(a) The initial date in reckoning the period for the obligation to use and develop a housing site acquired before the enforcement of the Act on Ownership of the Housing Site;

B. The meaning of the period of the duty to use and develop under the Act on the Ownership of Housing Site and the purport of the special provisions on the calculation of such period

C. In the case of a building site cited in Article 20(1)3 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Site and Article 9-2 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act, whether it is reasonable to extend the period of the duty of use and development to the extent that the circumstance exists

A. In light of the provisions of Articles 2, 10 through 15, and 18 of the Addenda to the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites, the period of time for use and development of the housing site acquired prior to the enforcement of the same Act shall be calculated from the enforcement date of the same Act.

B. The purport of Article 20(1)1 and Article 18 of the same Act, Articles 21 through 21 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13882 of May 10, 1993), which provides that no charge shall be imposed for the compulsory period of use and development between two years, is to grant a grace period for two years so that a person who acquired a housing site exceeding the maximum limit of ownership by a household by permission, etc. for the acquisition of a housing site can use and develop the housing site according to the use plan. Meanwhile, Article 21-2 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides special provisions on the calculation of the compulsory period of use and development, where it is impossible to use and develop a housing site due to objective reasons such as restriction on construction permission, the grace period excluded from the subject of imposition by extending the compulsory period of use and development for the limited period is not listed, but an exceptional provision, and therefore, if it is reasonable to extend the compulsory development period of Article 21-2 of the same Decree, it is not reasonable.

C. In light of the purport of Article 20(1)3 of the Housing Site Ownership Act and Article 9-2 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act and the principle of equity, it is reasonable to extend the period of the duty to use and develop a site in the case of a site, unless there are special circumstances, to deem it reasonable to extend the period of the duty to use and develop the site, and it is reasonable to extend the period of the duty to use and develop the site as long as such circumstances exist.

A. Article 18 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites, Article 2 of the Addenda of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites. Articles 21 and 21-2 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13882 of May 10, 193), Article 20(1)3 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites, Article 9-2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites

B. Supreme Court Decision 94Nu1999 delivered on August 26, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 2543)

[Judgment of the court below]

Attorney Shin-ro, Counsel for the head of Seocho-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government

Seoul High Court Decision 93Gu23246 delivered on April 6, 1994

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The defendant's attorney's grounds of appeal are examined.

1. According to Articles 19 and 20(1)1 and 3 of the Act on the Ownership of Housing Sites (hereinafter “the Act”), an owner of a housing site who does not fall under any of the subparagraphs of Article 16(1) of the Act shall impose a charge for excess ownership (hereinafter “charges”) on the housing site for each household exceeding the upper limit of possession by a household, but the housing site within the obligatory period for use and development under Article 18 of the Act or the housing site ( subparagraph 1) in which it is prohibited or de facto impossible to construct a house in accordance with the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, such as the Building Act and the Urban Planning Act, shall be excluded from the imposition of charges. Article 18(1) of the Act provides that a period of time limit for use and development under Article 16(1) of the Act shall be limited within five years from the date of acquisition, etc. prescribed by the Presidential Decree, but shall not be limited to the obligatory period of use and development under Article 18(2) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Building Permission Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 128, May 18, 1993).

2. In light of the provisions of Articles 2, 10 through 15, and 18 of the Addenda of the Act, the period of time for use and development of the housing site acquired before the enforcement of the Act shall be calculated from the date of enforcement of the Act.

In addition, the purport of the above legislation that no charge shall be imposed during the period of two years is to grant a two-year grace period so that a person who acquired a housing site exceeding the upper limit of the ownership of each household by permission, etc. for the use and development of the housing site can use the housing site according to the use plan. On the other hand, the special provision on calculation of the period of use and development obligation is to guarantee the grace period excluded from the subject of the charge by extending the period of use and development obligation for the limited period if it is impossible to use and develop the housing site due to objective reasons such as restriction on the use permission. In light of the purport of each above provision, the provision of Article 21-2 of the former Enforcement Decree is not limited and listed, but an exemplary provision, and therefore, even if it does not fall under the grounds prescribed in Article 21-2 of the former Enforcement Decree, if there are objective circumstances to deem it reasonable to extend the period of use and development obligation by analogy the purport of the above provision.

In addition, Article 20 (1) 3 of the Act provides that a site excluded from the imposition of charges is a site where the construction of a house is prohibited or is de facto impossible under the Building Act and other relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, such as the Urban Planning Act. Article 9-2 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act provides that a site where construction of a house is de facto impossible under the latter part of Article 20 (1) 3 of the Act shall not be constructed. In light of the purport of the above provision and the principle of equity, unless there are special circumstances, in the case of a site (Article 9-2 (1) 2 of the Enforcement Rule refers to a site within an urban design district as prescribed by the Enforcement Decree of the Urban Planning Act and whose urban design is not publicly announced, it is reasonable to extend the period of the duty to use and develop the site (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 94Nu1999, Aug. 26, 194).

3. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that the Plaintiff owned the instant housing site from January 13, 1982 before the enforcement of the Act, and the daily price, including the instant housing site, was determined and publicly announced as an urban design area on February 4, 1987, but such urban design was determined and publicly announced on August 30, 191. The Defendant did not grant a building permit until the urban design becomes final and conclusive on the ground that construction within the said urban design area should conform to the urban design pursuant to the related Acts and subordinate statutes, such as the Building Act, etc., and that the Plaintiff’s reply to the non-construction price on April 25, 1991, and that the Defendant excluded the above disposition from the imposition standard of imposition on the first 3 housing site from the imposition of the first 9th 7th 7th 1992, which was the first 9th 13th 7th 198, which was the first 9th 7th 198.

The above judgment of the court below is justifiable as it is in accordance with the above legal principles, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles, such as theory of lawsuit. All arguments are without merit.

4. Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed, and all costs of appeal shall be assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Cho Chang-tae (Presiding Justice)