The key land of this case is not subject to permission to create grassland, so it does not constitute grassland under the Grassland Act and does not constitute grassland under Article 68 (2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act.

Considering that the grassland created without permission for the development of grassland is excluded from administrative regulations such as the payment of substitute grassland development costs for the restriction and conversion of the grassland, restrictions on activities, etc. and criminal punishment due to violation of the Restriction Regulations, land without permission for the development of grassland is illegally created in violation of the Grassland Act and it cannot be deemed a grassland subject to reduction or exemption of the grassland.

Article 68 (2) of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act, Article 5 of the Grassland Act

2014 old group 100193 Revocation of the imposition of transfer income tax

HeadA et al. 2

The Director of the National Tax Service

July 18, 2014

August 22, 2014

1. All of the plaintiffs' claims are dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit are assessed against the plaintiffs.

Cheong-gu Office

The Defendant’s imposition of ○○○○○○ on April 2, 2013 (including additional tax) among the transfer income tax (including additional tax) accrued in the year 2009, the imposition of ○○○○○○○○○○○ on the Plaintiff’s 2009, the imposition of the transfer income tax (including additional tax) accrued in the year 2009, and the imposition of the Plaintiff’s ○○○○○○○○○○ on the Plaintiff’s 2009, respectively,

1. Details of the disposition;

A. Since 1979, the plaintiff headCC operated '○ farm' in ○○○○-dong 465-4, ○○○○-dong 465-4, and the plaintiff head A and head B had operated '○2 farm' in the above land since 2002 as the child of the plaintiff headCC.

B. On March 18, 2003, the Plaintiff ○○○○○○-dong 465-5, 465-6, and the sum of 88,744m2 (hereinafter “instant donated land”) was donated by the Plaintiff ○○○○-si ○○○○○, ○65-6, and the Defendant filed an application for exemption of gift tax pursuant to Article 15(2) of the Addenda of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act (wholly amended by Act No. 5584, Dec. 28, 1998) (wholly amended by Act No. 6297, Dec. 29, 200); Article 58 of the former Regulation of Tax Reduction and Exemption Act (wholly amended by Act No. 5584, Dec. 28, 1998);

C. On March 10, 2004, the Defendant: “The land donated in this case constitutes grassland provided by Article 58(1)1(b) of the former early depreciation Act; the Plaintiff headCC constitutes a self-employed farmer provided by Article 58(1) of the same Act; however, the Plaintiff headB on January 1, 1999, the enforcement date of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act (wholly amended by Act No. 5584, Dec. 28, 1998), which is the date of entry into force of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act (wholly amended by Act No. 5584, Dec. 28, 1998), does not constitute a farming child provided by Article 58(1) of the former Early Punishment Act.” For the reason, the Defendant issued a disposition imposing gift tax (including additional tax) on the land donated in this case, and subsequently corrected 000 won (hereinafter “Disposition imposing gift tax on the remaining 000 won”).

D. The plaintiff headB filed a lawsuit against the defendant to revoke the gift tax imposition disposition of this case with the Daejeon District Court ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○, and on March 16, 2005, the plaintiff head, on the ground that the plaintiff headCC met the requirements of the self-employed farmer and that the gift land of this case is grassland not more than 148,500 square meters under the Grassland Act, there is no dispute between the parties concerned. The plaintiff headB was sentenced to a favorable judgment that revoked the imposition disposition of the gift tax of this case on the ground that "the plaintiff head shall be farming children as of January 1, 199." The defendant filed an appeal and appeal against the preceding winning judgment, but all of the appeals were dismissed.

E. On November 19, 2009, the Plaintiff headB invested in kind the sum of 112,739 square meters in ○○○-dong, ○○○○-dong, and 448-12, and the aggregate of 12,739 square meters in ○○-si, ○○-si (including the instant donated land); Plaintiff headA made an investment in kind with the sum of 22,826 square meters in 449-13 and 465-4 land of the same 465-4 land and 1280 square meters in Do to the agricultural company DDD company (hereinafter “the instant invested land”).

F. The Plaintiffs filed an application for exemption of capital gains tax on the basis of Article 68(2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act [Article 68(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Act No. 9921, Jan. 1, 2010; hereinafter “former Restriction of Special Taxation Act”) [Article 68(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Act No. 9921, Jan. 1, 2010; hereinafter “former Restriction of Special Taxation”) [Article 6

G. On November 15, 2012, the Daejeon Regional Tax Office notified the Plaintiff headB of each taxation notice of ○○○○○○○, Plaintiff headCC, on the ground that “The instant invested land was not subject to permission for the development of grassland under the Grassland Act, and thus cannot be deemed grassland under the Grassland Act” (including additional tax) and notified the Plaintiff headB of each taxation notice of ○○○○○, Plaintiff headCC, ○○○○, and Plaintiff headCC. The Plaintiff headB notified the Plaintiff headB of each pre-announcement notice of gift tax (including additional tax) on the gift tax of the instant donated land.

H. With respect to the transfer income tax (including additional tax) and gift tax (including additional tax), the Plaintiff headB filed a request for pre-assessment review on the transfer income tax (including additional tax), respectively. On March 22, 2013, the Commissioner of the National Tax Service rendered a decision to partially adopt the gift tax and the gift tax (including additional tax) among the transfer income tax (including additional tax) and the Plaintiff headB, respectively. The reasons for the partial adoption decision made by the Commissioner of the National Tax Service to the headB are as follows.

① Part of the gift land of this case among transfer income tax (including additional tax)

In relation to the imposition of the gift tax of this case, the defendant expressed the public view that the land of this case is grassland under the Grassland because the land of this case is subject to exemption of capital gains tax under Article 68 (2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act on the ground that there is no dispute with the plaintiff headB, and the public opinion statement of this public opinion shows that the trust of the plaintiff headB falls under the trust value because there is no cause attributable to the plaintiff headB. Based on such trust value, the plaintiff headB made an investment in kind in the agricultural company with the knowledge that the land of this case is subject to exemption of capital gains tax under Article 68 (2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act on the ground that the trust of the land of this case at the time of investment in kind by the plaintiff headB is worth protecting the land of this case without going through separate procedures for permission for creation of grassland under the Grassland.

(2) Gift tax (including additional tax)

In the preceding winning judgment, since there was no dispute over the fact that the instant donated land was grassland, it was judged that all the causes and sources were added to the single taxable unit that was subject to the taxation at the time. The imposition of gift tax in this case was not a grassland at this time on the case for which the final and conclusive judgment was rendered that the gift tax in this case was unlawful, and applying the same provision on the same land to the Plaintiff headB may be deemed a re-disposition contrary to the binding force, and the administrative disposition in violation of the binding force of the final and conclusive judgment may be deemed a significant and apparent defect and thus be deemed null and void.

I. The Defendant accepted a decision by the Commissioner of the National Tax Service on partial adoption of the capital gains tax (including additional tax) accrued in 2009 on April 2, 2013, based on the investment in kind in the land other than the instant gift land (hereinafter referred to as “the instant land”). On April 2, 2013, the Defendant issued to the head of the Plaintiff notice on the reduction of the capital gains tax (including the additional tax) accrued in 2009 to the Plaintiff head B, the notice on the reduction of the capital gains tax (including the additional tax) accrued in 2009 to the Plaintiff head of the Plaintiff on the reduction of the capital gains tax (including the additional tax) accrued in 209 to the Plaintiff head of theCC on the reduction of the increase of the capital gains tax (including the additional tax) accrued in 209 to the Plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as “the instant disposition”).

(j) The key land of this case constitutes “land used for cultivating a multi-life improved grassland, and land for crops, and wooden roads, access roads, livestock pens, and incidental facilities prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries” as prescribed by subparagraph 1 of Article 2 of the former Grassland Act (amended by Act No. 10243, Apr. 12, 2010; hereinafter “former Grassland”), but there was no permission to create grassland under Article 5 of the same Act for the key land of this case.

[Ground of Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1 through 8, Gap evidence 9-2, 3, Gap evidence 16, 17, Gap evidence 18-1 through 4, Eul evidence 1-1 through 3, Eul evidence 3 and 6, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiffs' assertion

For the following reasons, the instant disposition is unconstitutional and illegal.

(1) grassland under Article 68(2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act

In light of the language, legislative purpose and purport of Article 68(2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act, farmland under Article 68(2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act, balance with fishing land under Article 67(4) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act, contents of the amended Grassland Act, the principle of strict interpretation of the principle of no taxation without the law without the law, and possibility of social confusion, etc., " grassland pursuant to the Grassland Act" under Articles 66(4) and 68(2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act is sufficient if the definition of grassland under Article 2(1) of the former Grassland Act is defined, and permission for the creation of grassland is not necessary. The issue

(2) Violation of tax equality principle

Article 68 (2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act is a provision for strengthening the competitiveness of domestic livestock raisers, and Article 5 of the former Grassland Act is a provision for preventing reckless development due to the development of grassland, and in light of this purpose, there is no reasonable ground to discriminate against the investment in kind of grassland for which permission for the development of grassland is obtained or the investment in kind of grassland without permission for the development of grassland

If a person who invests in kind farmland actually uses farmland for agriculture regardless of whether he/she has obtained certification of qualification for acquisition of farmland under the Farmland Act, it is against the owner of the farmland and the owner of the grassland on the sole ground that he/she was not granted permission at the stage of creation even if the farmland was actually used in the livestock industry.

A person who owns a fishing land under the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act grants preference to tax reduction and exemption only if it is actually used in the livestock industry, and imposes a tax on the ground that it was not permitted at the stage of creation of the livestock industry is discrimination between the owner of the fishing land and the owner of the grassland not permitted for creation of the grassland without reasonable grounds.

(3) Violation of the principle of substantial taxation

If the grassland was actually created and used as grassland regardless of whether the permission for the creation of grassland was obtained according to the principle of substantial taxation, it constitutes grassland under the Grassland Act to which the transfer income tax is reduced. The key land of this case is being substantially created and used as grassland.

(4) Violation of the principle of trust protection.

In a lawsuit seeking revocation of the disposition of gift tax of this case, the tax office expressed the public opinion that the gift land of this case constitutes grassland under the Grassland. In light of the fact that the gift land of this case and the land at this case are used as all sites for stock farms, there is no boundary classification by boundary marks, etc., and that the land cannot be identified as the land, there is a public opinion indication that the land at this case constitutes grassland. The plaintiffs' trust in the name of public opinion indication is worthy of protection because there is no reason attributable to it. Based on such trust, the plaintiffs made an investment in kind to an agricultural company without following a separate permission procedure for grassland development with the knowledge that the land at this case falls under grassland under the grassland under the Grassland Act. The imposition of capital gains tax on the land at this issue is unlawful against the principle of trust protection.

(5) Farmland of Article 68(2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act

The key land of this case constitutes farmland under the Farmland Act and constitutes farmland under Article 68 (2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act.

(b) Related statutes;

It is as shown in the attached Form.

C. Determination

(1) Whether Article 68(2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act is grassland

(A) In light of the principle of no taxation without law, or the requirements for tax exemption or exemption, the interpretation of tax laws shall be interpreted as the text of the law, barring any special circumstance, and it shall not be extensively interpreted or analogically interpreted without reasonable cause (see Supreme Court Decision 97Nu4173, Oct. 24, 1997). In particular, it accords with the principle of fair taxation to strictly interpret that the provisions that are clearly preferential in terms of the requirements for tax exemption or exemption are clearly considered as a provision of tax exemption or exemption (see Supreme Court Decision 97Nu20090, Mar. 27, 1998).

(B) Article 66 (4) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act provides that " Grassland pursuant to the Grassland (hereinafter referred to as "the grassland") is "the grassland pursuant to the Grassland Act" and Article 68 (2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act also refers to "the grassland pursuant to the Grassland Act".

The definition of grassland under Article 2 subparagraph 1 of the former Grassland Act does not correspond to the same provision because it is defined as grassland according to the purpose of use of the land and its use condition. If a person intends to use the land as grassland under Article 5 subparagraph 1 of the former Grassland Act, land for which permission for grassland development is not obtained under Article 5 of the former Grassland Act can not be deemed as being illegally created in violation of the former Grassland Act. ② Farmland under Article 68 (2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act is subject to various regulations for conservation of farmland such as restriction on its use under the Farmland Act, but it is not subject to the legislation of Article 68 (2) of the former Grassland Act, which is not subject to the provision of Article 5 (2) of the former Grassland Act.

Therefore, since the land at issue of this case is not subject to permission to create grassland, it is not subject to grassland under the Grassland Act, and it does not fall under grassland under Article 68 (2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act.

(2) Whether the principle of tax equality is violated

(A) The principle of tax equality is a principle that the imposition and collection of taxes must be conducted fairly and equally in conformity with the taxpayer’s ability to pay taxes, and that discrimination or preferential treatment should not be permitted against a specific taxpayer without reasonable grounds. Moreover, even in the case of preferential treatment of tax reduction and exemption, if it is deemed that taking measures only for a specific taxpayer is remarkably unreasonable and unfair, it would be unconstitutional against the principle of tax equality. However, in the legislative purpose of granting benefits of tax reduction and exemption, determination of the scope in light of the legislative purpose, fairness of taxation, etc. is within the broad discretion of the legislators, and it cannot be readily concluded that such determination is unconstitutional unless it is deemed that the legislative purpose of granting benefits of tax reduction and exemption belongs to the broad discretion of the legislators and clearly deviates from the discretionary scope. Meanwhile, remaining tax preferential measures would result in the tax burden of a specific taxpayer subject to tax reduction and exemption to the other taxpayers, and thus, it would be contrary to the ideology of tax equality, and thus, it would be reasonable that the legislators should have made a progressive decision on the scope of tax exemption and exemption within 20 percent (see 20).

(B) In light of the above interpretation, Article 67(4) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act provides that the investment in kind of land for fisheries shall be exempted from capital gains tax pursuant to the aforementioned interpretation, and Article 68(2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act provides that the investment in kind of grassland and the investment in kind of farmland shall be exempted from capital gains tax. However, the investment in kind of grassland created without obtaining permission for the development of grassland does not stipulate that the investment in kind of grassland shall be exempted from capital gains tax. However, in farmland and fisheries land, there is no procedure for the development permission differently from grassland, and the legislators cannot be said to have a duty to regulate the illegally created grassland identical to the farmland, fishing land, and lawfully developed grassland. Rather, in light of the fact that Article 68(2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act does not stipulate the investment in kind of grassland created without permission for the development of grassland as the object of exemption from capital gains tax, and thus, it cannot be deemed that there is a substantial unreasonable and unfair measure, as long as the Plaintiffs fail to meet the legal requirements for tax reduction and exemption.

(3) Whether the substance over form principle is violated

As seen earlier, the grassland under Article 68(2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act requires the permission to create grassland under Article 5 of the former Grassland Act. Since the instant land does not fall under the grassland under Article 68(2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act, and the instant land does not fall under the grassland under Article 68(2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act, and is actually being created and used as grassland, the instant disposition cannot be deemed to violate

(4) Violation of the principle of trust protection.

The preceding favorable judgment is related to the imposition of gift tax of this case on the ground of the gift of this case on the ground of the gift of this case, and only the fact that the gift land of this case constitutes grassland under Article 58 (1) 1 (b) of the former Early Reduction and Exemption Act is not disputed between the parties concerned, and it is irrelevant to whether the land at issue of this case constitutes grassland under Article 68 (2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act. Unless the existence of a public statement of opinion is acknowledged that the land at issue of this case falls under grassland under grassland under Article 68 (2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act, the disposition at issue of this case cannot be deemed to violate

(5) Whether Article 68(2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act is farmland

Since Article 63(5) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 21835, Nov. 20, 2009) limits the farmland exempted from capital gains tax to the whole and the part of the paddy field pursuant to Article 68(2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act, land other than the previous and paddy field does not constitute farmland under Article 68(2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act. The key land of this case is land falling under Article 2 subparag. 1 of the former Grassland Act, which is a stock farm site, and cannot be seen as a transfer and the answer, and thus does not constitute farmland under Article 68(2) of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Du4462, Feb. 22,

(6) Sub-committee

Therefore, the plaintiffs' assertion is without merit, and the disposition of this case is legitimate.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims are dismissed in entirety as it is without merit. It is so ordered as per Disposition.

shall be ruled.