one is to maintain the governing system to a certain extent, and the specific method of unification itself cannot be more specific and more specific and more specific methods of unification by strengthening the federal system in the form of peaceful unification and pursuing the unification itself in the form of a peaceful and more favorable one by itself, and thus, it cannot be more specific and more specific in the form of the federal system.

Therefore, any person asserts a federal unification plan, which is claiming the same content as that of the federal system asserted by North Korea, or that it is favorable and unfavorable to the Republic of Korea. Furthermore, the federal system itself asserted by North Korea is not specifically proven that there is a risk of harm and injury to the Republic of Korea. Rather, the Republic of Korea and North Korea adopted the 6.15 Joint Declaration at the South and North summit in 2000 and agreed to confirm that the federal system presented by the South and North Korean Union (the Union system) and the North Korean side is in fact the same content and to jointly promote it. Although North Korea asserted the two federal systems within one country prior to that, it merely differs in terms of the degree of combination and complete single country, and it does not clearly indicate that there is a risk of harm and injury to the Republic of Korea. However, North Korea’s assertion that there is a risk of harm and injury to the South and North Korean government itself as a condition for the abolition of the federal regime itself, it does not appear to have any inherent nature of the National Security Act.

The problem is that the contents of the federal unification plan include the contents or conditions that harm the Republic of Korea, which is not inherent in the federal system itself, and thus, the prosecutor must objectively prove that the federal system contains such risks, and it cannot be deemed as subject to punishment as a dangerous act only by asserting the federal system identical with that claimed by North Korea without such specific proof. Furthermore, the abolition of the National Security Act and the number of non-military forces, etc. that North Korea presents as the entry condition of the federal system, as seen above, constitute a matter that can be argued by the citizen of the Republic of Korea, cannot be deemed as having a clear and present danger or substantial risk of actual harm.

In conclusion, in order to punish the acts of asserting the federal unification plan, including the abolition of the National Security Act and the acceptance of the U.S. military forces, which are not identical to the assertion of North Korea, as well as the assertion of the federal unification plan that is not identical to the assertion of North Korea, or the acts of asserting the federal unification plan, including the abolition of the National Security Act and the acceptance of the U.S. military forces, which are presented as a premise by North Korea, it is necessary to prove specific and objective reasons to recognize the risk of causing substantial harm and harm to the existence and security of the Republic of Korea or democratic fundamental order. If such strict interpretation is not strictly interpreted, there is a risk that the people might use it as a means of selective control and suppression of the sound private unification campaign, which they claim the unification plan based on their political power, and the unification campaign will result in the abolition that the

As seen earlier, as alleged in North Korea, any person shall freely decide on his/her own idea and freedom to express it outside, unless the existence of clear and present danger or obvious danger of substantial harm may be guaranteed. However, as stated in Supreme Court precedents or majority opinions so far, interpreting that the degree of risk likely to cause danger meets the requirements of danger demanded by the National Security Act. If, although there is no danger in the assertion, it is assessed that there is a danger that other person carries out such an assertion, it would be punished by assessing that there is a danger, it would be another position without cooperation with the government’s policies or that those who engage in critical activities with the government’s authority should be punished. Moreover, it is too clear that North Korea’s act would be subject to punishment as a result of suppressing the other person’s opinion that is the core issue of the National Security Act, excluding those who are in charge of the National Security Act, and thus, would not be subject to punishment in accordance with the National Security Act’s general interpretation and punishment. If there is no concern about the North Korean government’s action or defendant’s opinion in this case, then it would be an object of unification.

C. unconstitutionality of the National Security Act

The possibility of arbitrary and selective punishment for the thoughts and expressions of the people in a free democracy country where the freedom of ideas and expressions should be guaranteed to the maximum, can be a weapon that enables the emergence of authoritative regime. In fact, it is difficult to say that Korea's past fiscal power could have been maintained for a long time, and that it has been difficult to strictly observe the standards for interpreting statutes related to public security such as anti-public law and the National Security Act.

After the issue of unconstitutionality has been raised for a long time on the National Security Act, the Constitutional Court confirmed that there are many unconstitutional elements in the National Security Act with limited constitutionality decisions 89HunGa113 delivered on April 2, 1990. Accordingly, the amended National Security Act as of May 31, 191 stated that the requirement of " knowing that it may endanger the existence and security of the State or democratic fundamental order" in most of the provisions of the National Security Act should be stated and removed the unconstitutional elements. Accordingly, in interpreting and applying the National Security Act, considering the purport of the amendment of the Act that added the risk requirement to remove the unconstitutional elements, the Constitutional Court should consider the purport of the amendment of the Act that added the risk requirement in order to eliminate the unconstitutional elements. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court should determine the danger by the strict standard so that the unconstitutional elements can be excluded, such as the violation of the principle of unconstitutionality, the fundamental violation of the freedom of thought and science and the freedom of expression, the violation of the right to equality, and the violation of the regulations on peaceful unification.

The Supreme Court has presented the standard of “the risk of actual harm (clear)” as a standard to acknowledge the requirement of risk established under the amended National Security Act. However, in fact, it has been convicted of the actual danger without any difference from the previous one, and the majority opinion of this case also does not deviate from such a position, it can sufficiently be seen as seen earlier. As such, the risk requirement of the amended Act, which was prepared to eliminate the unconstitutionality of the National Security Act, was lost as a fatal requirement for not performing the actual function. If our court has taken a position of interpretation that easily recognizes the risk by applying the same standard as the Supreme Court precedents among them, it is difficult to expect to remove the unconstitutional element through the application of the requirement of risk. If so, it is difficult to expect the removal of the unconstitutional element through the application of the amended National Security Act, and if so, the current National Security Act, which cannot avoid the unconstitutionality, must be repealed or fundamentally amended, and it is reasonable to request the Constitutional Court to make adjudication on the unconstitutionality once again, from April 29, 2008.

(d) Conclusion;

In addition, it is difficult to understand that there has been no substantial change in the standard of risk presented by the previous precedents even after the Constitutional Court pointed out the unconstitutionality of the National Security Act and the revision of the National Security Act.

If our court does not set a strict standard on the interpretation of the National Security Act and the restriction of freedom of ideas and expression by excessively escaping from the past precedents, it is doubtful whether there is no possibility that the court's judgment, which became final and conclusive by the Supreme Court's judgment, would be invalid by a new judgment of the court, such as the case of the past leather Party or the case of the conspiracy of insurrection between the Kim Jong-dae and the case of 20 cases where the court's decision becomes final and conclusive by a new judgment of the Supreme Court, in the event that an authoritative authority authority enters into the Republic of Korea or the agency in charge of public security excessively abuses its authority.

7. Concurrence with the Majority Opinion by Justice Yang Sung-tae, Justice Kim Nung-hwan, Justice Cha Han-sung, and Justice Min Il-young regarding anti-government organization

A. The Dissenting Opinion by Justice Park Si-hwan regarding the status of an anti-government organization, etc. of North Korea, we cannot agree with the Majority Opinion that the National Security Act can be applied once to all matters related to North Korea since North Korea coexists with the aspect that it is an anti-government organization and the part that aims to coexist in South and North Korea while exchanging and cooperating with the Republic of Korea. If we agree with the Majority Opinion, the National Security Act should be repealed or amended as unconstitutional.

In the recent en banc Decision 2003Do758 Decided April 17, 2008, the Supreme Court declared that North Korea is an anti-government organization, and that North Korea still declared that its final purpose is the subject of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea through the Protocol of the Trackdong that it is the subject of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the socialism and its constitution, and confirmed that it explicitly declared the policies that actively support the democratization of South Korea and the war against the anti-government in order to achieve this objective of the hostile unification, and that it is carrying out the policies accordingly. In addition, there is no evidence to deem that there was any change in the North Korea’s substance from the above en banc Decision to the point of time until the time the above en banc Decision 2003Do758 delivered on April 17, 2008. In this context, the above dissenting opinion, which viewed the anti-government organization of the Republic of Korea as a different from the previous one, does not seem to have any significance from the historical meaning of the established precedents.

The Dissenting Opinion argues that there was a change in the reality, such as joining UN simultaneously, the inter-Korean exchange and cooperation has been constantly expanded, and the legal support therefor has been established. Of course, there is no doubt that both North and South Korea have to make every possible effort in order to overcome the reality in which both North and South Korea are facing each other in the divided land, and to achieve the peaceful unification and mitigation of the tension between South and North Korea. As such, the Republic of Korea has extended and systematically supported the inter-Korean exchange with policy consideration that the two Korea should be accompanied by the other party or cooperation. However, such fact is not only reflected in the formation of Supreme Court precedents as above, but also should not be viewed as a different anti-government organization from the perspective of North Korea, on the ground that there was no evidence that there was any change in the substance of North Korea as well as the efforts and policy consideration of the Republic of Korea as seen above. The Dissenting Opinion’s position on the contrary of the National Security Act merely recognizes that the above logic does not constitute an act of any anti-government organization, but also does not constitute an act of any anti-government organization.

In addition, as already expressed in the above en banc decision, unless the North Korea shows any apparent change that it will no longer threaten our free democracy system according to the development of inter-Korean relations, and accordingly, the National Security Act, the purpose of which is to secure the security of the State and the lives and freedom of citizens by regulating anti-state activities that may endanger the national security, cannot be deemed to violate the Constitution or to lose its normative power. In addition, considering the situation in which the Constitutional Court has already rendered a constitutional decision on the National Security Act, and the National Assembly has also maintained the National Security Act, it is inappropriate to raise a debate on the unconstitutionality of the National Security Act.

B. The concurring opinion with the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Park Si-hwan regarding the determination of the national existence and security or the risk to the free democratic fundamental order is that even if practical solidarity claims the unification of the anti-U.S., U.S. iron, federal system, etc. as alleged by North Korea, it cannot be deemed that there exists a clear and present danger or substantial risk of harm to the Republic of Korea.

However, the Majority Opinion does not seem to have any risk of substantial harm to the national existence and security and free democratic fundamental order solely on the grounds that the anti-U.S. or U.S. federal unification assertion is the same as that of North Korea. The core of the Majority Opinion is that North Korea has asserted against anti-U.S., U.S. and U.S. federal unification with a clear political calculation as a part of North Korea’s publicity for unification in South and North Korea since the past. At present, North Korea is trying to promote the construction project of the United States Armed Forces based on the principal ideology and promote and disseminate the anti-U.S. Revolution theory by taking advantage of the fact-finding theory. Nevertheless, there is a risk of substantial harm to the national existence and security and free democratic basic order. In this case, the Majority Opinion is justifiable to have determined that the practice was a dual organization composed of North Korea’s activities as an anti-government organization on the basis of the evidence duly submitted by the lower court, which is not a basis for criticism of the Majority Opinion without any specific legal principles applied to the establishment of North Korea’s anti-government organization.

C. Finally, the Supreme Court en banc decision of this case is significant in breaking the legal principle that if the act of acquiring, possessing, producing, distributing, etc. the pro-enemy act is recognized as being related to the purpose of the pro-enemy act among the previous Supreme Court decisions on the crime of violating the National Security Act, the purpose of the pro-enemy act can be presumed, and the prosecutor must prove that the act was committed with the purpose of the pro-enemy act, and there is no objection to the contrary. Nevertheless, the above dissenting opinion is inappropriate to fill out a criticism in the Supreme Court decision established in relation to the National Security Act without reasonable interest in the significance of the decision.

Chief Justice Lee Yong-hoon (Presiding Justice)