(a) Where a road becomes administrative property;

(b) The case holding that it does not serve as administrative property only on the designation of land categories, determination of urban planning and cadastral approval of roads, or on the designation of state property management office;

(c) Where school facilities become administrative property;

(d) Where the State has changed its land category into a school site and has left it unattended for a long time without using it, the case holding that it is not administrative property;

A. An artificial property, such as a road, for public use, is designated by a law or determined to be used as an administrative disposition, or is actually used as an administrative property. A road shall have the form of a road. A road shall have the same type as a road, and a road zone shall be determined and publicly announced, and a road shall have the act of opening the public use as a public object from the time it was constructed through the procedure prescribed by the Urban Planning Act or from the time it was determined and publicly announced as a road

(b) The case holding that, in a case where only a decision of urban planning and a cadastral approval of a road was made with respect to the land, and the relevant urban planning project was implemented or no land was used for the natural air, it cannot be said that there had yet to be an act of commencing public use solely on the ground that there was no act of designating a land category, the determination of urban planning and the public notice of cadastral approval,

(c) In order to become an administrative property that is an artificial public property, cases designated as a school site under statutes, cases determined to be used as a school site within one year due to an administrative disposition, or cases falling under any of cases where it is actually used as a school site;

(d) The case holding that, in case where the State designates the management agency of the land as a literature delivery from 17 years to 13 years after changing the land category into a school site, and there is no specific plan to use the land as a school site even though it has yet to use the land as a school site even after 13 years have passed since the land category was changed into a school site, it cannot be viewed as an "cases where the management agency designates the relevant land as a delivery form and has decided to use it as a school site within 1 year from the land category changed from its land category to its land category as a school site" as referred to in subparagraph (c).

(a)(c)Article 4(2) of the State Property Act, Article 2(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the State Property Act, Articles 12 and 13 of the Urban Planning Act;

A.C. Supreme Court Decision 94Da12579 delivered on September 13, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 2634), 95Da18956 delivered on September 15, 1995 (Gong1995Ha, 3396). Supreme Court Decision 94Da18195 delivered on February 24, 1995 (Gong195Sang, 1427), 94Da6082 delivered on April 28, 1995 (Gong195Sang, 1971). Supreme Court Decision 93Da42658 delivered on April 28, 1995 (Gong195Sang, 195Sang, 19555)

Attorney Seo-gu, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Korea

Daegu District Court Decision 93Na3606 delivered on July 23, 1993

Of the judgment of the court below, the part concerning (A) part (a) and 76 square meters in the judgment of the court below on the farmland with a road of 169 square meters, shall be reversed, and this part of the case shall be remanded to the Daegu District Court Panel Division.

The remaining appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal dismissed shall be assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court recognized that the Plaintiff’s claim was made on June 24, 1969 on the 16th and 169 square meters (hereinafter “road”). The Plaintiff’s land category was 169 square meters on the 6th and 130 square meters on the 196th and 9th and 130 square meters on the 196th and 196th and later on the 196th and the 196th and later on the 196th and later on the 196th and later on the 196th and later on the 196th and later on the 196th and later on the 19th and later on the 196th and later on the 19th and later on the 19th and later on the 19th and later on the 19th and later on the 19th and later on the 19th and later on the 1st and present 16th and present portion of the Plaintiff’s land ownership.

2. First, we examine the part above (A) land.

According to Article 4(2) of the State Property Act and Article 2(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, administrative property refers to the property that the State has decided to use for public use, public use, or corporate use within one year. Artificial property such as a road shall be an administrative property designated by a statute or determined to be used for public use by an administrative disposition, or where it is actually used as an administrative property. A road shall be in the form of a road. A road shall have the form of a road. A road shall have the road from the time a road is determined and publicly announced as a road zone is determined and publicly announced, or from the time when a road is constructed through the procedure prescribed by the Urban Planning Act (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da12579 delivered on September 13, 199; Supreme Court Decision 94Da18195 delivered on February 24, 195).

However, according to the records, at the time of September 31, 1978, the plaintiff asserted that the prescriptive acquisition of the above part of the land was completed, only the decision of the gold-gu urban planning and the cadastral approval under subparagraph 48 of the Construction Book Notification No. 584 of Sep. 30, 1971, and the Presidential Decree No. 48 of Apr. 4, 1972, but it can be known that the above part of the urban planning project was implemented until the closing of argument in the court below or it was not used as a natural public figure (the defendant does not assert that the urban planning project was implemented). Thus, it cannot be said that there was no public act yet to have been conducted only by the designation of the above land category, the determination of urban planning and the announcement of the cadastral approval, or the designation of the state property management office. Thus, it cannot be said that the above part of the land was an administrative property

Therefore, despite the expiration of the prescriptive acquisition period of 20 years for the above part of the land, the court below rejected the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the above part of the land was already administrative property, which affected the conclusion of the judgment by misapprehending the nature of state property and the legal principles on the classification of state property, which affected the conclusion of the judgment (However, according to the records of this case, the plaintiff asserted only that the plaintiff succeeded to the possession of the non-party 1 and continues to occupy until now, and the above non-party 3 did not assert that the plaintiff succeeded to the possession of the non-party 1 and succeeded to the possession of the above non-party 3, as alleged by the plaintiff, the court below recognized the fact that the non-party 1, the non-party 3, and the plaintiff succeeded to the possession of the above non-party 3 in succession, as alleged by the plaintiff. The court below should first correct this point, and then examine whether the plaintiff can directly file a claim for the registration of ownership transfer against

3. The following shall be considered as to the land above (C) part:

(1) In order to become an administrative property that is a human public property, (1) where a school facility is designated as a school site under Acts and subordinate statutes, (2) where a school site is determined as an administrative disposition within one year, or (3) where a school site is actually used as a school site (see Supreme Court Decision 94Da12579, Sept. 13, 1994; Supreme Court Decision 93Da42658, Apr. 28, 1995).

According to the records, since the land of this case is not yet used as a school site, and there is no material to recognize that the law has been decided to use it as a school site, it does not fall under the above (1), (3) it is clear that it does not fall under the above (1), (17) years from the time when the management agency of the above land was designated as a school site to the time of closing argument in the court below's decision, and (13) years have passed since the land category was changed from the time when the management agency was designated as a school site to the time of closing argument in the court below's decision, and there is no specific plan to use the above land as a school site and there is no specific plan to use it. In light of the fact that the management agency of the above land has designated as a school site as a delivery and the land category was changed from the land category to the school site to the land category, it does not constitute "where it has been decided to use it as a school site within 1 year from the above administrative disposition." Therefore, the court below'

However, according to the statement No. 1 (application for a loan contract of state property and waiver of the prescription benefit) and the testimony of Non-Party 4 of the first instance trial witness, the plaintiff set up and delivered to the head of the Geum National School of Korea, which can be deemed to have been delegated the management of the school site of this case by the defendant on March 14, 191, an application for permission to enter into a loan of state property (application for permission to use) and a letter of waiver of the prescription benefit (Evidence No. 1) with respect to the land of the above Item (C), which shall be deemed to have renounced the prescription benefit (the plaintiff's expression of intent to waive the prescription benefit is made by coercion and it is argued that the delivery of the preparatory document as of September 29, 192 is revoked by coercion, but the testimony of Non-Party 5 of the first instance trial witness, which corresponds to the fact that the above declaration of intention was made by coercion, is not reasonable in light of the fact that

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim concerning the part (C) is groundless because the plaintiff has waived the prescription benefit and has no right to claim ownership transfer registration against the plaintiff, and the decision of the court below that dismissed the claim concerning this part is justified, and the above error of the court below is not affected by the conclusion of the judgment, and eventually, the appeal about this part of the plaintiff is without merit.

4. Therefore, the part concerning the above part of the judgment of the court below concerning the land is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination, and the remaining appeal by the plaintiff is dismissed, and the costs of appeal as to the dismissal of the appeal are assessed against the losing plaintiff. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of

Justices Lee Jae-soo (Presiding Justice)