(a) The burden of proving the intention of possession, which is the requirement for the acquisition by prescription;

B. In the case of the above “A”, the degree of proof

(c) The case holding that the presumption of autonomous possession by the military was reversed in light of the fact that the land in dispute was changed to the road category after the procedure for land division, etc. and that the land in dispute was registered as the owner in the new old land ledger installed by the military, and that the third party was also registered in the new old land ledger installed by the military;

A. As to the existence and existence of an intention of possession, which is the requirement for possession by prescription, if the nature of the source of possession right is not clear, it shall be presumed that the possessor has possession as the intention of possession pursuant to Article 197(1) of the Civil Code. Thus, the possessor does not have the responsibility to prove that he/she is the possession by nature of the source of possession right and is responsible to prove it to

B. In the case of the above “A” refers to an intention to exercise exclusive control as if it were one’s own property by removing another’s ownership. Thus, the presumption of possession with autonomy is reversed when objective circumstances are acknowledged that possession cannot be viewed as possessing with the intention to exercise exclusive control as if it were not by possession with a typical title such as superficies, lease on a deposit basis, lease on a deposit basis, etc., but by the intention to exclude another’s ownership and exercise exclusive control as if

C. The case holding that the presumption of possession of autonomy in the military was reversed in light of the fact that the land in dispute was registered as the owner in the new and old land cadastre installed by the military and that the third party was registered as the owner after the procedure of land division, etc. was changed to the road category after the process of land division, etc., and that the land in dispute was registered as the owner in the new and old land cadastre installed by the military.

(b)Article 197(1) and Article 245(a) of the Civil Code; (b) Article 261 of the Civil Procedure Act;

A. (B) Supreme Court Decision 90Da18838 delivered on July 9, 1991 (Gong1991, 2115) 91Da25437 delivered on November 26, 1991 (Gong1992, 290) 92Da11961 delivered on June 23, 1992 (Gong192, 2262). Supreme Court Decision 90Da21381, 21398 delivered on November 13, 1990 (Gong191, 83) 91Da17825 delivered on August 27, 1991 (Gong191, 2430)

Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant)

Busan Cheong-gun

Busan High Court Decision 91Na7132, 91Na7149 decided June 3, 1992

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff).

1. We examine the first ground for appeal.

The gist of the theory of lawsuit is that the court below violated the rules of evidence or erred by misapprehending the legal principles of judicial confession, etc. in denying the fact that the land of this case, which was registered as the plaintiff as owned by the defendant and used as a road by the defendant Gun, was incorporated into the road from 1942. In light of the records, the reasoning of the judgment below is somewhat inconsistent in the contents of the judgment below as to this point. However, it is clear that the court below recognized the fact that the land of this case was used as a road by the defendant Gun from 1942 to 1942 as a fact without dispute between the parties. Thus, there is no reason to criticize the judgment of the court

2. We examine the second ground for appeal.

If the nature of the source of possession right is not clear with respect to the existence or absence of intention of possession as an element of possession with intention of possession under Article 197(1) of the Civil Act, the presumption of possession with intention of possession is reversed (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 90Meu21381, 21398, Nov. 13, 1990; Supreme Court Decision 91Da17825, Aug. 27, 1991; Supreme Court Decision 91Da17825, Aug. 27, 1991).

Examining the evidence admitted by the court below in comparison with the records, the land category of this case was originally changed to the site on April 24, 194, when the defendant Gun used it as a road and occupied it on April 24, 1942. After that, the land category was changed to the road with the land of this case while land category was changed to the road while the land category was changed to the road, and even though the ownership transfer registration was made in the future of the defendant Gun, the land category was changed to the road although the land category was changed to the road while the land category was changed to the road while the land category was changed to the road while the land category was changed to the road. The land category of this case was changed to the road before April 30, 1969 without the ownership transfer registration in the defendant Gun. The land category of this case remains to be owned by the plaintiff without the ownership transfer registration in the old land cadastre as well as the land cadastre kept and managed by the defendant Gun, and it was difficult for the defendant Gun to recognize the change to the land ownership of this case as one of this case.

Therefore, the court below's rejection of the defendant's assertion for the prescriptive acquisition is just and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles like the theory of lawsuit.

3. Ultimately, the appeal is dismissed, and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)