Permanent Yellow Co., Ltd. and one other (Law Firm Maritime Affairs, Attorneys Hong-seok et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Simsan Incorporated Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Square, Attorneys Hong-seok et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant)

September 29, 2016

Suwon District Court Decision 2013Guhap9817 Decided January 20, 2016

1. The part of the judgment of the court of first instance against the plaintiffs, which orders additional payment, shall be revoked.

The defendant shall pay 305,657,043 won to the branch of the Silgum Pung, that is, 1,447,00,168 won, and 305,657,043 won and 15% interest per annum from September 22, 2012 to November 3, 2016 and from the next day to the date of full payment of all the above amounts to the Silgum P, that is, 305,657,043 won and each of the above amounts.

2. The plaintiffs' remaining appeals and the defendant's appeals are dismissed, respectively.

3. Of the total litigation costs, 50% of the portion arising between the Plaintiff and the Defendant’s Permanent Yellow Co., Ltd. shall be borne by the said Plaintiff, the remainder by the Defendant, respectively, and 10% of the portion arising between the Plaintiff’s Permanent Yellow Co., Ltd. and the Defendant’s Permanent Yellow Co., Ltd., and the remainder by the said Plaintiff, respectively.

4. The part ordering a payment of money under paragraph (1) may be provisionally executed.

1. Purport of claim

From September 22, 2012 to the service date of a copy of the application for modification of the purport and cause of the instant claim from September 22, 2012 to the service date of a copy of the application for modification to the purport of the claim and cause of the instant claim from September 22, 2012, the Defendant shall pay 3,807,55,543 won to the clan of the Permanent Yellow Colon of the Plaintiff, and 15% per annum to the date of complete payment from the next day to the date of complete payment.

2. Purport of appeal

A. The plaintiffs

The portion of the judgment of the court of first instance against the plaintiffs falling under the order to pay below shall be revoked. The defendant shall pay to the branch of the court of first instance 3,209,778,425 won, to the branch of the court of first instance, and to the branch of the court of first instance 330,494,743 won and each of the above amounts shall be 5% per annum from September 22, 2012 to November 13, 2015, and 15% per annum from the next day to the day of full payment.

B. Defendant

The part of the judgment of the court of first instance against the defendant shall be revoked, and the plaintiffs' claims corresponding to the above revocation shall be dismissed.

1. Details of ruling;

(a) Designation of an industrial complex, and approval of a development plan and implementation plan;

- Business name: Pyeongtaek Sheet General Industrial Complex Development Project (hereinafter referred to as the “instant project”).

- Notice: Gyeonggi-do Notice No. 2008-128, February 26, 2010, Gyeonggi-do Notice No. 2010-54, May 2, 2008

- Project operator: Mayang C&C Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Mayang C&C”);

B. The ruling of expropriation by the Gyeonggi-do Regional Land Tribunal on August 23, 2010 (hereinafter “the first adjudication of expropriation”)

- On January 29, 2010, the Plaintiffs filed an application for adjudication of expropriation with the Korea Land Tribunal on Mayang-si, and Mayang-si, April 12, 2010, filed an application for adjudication of expropriation with the Korea Land Tribunal on Mayang-do.

- Land to be expropriated: Land listed in the [Attachment 1] List owned by the Plaintiffs (hereinafter “instant land”).

- Compensation amount of loss: 1,782,042,50 won for the Residential Yellow Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the “Plaintiff’s clan”) and for the Residential Yellow Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the “Plaintiff’s clan”) 7,882,042,50 won for the Residential Yellow Co., Ltd.

- Commencement date of expropriation: September 23, 2010

(c)Invalidation of the primary expropriation ruling, and modification of a development plan and implementation plan;

1) Mayang C&C failed to pay or deposit compensation by the date of commencement of the first expropriation ruling. Accordingly, the first expropriation ruling becomes void pursuant to Article 42(1) of the Act on Acquisition of and Compensation for Land, etc. for Public Works Projects (hereinafter “Land Compensation Act”).

2) After that, the operator of the instant project changed the development plan and the implementation plan of Pyeongtaek-si on July 28, 201 (No. 2011-200 of the Gyeonggi-do Notice) from the friendly cream to the Defendant and the method of development from the private development to the private joint development.

D. Adjudication on expropriation by the Gyeonggi-do Regional Land Tribunal on July 24, 2012 (hereinafter “instant adjudication on expropriation”).

- The defendant applies for adjudication of expropriation to the Gyeonggi-do Regional Land Tribunal on January 30, 2012

- The amount of compensation for losses from the land of this case: 8,682,01,006 won for the clans of the plaintiff and 2,056,125,000 won for the clans of the plaintiff;

- Dismissal of an application for adjudication claiming compensation for losses equivalent to the additional charges for delay under Article 30(3) of the Land Compensation Act, which have been suffered by the plaintiffs since the first expropriation ruling becomes void.

- Commencement date of expropriation: September 21, 2012

- An appraisal corporation: A Pacific appraisal corporation and two appraisal corporations;

(e) Ruling by the Central Land Tribunal on September 26, 2013;

- The amount of compensation for losses from the land of this case: 8,695,171,760 won for the clans of the plaintiff and 2,089,639,000 won for the clans of the plaintiff;

- An appraisal corporation: the Korea Appraisal Board and the Central Appraisal Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the “appraisaler for adjudication,” including an appraiser for adjudication of expropriation, and the result of the appraisal is referred to as “the result of appraisal of adjudication”).

【Ground of recognition】 The fact that there is no dispute, Gap’s 1 through 5, 13, Eul’s 1 through 3, 5, and 6(including branch numbers), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The plaintiffs' assertion

A. Claim to increase compensation for the instant land

1) An appraisal appraiser for adjudication calculated compensation by evaluating the actual status of use of land (location omitted) as forest land which is the land category of “miscellaneous land, electric field, and orchard” in which the form and quality change was illegally changed from among the land (location omitted) land (hereinafter “land”). However, given that part of the land (location omitted) was reclaimed before June 1961 as “electric field” around 1988, this part should be assessed under the premise of actual use. Since 30,000 square meters of the land among the (location omitted) land is a miscellaneous land form and quality as grassland under the Grassland Act in 1984, it should be assessed under the premise that it is grassland. In addition, since the head of the Si/Gun/Gu did not have any provision governing the temporary use of the land under the premise of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Use of Mountainous Districts and Development (hereinafter “Special Cases Concerning the Use of Farmland”), it should be assessed under the premise that the actual status of use of farmland should be changed from forest land under the same Act.

2) The adjudication appraiser assessed the portion of the land in Pyeongtaek-si (location omitted) which is the “road” as a private road under Article 26(1)2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Land Compensation Act and calculated compensation. However, it is unreasonable to evaluate the said portion of the land as a “de facto private road” solely on the ground that the said portion of the land is either a land incorporated into the Saemaeul road or is actually offered to many and unspecified persons for passage. Therefore, the said portion of the land should be assessed on the premise that it

3) In addition, since the amount of compensation for loss in the adjudication on the land of this case is too underassessment because the individual factors are not reflected properly, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiffs the difference (the plaintiff's clan: 1,624,808,940 won, the plaintiff clan: 24,837,700 won) between the compensation duly calculated according to the appraisal by the court appraiser and the compensation determined in the appraisal by the adjudication.

(b) Claim for payment of additional dues;

According to the invalidation of the first adjudication on expropriation, the application for adjudication on expropriation of friendly U.S. will lose its validity, while it does not lose the validity of the plaintiffs' request for adjudication on expropriation. Thus, a project operator is obligated to apply again for adjudication to the competent Land Tribunal within 60 days from the starting point of counting the day following the date the adjudication became invalidated. Nevertheless, the defendant succeeding to the rights and obligations related to the implementation of the project from Mayang, which is the existing project operator, after the lapse of 60 days from December 15, 201, filed an application for adjudication on expropriation of this case on December 15, 2011. Accordingly, pursuant to Article 30(3) of the Land Compensation Act, the defendant has to pay the plaintiffs the first adjudication on the legitimate compensation from September 25, 2010 to November 25, 2010 to December 15, 2011, to 36:4% of the plaintiff, 206, additional 27:36% of the annual damages calculated by the defendant's request for adjudication on expropriation of this case.

3. Determination

A. Determination on the claim for increase in compensation

1) The determination on the assertion that the portion used as "miscellaneous land, electricity, orchard and grassland" among the land (location omitted) should be calculated on the basis of the actual status of use.

A) Relevant legal principles

Article 70(2) of the Land Compensation Act provides that the amount of compensation for the land shall be calculated by taking into account the actual situation at the time of the price and objective situations based on the general method of use, but it does not take into account temporary use, subjective value of land owners or persons concerned, and the cases premised on the use for special purposes. Article 24 of the Enforcement Rule of the Land Compensation Act provides that the land subject to the alteration of form and quality and quality shall be assessed by considering the current condition at the time of the alteration of the form and quality of the land without obtaining permission or filing a report in accordance with the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes (hereinafter referred to as “illegal alteration of form and quality”). Accordingly, the amount of compensation for the land shall be calculated by the actual use of the land at the time of the alteration of the form and quality. Thus, in order to calculate the amount of compensation by the original use of the land subject to the expropriation or by the current use at the time of the alteration of the form and quality and quality of the land on the ground that it is illegal alteration of the form and quality.

Meanwhile, according to the regulation of the law on the reclamation of land, the category of which is “forest”, or the alteration of the form and quality of the forest, Article 2 of the former Cream Decree (amended by Act No. 10, Jun. 20, 191; Act No. 10, Dec. 27, 1961; Act No. 2 of the Addenda of the Forestry Act enacted by Act No. 881, Dec. 27, 1961; Article 1 subparag. 3 of the former Regulation on the Restriction of Private Forest (wholly amended by Act No. 17, Mar. 17, 193; Act No. 2, Jan. 19, 1962); Article 1 subparag. 2 of the former Forestry Act (amended by Act No. 10681, Jun. 3, 196; Act No. 10681, Mar. 16, 201; Act No. 10685, Jun. 28, 20193).

B) Whether the part used as “miscellaneous land, electric power, and orchard” among the land (location omitted) constitutes a land changing the form and quality of unlawful land

In light of the above legal principles, considering the following circumstances: (a) land category category of land is forest land; (b) land reclamation or change in the form and quality of land has not been permitted by the competent administrative agency for the purpose of clearing land or changing the form and quality of land; (c) first, around 1946 to 1985, most of the above land appears to have been forest land reclamation; (d) land type and quality of land could not have been permitted from 196 to 196 to 196 to 196 to 196 to 196 to 196 to 196 to 196 to 196 to 30 to 196 to 196 to 30 to 196 to 4 to 196 to 19 to 30 to 196 to 19 to 4 to 19 to 19 to 19 to 30 to 19 to 30 to 30 to 30 to 30 to 4 to 19 to 20 to 1 to 16 to 20 to 2 to 30 to 2.

C) Whether “the grassland” should be assessed as “the grassland” inasmuch as the portion of the land, the current status of which is 30,000 square meters, among the land, is miscellaneous, obtained permission to create grassland pursuant to the Grassland Act around 1984 around 1984.

According to the results of the fact-finding on Gap evidence 14 and Pyeongtaek-si of this court, it is recognized that the permission for the creation of grassland was granted to 30,000 square meters of the land ( Address omitted) in 1984, and accordingly, the fact that the grassland was created on part of the ( Address omitted) land was established. However, according to the overall purport of Gap evidence Nos. 15 and 20, since the general use status of the above part of the land at the pricing point was limited to "miscellaneous land" rather than "miscellaneous land", the plaintiffs' assertion on the premise that the actual use status of the above part of the land was "the beginning" is without merit ( Address omitted) and there is no evidence to deem that the plaintiff's closing association obtained the permission of the competent administrative agency on the use of the part of the land as miscellaneous land (number omitted) and the current status of the land (number omitted), it cannot be deemed that there was a general use condition or method of use of grassland of this part, which is a 300,000 square meters of the forest land.

D) Whether special provisions prescribed by the Addenda to the Management of Mountainous Districts Act can be applied to the portion used as miscellaneous land, electric power, and orchard among the land (location omitted)

Article 2(1)2 of the Addenda to the Management of Mountainous Districts Act (amended by Act No. 1031, May 31, 2010) provides that where a mountainous district continues to be used for any other purpose for at least five years without due process as at the time the Mountainous Districts Management Act was implemented, a person who uses it for facilities for agriculture, forestry and fishery prescribed by Presidential Decree shall report such fact to the head of the relevant Si/Gun/Gu within one year from the enforcement date of the aforesaid Act, as prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. Article 2(2)4 of the Addenda to the Mountainous Districts Management Act (amended by Act No. 1031) provides that where a mountainous district reported pursuant to paragraph (1) is a mountainous district meeting the standards prescribed by Presidential Decree, such as restrictions on the use of a mountainous district and criteria for permission for conversion of a mountainous district under the aforesaid Act or other Act, the head of the relevant Si/Gun/Gu may take necessary measures to change land category, such as permission for conversion of a mountainous district, and Article 2(2)4).

However, in this case, even if a part of the land (location omitted) is used as miscellaneous land, electric field, or orchard, the Plaintiff’s Order, the owner of the land, does not constitute a person qualified to acquire farmland under the Farmland Act as a non-corporate body, and thus, the said part of the land does not constitute a person subject to the application of the special case on temporary use of mountainous district for illegal use.

Therefore, it is reasonable that the defendant calculated compensation for losses by evaluating the portion of land used as miscellaneous land, electric field, and orchard as forest land at the time of changing the form and quality, and this part of the plaintiffs' assertion is without merit without any further determination.

2) Determination as to the assertion that the part used as “road” among the land (road omitted) should be assessed on the premise that it is a general road site.

A) In order to regard a certain land as a site for a “private road” under Article 26(1)2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Land Compensation Act and to assess the amount of compensation within 1/3 of the appraised value of neighboring land, it must have the substance corresponding to a private road under the Private Road Act by providing it for general traffic, etc. Furthermore, it should fall under any of Article 26(2)1 through 4 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act. Furthermore, “road, the owner of which is unable to restrict another’s traffic by his/her own will” under Article 26(2)2 of the same Enforcement Rule means a case where a private land is naturally and naturally used as a site or a proposed road site and its use is adhered, and thus, it is not legally permitted to restore it to the present state of standardized use, which is anticipated if it is not used as a site. In such a case, it is difficult to determine whether the land has been provided for a large number of unspecified persons for a long time, and it is not a road’s original usage status but its original usage status, etc.

B) According to the statements in Gap evidence Nos. 12 and 19 (including the number of branch numbers), the results of appraisal commission to the appraiser of the court of first instance, and the purport of the entire pleadings, it can be acknowledged that the part of the land owned by the plaintiff's branch is a road for which the residents of ○○○○○ in the 1970s are mobilized and packed, and that the part of the land is deemed to have been used as a road for the use of many unspecified persons since the 1970s because it is connected with the road. According to the above facts, it is not easy to restore the part of the land to its original state due to the high use of the road, and it seems difficult for the plaintiffs to raise objections against the passage of neighboring residents. Thus, the part of the land constitutes a de facto private road as provided in Article 26 of the Enforcement Rule of the Land Compensation Act.

Therefore, it is reasonable for the defendant to evaluate the portion of the land used as the road as the actual private road and calculate the compensation for losses. This part of the plaintiffs' assertion is without merit.

3) Calculation of a reasonable amount of compensation for losses

In a lawsuit concerning the increase or decrease of compensation, in case where the appraisal by each appraisal agency and the appraisal by the court has no illegality in the appraisal method, and the remaining appraisal factors except for the individual assessment factors are different in the appraisal method, but there is a difference in the appraisal result due to a somewhat different relation between the individual assessment factors and the assessment. However, in case where there is no evidence to prove that there is an error in the individual assessment comparison among them, the adoption of any one of the appraisal is recognized as a fair compensation amount unless it is contrary to the logical rule and the empirical rule (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Du4679, Jan. 28, 2005, etc.).

With respect to the instant case, there is no evidence to prove any error in the assessment methods, and there is no evidence to prove any error in the assessment methods. However, since the result of the court appraisal shows that the factors of the characteristics of the instant land and the formation of the price are more appropriately reflected, the compensation price of the instant land shall be calculated according to the result of the court appraisal.

According to the result of the commission of appraisal by the Nonparty of the court of first instance to the Nonparty, the Nonparty (hereinafter “court appraiser”) may recognize the fact that the present condition of the instant land is calculated as indicated in the attached Table 2, in a case where he ascertains the present condition of the instant land as stated in the land protocol prepared by the project operator. Accordingly, according to this, it can be known that the court appraiser calculated the price of the instant land as the amount lower than the compensation stipulated in the ruling on objection. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ assertion based on the premise that the adjudication

B. Determination on the claim for payment of late payment penalty

1) Relevant legal principles

The Industrial Sites Act requires that the Land Compensation Act shall apply mutatis mutandis to cases where a project operator expropriates land, buildings, etc. necessary for an industrial complex development project (Article 22(5)). According to the Land Compensation Act, when an agreement is not reached after a public announcement of project approval, any landowner and person concerned (hereinafter referred to as "land owner, etc.") may request a project operator to file a written application for adjudication, as prescribed by Presidential Decree, and the project operator shall file an application for adjudication with the competent Land Tribunal within 60 days from the date of receipt of such request, as prescribed by Presidential Decree. If a project operator files an application for adjudication after the expiration of the period, the amount calculated by applying the statutory interest rate under Article 3 of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings for the delayed period shall be paid in addition to the compensation adjudicated by the competent Land Tribunal (Article 30(1), (2),

Meanwhile, when a project operator fails to pay or deposit an indemnity adjudicated by the competent Land Tribunal by the commencement date of expropriation, the adjudication becomes void (Article 42(1) of the Land Compensation Act), and a project operator’s application for adjudication also becomes void (see Supreme Court Decision 84Nu158, Mar. 10, 1987). In such cases, a project operator shall apply again for adjudication. In principle, it is not necessary to go through the procedures for consultation with landowners, etc. again. Therefore, if a request for adjudication is filed by a landowner, etc. under Article 30(1) of the Land Compensation Act before the invalidation of adjudication, the adjudication shall be invalidated and within 60 days after the lapse of adjudication, and where such request for adjudication was not made, each application for adjudication shall be filed within 60 days after the date on which the request for adjudication was made under Article 30(1) of the Land Compensation Act after the invalidation of adjudication, and when an application for adjudication is filed after the lapse of such period, additional charges shall be paid to the landowner, etc. under Article 30(3) of the Land Compensation Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2627Du12627, Feb.

2) Whether the Defendant succeeded to the obligation of the Defendant to file an application for adjudication on the instant land from Mayang C&C

In full view of the following circumstances, Gap evidence 6 through 8, Eul evidence 1, Eul evidence 1, 4, 8, and 9 (including branch numbers) and the overall purport of the pleadings, the defendant shall be deemed to have succeeded to the rights and obligations relating to the business of this case from Mayang C, and even if the first ruling of expropriation was invalidated, the plaintiff's claim for adjudication on the land of this case shall not be deemed to have expired. Thus, the defendant, who succeeded to the rights and obligations of the project operator from Mayang C, is obligated to apply for adjudication to the local Land Tribunal of Gyeonggi-do on the land of this case.

A) The land, buildings, etc. necessary for an industrial complex development project can be expropriated (see Article 22(1), (2), and (5) of the Industrial Sites Act). The project approval and the announcement of the project approval related to the instant project are “Man-si Po-si Po-si’s designation and development plan of the general industrial complex” made by the Gyeonggi-do Notice No. 2008-128 on May 2, 2008 and “the announcement of the modification of the development plan and the implementation plan of the general industrial complex” made by the Gyeonggi-do Notice No. 2010-54 on February 26, 2010.

B) On the premise that each of the above Gyeonggi-do notice of May 2, 2008 and February 26, 2010 on July 28, 201 of the Gyeonggi-do Governor’s “Public Notice of Amendment to the Development Plan for the General Industrial Complex” is valid, it is merely a change of a project operator on the premise that the industrial complex development project is implemented by the designation of the authority designating Gyeonggi-do, which is the authority to designate industrial complexes (the Defendant’s change of the project operator of the instant project cannot be deemed as the project approval and the public notice of amendment to the Development Plan and the implementation plan for the General Industrial Complex” as of July 28, 2011, and thus, the Defendant cannot be deemed as having obtained the authority to expropriate land, buildings, etc. necessary for the industrial complex development project under the said public notice.

C) On July 28, 2011, the Governor of the Gyeonggi-do extended the period of development of the industrial complex by determining the “period of development of the industrial complex” as “from November 2007 to July 31, 2013” to “ July 31, 2013.” However, on May 2, 2008 of the Gyeonggi-do’s notification, the period (time) has been maintained as “as of May 2, 2008,” “as of November 2007, 2007,” the “the designation and development plan of the general industrial complex” (if the Defendant did not succeed to the status of the project implementer from Mayangyang C, the period (time) was determined as the project implementer from the time when the Defendant was designated as the project implementer).”

D) On December 8, 2010, the Governor of the Gyeonggi-do sent the reply that “the project implementer under SPC has approved the change,” and at the same time, the execution authority of SPC for the general industrial complex ceases to exist as the initial project implementer for the Postin, and clearly stated that the Defendant’s change of the project implementer would have ceased to exist when the project implementer is changed.

E) Article 5(1) of the Industrial Sites Act provides that “The rights and obligations of a project operator under this Act shall be transferred to a person who succeeds to the project”.

F) Article 16(2) of the Industrial Sites Act provides that, where a project operator fails to complete or is unlikely to complete an industrial complex development project within two years after obtaining approval of an implementation plan, the authority designating industrial complexes may designate another project operator and have him/her execute the relevant industrial complex development project. The above provision is premised on the assumption that a new designated project operator succeeds to the relevant industrial complex development project, as a provision for allowing the authority designating industrial complexes to exclude a project operator lacking capacity to implement an industrial complex development and to promptly implement an industrial complex development by designating another

G) The amendment of the development plan and implementation plan of July 28, 201, as the project implementer changed the method of development from the U.S. to the Defendant from the U.S. development to the public-private partnership development. However, there is a difference in the fact that the Pyeongtaek-si Urban Corporation at the time of the establishment of the Defendant participated in part of the industrial site to the Defendant’s shareholder (20% in the ratio), and that the entire industrial site should be sold to the end-user without directly using part of the industrial site created by the Defendant, and there is no change in the essential contents of the instant project, such as the fact that the business implementer attracts the manufacturing business of metal processed products by creating an industrial complex in the U.S. P. Do ○-Eup and the

H) Although the term “property acquisition agreement and debt acquisition agreement” entered into between Mayang C and the Defendant stipulates that only the obligation stipulated in Article 2(1) of the above contract shall be assumed by the Defendant (Article 2(2)), the above contract is concluded for the purpose of establishing the legal relationship between the Defendant and Mayang C in order to acquire the right owned by Mayang C with respect to the instant business from Mayang C, and thus, notwithstanding Article 5(1) of the Land Compensation Act and Article 16(2) of the Industrial Sites Act, it cannot be deemed that the Defendant did not succeed to the obligation of Mayang C as the project operator on the grounds of the above contractual provisions.

I) Although a project operator could apply for a ruling at any time during the project period stipulated in an industrial complex development plan (Article 22(3) of the Industrial Sites Act), the project operator changed the project implementation method from the private development method under Article 16(1)3 of the Industrial Sites Act to the private joint development method under Article 16(1)4 of the same Act.

I) Considering that the obligation to pay additional charges for the application for delay of a ruling, which ought to be borne solely by the Defendant, is contrary to the principle of fairness (and even so, Maw-C holds 49.8% of the shares issued by the Defendant, and in fact, Maw-Cin continues to implement the instant business through the Defendant.)

(iii)the calculation of additional charges;

On January 29, 2010, the plaintiffs filed an application for adjudication of expropriation in Mayang, and Mayang filed an application for adjudication of expropriation on April 12, 2010, and the first adjudication of expropriation was invalidated on September 24, 2010, which is the day following the first adjudication of expropriation.

Therefore, Mayang's first expropriation ruling is within 60 days from the time when the first expropriation ruling became invalidated until November 23, 2010.

Although the competent Land Tribunal had filed an application for a new adjudication on expropriation, the Defendant, who succeeded to the rights and obligations of the project implementer as the project implementer in relation to the instant project from Mayang, filed an application for the adjudication on expropriation of the instant case on January 30, 2012, barring special circumstances, is obligated to pay to the Plaintiffs additional charges calculated at the rate of 20% per annum for the period from November 25, 2010 to January 29, 2012, which is the day before the date of the first adjudication on expropriation of the instant case, as requested by the Plaintiffs, after the date of invalidation of the first adjudication on expropriation of the instant amount of the instant adjudication on expropriation of the instant case.

The Defendant asserts to the effect that “The time difference between the time when the right to implement the instant development project against the Defendant was extinguished and the designation of the operator of the instant development project against the Defendant is eight months different from the time when the right to implement the instant development project against the Defendant was extinguished, so it cannot be deemed that the Defendant succeeded to the rights and duties of the project operator with respect to the instant project from the Mayang C, and the Defendant was unable to file an application for adjudication for the said eight months.” However, as seen earlier, the Defendant may be deemed to have succeeded to the rights and duties of the project operator with respect to the instant project from the Mayang C, and the Governor of the Gyeonggi-do succeeded to the rights and duties of the project operator with respect to the instant project from the Mayang C, and the Governor of the Gyeonggi-do granted the Defendant the right to implement the instant project at the same time (see subparagraph 1-3 and subparagraph 8-8 of the evidence No. 1-3), and the Defendant’s assertion on the premise other than the foregoing is without merit.

Therefore, the defendant shall pay additional charges to the plaintiffs regarding the amount of compensation for expropriation of this case (the "compensation adjudicated by the competent Land Tribunal" under Article 30 (3) of the Land Compensation Act, and the above provision is not prepared to compensate for losses caused by expropriation of land, etc., since it was not prepared to compensate for losses caused by delayed expropriation. Thus, the increased portion according to the adjudication is not subject to the compensation). As to the above, Article 3 (1) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning Expedition, etc. of Legal Proceedings for 431 days, which is the number of delayed filing of the application for adjudication for expropriation, and Article 3 (1) of the Addenda of the Act on Special Cases Concerning Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings (amended by Presidential Decree No. 26553, Sep. 25, 2015) concerning statutory interest rate under the main sentence of Article 3 (1) of the former Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings (amended by Presidential Decree No. 26553, Sep. 25, 2015).

C. Sub-committee

Therefore, the defendant is obligated to pay to the plaintiff's clan 2,04,77,286 won (=8,682,01,006 won x 20% per annum x 431/366 days x less than won; hereinafter the same shall apply), 447,226,305 won [484,256,762 won [2,056,125,000 won x 20% per annum x 447,226,305 won per annum 4366 days] and damages for delay calculated as follows] as requested by the plaintiff's clan to the plaintiff's clan.

1) Plaintiff’s affiliated association

A) As regards KRW 597,77,118 cited in the first instance trial, 5% per annum under the Civil Act and 15% per annum under the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the following day to the date of full payment, which is the date of the first instance judgment, which is deemed reasonable for the Defendant to resist the existence and scope of the obligation from September 22, 2012, which is the date following the date of the date of the first instance judgment to January 20, 2016, which is the date of adjudication of the first instance court, and which

B) With respect to KRW 1,447,00,168, which is recognized additionally in the trial of the party, 5% per annum as stipulated in the Civil Act until November 3, 2016, and 15% per annum as stipulated in the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings, which is the date following the date of the commencement of the confinement in this case, for the defendant's objection to the existence and scope of his/her obligation, from September 22, 2012 to November 3, 2016, and for the next day to the date of full payment

2) Plaintiff clans

A) As regards KRW 141,569,262 cited in the first instance trial, 5% per annum under the Civil Act and 15% per annum under the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the following day to the date of full payment, which is the date of the first instance judgment, which is deemed reasonable for the Defendant to resist the existence and scope of the obligation from September 22, 2012, which is the date following the date of the date of the first instance judgment to January 20, 2016, which is the date of adjudication of the first instance court, and

B) With respect to KRW 305,657,043, which is additionally recognized at the trial of the party, 5% per annum under the Civil Act and 15% per annum under the Special Act on the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings from September 22, 2012 to November 3, 2016, which is the day following the date of the commencement of the expropriation of this case, deemed reasonable for the defendant to resist the existence and scope of the obligation.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the part within the above-mentioned scope of the plaintiffs' claim shall be quoted for the reasons and the remaining part shall be dismissed for the lack of reasons. The part against the plaintiffs as to additional money (Plaintiff's clan: 1,447,00,168 won, Plaintiff clan: 305,657,043 won) and damages for delay in the trial of the court of first instance against the plaintiffs shall be unfair in conclusion. Thus, the above part shall be revoked and the above part shall be ordered to pay the above amount. The remaining part shall be justified in conclusion, and the plaintiffs' remaining appeal and the defendant's appeal as to this part shall be dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.

[Attachment]

Judges Kim Jong-ju (Presiding Judge)

1) From the private development method under Article 16(1)3 of the Industrial Sites Act to the private joint development method under Article 16(1)4 of the same Act.

Note 2) up to November 23, 2010.