[1] Whether land expropriated by a local government prior to the enactment of the former Local Finance Act is administrative property (affirmative)

[2] Whether the expression of intent to discontinue the use of administrative property can be deemed to have existed solely on the fact that administrative property is in a state that is not provided for its original purpose (negative)

[1] Before the enactment of the former Local Finance Act (amended by Act No. 1443, Nov. 11, 1963; Act No. 4006, Apr. 6, 198); the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Finance Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 1605, Jan. 15, 1964; Presidential Decree No. 5277, Aug. 20, 1970) and the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Finance Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 5277, Jan. 15, 1964), a local government expropriates a parcel of land for the purpose of using it as a road site; the remaining part is planned to be used as a road site for the extension of the road; the land is a public property that the local government directly determines to use for public use, and thus, is not subject to the prescriptive acquisition.

[2] Although an expression of intent to abolish the administrative property for public use is not only an express expression of intent, but also an implied expression of intent, it cannot be deemed that the office of administration has expressed its intent to discontinue the use solely on the fact that the administrative property is in a state where it is not provided for its original purpose.

[1] Article 245(1) of the Civil Act; Article 56(2) of the former Local Finance Act (amended by Act No. 4006 of Apr. 6, 198); Article 59(2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Finance Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 5277 of Aug. 20, 1970) / [2] Article 72(2) of the Local Finance Act; Article 78(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Finance Act; Article 245(1) of the Civil Act

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 93Da5620 delivered on March 22, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 1314), Supreme Court Decision 94Da12579 delivered on September 13, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 2634) / [1] Supreme Court Decision 69Da418, 419, 420 delivered on July 8, 196 (No17-2, 288), Supreme Court Decision 93Da23442 delivered on May 10, 1994 (Gong194Sang, 1636) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 95Da52383 delivered on May 28, 1996 (Gong196Ha, 196Ha, 197) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 196Da53975 delivered on May 25, 1996

Lee Sung-sung et al. (Attorneys Kim Young-chul et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul Special Metropolitan City (red Law Firm, Attorneys Ansan-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 94Na3737 delivered on July 5, 1995

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

Article 56(2) of the former Local Finance Act (amended by Act No. 1443, Nov. 11, 1963; Act No. 4006, Apr. 6, 198); Article 56(2) of the former Local Finance Act (amended by Act No. 1443, Nov. 1, 1964; Act No. 4006, Apr. 6, 198; Act No. 59(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Finance Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 1605, Jan. 15, 1964); Article 59(1) of the former Local Finance Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 1605, Jan. 15, 1964; Act No. 11943, Apr. 2, 1964; Act No. 2010, Apr. 2, 200>

However, on December 20, 1961, the court below acknowledged the fact that the defendant, on the basis of the evidence, expropriated the land of 380 4 to 1,210 square meters from the Kandong, Mapo-gu, Seoul Foundation for the purpose of using it in a road site. After then, the above land was divided into 17,18 3 lots of land as the land in this case and completed the construction of the second line for the land of the same 17 lots of land, and the remaining land of the same 18 lots of land as the land in this case was extended to 25 meters in the long-term street, the court below did not err in the misapprehension of the rules of evidence in finding facts as above. The court below did not err in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to property directly used for the public purpose, as administrative property under the provisions of the former Local Finance Act, and there were no errors in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to property for the purpose of public use.

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

Although the expression of intent to abolish the administrative property for public use is not only explicitly expressed but also implied expression of intention, it cannot be deemed that there was an expression of intent to abolish the administrative property for public use solely based on the fact that the administrative property is not provided for its original purpose (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 93Da56220, Mar. 22, 1994; 95Da52383, May 28, 1996; 95Da52352, Sept. 6, 1996). The lower court’s determination that the Defendant cannot be deemed to have implicitly discontinued the land of this case is justifiable as it is in accordance with the above legal doctrine. There is no reason to discuss this issue.

3. Regarding ground of appeal No. 3

The issue is that: (a) it is invalid against the excessive prohibition principle, the good faith principle, and the prohibition of abuse of rights; and (b) it is already invalidated by the principle of forfeiture of rights; (c) however, it cannot be a legitimate ground for appeal as a new argument that did not reach the conclusion of argument at the lower court.

4. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jeong Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)