A. Whether it is reasonable to observe only the remainder of the elements of a trademark, except for the parts indicated with ordinary names or technical marks, among the elements of the trademark, when determining similarity of trademarks

B. Whether the trademark is similar to the trademark

A. Even if there are similar parts between trademarks, the part constituting the essential part shall be deemed not to be a similar trademark unless there is any possibility of misconception or confusion as to the source of goods in the transaction, and if there is any possibility of confusion or confusion as to the source of goods in the transaction as a whole, such part shall not be deemed to be an essential part of a trademark because there is no distinctiveness of the designated goods in the ordinary name or technical mark, etc. among the elements of a trademark, such part shall not be deemed to be

B. Even if the part of “FLAVRS” in the registered trademark is somewhat similar in terms of the cited trademark’s name, that part is “scarsh, scarsh, scarsh, and scarsh,” and its meaning can be senseed in relation to the Ascare, scare, and scarsh, which are the designated goods, and thus, it cannot be an essential part because it constitutes a mark indicating the quality of the designated goods in a common way and cannot be an essential part because it is not appropriate to compare this part with the cited trademark in determining the similarity of two trademarks, and since the remaining parts, other than this part, are remarkably different in terms of the cited trademark, their two trademarks are not similar in full view.

Article 9(1)7 of the former Trademark Act (amended by Act No. 4210 of Jan. 13, 1990) (see current Article 7(1)7)

A. Supreme Court Decision 93Hu1254 delivered on January 28, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 833) 93Hu1094 delivered on February 8, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 1015) 93Hu1919 delivered on August 12, 1994 (Gong194Ha, 2303)

Dongyang et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant-appellee

Cambodia (Attorney Kim Jin-jin, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Korean Intellectual Property Office 92 dated September 15, 1994

The decision of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Korean Intellectual Property Office.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. According to the reasoning of the decision of the court below, the court below judged the similarity between the trademark and the cited trademark registered priorly, and judged that the trademark is referred to as "hullar" or "hullar" by the part of the English text, while the cited trademark is merely referred to as "hullar" as "hullar" as it is in Korean language, and thus, when both trademarks are referred to as "hullar" as "hullar", the two trademarks are identical to the above three sound and the end sound is not identical only when they are collectively referred to as "hul" and "hul", and thus, both trademarks are similar to the two trademarks, and although these diagrams are composed to the registered trademark, they are not considerably composed to offset the similarity between the two trademarks, and eventually, even if their appearance and concept are different, they are similar to the trademark as a whole, and thus, they cannot be exempted from the registered trademark as a whole due to the similarity under Article 16 (1) 4 of the former Trademark Act (amended by Act No. 1013, Jan. 14, 1990). 7).

2. However, even though there are similar parts between trademarks, if there are different parts which form the essential parts and they are so different that there is no possibility of misconception or confusion as to the origin of goods in trade, it shall be deemed that the trademark is not a similar trademark unless there is any possibility of misconception or confusion as to the origin of goods in trade. If the parts indicated in the ordinary name of the designated goods in question or technical marks, etc. are included in the trademark elements, such parts cannot be deemed an essential part of the trademark because there is no distinctiveness of the goods in the trademark, and therefore, it shall be reasonable to observe only the remaining parts in determining the similarity of trademark (see Supreme Court Decisions 93Hu1254, Jan. 28, 1994; 93Hu1094, Feb. 8, 1994; 93Hu1919, Aug

According to the records, even if the part of "FLAVRS" in the registered trademark is somewhat similar in terms of the cited trademark and its name, the part has a unique massage, pattern, and flaco, etc., and in view of the relationship with Ascream, chocolate, etc., the meaning of "scream and flaco, etc., which are the designated goods," and thus, it cannot be an essential part because it constitutes a mark indicating the quality of the designated goods in a common way, and it cannot be an essential part, because it is inappropriate to compare it with the cited trademark in determining the similarity of both trademarks, and since the remaining part, other than this part, is remarkably different in the cited trademark, it cannot be seen as similar to both trademarks as a whole.

Nevertheless, the judgment of the court below that the two trademarks are similar is erroneous in the misunderstanding of legal principles as to the similarity of trademarks, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. Therefore, the arguments assigning this error are with merit

3. Therefore, the decision of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Korean Intellectual Property Office appellant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Ahn Yong-sik (Presiding Justice)