A. The case reversing the judgment of the court below on the ground that it erred in the misapprehension of the purport of the plaintiff's assertion as to the exclusion of application of the General Insurance Clause, which excludes an unforeseen addiction from the accident of a life insurance contract, or in the misapprehension of the judgment of the court below.

(b) where the ordinary insurance terms and conditions exclude the binding force and the binding force between the contracting parties;

A. The case reversing the judgment below by misapprehending the purport of the plaintiff's assertion that "it shall not be applied because the plaintiff's assertion on the exclusion of the general insurance terms and conditions, which excludes the unforeseen addiction from the accident of the life insurance contract, is not that "it shall not be applied since it did not explain the contents of the accident excluded from the accident," but rather that "it shall be excluded from the application since it explained different contents from the general insurance terms and conditions", or neglecting judgment as to the evidence.

B. The binding effect of a general insurance clause on a contracting party is not because it itself is not because it is not due to the fact that it itself is the legal or legal nature of the terms and conditions, but because it was agreed to include the terms and conditions in the terms and conditions. In general, in a case where an insurance clause which includes a general insurance clause among the contracting parties has been made, the binding force of the terms and conditions shall not be ruled out even if the contracting party is unaware of the contents of the terms and conditions, but in a case where it is expressly agreed differently between the

A. Article 193(2)(a) of the Civil Procedure Act

B. Supreme Court Decision 84Meu2543 decided Nov. 26, 1985 (Gong1986,108) (Gong1986,108) decided Oct. 14, 1986 (Gong1986,3028) 88Da4645 decided Mar. 28, 1989 (Gong1989,672)

[Judgment of the court below]

Law Firm Il Life Insurance Co., Ltd., Counsel for defendant-appellee

Seoul High Court Decision 90Na43188 delivered on May 17, 1991

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that the non-party 1 (the deceased), who is the plaintiff's deceased father, entered into the life insurance contract (the non-party 2 insurance contracts) with the non-party 2 (the non-party 2) who is the insurance solicitor of the defendant company on April 14, 198, and the deceased died from sbio sbio germs and liver disease on August 2 of the same year, and that the general insurance contract of this case lists the death of 500% of the principal contract amount due to the disaster, but in the case of the severe sbio sbio sbio sbio sbio sbio sbio sbio sbio sbio sbio sbio sbio sbio sbio sbio sbio sbio sul sul sule sbio scul sul or chine sbio scul s.

2. However, according to the court below's statement 190.14, the non-party's insurance solicitor's statement 5 times as to the non-party's non-party's 99. The non-party's non-party's 5th insurance contract's 19. The non-party's 5th insurance contract's 10,000 insurance premium's 5th insurance premium's 0th insurance premium's 5th insurance premium's 0th insurance premium's 5th insurance premium's 19. The non-party's 5th insurance premium's 0th insurance premium's 0th insurance premium's 19. The non-party's 5th insurance premium's 0th insurance premium's 0th insurance premium's 5th insurance premium's 5th insurance premium's 5th insurance premium's 5th insurance premium's 5th insurance premium's 5th insurance premium's 190,000 won.

3. If the plaintiff's attorney made the above assertion at the court below, and the above precedents were followed, the purport of the argument is that "the exclusion provision of the above standardized contract cannot be applied because the insurance solicitor of the defendant company did not explain the accident excluded from the accident at the time of conclusion of the insurance contract at the time of conclusion of the insurance contract at issue," rather than that "the above exclusion provision of the standardized contract cannot be applied since the insurance solicitor of the defendant company did not explain the accident excluded from the accident". It is reasonable to view that the contents explained at the time of the insurance contract is the content of the insurance contract and the application of the standardized standardized contract which is inconsistent with this is excluded

4. In addition, the binding force of a general insurance clause against a contracting party is not due to the fact that it itself is not due to the fact that the contract itself has the legal or legal nature, but because the parties agreed to include the general insurance clause in the contents of the contract. In general, in a case where an insurance clause which includes the general insurance clause among the parties in the contents of the contract has been made, the binding force of such terms cannot be ruled out even if the contractor does not know the contents of the insurance clause. However, in a case where the contract is explicitly agreed differently between the parties, it should be viewed that the binding force of the terms should be excluded (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 84Meu2543, Nov. 26, 1985; 8Da4645, Mar. 28, 1989). Thus, if the plaintiff's attorney asserted as above in the court below, it should be decided thereon

5. However, in light of the evidence Nos. 2, 3, 4 and evidence Nos. 2, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8 of the above fact-finding, the fact-finding results of the first instance court and the testimony of the non-party Nos. 3 of the first instance court, which are used as evidence of the above fact-finding, and the court below did not reject the plaintiff's testimony of the non-party No. 4 of the first instance court witness who corresponds to the plaintiff's above assertion, it is difficult to view that the court below rejected the plaintiff's attorney's above assertion that "in entering into the insurance contract of this case, the court below did not agree with an explicit special agreement that "the parties to the contract include all food poisoning accidents differently from the terms of the insurance contract"

6. Therefore, the court below erred by misapprehending the purport of the plaintiff's assertion, misunderstanding the judgment, or omitting judgment on evidence, and this affected the conclusion of judgment, and thus, it is reasonable within the scope of this part.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Jae-chul (Presiding Justice)